diff options
| author | Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com> | 2020-04-30 21:32:05 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-06-07 13:18:50 +0200 |
| commit | 1610cd913f5aaae23c6e6eab0e807145e4852b3d (patch) | |
| tree | 46945afcbe6261822e59ba39e6a353fbef79739f /security | |
| parent | 31ca6427f64dd4c05b6725baf2d8c8c445d68b77 (diff) | |
evm: Fix RCU list related warnings
[ Upstream commit 770f60586d2af0590be263f55fd079226313922c ]
This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
[ 32.848432] =============================
[ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[ 32.849308] -----------------------------
[ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list. Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 |
3 files changed, 11 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index cc826c2767a3..fbc2ee6d46fc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm); error = -ENODATA; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { bool is_ima = false; if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index f9a81b187fae..a2c393385db0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0); if (error < 0) { if (error == -ENODATA) @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) struct xattr_list *xattr; namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen) && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) { found = 1; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index c11c1f7b3ddd..0f37ef27268d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; } - /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */ + /* + * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs(). + * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list + * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed + * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding + * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs() + * and evm_protected_xattr(). + */ mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex); list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) { |