diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'services')
-rw-r--r-- | services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c | 98 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c | 678 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c | 1066 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h | 234 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c | 150 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S | 74 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S | 128 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c | 310 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c | 452 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h | 55 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c | 42 |
16 files changed, 3341 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c index 2693e7d1..e5e2be77 100644 --- a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c +++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_common.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ uint64_t opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_context_t *optee_ctx) cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); rc = opteed_enter_sp(&optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx); -#if DEBUG +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS optee_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; #endif diff --git a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c index 599d7a30..483d45b6 100644 --- a/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c +++ b/services/spd/tlkd/tlkd_common.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ uint64_t tlkd_synchronous_sp_entry(tlk_context_t *tlk_ctx) cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); rc = tlkd_enter_sp(&tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx); -#if DEBUG +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS tlk_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; #endif diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c index 1538232f..de54dbe9 100644 --- a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c +++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_common.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ uint64_t tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx) cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); rc = tspd_enter_sp(&tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx); -#if DEBUG +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS tsp_ctx->c_rt_ctx = 0; #endif diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf0e779d --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_event.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <utils.h> +#include "sdei_private.h" + +#define MAP_OFF(_map, _mapping) ((_map) - (_mapping)->map) + +/* + * Get SDEI entry with the given mapping: on success, returns pointer to SDEI + * entry. On error, returns NULL. + * + * Both shared and private maps are stored in single-dimensional array. Private + * event entries are kept for each PE forming a 2D array. + */ +sdei_entry_t *get_event_entry(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_entry_t *cpu_priv_base; + unsigned int idx, base_idx; + + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* + * For a private map, find the index of the mapping in the + * array. + */ + mapping = SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(); + idx = MAP_OFF(map, mapping); + + /* Base of private mappings for this CPU */ + base_idx = plat_my_core_pos() * mapping->num_maps; + cpu_priv_base = &sdei_private_event_table[base_idx]; + + /* + * Return the address of the entry at the same index in the + * per-CPU event entry. + */ + return &cpu_priv_base[idx]; + } else { + mapping = SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING(); + idx = MAP_OFF(map, mapping); + + return &sdei_shared_event_table[idx]; + } +} + +/* + * Find event mapping for a given interrupt number: On success, returns pointer + * to the event mapping. On error, returns NULL. + */ +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map_by_intr(int intr_num, int shared) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int i; + + /* + * Look for a match in private and shared mappings, as requested. This + * is a linear search. However, if the mappings are required to be + * sorted, for large maps, we could consider binary search. + */ + mapping = shared ? SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING() : SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(); + iterate_mapping(mapping, i, map) { + if (map->intr == intr_num) + return map; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Find event mapping for a given event number: On success returns pointer to + * the event mapping. On error, returns NULL. + */ +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map(int ev_num) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int i, j; + + /* + * Iterate through mappings to find a match. This is a linear search. + * However, if the mappings are required to be sorted, for large maps, + * we could consider binary search. + */ + for_each_mapping_type(i, mapping) { + iterate_mapping(mapping, j, map) { + if (map->ev_num == ev_num) + return map; + } + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..42bf46d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c @@ -0,0 +1,678 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <cassert.h> +#include <context_mgmt.h> +#include <debug.h> +#include <ehf.h> +#include <interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <sdei.h> +#include <string.h> +#include "sdei_private.h" + +#define PE_MASKED 1 +#define PE_NOT_MASKED 0 + +/* x0-x17 GPREGS context */ +#define SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS 18 + +/* Maximum preemption nesting levels: Critical priority and Normal priority */ +#define MAX_EVENT_NESTING 2 + +/* Per-CPU SDEI state access macro */ +#define sdei_get_this_pe_state() (&sdei_cpu_state[plat_my_core_pos()]) + +/* Structure to store information about an outstanding dispatch */ +typedef struct sdei_dispatch_context { + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + unsigned int sec_state; + unsigned int intr_raw; + uint64_t x[SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS]; + + /* Exception state registers */ + uint64_t elr_el3; + uint64_t spsr_el3; +} sdei_dispatch_context_t; + +/* Per-CPU SDEI state data */ +typedef struct sdei_cpu_state { + sdei_dispatch_context_t dispatch_stack[MAX_EVENT_NESTING]; + unsigned short stack_top; /* Empty ascending */ + unsigned int pe_masked:1; + unsigned int pending_enables:1; +} sdei_cpu_state_t; + +/* SDEI states for all cores in the system */ +static sdei_cpu_state_t sdei_cpu_state[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT]; + +unsigned int sdei_pe_mask(void) +{ + unsigned int ret; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + /* + * Return value indicates whether this call had any effect in the mask + * status of this PE. + */ + ret = (state->pe_masked ^ PE_MASKED); + state->pe_masked = PE_MASKED; + + return ret; +} + +void sdei_pe_unmask(void) +{ + int i; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + uint64_t my_mpidr = read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK; + + /* + * If there are pending enables, iterate through the private mappings + * and enable those bound maps that are in enabled state. Also, iterate + * through shared mappings and enable interrupts of events that are + * targeted to this PE. + */ + if (state->pending_enables) { + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + if (is_map_bound(map) && GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED)) + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + } + + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + if (is_map_bound(map) && + GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED) && + (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) && + (se->affinity == my_mpidr)) { + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + } + sdei_map_unlock(map); + } + } + + state->pending_enables = 0; + state->pe_masked = PE_NOT_MASKED; +} + +/* Push a dispatch context to the dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *push_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + + /* Cannot have more than max events */ + assert(state->stack_top < MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + disp_ctx = &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top]; + state->stack_top++; + + return disp_ctx; +} + +/* Pop a dispatch context to the dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *pop_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->stack_top == 0) + return NULL; + + assert(state->stack_top <= MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + state->stack_top--; + + return &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top]; +} + +/* Retrieve the context at the top of dispatch stack */ +static sdei_dispatch_context_t *get_outstanding_dispatch(void) +{ + sdei_cpu_state_t *state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->stack_top == 0) + return NULL; + + assert(state->stack_top <= MAX_EVENT_NESTING); + + return &state->dispatch_stack[state->stack_top - 1]; +} + +static void save_event_ctx(sdei_ev_map_t *map, void *tgt_ctx, int sec_state, + unsigned int intr_raw) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + gp_regs_t *tgt_gpregs; + el3_state_t *tgt_el3; + + assert(tgt_ctx); + tgt_gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(tgt_ctx); + tgt_el3 = get_el3state_ctx(tgt_ctx); + + disp_ctx = push_dispatch(); + assert(disp_ctx); + disp_ctx->sec_state = sec_state; + disp_ctx->map = map; + disp_ctx->intr_raw = intr_raw; + + /* Save general purpose and exception registers */ + memcpy(disp_ctx->x, tgt_gpregs, sizeof(disp_ctx->x)); + disp_ctx->spsr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_SPSR_EL3); + disp_ctx->elr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_ELR_EL3); +} + +static void restore_event_ctx(sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx, void *tgt_ctx) +{ + gp_regs_t *tgt_gpregs; + el3_state_t *tgt_el3; + + assert(tgt_ctx); + tgt_gpregs = get_gpregs_ctx(tgt_ctx); + tgt_el3 = get_el3state_ctx(tgt_ctx); + + CASSERT(sizeof(disp_ctx->x) == (SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS * sizeof(uint64_t)), + foo); + + /* Restore general purpose and exception registers */ + memcpy(tgt_gpregs, disp_ctx->x, sizeof(disp_ctx->x)); + write_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_SPSR_EL3, disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + write_ctx_reg(tgt_el3, CTX_ELR_EL3, disp_ctx->elr_el3); +} + +static void save_secure_context(void) +{ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); +} + +/* Restore Secure context and arrange to resume it at the next ERET */ +static void restore_and_resume_secure_context(void) +{ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); +} + +/* + * Restore Non-secure context and arrange to resume it at the next ERET. Return + * pointer to the Non-secure context. + */ +static cpu_context_t *restore_and_resume_ns_context(void) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_ctx; + + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + ns_ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_ctx); + + return ns_ctx; +} + +/* + * Populate the Non-secure context so that the next ERET will dispatch to the + * SDEI client. + */ +static void setup_ns_dispatch(sdei_ev_map_t *map, sdei_entry_t *se, + cpu_context_t *ctx, int sec_state_to_resume, + unsigned int intr_raw) +{ + el3_state_t *el3_ctx = get_el3state_ctx(ctx); + + /* Push the event and context */ + save_event_ctx(map, ctx, sec_state_to_resume, intr_raw); + + /* + * Setup handler arguments: + * + * - x0: Event number + * - x1: Handler argument supplied at the time of event registration + * - x2: Interrupted PC + * - x3: Interrupted SPSR + */ + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X0, map->ev_num); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X1, se->arg); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X2, read_ctx_reg(el3_ctx, CTX_ELR_EL3)); + SMC_SET_GP(ctx, CTX_GPREG_X3, read_ctx_reg(el3_ctx, CTX_SPSR_EL3)); + + /* + * Prepare for ERET: + * + * - Set PC to the registered handler address + * - Set SPSR to jump to client EL with exceptions masked + */ + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, (uintptr_t) se->ep, + SPSR_64(sdei_client_el(), MODE_SP_ELX, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS)); +} + +/* Handle a triggered SDEI interrupt while events were masked on this PE */ +static void handle_masked_trigger(sdei_ev_map_t *map, sdei_entry_t *se, + sdei_cpu_state_t *state, unsigned int intr_raw) +{ + uint64_t my_mpidr __unused = (read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK); + int disable = 0; + + /* Nothing to do for event 0 */ + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + return; + + /* + * For a private event, or for a shared event specifically routed to + * this CPU, we disable interrupt, leave the interrupt pending, and do + * EOI. + */ + if (is_event_private(map)) { + disable = 1; + } else if (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) { + assert(se->affinity == my_mpidr); + disable = 1; + } + + if (disable) { + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); + state->pending_enables = 1; + + return; + } + + /* + * We just received a shared event with routing set to ANY PE. The + * interrupt can't be delegated on this PE as SDEI events are masked. + * However, because its routing mode is ANY, it is possible that the + * event can be delegated on any other PE that hasn't masked events. + * Therefore, we set the interrupt back pending so as to give other + * suitable PEs a chance of handling it. + */ + assert(plat_ic_is_spi(map->intr)); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* + * Leaving the same interrupt pending also means that the same interrupt + * can target this PE again as soon as this PE leaves EL3. Whether and + * how often that happens depends on the implementation of GIC. + * + * We therefore call a platform handler to resolve this situation. + */ + plat_sdei_handle_masked_trigger(my_mpidr, map->intr); + + /* This PE is masked. We EOI the interrupt, as it can't be delegated */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); +} + +/* SDEI main interrupt handler */ +int sdei_intr_handler(uint32_t intr_raw, uint32_t flags, void *handle, + void *cookie) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + cpu_context_t *ctx; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + unsigned int sec_state; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state; + uint32_t intr; + + /* + * To handle an event, the following conditions must be true: + * + * 1. Event must be signalled + * 2. Event must be enabled + * 3. This PE must be a target PE for the event + * 4. PE must be unmasked for SDEI + * 5. If this is a normal event, no event must be running + * 6. If this is a critical event, no critical event must be running + * + * (1) and (2) are true when this function is running + * (3) is enforced in GIC by selecting the appropriate routing option + * (4) is satisfied by client calling PE_UNMASK + * (5) and (6) is enforced using interrupt priority, the RPR, in GIC: + * - Normal SDEI events belong to Normal SDE priority class + * - Critical SDEI events belong to Critical CSDE priority class + * + * The interrupt has already been acknowledged, and therefore is active, + * so no other PE can handle this event while we are at it. + * + * Find if this is an SDEI interrupt. There must be an event mapped to + * this interrupt + */ + intr = plat_ic_get_interrupt_id(intr_raw); + map = find_event_map_by_intr(intr, plat_ic_is_spi(intr)); + if (!map) { + ERROR("No SDEI map for interrupt %u\n", intr); + panic(); + } + + /* + * Received interrupt number must either correspond to event 0, or must + * be bound interrupt. + */ + assert((map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) || is_map_bound(map)); + + se = get_event_entry(map); + state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + + if (state->pe_masked == PE_MASKED) { + /* + * Interrupts received while this PE was masked can't be + * dispatched. + */ + SDEI_LOG("interrupt %u on %lx while PE masked\n", map->intr, + read_mpidr_el1()); + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + handle_masked_trigger(map, se, state, intr_raw); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + } + + /* Insert load barrier for signalled SDEI event */ + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + dmbld(); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Assert shared event routed to this PE had been configured so */ + if (is_event_shared(map) && (se->reg_flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE)) { + assert(se->affinity == + (read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK)); + } + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISPATCH)) { + SDEI_LOG("SDEI event 0x%x can't be dispatched; state=0x%x\n", + map->ev_num, se->state); + + /* + * If the event is registered, leave the interrupt pending so + * that it's delivered when the event is enabled. + */ + if (GET_EV_STATE(se, REGISTERED)) + plat_ic_set_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* + * The interrupt was disabled or unregistered after the handler + * started to execute, which means now the interrupt is already + * disabled and we just need to EOI the interrupt. + */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + } + + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (is_event_critical(map)) { + /* + * If this event is Critical, and if there's an outstanding + * dispatch, assert the latter is a Normal dispatch. Critical + * events can preempt an outstanding Normal event dispatch. + */ + if (disp_ctx) + assert(is_event_normal(disp_ctx->map)); + } else { + /* + * If this event is Normal, assert that there are no outstanding + * dispatches. Normal events can't preempt any outstanding event + * dispatches. + */ + assert(disp_ctx == NULL); + } + + sec_state = get_interrupt_src_ss(flags); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + SDEI_LOG("ACK %lx, ev:%d ss:%d spsr:%lx ELR:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1(), + map->ev_num, sec_state, read_spsr_el3(), + read_elr_el3()); + + ctx = handle; + + /* + * Check if we interrupted secure state. Perform a context switch so + * that we can delegate to NS. + */ + if (sec_state == SECURE) { + save_secure_context(); + ctx = restore_and_resume_ns_context(); + } + + setup_ns_dispatch(map, se, ctx, sec_state, intr_raw); + + /* + * End of interrupt is done in sdei_event_complete, when the client + * signals completion. + */ + return 0; +} + +/* Explicitly dispatch the given SDEI event */ +int sdei_dispatch_event(int ev_num, unsigned int preempted_sec_state) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + cpu_context_t *ctx; + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + sdei_cpu_state_t *state; + + /* Validate preempted security state */ + if ((preempted_sec_state != SECURE) && + (preempted_sec_state != NON_SECURE)) { + return -1; + } + + /* Can't dispatch if events are masked on this PE */ + state = sdei_get_this_pe_state(); + if (state->pe_masked == PE_MASKED) + return -1; + + /* Event 0 can't be dispatched */ + if (ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) + return -1; + + /* Locate mapping corresponding to this event */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return -1; + + /* + * Statically-bound or dynamic maps are dispatched only as a result of + * interrupt, and not upon explicit request. + */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map) || is_map_bound(map)) + return -1; + + /* The event must be private */ + if (is_event_shared(map)) + return -1; + + /* Examine state of dispatch stack */ + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (disp_ctx) { + /* + * There's an outstanding dispatch. If the outstanding dispatch + * is critical, no more dispatches are possible. + */ + if (is_event_critical(disp_ctx->map)) + return -1; + + /* + * If the outstanding dispatch is Normal, only critical events + * can be dispatched. + */ + if (is_event_normal(map)) + return -1; + } + + se = get_event_entry(map); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISPATCH)) + return -1; + + /* Activate the priority corresponding to the event being dispatched */ + ehf_activate_priority(sdei_event_priority(map)); + + /* + * We assume the current context is SECURE, and that it's already been + * saved. + */ + ctx = restore_and_resume_ns_context(); + + /* + * The caller has effectively terminated execution. Record to resume the + * preempted context later when the event completes or + * complete-and-resumes. + */ + setup_ns_dispatch(map, se, ctx, preempted_sec_state, 0); + + return 0; +} + +int sdei_event_complete(int resume, uint64_t pc) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + cpu_context_t *ctx; + sdei_action_t act; + unsigned int client_el = sdei_client_el(); + + /* Return error if called without an active event */ + disp_ctx = pop_dispatch(); + if (!disp_ctx) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* Validate resumption point */ + if (resume && (plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(pc, client_el) != 0)) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + map = disp_ctx->map; + assert(map); + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + SDEI_LOG("EOI:%lx, %d spsr:%lx elr:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1(), + map->ev_num, read_spsr_el3(), read_elr_el3()); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + act = resume ? DO_COMPLETE_RESUME : DO_COMPLETE; + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, act)) { + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + return SDEI_EDENY; + } + + /* + * Restore Non-secure to how it was originally interrupted. Once done, + * it's up-to-date with the saved copy. + */ + ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + restore_event_ctx(disp_ctx, ctx); + + if (resume) { + /* + * Complete-and-resume call. Prepare the Non-secure context + * (currently active) for complete and resume. + */ + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(NON_SECURE, pc, SPSR_64(client_el, + MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS)); + + /* + * Make it look as if a synchronous exception were taken at the + * supplied Non-secure resumption point. Populate SPSR and + * ELR_ELx so that an ERET from there works as expected. + * + * The assumption is that the client, if necessary, would have + * saved any live content in these registers before making this + * call. + */ + if (client_el == MODE_EL2) { + write_elr_el2(disp_ctx->elr_el3); + write_spsr_el2(disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + } else { + /* EL1 */ + write_elr_el1(disp_ctx->elr_el3); + write_spsr_el1(disp_ctx->spsr_el3); + } + } + + /* + * If the cause of dispatch originally interrupted the Secure world, and + * if Non-secure world wasn't allowed to preempt Secure execution, + * resume Secure. + * + * No need to save the Non-secure context ahead of a world switch: the + * Non-secure context was fully saved before dispatch, and has been + * returned to its pre-dispatch state. + */ + if ((disp_ctx->sec_state == SECURE) && + (ehf_is_ns_preemption_allowed() == 0)) { + restore_and_resume_secure_context(); + } + + if ((map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) || is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * The event was dispatched after receiving SDEI interrupt. With + * the event handling completed, EOI the corresponding + * interrupt. + */ + plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(disp_ctx->intr_raw); + } else { + /* + * An unbound event must have been dispatched explicitly. + * Deactivate the priority level that was activated at the time + * of explicit dispatch. + */ + ehf_deactivate_priority(sdei_event_priority(map)); + } + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; +} + +int sdei_event_context(void *handle, unsigned int param) +{ + sdei_dispatch_context_t *disp_ctx; + + if (param >= SDEI_SAVED_GPREGS) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Get outstanding dispatch on this CPU */ + disp_ctx = get_outstanding_dispatch(); + if (!disp_ctx) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + assert(disp_ctx->map); + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(get_event_entry(disp_ctx->map), DO_CONTEXT)) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* + * No locking is required for the Running status as this is the only CPU + * which can complete the event + */ + + return disp_ctx->x[param]; +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f08c8ba --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,1066 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl31.h> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <cassert.