<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git, branch v2.6.25.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.25.10</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-03T03:46:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=76605033bb81028b4c603a324dcec6793b7da8ae'/>
<id>76605033bb81028b4c603a324dcec6793b7da8ae</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: shift bits the right way in native_read_tscp</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Max Asbock</name>
<email>masbock@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-30T16:17:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8ede7cd02adbd93b00f7097e38c7d3ee0c21f3f0'/>
<id>8ede7cd02adbd93b00f7097e38c7d3ee0c21f3f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 41aefdcc98fdba47459eab67630293d67e855fc3 upstream

x86: shift bits the right way in native_read_tscp

native_read_tscp shifts the bits in the high order value in the
wrong direction, the attached patch fixes that.

Signed-off-by: Max Asbock &lt;masbock@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Glauber Costa &lt;gcosta@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 41aefdcc98fdba47459eab67630293d67e855fc3 upstream

x86: shift bits the right way in native_read_tscp

native_read_tscp shifts the bits in the high order value in the
wrong direction, the attached patch fixes that.

Signed-off-by: Max Asbock &lt;masbock@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Glauber Costa &lt;gcosta@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: fix cpu hotplug crash</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yanmin Zhang</name>
<email>yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-30T16:21:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=712a9da4d9f05a918152422bbc30b601f892b62c'/>
<id>712a9da4d9f05a918152422bbc30b601f892b62c</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit fcb43042ef55d2f46b0efa5d7746967cef38f056 upstream

x86: fix cpu hotplug crash

Vegard Nossum reported crashes during cpu hotplug tests:

  http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=121413950227884&amp;w=4

In function _cpu_up, the panic happens when calling
__raw_notifier_call_chain at the second time. Kernel doesn't panic when
calling it at the first time. If just say because of nr_cpu_ids, that's
not right.

By checking the source code, I found that function do_boot_cpu is the culprit.
Consider below call chain:
 _cpu_up=&gt;__cpu_up=&gt;smp_ops.cpu_up=&gt;native_cpu_up=&gt;do_boot_cpu.

So do_boot_cpu is called in the end. In do_boot_cpu, if
boot_error==true, cpu_clear(cpu, cpu_possible_map) is executed. So later
on, when _cpu_up calls __raw_notifier_call_chain at the second time to
report CPU_UP_CANCELED, because this cpu is already cleared from
cpu_possible_map, get_cpu_sysdev returns NULL.

Many resources are related to cpu_possible_map, so it's better not to
change it.

Below patch against 2.6.26-rc7 fixes it by removing the bit clearing in
cpu_possible_map.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Yanmin &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit fcb43042ef55d2f46b0efa5d7746967cef38f056 upstream

x86: fix cpu hotplug crash

Vegard Nossum reported crashes during cpu hotplug tests:

  http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=121413950227884&amp;w=4

In function _cpu_up, the panic happens when calling
__raw_notifier_call_chain at the second time. Kernel doesn't panic when
calling it at the first time. If just say because of nr_cpu_ids, that's
not right.

By checking the source code, I found that function do_boot_cpu is the culprit.
Consider below call chain:
 _cpu_up=&gt;__cpu_up=&gt;smp_ops.cpu_up=&gt;native_cpu_up=&gt;do_boot_cpu.

So do_boot_cpu is called in the end. In do_boot_cpu, if
boot_error==true, cpu_clear(cpu, cpu_possible_map) is executed. So later
on, when _cpu_up calls __raw_notifier_call_chain at the second time to
report CPU_UP_CANCELED, because this cpu is already cleared from
cpu_possible_map, get_cpu_sysdev returns NULL.

Many resources are related to cpu_possible_map, so it's better not to
change it.

Below patch against 2.6.26-rc7 fixes it by removing the bit clearing in
cpu_possible_map.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Yanmin &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace GET/SET FPXREGS broken</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>TAKADA Yoshihito</name>
<email>takada@mbf.nifty.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-30T16:22:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=66f100382995e2510e5bbae37ec4dbc4f73e4638'/>
<id>66f100382995e2510e5bbae37ec4dbc4f73e4638</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 11dbc963a8f6128595d0f6ecf138dc369e144997 upstream

ptrace GET/SET FPXREGS broken

When I update kernel 2.6.25 from 2.6.24, gdb does not work.
On 2.6.25, ptrace(PTRACE_GETFPXREGS, ...) returns ENODEV.

