diff options
| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2020-10-26 13:07:15 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-12-30 11:51:00 +0100 |
| commit | 054be9aed8473ce48076c13f749b2f5fa825c336 (patch) | |
| tree | ca78985211238e94ff04de3c1ac030d9ad8ba802 /crypto | |
| parent | 5a225303a68fd5875f4373f1b848ed005a3bec7f (diff) | |
crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name
commit 92eb6c3060ebe3adf381fd9899451c5b047bb14d upstream.
Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field
stayed at the original 64 bytes.
This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be
defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
(either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an
easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
This addresses the syzbot report
"UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e).
Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/af_alg.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 1d4b0157ee5d..4a2e91baabde 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); - struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr; + struct sockaddr_alg_new *sa = (void *)uaddr; const struct af_alg_type *type; void *private; int err; @@ -155,7 +155,11 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED) return -EINVAL; - if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa)) + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg_new, salg_name) != + offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name) != sizeof(*sa)); + + if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1) return -EINVAL; /* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */ @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) return -EINVAL; sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0; - sa->salg_name[sizeof(sa->salg_name) + addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0; + sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0; type = alg_get_type(sa->salg_type); if (IS_ERR(type) && PTR_ERR(type) == -ENOENT) { |