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <context_mgmt.h> +#include <debug.h> +#include <ehf.h> +#include <interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <platform.h> +#include <pubsub.h> +#include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <sdei.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <utils.h> +#include "sdei_private.h" + +#define MAJOR_VERSION 1 +#define MINOR_VERSION 0 +#define VENDOR_VERSION 0 + +#define MAKE_SDEI_VERSION(_major, _minor, _vendor) \ + ((((unsigned long long)(_major)) << 48) | \ + (((unsigned long long)(_minor)) << 32) | \ + (_vendor)) + +#define LOWEST_INTR_PRIORITY 0xff + +#define is_valid_affinity(_mpidr) (plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(_mpidr) >= 0) + +CASSERT(PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI < PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI, + sdei_critical_must_have_higher_priority); + +static unsigned int num_dyn_priv_slots, num_dyn_shrd_slots; + +/* Initialise SDEI map entries */ +static void init_map(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->reg_count = 0; +} + +/* Convert mapping to SDEI class */ +sdei_class_t map_to_class(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return is_event_critical(map) ? SDEI_CRITICAL : SDEI_NORMAL; +} + +/* Clear SDEI event entries except state */ +static void clear_event_entries(sdei_entry_t *se) +{ + se->ep = 0; + se->arg = 0; + se->affinity = 0; + se->reg_flags = 0; +} + +/* Perform CPU-specific state initialisation */ +static void *sdei_cpu_on_init(const void *arg) +{ + int i; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + /* Initialize private mappings on this CPU */ + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + se = get_event_entry(map); + clear_event_entries(se); + se->state = 0; + } + + SDEI_LOG("Private events initialized on %lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + + /* All PEs start with SDEI events masked */ + sdei_pe_mask(); + + return 0; +} + +/* Initialise an SDEI class */ +void sdei_class_init(sdei_class_t class) +{ + unsigned int i, zero_found __unused = 0; + int ev_num_so_far __unused; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Sanity check and configuration of shared events */ + ev_num_so_far = -1; + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + /* Ensure mappings are sorted */ + assert((ev_num_so_far < 0) || (map->ev_num > ev_num_so_far)); + + ev_num_so_far = map->ev_num; + + /* Event 0 must not be shared */ + assert(map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0); + + /* Check for valid event */ + assert(map->ev_num >= 0); + + /* Make sure it's a shared event */ + assert(is_event_shared(map)); + + /* No shared mapping should have signalable property */ + assert(!is_event_signalable(map)); +#endif + + /* Skip initializing the wrong priority */ + if (map_to_class(map) != class) + continue; + + /* Platform events are always bound, so set the bound flag */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + assert(map->intr == SDEI_DYN_IRQ); + assert(is_event_normal(map)); + num_dyn_shrd_slots++; + } else { + /* Shared mappings must be bound to shared interrupt */ + assert(plat_ic_is_spi(map->intr)); + set_map_bound(map); + } + + init_map(map); + } + + /* Sanity check and configuration of private events for this CPU */ + ev_num_so_far = -1; + for_each_private_map(i, map) { +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + /* Ensure mappings are sorted */ + assert((ev_num_so_far < 0) || (map->ev_num > ev_num_so_far)); + + ev_num_so_far = map->ev_num; + + if (map->ev_num == SDEI_EVENT_0) { + zero_found = 1; + + /* Event 0 must be a Secure SGI */ + assert(is_secure_sgi(map->intr)); + + /* + * Event 0 can have only have signalable flag (apart + * from being private + */ + assert(map->map_flags == (SDEI_MAPF_SIGNALABLE | + SDEI_MAPF_PRIVATE)); + } else { + /* No other mapping should have signalable property */ + assert(!is_event_signalable(map)); + } + + /* Check for valid event */ + assert(map->ev_num >= 0); + + /* Make sure it's a private event */ + assert(is_event_private(map)); +#endif + + /* Skip initializing the wrong priority */ + if (map_to_class(map) != class) + continue; + + /* Platform events are always bound, so set the bound flag */ + if (map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) { + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + assert(map->intr == SDEI_DYN_IRQ); + assert(is_event_normal(map)); + num_dyn_priv_slots++; + } else { + /* + * Private mappings must be bound to private + * interrupt. + */ + assert(plat_ic_is_ppi(map->intr)); + set_map_bound(map); + } + } + + init_map(map); + } + + /* Ensure event 0 is in the mapping */ + assert(zero_found); + + sdei_cpu_on_init(NULL); +} + +/* SDEI dispatcher initialisation */ +void sdei_init(void) +{ + sdei_class_init(SDEI_CRITICAL); + sdei_class_init(SDEI_NORMAL); + + /* Register priority level handlers */ + ehf_register_priority_handler(PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI, + sdei_intr_handler); + ehf_register_priority_handler(PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI, + sdei_intr_handler); +} + +/* Populate SDEI event entry */ +static void set_sdei_entry(sdei_entry_t *se, uint64_t ep, uint64_t arg, + unsigned int flags, uint64_t affinity) +{ + assert(se != NULL); + + se->ep = ep; + se->arg = arg; + se->affinity = (affinity & MPIDR_AFFINITY_MASK); + se->reg_flags = flags; +} + +static unsigned long long sdei_version(void) +{ + return MAKE_SDEI_VERSION(MAJOR_VERSION, MINOR_VERSION, VENDOR_VERSION); +} + +/* Validate flags and MPIDR values for REGISTER and ROUTING_SET calls */ +static int validate_flags(uint64_t flags, uint64_t mpidr) +{ + /* Validate flags */ + switch (flags) { + case SDEI_REGF_RM_PE: + if (!is_valid_affinity(mpidr)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + break; + case SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY: + break; + default: + /* Unknown flags */ + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Set routing of an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_routing_set(int ev_num, uint64_t flags, uint64_t mpidr) +{ + int ret, routing; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + ret = validate_flags(flags, mpidr); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* The event must not be private */ + if (is_event_private(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + + if (!is_map_bound(map) || is_event_private(map)) { + ret = SDEI_EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_ROUTING)) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* Choose appropriate routing */ + routing = (flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY) ? INTR_ROUTING_MODE_ANY : + INTR_ROUTING_MODE_PE; + + /* Update event registration flag */ + se->reg_flags = flags; + + /* + * ROUTING_SET is permissible only when event composite state is + * 'registered, disabled, and not running'. This means that the + * interrupt is currently disabled, and not active. + */ + plat_ic_set_spi_routing(map->intr, routing, (u_register_t) mpidr); + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Register handler and argument for an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_register(int ev_num, uint64_t ep, uint64_t arg, + uint64_t flags, uint64_t mpidr) +{ + int ret; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_state_t backup_state; + + if (!ep || (plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(ep, sdei_client_el()) != 0)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + ret = validate_flags(flags, mpidr); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Private events always target the PE */ + if (is_event_private(map)) + flags = SDEI_REGF_RM_PE; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + /* + * Even though register operation is per-event (additionally for private + * events, registration is required individually), it has to be + * serialised with respect to bind/release, which are global operations. + * So we hold the lock throughout, unconditionally. + */ + sdei_map_lock(map); + + backup_state = se->state; + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_REGISTER)) + goto fallback; + + /* + * When registering for dynamic events, make sure it's been bound + * already. This has to be the case as, without binding, the client + * can't know about the event number to register for. + */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map) && !is_map_bound(map)) + goto fallback; + + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* Multiple calls to register are possible for private events */ + assert(map->reg_count >= 0); + } else { + /* Only single call to register is possible for shared events */ + assert(map->reg_count == 0); + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* Meanwhile, did any PE ACK the interrupt? */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_active(map->intr)) + goto fallback; + + /* The interrupt must currently owned by Non-secure */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(map->intr) != INTR_TYPE_NS) + goto fallback; + + /* + * Disable forwarding of new interrupt triggers to CPU + * interface. + */ + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + /* + * Any events that are triggered after register and before + * enable should remain pending. Clear any previous interrupt + * triggers which are pending (except for SGIs). This has no + * affect on level-triggered interrupts. + */ + if (ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) + plat_ic_clear_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + /* Map interrupt to EL3 and program the correct priority */ + plat_ic_set_interrupt_type(map->intr, INTR_TYPE_EL3); + + /* Program the appropriate interrupt priority */ + plat_ic_set_interrupt_priority(map->intr, sdei_event_priority(map)); + + /* + * Set the routing mode for shared event as requested. We + * already ensure that shared events get bound to SPIs. + */ + if (is_event_shared(map)) { + plat_ic_set_spi_routing(map->intr, + ((flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_ANY) ? + INTR_ROUTING_MODE_ANY : + INTR_ROUTING_MODE_PE), + (u_register_t) mpidr); + } + } + + /* Populate event entries */ + set_sdei_entry(se, ep, arg, flags, mpidr); + + /* Increment register count */ + map->reg_count++; + + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return 0; + +fallback: + /* Reinstate previous state */ + se->state = backup_state; + + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return SDEI_EDENY; +} + +/* Enable SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_enable(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + int ret, before, after; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + before = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_ENABLE)) + goto finish; + after = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + + /* + * Enable interrupt for bound events only if there's a change in enabled + * state. + */ + if (is_map_bound(map) && (!before && after)) + plat_ic_enable_interrupt(map->intr); + + ret = 0; + +finish: + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Disable SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_disable(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + int ret, before, after; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + before = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_DISABLE)) + goto finish; + after = GET_EV_STATE(se, ENABLED); + + /* + * Disable interrupt for bound events only if there's a change in + * enabled state. + */ + if (is_map_bound(map) && (before && !after)) + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + ret = 0; + +finish: + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Query SDEI event information */ +static uint64_t sdei_event_get_info(int ev_num, int info) +{ + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + unsigned int flags, registered; + uint64_t affinity; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Sample state under lock */ + registered = GET_EV_STATE(se, REGISTERED); + flags = se->reg_flags; + affinity = se->affinity; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + switch (info) { + case SDEI_INFO_EV_TYPE: + return is_event_shared(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_NOT_SIGNALED: + return !is_event_signalable(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_PRIORITY: + return is_event_critical(map); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_MODE: + if (!is_event_shared(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + if (!registered) + return SDEI_EDENY; + return (flags == SDEI_REGF_RM_PE); + + case SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_AFF: + if (!is_event_shared(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + if (!registered) + return SDEI_EDENY; + if (flags != SDEI_REGF_RM_PE) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + return affinity; + + default: + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } +} + +/* Unregister an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_unregister(int ev_num) +{ + int ret = 0; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + /* + * Even though unregister operation is per-event (additionally for + * private events, unregistration is required individually), it has to + * be serialised with respect to bind/release, which are global + * operations. So we hold the lock throughout, unconditionally. + */ + sdei_map_lock(map); + + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_UNREGISTER)) { + /* + * Even if the call is invalid, and the handler is running (for + * example, having unregistered from a running handler earlier), + * return pending error code; otherwise, return deny. + */ + ret = GET_EV_STATE(se, RUNNING) ? SDEI_EPEND : SDEI_EDENY; + + goto finish; + } + + map->reg_count--; + if (is_event_private(map)) { + /* Multiple calls to register are possible for private events */ + assert(map->reg_count >= 0); + } else { + /* Only single call to register is possible for shared events */ + assert(map->reg_count == 0); + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + plat_ic_disable_interrupt(map->intr); + + /* + * Clear pending interrupt. Skip for SGIs as they may not be + * cleared on interrupt controllers. + */ + if (ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) + plat_ic_clear_interrupt_pending(map->intr); + + assert(plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(map->intr) == INTR_TYPE_EL3); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_type(map->intr, INTR_TYPE_NS); + plat_ic_set_interrupt_priority(map->intr, LOWEST_INTR_PRIORITY); + } + + clear_event_entries(se); + + /* + * If the handler is running at the time of unregister, return the + * pending error code. + */ + if (GET_EV_STATE(se, RUNNING)) + ret = SDEI_EPEND; + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Query status of an SDEI event */ +static int sdei_event_status(int ev_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + sdei_state_t state; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* State value directly maps to the expected return format */ + state = se->state; + + if (is_event_shared(map)) + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return state; +} + +/* Bind an SDEI event to an interrupt */ +static int sdei_interrupt_bind(int intr_num) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + int retry = 1, shared_mapping; + + /* SGIs are not allowed to be bound */ + if (plat_ic_is_sgi(intr_num)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + shared_mapping = plat_ic_is_spi(intr_num); + do { + /* + * Bail out if there is already an event for this interrupt, + * either platform-defined or dynamic. + */ + map = find_event_map_by_intr(intr_num, shared_mapping); + if (map) { + if (is_map_dynamic(map)) { + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Dynamic event, already bound. Return + * event number. + */ + return map->ev_num; + } + } else { + /* Binding non-dynamic event */ + return SDEI_EINVAL; + } + } + + /* + * The interrupt is not bound yet. Try to find a free slot to + * bind it. Free dynamic mappings have their interrupt set as + * SDEI_DYN_IRQ. + */ + map = find_event_map_by_intr(SDEI_DYN_IRQ, shared_mapping); + if (!map) + return SDEI_ENOMEM; + + /* The returned mapping must be dynamic */ + assert(is_map_dynamic(map)); + + /* + * We cannot assert for bound maps here, as we might be racing + * with another bind. + */ + + /* The requested interrupt must already belong to NS */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(intr_num) != INTR_TYPE_NS) + return SDEI_EDENY; + + /* + * Interrupt programming and ownership transfer are deferred + * until register. + */ + + sdei_map_lock(map); + if (!is_map_bound(map)) { + map->intr = intr_num; + set_map_bound(map); + retry = 0; + } + sdei_map_unlock(map); + } while (retry); + + return map->ev_num; +} + +/* Release a bound SDEI event previously to an interrupt */ +static int sdei_interrupt_release(int ev_num) +{ + int ret = 0; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + sdei_entry_t *se; + + /* Check if valid event number */ + map = find_event_map(ev_num); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + if (!is_map_dynamic(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + se = get_event_entry(map); + + sdei_map_lock(map); + + /* Event must have been unregistered before release */ + if (map->reg_count != 0) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Interrupt release never causes the state to change. We only check + * whether it's permissible or not. + */ + if (!can_sdei_state_trans(se, DO_RELEASE)) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + if (is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Deny release if the interrupt is active, which means it's + * probably being acknowledged and handled elsewhere. + */ + if (plat_ic_get_interrupt_active(map->intr)) { + ret = SDEI_EDENY; + goto finish; + } + + /* + * Interrupt programming and ownership transfer are already done + * during unregister. + */ + + map->intr = SDEI_DYN_IRQ; + clr_map_bound(map); + } else { + SDEI_LOG("Error release bound:%d cnt:%d\n", is_map_bound(map), + map->reg_count); + ret = SDEI_EINVAL; + } + +finish: + sdei_map_unlock(map); + + return ret; +} + +/* Perform reset of private SDEI events */ +static int sdei_private_reset(void) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + int ret = 0, final_ret = 0, i; + + /* Unregister all private events */ + for_each_private_map(i, map) { + /* + * The unregister can fail if the event is not registered, which + * is allowed, and a deny will be returned. But if the event is + * running or unregister pending, the call fails. + */ + ret = sdei_event_unregister(map->ev_num); + if ((ret == SDEI_EPEND) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = ret; + } + + return final_ret; +} + +/* Perform reset of shared SDEI events */ +static int sdei_shared_reset(void) +{ + const sdei_mapping_t *mapping; + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + int ret = 0, final_ret = 0, i, j; + + /* Unregister all shared events */ + for_each_shared_map(i, map) { + /* + * The unregister can fail if the event is not registered, which + * is allowed, and a deny will be returned. But if the event is + * running or unregister pending, the call fails. + */ + ret = sdei_event_unregister(map->ev_num); + if ((ret == SDEI_EPEND) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = ret; + } + + if (final_ret != 0) + return final_ret; + + /* + * Loop through both private and shared mappings, and release all + * bindings. + */ + for_each_mapping_type(i, mapping) { + iterate_mapping(mapping, j, map) { + /* + * Release bindings for mappings that are dynamic and + * bound. + */ + if (is_map_dynamic(map) && is_map_bound(map)) { + /* + * Any failure to release would mean there is at + * least a PE registered for the event. + */ + ret = sdei_interrupt_release(map->ev_num); + if ((ret != 0) && (final_ret == 0)) + final_ret = ret; + } + } + } + + return final_ret; +} + +/* Send a signal to another SDEI client PE */ +int sdei_signal(int event, uint64_t target_pe) +{ + sdei_ev_map_t *map; + + /* Only event 0 can be signalled */ + if (event != SDEI_EVENT_0) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Find mapping for event 0 */ + map = find_event_map(SDEI_EVENT_0); + if (!map) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* The event must be signalable */ + if (!is_event_signalable(map)) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Validate target */ + if (plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(target_pe) < 0) + return SDEI_EINVAL; + + /* Raise SGI. Platform will validate target_pe */ + plat_ic_raise_el3_sgi(map->intr, (u_register_t) target_pe); + + return 0; +} + +/* Query SDEI dispatcher features */ +uint64_t sdei_features(unsigned int feature) +{ + if (feature == SDEI_FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS) { + return FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS(num_dyn_priv_slots, + num_dyn_shrd_slots); + } + + return SDEI_EINVAL; +} + +/* SDEI top level handler for servicing SMCs */ +uint64_t sdei_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + + uint64_t x5; + int ss = get_interrupt_src_ss(flags); + int64_t ret; + unsigned int resume = 0; + + if (ss != NON_SECURE) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + /* Verify the caller EL */ + if (GET_EL(read_spsr_el3()) != sdei_client_el()) + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); + + switch (smc_fid) { + case SDEI_VERSION: + SDEI_LOG("> VER\n"); + ret = sdei_version(); + SDEI_LOG("< VER:%lx\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_REGISTER: + x5 = SMC_GET_GP(handle, CTX_GPREG_X5); + SDEI_LOG("> REG(n:%d e:%lx a:%lx f:%x m:%lx)\n", (int) x1, + x2, x3, (int) x4, x5); + ret = sdei_event_register(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5); + SDEI_LOG("< REG:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_ENABLE: + SDEI_LOG("> ENABLE(n:%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_event_enable(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< ENABLE:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_DISABLE: + SDEI_LOG("> DISABLE(n:%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_event_disable(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< DISABLE:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_CONTEXT: + SDEI_LOG("> CTX(p:%d):%lx\n", (int) x1, read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_event_context(handle, x1); + SDEI_LOG("< CTX:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE_AND_RESUME: + resume = 1; + /* Fall through */ + + case SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE: + SDEI_LOG("> COMPLETE(r:%d sta/ep:%lx):%lx\n", resume, x1, + read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_event_complete(resume, x1); + SDEI_LOG("< COMPLETE:%lx\n", ret); + + /* + * Set error code only if the call failed. If the call + * succeeded, we discard the dispatched context, and restore the + * interrupted context to a pristine condition, and therefore + * shouldn't be modified. We don't return to the caller in this + * case anyway. + */ + if (ret) + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + + SMC_RET0(handle); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_STATUS: + SDEI_LOG("> STAT(n:%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_event_status(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< STAT:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_GET_INFO: + SDEI_LOG("> INFO(n:%d, %d)\n", (int) x1, (int) x2); + ret = sdei_event_get_info(x1, x2); + SDEI_LOG("< INFO:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_UNREGISTER: + SDEI_LOG("> UNREG(n:%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_event_unregister(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< UNREG:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_PE_UNMASK: + SDEI_LOG("> UNMASK:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + sdei_pe_unmask(); + SDEI_LOG("< UNMASK:%d\n", 0); + SMC_RET1(handle, 0); + break; + + case SDEI_PE_MASK: + SDEI_LOG("> MASK:%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_pe_mask(); + SDEI_LOG("< MASK:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_INTERRUPT_BIND: + SDEI_LOG("> BIND(%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_interrupt_bind(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< BIND:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_INTERRUPT_RELEASE: + SDEI_LOG("> REL(%d)\n", (int) x1); + ret = sdei_interrupt_release(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< REL:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_SHARED_RESET: + SDEI_LOG("> S_RESET():%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_shared_reset(); + SDEI_LOG("< S_RESET:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_PRIVATE_RESET: + SDEI_LOG("> P_RESET():%lx\n", read_mpidr_el1()); + ret = sdei_private_reset(); + SDEI_LOG("< P_RESET:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_ROUTING_SET: + SDEI_LOG("> ROUTE_SET(n:%d f:%lx aff:%lx)\n", (int) x1, x2, x3); + ret = sdei_event_routing_set(x1, x2, x3); + SDEI_LOG("< ROUTE_SET:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_FEATURES: + SDEI_LOG("> FTRS(f:%lx)\n", x1); + ret = sdei_features(x1); + SDEI_LOG("< FTRS:%lx\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + + case SDEI_EVENT_SIGNAL: + SDEI_LOG("> SIGNAL(e:%lx t:%lx)\n", x1, x2); + ret = sdei_signal(x1, x2); + SDEI_LOG("< SIGNAL:%ld\n", ret); + SMC_RET1(handle, ret); + break; + default: + break; + } + + WARN("Unimplemented SDEI Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid); + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} + +/* Subscribe to PSCI CPU on to initialize per-CPU SDEI configuration */ +SUBSCRIBE_TO_EVENT(psci_cpu_on_finish, sdei_cpu_on_init); diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..44db4193 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef __SDEI_PRIVATE_H__ +#define __SDEI_PRIVATE_H__ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <debug.