But 2.6.24 kernel's ptrace() returns EIO.
It is issue of compatibility.

I attached test program as pt.c and patch for fix it.

#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;signal.h&gt;
#include &lt;errno.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/ptrace.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;

struct user_fxsr_struct {
	unsigned short	cwd;
	unsigned short	swd;
	unsigned short	twd;
	unsigned short	fop;
	long	fip;
	long	fcs;
	long	foo;
	long	fos;
	long	mxcsr;
	long	reserved;
	long	st_space[32];	/* 8*16 bytes for each FP-reg = 128 bytes */
	long	xmm_space[32];	/* 8*16 bytes for each XMM-reg = 128 bytes */
	long	padding[56];
};

int main(void)
{
  pid_t pid;

  pid = fork();

  switch(pid){
  case -1:/*  error */
    break;
  case 0:/*  child */
    child();
    break;
  default:
    parent(pid);
    break;
  }
  return 0;
}

int child(void)
{
  ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME);
  kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
  sleep(10);
  return 0;
}
int parent(pid_t pid)
{
  int ret;
  struct user_fxsr_struct fpxregs;

  ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETFPXREGS, pid, 0, &amp;fpxregs);
  if(ret &lt; 0){
    printf("%d: %s.\n", errno, strerror(errno));
  }
  kill(pid, SIGCONT);
  wait(pid);
  return 0;
}

/* in the kerel, at kernel/i387.c get_fpxregs() */

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 11dbc963a8f6128595d0f6ecf138dc369e144997 upstream

ptrace GET/SET FPXREGS broken

When I update kernel 2.6.25 from 2.6.24, gdb does not work.
On 2.6.25, ptrace(PTRACE_GETFPXREGS, ...) returns ENODEV.

But 2.6.24 kernel's ptrace() returns EIO.
It is issue of compatibility.

I attached test program as pt.c and patch for fix it.

#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;signal.h&gt;
#include &lt;errno.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/ptrace.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;

struct user_fxsr_struct {
	unsigned short	cwd;
	unsigned short	swd;
	unsigned short	twd;
	unsigned short	fop;
	long	fip;
	long	fcs;
	long	foo;
	long	fos;
	long	mxcsr;
	long	reserved;
	long	st_space[32];	/* 8*16 bytes for each FP-reg = 128 bytes */
	long	xmm_space[32];	/* 8*16 bytes for each XMM-reg = 128 bytes */
	long	padding[56];
};

int main(void)
{
  pid_t pid;

  pid = fork();

  switch(pid){
  case -1:/*  error */
    break;
  case 0:/*  child */
    child();
    break;
  default:
    parent(pid);
    break;
  }
  return 0;
}

int child(void)
{
  ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME);
  kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
  sleep(10);
  return 0;
}
int parent(pid_t pid)
{
  int ret;
  struct user_fxsr_struct fpxregs;

  ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETFPXREGS, pid, 0, &amp;fpxregs);
  if(ret &lt; 0){
    printf("%d: %s.\n", errno, strerror(errno));
  }
  kill(pid, SIGCONT);
  wait(pid);
  return 0;
}

/* in the kerel, at kernel/i387.c get_fpxregs() */

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: fix cpu hotplug</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Adamushko</name>
<email>dmitry.adamushko@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-30T16:22:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0758c2f30b75419fbe5e0ec6dfc892bbc0687f57'/>
<id>0758c2f30b75419fbe5e0ec6dfc892bbc0687f57</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 79c537998d143b127c8c662a403c3356cb885f1c upstream

the CPU hotplug problems (crashes under high-volume unplug+replug
tests) seem to be related to migrate_dead_tasks().

Firstly I added traces to see all tasks being migrated with
migrate_live_tasks() and migrate_dead_tasks(). On my setup the problem
pops up (the one with "se == NULL" in the loop of
pick_next_task_fair()) shortly after the traces indicate that some has
been migrated with migrate_dead_tasks()). btw., I can reproduce it
much faster now with just a plain cpu down/up loop.

[disclaimer] Well, unless I'm really missing something important in
this late hour [/desclaimer] pick_next_task() is not something
appropriate for migrate_dead_tasks() :-)

the following change seems to eliminate the problem on my setup
(although, I kept it running only for a few minutes to get a few
messages indicating migrate_dead_tasks() does move tasks and the
system is still ok)

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Commit 79c537998d143b127c8c662a403c3356cb885f1c upstream

the CPU hotplug problems (crashes under high-volume unplug+replug
tests) seem to be related to migrate_dead_tasks().

