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<title>linux-toradex.git, branch v2.6.16.27</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
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<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.16.27</title>
<updated>2006-07-17T13:58:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-17T13:58:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=659eadfc20751c1e0784f4910d194fcd836b86db'/>
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<pre>
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<entry>
<title>[PATCH] USB serial ftdi_sio: Prevent userspace DoS (CVE-2006-2936)</title>
<updated>2006-07-17T13:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Abbott</name>
<email>abbotti@mev.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-26T11:59:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b6c9e34e0aca7f2ba1c106d6805f1c18a99dffc8'/>
<id>b6c9e34e0aca7f2ba1c106d6805f1c18a99dffc8</id>
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This patch limits the amount of outstanding 'write' data that can be
queued up for the ftdi_sio driver, to prevent userspace DoS attacks (or
simple accidents) that use up all the system memory by writing lots of
data to the serial port.

Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott &lt;abbotti@mev.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
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This patch limits the amount of outstanding 'write' data that can be
queued up for the ftdi_sio driver, to prevent userspace DoS attacks (or
simple accidents) that use up all the system memory by writing lots of
data to the serial port.

Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott &lt;abbotti@mev.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] IPV6 ADDRCONF: Fix default source address selection without CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY</title>
<updated>2006-07-17T13:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>YOSHIFUJI Hideaki</name>
<email>yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-22T08:42:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8ac7545d688e3f83a02549b5281620cfeed0e281'/>
<id>8ac7545d688e3f83a02549b5281620cfeed0e281</id>
<content type='text'>
We need to update hiscore.rule even if we don't enable CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY,
because we have more less significant rule; longest match.

Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
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We need to update hiscore.rule even if we don't enable CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY,
because we have more less significant rule; longest match.

Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] IPV6: Fix source address selection.</title>
<updated>2006-07-17T13:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>$,1 aukasz Stelmach</name>
<email>stlman@poczta.fm</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-22T08:39:05+00:00</published>
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Two additional labels (RFC 3484, sec. 10.3) for IPv6 addreses
are defined to make a distinction between global unicast
addresses and Unique Local Addresses (fc00::/7, RFC 4193) and
Teredo (2001::/32, RFC 4380). It is necessary to avoid attempts
of connection that would either fail (eg. fec0:: to 2001:feed::)
or be sub-optimal (2001:0:: to 2001:feed::).

Signed-off-by: $,1 aukasz Stelmach &lt;stlman@poczta.fm&gt;
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
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<pre>
Two additional labels (RFC 3484, sec. 10.3) for IPv6 addreses
are defined to make a distinction between global unicast
addresses and Unique Local Addresses (fc00::/7, RFC 4193) and
Teredo (2001::/32, RFC 4380). It is necessary to avoid attempts
of connection that would either fail (eg. fec0:: to 2001:feed::)
or be sub-optimal (2001:0:: to 2001:feed::).

Signed-off-by: $,1 aukasz Stelmach &lt;stlman@poczta.fm&gt;
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.16.25</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T19:45:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-15T19:45:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e7291d7695d3271fe6062039a21e1ab276390554'/>
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<pre>
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Relax /proc fix a bit</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T19:45:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-15T05:59:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=17fe0b2d3142f81b09ece55aa5e290cdc49b4a22'/>
<id>17fe0b2d3142f81b09ece55aa5e290cdc49b4a22</id>
<content type='text'>
Relax /proc fix a bit

Clearign all of i_mode was a bit draconian. We only really care about
S_ISUID/ISGID, after all.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
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<pre>
Relax /proc fix a bit

Clearign all of i_mode was a bit draconian. We only really care about
S_ISUID/ISGID, after all.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.16.25</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T02:33:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-15T02:33:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f7a3975e687412bc400352e0eeaf9a8521de4e10'/>
<id>f7a3975e687412bc400352e0eeaf9a8521de4e10</id>
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<pre>
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix nasty /proc vulnerability (CVE-2006-3626)</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T02:30:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-14T23:59:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d8a2707576c2d12dd79d797a9bff3b10b3d182f7'/>
<id>d8a2707576c2d12dd79d797a9bff3b10b3d182f7</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix nasty /proc vulnerability

We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status.  This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Fix nasty /proc vulnerability

We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status.  This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.16.24</title>
<updated>2006-07-06T20:06:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-06T20:06:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=407972755b44d0a18647dab1f1e62df80b6638d0'/>
<id>407972755b44d0a18647dab1f1e62df80b6638d0</id>
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<pre>
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix prctl privilege escalation and suid_dumpable (CVE-2006-2451)</title>
<updated>2006-07-06T20:05:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-06T20:05:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9e4e45f19bdd41b4091e5fe556f816f4046c7598'/>
<id>9e4e45f19bdd41b4091e5fe556f816f4046c7598</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides

During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core
dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a
core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have
permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk
consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
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Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides

During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core
dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a
core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have
permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk
consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
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