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <interrupt_mgmt.h> +#include <platform.h> +#include <sdei.h> +#include <spinlock.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <types.h> +#include <utils_def.h> + +#ifdef AARCH32 +# error SDEI is implemented only for AArch64 systems +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI +# error Platform must define SDEI critical priority value +#endif + +#ifndef PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI +# error Platform must define SDEI normal priority value +#endif + +/* Output SDEI logs as verbose */ +#define SDEI_LOG(...) VERBOSE("SDEI: " __VA_ARGS__) + +/* SDEI handler unregistered state. This is the default state. */ +#define SDEI_STATE_UNREGISTERED 0 + +/* SDE event status values in bit position */ +#define SDEI_STATF_REGISTERED 0 +#define SDEI_STATF_ENABLED 1 +#define SDEI_STATF_RUNNING 2 + +/* SDEI SMC error codes */ +#define SDEI_EINVAL (-2) +#define SDEI_EDENY (-3) +#define SDEI_EPEND (-5) +#define SDEI_ENOMEM (-10) + +/* + * 'info' parameter to SDEI_EVENT_GET_INFO SMC. + * + * Note that the SDEI v1.0 speification mistakenly enumerates the + * SDEI_INFO_EV_SIGNALED as SDEI_INFO_SIGNALED. This will be corrected in a + * future version. + */ +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_TYPE 0 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_NOT_SIGNALED 1 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_PRIORITY 2 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_MODE 3 +#define SDEI_INFO_EV_ROUTING_AFF 4 + +#define SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING() (&sdei_global_mappings[_SDEI_MAP_IDX_PRIV]) +#define SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING() (&sdei_global_mappings[_SDEI_MAP_IDX_SHRD]) + +#define for_each_mapping_type(_i, _mapping) \ + for (_i = 0, _mapping = &sdei_global_mappings[i]; \ + _i < _SDEI_MAP_IDX_MAX; \ + _i++, _mapping = &sdei_global_mappings[i]) + +#define iterate_mapping(_mapping, _i, _map) \ + for (_map = (_mapping)->map, _i = 0; \ + _i < (_mapping)->num_maps; \ + _i++, _map++) + +#define for_each_private_map(_i, _map) \ + iterate_mapping(SDEI_PRIVATE_MAPPING(), _i, _map) + +#define for_each_shared_map(_i, _map) \ + iterate_mapping(SDEI_SHARED_MAPPING(), _i, _map) + +/* SDEI_FEATURES */ +#define SDEI_FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS 0 +#define BIND_SLOTS_MASK 0xffff +#define FEATURES_SHARED_SLOTS_SHIFT 16 +#define FEATURES_PRIVATE_SLOTS_SHIFT 0 +#define FEATURE_BIND_SLOTS(_priv, _shrd) \ + ((((_priv) & BIND_SLOTS_MASK) << FEATURES_PRIVATE_SLOTS_SHIFT) | \ + (((_shrd) & BIND_SLOTS_MASK) << FEATURES_SHARED_SLOTS_SHIFT)) + +#define GET_EV_STATE(_e, _s) get_ev_state_bit(_e, SDEI_STATF_##_s) +#define SET_EV_STATE(_e, _s) clr_ev_state_bit(_e->state, SDEI_STATF_##_s) + +static inline int is_event_private(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_PRIVATE_SHIFT)) != 0); +} + +static inline int is_event_shared(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return !is_event_private(map); +} + +static inline int is_event_critical(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_CRITICAL_SHIFT)) != 0); +} + +static inline int is_event_normal(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return !is_event_critical(map); +} + +static inline int is_event_signalable(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_SIGNALABLE_SHIFT)) != 0); +} + +static inline int is_map_dynamic(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_DYNAMIC_SHIFT)) != 0); +} + +/* + * Checks whether an event is associated with an interrupt. Static events always + * return true, and dynamic events return whether SDEI_INTERRUPT_BIND had been + * called on them. This can be used on both static or dynamic events to check + * for an associated interrupt. + */ +static inline int is_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return ((map->map_flags & BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT)) != 0); +} + +static inline void set_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->map_flags |= BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT); +} + +static inline void clr_map_bound(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + map->map_flags &= ~(BIT(_SDEI_MAPF_BOUND_SHIFT)); +} + +static inline int is_secure_sgi(unsigned int intr) +{ + return (plat_ic_is_sgi(intr) && + (plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(intr) == INTR_TYPE_EL3)); +} + +/* + * Determine EL of the client. If EL2 is implemented (hence the enabled HCE + * bit), deem EL2; otherwise, deem EL1. + */ +static inline unsigned int sdei_client_el(void) +{ + return read_scr_el3() & SCR_HCE_BIT ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1; +} + +static inline unsigned int sdei_event_priority(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + return is_event_critical(map) ? PLAT_SDEI_CRITICAL_PRI : + PLAT_SDEI_NORMAL_PRI; +} + +static inline int get_ev_state_bit(sdei_entry_t *se, unsigned int bit_no) +{ + return ((se->state & BIT(bit_no)) != 0); +} + +static inline void clr_ev_state_bit(sdei_entry_t *se, unsigned int bit_no) +{ + se->state &= ~BIT(bit_no); +} + +/* SDEI actions for state transition */ +typedef enum { + /* + * Actions resulting from client requests. These directly map to SMC + * calls. Note that the state table columns are listed in this order + * too. + */ + DO_REGISTER = 0, + DO_RELEASE = 1, + DO_ENABLE = 2, + DO_DISABLE = 3, + DO_UNREGISTER = 4, + DO_ROUTING = 5, + DO_CONTEXT = 6, + DO_COMPLETE = 7, + DO_COMPLETE_RESUME = 8, + + /* Action for event dispatch */ + DO_DISPATCH = 9, + + DO_MAX, +} sdei_action_t; + +typedef enum { + SDEI_NORMAL, + SDEI_CRITICAL +} sdei_class_t; + +static inline void sdei_map_lock(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + spin_lock(&map->lock); +} + +static inline void sdei_map_unlock(sdei_ev_map_t *map) +{ + spin_unlock(&map->lock); +} + +extern const sdei_mapping_t sdei_global_mappings[]; +extern sdei_entry_t sdei_private_event_table[]; +extern sdei_entry_t sdei_shared_event_table[]; + +void init_sdei_state(void); + +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map_by_intr(int intr_num, int shared); +sdei_ev_map_t *find_event_map(int ev_num); +sdei_entry_t *get_event_entry(sdei_ev_map_t *map); + +int sdei_event_context(void *handle, unsigned int param); +int sdei_event_complete(int resume, uint64_t arg); + +void sdei_pe_unmask(void); +unsigned int sdei_pe_mask(void); + +int sdei_intr_handler(uint32_t intr, uint32_t flags, void *handle, + void *cookie); +bool can_sdei_state_trans(sdei_entry_t *se, sdei_action_t act); + +#endif /* __SDEI_PRIVATE_H__ */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f60dfd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_state.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <cassert.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include "sdei_private.h" + +/* Aliases for SDEI handler states: 'R'unning, 'E'nabled, and re'G'istered */ +#define r_ 0 +#define R_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_RUNNING) + +#define e_ 0 +#define E_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_ENABLED) + +#define g_ 0 +#define G_ (1u << SDEI_STATF_REGISTERED) + +/* All possible composite handler states */ +#define reg_ (r_ | e_ | g_) +#define reG_ (r_ | e_ | G_) +#define rEg_ (r_ | E_ | g_) +#define rEG_ (r_ | E_ | G_) +#define Reg_ (R_ | e_ | g_) +#define ReG_ (R_ | e_ | G_) +#define REg_ (R_ | E_ | g_) +#define REG_ (R_ | E_ | G_) + +#define MAX_STATES (REG_ + 1) + +/* Invalid state */ +#define SDEI_STATE_INVALID ((sdei_state_t) (-1)) + +/* No change in state */ +#define SDEI_STATE_NOP ((sdei_state_t) (-2)) + +#define X___ SDEI_STATE_INVALID +#define NOP_ SDEI_STATE_NOP + +/* Ensure special states don't overlap with valid ones */ +CASSERT(X___ > REG_, sdei_state_overlap_invalid); +CASSERT(NOP_ > REG_, sdei_state_overlap_nop); + +/* + * SDEI handler state machine: refer to sections 6.1 and 6.1.2 of the SDEI v1.0 + * specification: + * + * http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf + * + * Not all calls contribute to handler state transition. This table is also used + * to validate whether a call is permissible at a given handler state: + * + * - X___ denotes a forbidden transition; + * - NOP_ denotes a permitted transition, but there's no change in state; + * - Otherwise, XXX_ gives the new state. + * + * DISP[atch] is a transition added for the implementation, but is not mentioned + * in the spec. + * + * Those calls that the spec mentions as can be made any time don't picture in + * this table. + */ + +static const sdei_state_t sdei_state_table[MAX_STATES][DO_MAX] = { +/* + * Action: REG REL ENA DISA UREG ROUT CTX COMP COMPR DISP + * Notes: [3] [1] [3] [3][4] [2] + */ + /* Handler unregistered, disabled, and not running. This is the default state. */ +/* 0 */ [reg_] = { reG_, NOP_, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, + + /* Handler unregistered and running */ +/* 4 */ [Reg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, NOP_, reg_, reg_, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered */ +/* 1 */ [reG_] = { X___, X___, rEG_, NOP_, reg_, NOP_, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered and running */ +/* 5 */ [ReG_] = { X___, X___, REG_, NOP_, Reg_, X___, NOP_, reG_, reG_, X___, }, + + /* Handler registered and enabled */ +/* 3 */ [rEG_] = { X___, X___, NOP_, reG_, reg_, X___, X___, X___, X___, REG_, }, + + /* Handler registered, enabled, and running */ +/* 7 */ [REG_] = { X___, X___, NOP_, ReG_, Reg_, X___, NOP_, rEG_, rEG_, X___, }, + + /* + * Invalid states: no valid transition would leave the handler in these + * states; and no transition from these states is possible either. + */ + + /* + * Handler can't be enabled without being registered. I.e., XEg is + * impossible. + */ +/* 2 */ [rEg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, +/* 6 */ [REg_] = { X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, X___, }, +}; + +/* + * [1] Unregister will always also disable the event, so the new state will have + * Xeg. + * [2] Event is considered for dispatch only when it's both registered and + * enabled. + * [3] Never causes change in state. + * [4] Only allowed when running. + */ + +/* + * Given an action, transition the state of an event by looking up the state + * table above: + * + * - Return false for invalid transition; + * - Return true for valid transition that causes no change in state; + * - Otherwise, update state and return true. + * + * This function assumes that the caller holds necessary locks. If the + * transition has constrains other than the state table describes, the caller is + * expected to restore the previous state. See sdei_event_register() for + * example. + */ +bool can_sdei_state_trans(sdei_entry_t *se, sdei_action_t act) +{ + sdei_state_t next; + + assert(act < DO_MAX); + if (se->state >= MAX_STATES) { + WARN(" event state invalid: %x\n", se->state); + return false; + } + + next = sdei_state_table[se->state][act]; + switch (next) { + case SDEI_STATE_INVALID: + return false; + + case SDEI_STATE_NOP: + return true; + + default: + /* Valid transition. Update state. */ + SDEI_LOG(" event state 0x%x => 0x%x\n", se->state, next); + se->state = next; + + return true; + } +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa35811f --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include "../spm_private.h" + + .global spm_secure_partition_enter + .global spm_secure_partition_exit + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3 + * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C + * runtime and enter the secure payload. + * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C + * runtime context is to be saved. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spm_secure_partition_enter + /* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */ + mov x3, sp + str x3, [x0, #0] + sub sp, sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE + + /* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + stp x19, x20, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X19] + stp x21, x22, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X21] + stp x23, x24, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X23] + stp x25, x26, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X25] + stp x27, x28, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X27] + stp x29, x30, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X29] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to + * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET + * into the secure payload. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + b el3_exit +endfunc spm_secure_partition_enter + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context + * saved in spm_secure_partition_enter(). + * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0' + * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had + * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later + * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ +func spm_secure_partition_exit + /* Restore the previous stack */ + mov sp, x0 + + /* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */ + ldp x19, x20, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x21, x22, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x23, x24, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x25, x26, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x27, x28, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + ldp x29, x30, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)] + + /* --------------------------------------------------------------------- + * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the + * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0 + * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original + * entry call. + * --------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + mov x0, x1 + ret +endfunc spm_secure_partition_exit diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S new file mode 100644 index 00000000..218245d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <asm_macros.S> +#include <bl_common.h> +#include <context.h> + +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * Very simple stackless exception handlers used by the spm shim layer. + * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + .globl spm_shim_exceptions_ptr + +vector_base spm_shim_exceptions_ptr, .spm_shim_exceptions + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SP0 : 0x0 - 0x200 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionSP0 + +vector_entry IrqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size IrqSP0 + +vector_entry FiqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size FiqSP0 + +vector_entry SErrorSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SErrorSP0 + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionSPx + +vector_entry IrqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size IrqSPx + +vector_entry FiqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size FiqSPx + +vector_entry SErrorSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SErrorSPx + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions + * are handled since secure_partition does not implement + * a lower EL + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + msr tpidr_el1, x30 + mrs x30, esr_el1 + ubfx x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SVC + b.eq do_smc + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH32_SVC + b.eq do_smc + + cmp x30, #EC_AARCH64_SYS + b.eq handle_sys_trap + + /* Fail in all the other cases */ + b panic + + /* --------------------------------------------- + * Tell SPM that we are done initialising + * --------------------------------------------- + */ +do_smc: + mrs x30, tpidr_el1 + smc #0 + eret + + /* AArch64 system instructions trap are handled as a panic for now */ +handle_sys_trap: +panic: + b panic + check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionA64 + +vector_entry IrqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size IrqA64 + +vector_entry FiqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size FiqA64 + +vector_entry SErrorA64, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SErrorA64 + + /* ----------------------------------------------------- + * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800 + * ----------------------------------------------------- + */ +vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionA32 + +vector_entry IrqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size IrqA32 + +vector_entry FiqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size FiqA32 + +vector_entry SErrorA32, .spm_shim_exceptions + b . + check_vector_size SErrorA32 diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c b/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67301608 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch.h> +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <arm_spm_def.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <common_def.h> +#include <context.h> +#include <context_mgmt.h> +#include <debug.h> +#include <platform_def.h> +#include <platform.h> +#include <secure_partition.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <types.h> +#include <xlat_tables_v2.h> + +#include "spm_private.h" +#include "spm_shim_private.h" + +/* Allocate and initialise the translation context for the secure partition. */ +REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2(secure_partition, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MMAP_REGIONS, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MAX_XLAT_TABLES, + PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, + EL1_EL0_REGIME); + +/* Export a handle on the secure partition translation context */ +xlat_ctx_t *secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle = &secure_partition_xlat_ctx; + +/* Setup context of the Secure Partition */ +void secure_partition_setup(void) +{ + VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup start...\n"); + + cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(SECURE); + + /* Make sure that we got a Secure context. */ + assert(ctx != NULL); + + /* Assert we are in Secure state. */ + assert((read_scr_el3() & SCR_NS_BIT) == 0); + + /* Disable MMU at EL1. */ + disable_mmu_icache_el1(); + + /* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */ + tlbivmalle1(); + + /* + * General-Purpose registers + * ------------------------- + */ + + /* + * X0: Virtual address of a buffer shared between EL3 and Secure EL0. + * The buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1 translation regime + * with Normal IS WBWA attributes and RO data and Execute Never + * instruction access permissions. + * + * X1: Size of the buffer in bytes + * + * X2: cookie value (Implementation Defined) + * + * X3: cookie value (Implementation Defined) + * + * X4 to X30 = 0 (already done by cm_init_my_context()) + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X1, PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X2, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_0); + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X3, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_1); + + /* + * SP_EL0: A non-zero value will indicate to the SP that the SPM has + * initialized the stack pointer for the current CPU through + * implementation defined means. The value will be 0 otherwise. + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0, + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_BASE + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_PCPU_SIZE); + + /* + * Setup translation tables + * ------------------------ + */ + +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + + /* Get max granularity supported by the platform. */ + + u_register_t id_aa64prf0_el1 = read_id_aa64pfr0_el1(); + + int tgran64_supported = + ((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SHIFT) & + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_MASK) == + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SUPPORTED; + + int tgran16_supported = + ((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SHIFT) & + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_MASK) == + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SUPPORTED; + + int tgran4_supported = + ((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SHIFT) & + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_MASK) == + ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SUPPORTED; + + uintptr_t max_granule_size; + + if (tgran64_supported) { + max_granule_size = 64 * 1024; + } else if (tgran16_supported) { + max_granule_size = 16 * 1024; + } else { + assert(tgran4_supported); + max_granule_size = 4 * 1024; + } + + VERBOSE("Max translation granule supported: %lu KiB\n", + max_granule_size); + + uintptr_t max_granule_size_mask = max_granule_size - 1; + + /* Base must be aligned to the max granularity */ + assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_BASE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0); + + /* Size must be a multiple of the max granularity */ + assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_SIZE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0); + +#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + /* This region contains the exception vectors used at S-EL1. */ + const mmap_region_t sel1_exception_vectors = + MAP_REGION_FLAT(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START, + SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE, + MT_CODE | MT_SECURE | MT_PRIVILEGED); + mmap_add_region_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx, + &sel1_exception_vectors); + + mmap_add_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx, + plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(NULL)); + + init_xlat_tables_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx); + + /* + * MMU-related registers + * --------------------- + */ + + /* Set attributes in the right indices of the MAIR */ + u_register_t mair_el1 = + MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_DEVICE, ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) | + MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR, ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR_INDEX) | + MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE, ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE_INDEX); + + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MAIR_EL1, mair_el1); + + /* Setup TCR_EL1. */ + u_register_t tcr_ps_bits = tcr_physical_addr_size_bits(PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE); + + u_register_t tcr_el1 = + /* Size of region addressed by TTBR0_EL1 = 2^(64-T0SZ) bytes. */ + (64 - __builtin_ctzl(PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)) | + /* Inner and outer WBWA, shareable. */ + TCR_SH_INNER_SHAREABLE | TCR_RGN_OUTER_WBA | TCR_RGN_INNER_WBA | + /* Set the granularity to 4KB. */ + TCR_TG0_4K | + /* Limit Intermediate Physical Address Size. */ + tcr_ps_bits << TCR_EL1_IPS_SHIFT | + /* Disable translations using TBBR1_EL1. */ + TCR_EPD1_BIT + /* The remaining fields related to TBBR1_EL1 are left as zero. */ + ; + + tcr_el1 &= ~( + /* Enable translations using TBBR0_EL1 */ + TCR_EPD0_BIT + ); + + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TCR_EL1, tcr_el1); + + /* Setup SCTLR_EL1 */ + u_register_t sctlr_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1); + + sctlr_el1 |= + /*SCTLR_EL1_RES1 |*/ + /* Don't trap DC CVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC, DC CVAP, or IC IVAU */ + SCTLR_UCI_BIT | + /* RW regions at xlat regime EL1&0 are forced to be XN. */ + SCTLR_WXN_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 execution of WFI or WFE at EL0. */ + SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 accesses to CTR_EL0 from EL0. */ + SCTLR_UCT_BIT | + /* Don't trap to EL1 execution of DZ ZVA at EL0. */ + SCTLR_DZE_BIT | + /* Enable SP Alignment check for EL0 */ + SCTLR_SA0_BIT | + /* Allow cacheable data and instr. accesses to normal memory. */ + SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT | + /* Alignment fault checking enabled when at EL1 and EL0. */ + SCTLR_A_BIT | + /* Enable MMU. */ + SCTLR_M_BIT + ; + + sctlr_el1 &= ~( + /* Explicit data accesses at EL0 are little-endian. */ + SCTLR_E0E_BIT | + /* Accesses to DAIF from EL0 are trapped to EL1. */ + SCTLR_UMA_BIT + ); + + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_el1); + + /* Point TTBR0_EL1 at the tables of the context created for the SP. */ + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TTBR0_EL1, + (u_register_t)secure_partition_base_xlat_table); + + /* + * Setup other system registers + * ---------------------------- + */ + + /* Shim Exception Vector Base Address */ + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_VBAR_EL1, + SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR); + + /* + * FPEN: Forbid the Secure Partition to access FP/SIMD registers. + * TTA: Enable access to trace registers. + * ZEN (v8.2): Trap SVE instructions and access to SVE registers. + */ + write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPACR_EL1, + CPACR_EL1_FPEN(CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_ALL)); + + /* + * Prepare information in buffer shared between EL3 and S-EL0 + * ---------------------------------------------------------- + */ + + void *shared_buf_ptr = (void *) PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE; + + /* Copy the boot information into the shared buffer with the SP. */ + assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t) + <= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE)); + + assert(PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE <= (UINTPTR_MAX - PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE + 1)); + + const secure_partition_boot_info_t *sp_boot_info = + plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(NULL); + + assert(sp_boot_info != NULL); + + memcpy((void *) shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_boot_info, + sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t)); + + /* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */ + secure_partition_mp_info_t *sp_mp_info = + ((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info; + + assert(sp_mp_info != NULL); + + /* + * Point the shared buffer MP information pointer to where the info will + * be populated, just after the boot info. + */ + ((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info = + (secure_partition_mp_info_t *) ((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + + sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t)); + + /* + * Update the shared buffer pointer to where the MP information for the + * payload will be populated + */ + shared_buf_ptr = ((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info; + + /* + * Copy the cpu information into the shared buffer area after the boot + * information. + */ + assert(sp_boot_info->num_cpus <= PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT); + + assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + <= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE - + (sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info)))); + + memcpy(shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_mp_info, + sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info)); + + /* + * Calculate the linear indices of cores in boot information for the + * secure partition and flag the primary CPU + */ + sp_mp_info = (secure_partition_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr; + + for (unsigned int index = 0; index < sp_boot_info->num_cpus; index++) { + u_register_t mpidr = sp_mp_info[index].mpidr; + + sp_mp_info[index].linear_id = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); + if (plat_my_core_pos() == sp_mp_info[index].linear_id) + sp_mp_info[index].flags |= MP_INFO_FLAG_PRIMARY_CPU; + } + + VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup end.\n"); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk new file mode 100644 index 00000000..562eaee4 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +ifneq (${SPD},none) + $(error "Error: SPD and SPM are incompatible build options.") +endif +ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64) + $(error "Error: SPM is only supported on aarch64.") +endif + +# SPM sources + + +SPM_SOURCES := $(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/, \ + spm_main.c \ + ${ARCH}/spm_helpers.S \ + secure_partition_setup.c \ + ${ARCH}/spm_shim_exceptions.S) + + +# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image +NEED_BL32 := yes diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1b40d81d --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,452 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <bl31.h> +#include <context_mgmt.h> +#include <debug.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <platform.h> +#include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <secure_partition.h> +#include <smcc.h> +#include <smcc_helpers.h> +#include <spinlock.h> +#include <spm_svc.h> +#include <utils.h> +#include <xlat_tables_v2.h> + +#include "spm_private.h" + +/* Lock used for SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET and SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET */ +static spinlock_t mem_attr_smc_lock; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Partition context information. + ******************************************************************************/ +static secure_partition_context_t sp_ctx; +unsigned int sp_init_in_progress; + +/******************************************************************************* + * Replace the S-EL1 re-entry information with S-EL0 re-entry + * information + ******************************************************************************/ +void spm_setup_next_eret_into_sel0(cpu_context_t *secure_context) +{ + assert(secure_context == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + + cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, read_elr_el1(), read_spsr_el1()); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes an SP context pointer and: + * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from sp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee-saved registers) on the stack + * frame and saves a reference to this state. + * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers + * from the sp_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image. + ******************************************************************************/ +static uint64_t spm_synchronous_sp_entry(secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr) +{ + uint64_t rc; + + assert(sp_ctx_ptr != NULL); + assert(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx == 0); + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx); + + /* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + VERBOSE("%s: We're about to enter the Secure partition...\n", __func__); + + rc = spm_secure_partition_enter(&sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx); +#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx = 0; +#endif + + return rc; +} + + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function takes a Secure partition context pointer and: + * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp sp_ctx->cpu_ctx. + * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the + * stack frame using the reference to this state saved in + * spm_secure_partition_enter(). + * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state + * as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those. + ******************************************************************************/ +static void __dead2 spm_synchronous_sp_exit( + secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr, uint64_t ret) +{ + assert(sp_ctx_ptr != NULL); + /* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */ + assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + + assert(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx != 0); + spm_secure_partition_exit(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx, ret); + + /* Should never reach here */ + assert(0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * This function passes control to the Secure Partition image (BL32) for the + * first time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid + * secure context has already been created by spm_setup() which can be directly + * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. + * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t spm_init(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *secure_partition_ep_info; + uint64_t rc; + + VERBOSE("%s entry\n", __func__); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Partition (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + secure_partition_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + assert(secure_partition_ep_info); + + /* + * Initialise the common context and then overlay the S-EL0 specific + * context on top of it. + */ + cm_init_my_context(secure_partition_ep_info); + secure_partition_setup(); + + /* + * Arrange for an entry into the secure payload. + */ + sp_init_in_progress = 1; + rc = spm_synchronous_sp_entry(&sp_ctx); + assert(rc == 0); + sp_init_in_progress = 0; + VERBOSE("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 availability has been revoked\n"); + + return rc; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC & pointer to + * a context data structure, this function will initialize the SPM context and + * entry point info for the secure payload + ******************************************************************************/ +void spm_init_sp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *sp_ep_info, + uint64_t pc, + secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr) +{ + uint32_t ep_attr; + + assert(sp_ep_info); + assert(pc); + assert(sp_ctx_ptr); + + cm_set_context(&sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx, SECURE); + + /* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */ + ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE; + if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT) + ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG; + SET_PARAM_HEAD(sp_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr); + + sp_ep_info->pc = pc; + /* The SPM payload runs in S-EL0 */ + sp_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL0, + MODE_SP_EL0, + DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS); + + zeromem(&sp_ep_info->args, sizeof(sp_ep_info->args)); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + * Secure Partition Manager setup. The SPM finds out the SP entrypoint if not + * already known and initialises the context for entry into the SP for its + * initialisation. + ******************************************************************************/ +int32_t spm_setup(void) +{ + entry_point_info_t *secure_partition_ep_info; + + VERBOSE("%s entry\n", __func__); + + /* + * Get information about the Secure Partition (BL32) image. Its + * absence is a critical failure. + */ + secure_partition_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE); + if (!secure_partition_ep_info) { + WARN("No SPM provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device" + " without SPM initialization. SMCs destined for SPM" + " will return SMC_UNK\n"); + return 1; + } + + /* + * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value + * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without + * registering any handlers + */ + if (!secure_partition_ep_info->pc) { + return 1; + } + + spm_init_sp_ep_state(secure_partition_ep_info, + secure_partition_ep_info->pc, + &sp_ctx); + + /* + * All SPM initialization done. Now register our init function with + * BL31 for deferred invocation + */ + bl31_register_bl32_init(&spm_init); + + VERBOSE("%s exit\n", __func__); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Attributes are encoded using a different format in the SMC interface than in + * the Trusted Firmware, where the mmap_attr_t enum type is used. This function + * converts an attributes value from the SMC format to the mmap_attr_t format by + * setting MT_RW/MT_RO, MT_USER/MT_PRIVILEGED and MT_EXECUTE/MT_EXECUTE_NEVER. + * The other fields are left as 0 because they are ignored by the function + * change_mem_attributes(). + */ +static mmap_attr_t smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(unsigned int attributes) +{ + mmap_attr_t tf_attr = 0; + + unsigned int access = (attributes & SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_MASK) + >> SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_SHIFT; + + if (access == SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RW) { + tf_attr |= MT_RW | MT_USER; + } else if (access == SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RO) { + tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_USER; + } else { + /* Other values are reserved. */ + assert(access == SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_NOACCESS); + /* The only requirement is that there's no access from EL0 */ + tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_PRIVILEGED; + } + + if ((attributes & SP_MEM_ATTR_NON_EXEC) == 0) { + tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE; + } else { + tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE_NEVER; + } + + return tf_attr; +} + +/* + * This function converts attributes from the Trusted Firmware format into the + * SMC interface format. + */ +static int smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(mmap_attr_t attr) +{ + int smc_attr = 0; + + int data_access; + + if ((attr & MT_USER) == 0) { + /* No access from EL0. */ + data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_NOACCESS; + } else { + if ((attr & MT_RW) != 0) { + assert(MT_TYPE(attr) != MT_DEVICE); + data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RW; + } else { + data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RO; + } + } + + smc_attr |= (data_access & SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_MASK) << SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_SHIFT; + + if (attr & MT_EXECUTE_NEVER) { + smc_attr |= SP_MEM_ATTR_NON_EXEC; + } + + return smc_attr; +} + +static int spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(uintptr_t base_va) +{ + spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + mmap_attr_t attributes; + int rc = get_mem_attributes(secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle, + base_va, &attributes); + + spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + /* Convert error codes of get_mem_attributes() into SPM ones. */ + assert(rc == 0 || rc == -EINVAL); + + if (rc == 0) { + return smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(attributes); + } else { + return SPM_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } +} + +static int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(u_register_t page_address, + u_register_t pages_count, + u_register_t smc_attributes) +{ + uintptr_t base_va = (uintptr_t) page_address; + size_t size = (size_t) (pages_count * PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned int attributes = (unsigned int) smc_attributes; + + INFO(" Start address : 0x%lx\n", base_va); + INFO(" Number of pages: %i (%zi bytes)\n", (int) pages_count, size); + INFO(" Attributes : 0x%x\n", attributes); + + spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + int ret = change_mem_attributes(secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle, + base_va, size, smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(attributes)); + + spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock); + + /* Convert error codes of change_mem_attributes() into SPM ones. */ + assert(ret == 0 || ret == -EINVAL); + + return (ret == 0) ? SPM_SUCCESS : SPM_INVALID_PARAMETER; +} + + +uint64_t spm_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, + uint64_t x1, + uint64_t x2, + uint64_t x3, + uint64_t x4, + void *cookie, + void *handle, + uint64_t flags) +{ + cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context; + unsigned int ns; + + /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */ + ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags); + + if (ns == SMC_FROM_SECURE) { + + /* Handle SMCs from Secure world. */ + + switch (smc_fid) { + + case SPM_VERSION_AARCH32: + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_VERSION_COMPILED); + + case SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64: + assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE); + spm_setup_next_eret_into_sel0(handle); + + if (sp_init_in_progress) { + /* + * SPM reports completion. The SPM must have + * initiated the original request through a + * synchronous entry into the secure + * partition. Jump back to the original C + * runtime context. + */ + spm_synchronous_sp_exit(&sp_ctx, x1); + assert(0); + } + + /* + * This is the result from the Secure partition of an + * earlier request. Copy the result into the non-secure + * context, save the secure state and return to the + * non-secure state. + */ + + /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */ + ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE); + assert(ns_cpu_context); + + /* Restore non-secure state */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE); + + /* Return to normal world */ + SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1); + + case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64: + INFO("Received SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 SMC\n"); + + if (!sp_init_in_progress) { + WARN("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(x1)); + + case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64: + INFO("Received SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 SMC\n"); + + if (!sp_init_in_progress) { + WARN("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n"); + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } + SMC_RET1(handle, spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(x1, x2, x3)); + default: + break; + } + } else { + + /* Handle SMCs from Non-secure world. */ + + switch (smc_fid) { + + case SP_VERSION_AARCH64: + case SP_VERSION_AARCH32: + SMC_RET1(handle, SP_VERSION_COMPILED); + + case SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32: + case SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH64: + + /* Save the Normal world context */ + cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE); + + /* + * Restore the secure world context and prepare for + * entry in S-EL0 + */ + assert(&sp_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE)); + cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE); + cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE); + + if (x2 != 0) { + VERBOSE("SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32/64: X2 is not 0 as recommended."); + } + + SMC_RET4(&sp_ctx.cpu_ctx, + smc_fid, x2, x3, plat_my_core_pos()); + + case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64: + case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64: + /* SMC interfaces reserved for secure callers. */ + SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + default: + break; + } + } + + SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK); +} diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..16993e8c --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef __SPM_PRIVATE_H__ +#define __SPM_PRIVATE_H__ + +#include <context.h> + +/******************************************************************************* + * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the + * C runtime context while performing a security state switch. + ******************************************************************************/ +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 0x0 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20 0x8 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 0x10 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22 0x18 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 0x20 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24 0x28 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 0x30 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26 0x38 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 0x40 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28 0x48 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 0x50 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30 0x58 + +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE 0x60 +#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES (SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT) + + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <xlat_tables_v2.h> + +/* Handle on the Secure partition translation context */ +extern xlat_ctx_t *secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle; + +struct entry_point_info; + +typedef struct secure_partition_context { + uint64_t c_rt_ctx; + cpu_context_t cpu_ctx; +} secure_partition_context_t; + +uint64_t spm_secure_partition_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx); +void __dead2 spm_secure_partition_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret); +void spm_init_sp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *sp_ep_info, + uint64_t pc, + secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr); +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* __SPM_PRIVATE_H__ */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad953cde --- /dev/null +++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + */ + +#ifndef __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__ +#define __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__ + +#include <types.h> + +/* Assembly source */ +extern uintptr_t spm_shim_exceptions_ptr; + +/* Linker symbols */ +extern uintptr_t __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__; +extern uintptr_t __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__; + +/* Definitions */ +#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR (uintptr_t)(&spm_shim_exceptions_ptr) + +#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START \ + (uintptr_t)(&__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__) +#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END \ + (uintptr_t)(&__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__) +#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE \ + (SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END - SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START) + +#endif /* __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__ */ diff --git a/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c index 8e690467..ffc34716 100644 --- a/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c +++ b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2014-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. * * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */ @@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ #include <psci.h> #include <runtime_instr.h> #include <runtime_svc.h> +#include <sdei.h> #include <smcc_helpers.h> +#include <spm_svc.h> #include <std_svc.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <uuid.h> @@ -25,15 +27,31 @@ DEFINE_SVC_UUID(arm_svc_uid, static int32_t std_svc_setup(void) { uintptr_t svc_arg; + int ret = 0; svc_arg = get_arm_std_svc_args(PSCI_FID_MASK); assert(svc_arg); /* - * PSCI is the only specification implemented as a Standard Service. + * PSCI is one of the specifications implemented as a Standard Service. * The `psci_setup()` also does EL3 architectural setup. */ - return psci_setup((const psci_lib_args_t *)svc_arg); + if (psci_setup((const psci_lib_args_t *)svc_arg) != PSCI_E_SUCCESS) { + ret = 1; + } + +#if ENABLE_SPM + if (spm_setup() != 0) { + ret = 1; + } +#endif + +#if SDEI_SUPPORT + /* SDEI initialisation */ + sdei_init(); +#endif + + return ret; } /* @@ -80,6 +98,24 @@ uintptr_t std_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid, SMC_RET1(handle, ret); } +#if ENABLE_SPM + /* + * Dispatch SPM calls to SPM SMC handler and return its return + * value + */ + if (is_spm_fid(smc_fid)) { + return spm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, + handle, flags); + } +#endif + +#if SDEI_SUPPORT + if (is_sdei_fid(smc_fid)) { + return sdei_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle, + flags); + } +#endif + switch (smc_fid) { case ARM_STD_SVC_CALL_COUNT: /* |