Firstly I added traces to see all tasks being migrated with
migrate_live_tasks() and migrate_dead_tasks(). On my setup the problem
pops up (the one with "se == NULL" in the loop of
pick_next_task_fair()) shortly after the traces indicate that some has
been migrated with migrate_dead_tasks()). btw., I can reproduce it
much faster now with just a plain cpu down/up loop.

[disclaimer] Well, unless I'm really missing something important in
this late hour [/desclaimer] pick_next_task() is not something
appropriate for migrate_dead_tasks() :-)

the following change seems to eliminate the problem on my setup
(although, I kept it running only for a few minutes to get a few
messages indicating migrate_dead_tasks() does move tasks and the
system is still ok)

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86_64 ptrace: fix sys32_ptrace task_struct leak</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland McGrath</name>
<email>roland@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-27T20:48:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1e9a615bfce7996ea4d815d45d364b47ac6a74e8'/>
<id>1e9a615bfce7996ea4d815d45d364b47ac6a74e8</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 5a4646a4efed8c835f76c3b88f3155f6ab5b8d9b introduced a leak of
task_struct refs into sys32_ptrace.  This bug has already gone away in
for 2.6.26 in commit 562b80bafffaf42a6d916b0a2ee3d684220a1c10.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 5a4646a4efed8c835f76c3b88f3155f6ab5b8d9b introduced a leak of
task_struct refs into sys32_ptrace.  This bug has already gone away in
for 2.6.26 in commit 562b80bafffaf42a6d916b0a2ee3d684220a1c10.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>DRM: enable bus mastering on i915 at resume time</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jie Luo</name>
<email>clotho67@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-24T17:38:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=20dc9a897a736105af739346fd6517dec6142b5d'/>
<id>20dc9a897a736105af739346fd6517dec6142b5d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ea7b44c8e6baa1a4507f05ba2c0009ac21c3fe0b upstream

On 9xx chips, bus mastering needs to be enabled at resume time for much of the
chip to function.  With this patch, vblank interrupts will work as expected
on resume, along with other chip functions.   Fixes kernel bugzilla #10844.

Signed-off-by: Jie Luo &lt;clotho67@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes &lt;jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ea7b44c8e6baa1a4507f05ba2c0009ac21c3fe0b upstream

On 9xx chips, bus mastering needs to be enabled at resume time for much of the
chip to function.  With this patch, vblank interrupts will work as expected
on resume, along with other chip functions.   Fixes kernel bugzilla #10844.

Signed-off-by: Jie Luo &lt;clotho67@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes &lt;jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mthca: Clear ICM pages before handing to FW</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eli Cohen</name>
<email>eli@mellanox.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-23T23:30:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f139f638a58706d45e1219e7625ec39608115b2'/>
<id>6f139f638a58706d45e1219e7625ec39608115b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 87afd448b186c885d67a08b7417cd46253b6a9d6 upstream

Current memfree FW has a bug which in some cases, assumes that ICM
pages passed to it are cleared.  This patch uses __GFP_ZERO to
allocate all ICM pages passed to the FW.  Once firmware with a fix is
released, we can make the workaround conditional on firmware version.

This fixes the bug reported by Arthur Kepner &lt;akepner@sgi.com&gt; here:
http://lists.openfabrics.org/pipermail/general/2008-May/050026.html

[ Rewritten to be a one-liner using __GFP_ZERO instead of vmap()ing
  ICM memory and memset()ing it to 0. - Roland ]

Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen &lt;eli@mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;rolandd@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 87afd448b186c885d67a08b7417cd46253b6a9d6 upstream

Current memfree FW has a bug which in some cases, assumes that ICM
pages passed to it are cleared.  This patch uses __GFP_ZERO to
allocate all ICM pages passed to the FW.  Once firmware with a fix is
released, we can make the workaround conditional on firmware version.

This fixes the bug reported by Arthur Kepner &lt;akepner@sgi.com&gt; here:
http://lists.openfabrics.org/pipermail/general/2008-May/050026.html

[ Rewritten to be a one-liner using __GFP_ZERO instead of vmap()ing
  ICM memory and memset()ing it to 0. - Roland ]

Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen &lt;eli@mellanox.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;rolandd@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futexes: fix fault handling in futex_lock_pi</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-23T23:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=935cfe235e825998eef8fd0673b1bd62fe4a85c2'/>
<id>935cfe235e825998eef8fd0673b1bd62fe4a85c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b7558e457ed0de61023cfc913d2c342c7c3d9f2 upstream

This patch addresses a very sporadic pi-futex related failure in
highly threaded java apps on large SMP systems.

David Holmes reported that the pi_state consistency check in
lookup_pi_state triggered with his test application. This means that
the kernel internal pi_state and the user space futex variable are out
of sync. First we assumed that this is a user space data corruption,
but deeper investigation revieled that the problem happend because the
pi-futex code is not handling a fault in the futex_lock_pi path when
the user space variable needs to be fixed up.

The fault happens when a fork mapped the anon memory which contains
the futex readonly for COW or the page got swapped out exactly between
the unlock of the futex and the return of either the new futex owner
or the task which was the expected owner but failed to acquire the
kernel internal rtmutex. The current futex_lock_pi() code drops out
with an inconsistent in case it faults and returns -EFAULT to user
space. User space has no way to fixup that state.

When we wrote this code we thought that we could not drop the hash
bucket lock at this point to handle the fault.

After analysing the code again it turned out to be wrong because there
are only two tasks involved which might modify the pi_state and the
user space variable:

 - the task which acquired the rtmutex
 - the pending owner of the pi_state which did not get the rtmutex

Both tasks drop into the fixup_pi_state() function before returning to
user space. The first task which acquired the hash bucket lock faults
in the fixup of the user space variable, drops the spinlock and calls
futex_handle_fault() to fault in the page. Now the second task could
acquire the hash bucket lock and tries to fixup the user space
variable as well. It either faults as well or it succeeds because the
first task already faulted the page in.

One caveat is to avoid a double fixup. After returning from the fault
handling we reacquire the hash bucket lock and check whether the
pi_state owner has been modified already.

Reported-by: David Holmes &lt;david.holmes@sun.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: David Holmes &lt;david.holmes@sun.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
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commit 1b7558e457ed0de61023cfc913d2c342c7c3d9f2 upstream

This patch addresses a very sporadic pi-futex related failure in
highly threaded java apps on large SMP systems.

David Holmes reported that the pi_state consistency check in
lookup_pi_state triggered with his test application. This means that
the kernel internal pi_state and the user space futex variable are out
of sync. First we assumed that this is a user space data corruption,
but deeper investigation revieled that the problem happend because the
pi-futex code is not handling a fault in the futex_lock_pi path when
the user space variable needs to be fixed up.

The fault happens when a fork mapped the anon memory which contains
the futex readonly for COW or the page got swapped out exactly between
the unlock of the futex and the return of either the new futex owner
or the task which was the expected owner but failed to acquire the
kernel internal rtmutex. The current futex_lock_pi() code drops out
with an inconsistent in case it faults and returns -EFAULT to user
space. User space has no way to fixup that state.

When we wrote this code we thought that we could not drop the hash
bucket lock at this point to handle the fault.

After analysing the code again it turned out to be wrong because there
are only two tasks involved which might modify the pi_state and the
user space variable:

 - the task which acquired the rtmutex
 - the pending owner of the pi_state which did not get the rtmutex

Both tasks drop into the fixup_pi_state() function before returning to
user space. The first task which acquired the hash bucket lock faults
in the fixup of the user space variable, drops the spinlock and calls
futex_handle_fault() to fault in the page. Now the second task could
acquire the hash bucket lock and tries to fixup the user space
variable as well. It either faults as well or it succeeds because the
first task already faulted the page in.

One caveat is to avoid a double fixup. After returning from the fault
handling we reacquire the hash bucket lock and check whether the
pi_state owner has been modified already.

Reported-by: David Holmes &lt;david.holmes@sun.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: David Holmes &lt;david.holmes@sun.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

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</entry>
<entry>
<title>TTY: fix for tty operations bugs</title>
<updated>2008-07-03T03:46:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alan Cox</name>
<email>alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-27T14:21:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2a739dd53ad7ee010ae6e155438507f329dce788'/>
<id>2a739dd53ad7ee010ae6e155438507f329dce788</id>
<content type='text'>
This is fixed with the recent tty operations rewrite in mainline in a
different way, this is a selective backport of the relevant portions to
the -stable tree.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox &lt;alan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is fixed with the recent tty operations rewrite in mainline in a
different way, this is a selective backport of the relevant portions to
the -stable tree.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox &lt;alan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

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