<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git, branch v2.6.27.38</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.27.38</title>
<updated>2009-10-22T07:22:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-22T07:22:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6bded80b15b125c02186b3f3349e3eb8465445a3'/>
<id>6bded80b15b125c02186b3f3349e3eb8465445a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>USB: digi_acceleport: Fix broken unthrottle.</title>
<updated>2009-10-22T04:51:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hovold</name>
<email>jhovold@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-29T10:39:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2a5674f320473aca8610a9f66bb2262d1b1dc839'/>
<id>2a5674f320473aca8610a9f66bb2262d1b1dc839</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ba6b702f85a61561d329c4c11d3ed95604924f9a upstream.

This patch fixes a regression introduced in
39892da44b21b5362eb848ca424d73a25ccc488f.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;jhovold@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oliver@neukum.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ba6b702f85a61561d329c4c11d3ed95604924f9a upstream.

This patch fixes a regression introduced in
39892da44b21b5362eb848ca424d73a25ccc488f.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold &lt;jhovold@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum &lt;oliver@neukum.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SCSI: Fix protection scsi_data_buffer leak</title>
<updated>2009-10-22T04:51:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin K. Petersen</name>
<email>martin.petersen@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-18T21:33:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=73932f03a6dc32f93518006eb1dfd7a72ee68537'/>
<id>73932f03a6dc32f93518006eb1dfd7a72ee68537</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b4c2554d40ceac130a8d062eaa8838ed22158c45 upstream.

We would leak a scsi_data_buffer if the free_list command was of the
protected variety.

Reported-by: Boaz Harrosh &lt;bharrosh@panasas.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b4c2554d40ceac130a8d062eaa8838ed22158c45 upstream.

We would leak a scsi_data_buffer if the free_list command was of the
protected variety.

Reported-by: Boaz Harrosh &lt;bharrosh@panasas.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb-serial: fix crash when sub-driver updates firmware</title>
<updated>2009-10-22T04:51:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alan Stern</name>
<email>stern@rowland.harvard.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-27T15:25:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=66f7234efcc7182ee7f3e5884ae385b2ff4dce87'/>
<id>66f7234efcc7182ee7f3e5884ae385b2ff4dce87</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a3c8549ea7e94d74a41096d42bc6cdf43d183bf upstream.

This patch (as1244) fixes a crash in usb-serial that occurs when a
sub-driver returns a positive value from its attach method, indicating
that new firmware was loaded and the device will disconnect and
reconnect.  The usb-serial core then skips the step of registering the
port devices; when the disconnect occurs, the attempt to unregister
the ports fails dramatically.

This problem shows up with Keyspan devices and it might affect others
as well.

When the attach method returns a positive value, the patch sets
num_ports to 0.  This tells usb_serial_disconnect() not to try
unregistering any of the ports; instead they are cleaned up by
destroy_serial().

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a3c8549ea7e94d74a41096d42bc6cdf43d183bf upstream.

This patch (as1244) fixes a crash in usb-serial that occurs when a
sub-driver returns a positive value from its attach method, indicating
that new firmware was loaded and the device will disconnect and
reconnect.  The usb-serial core then skips the step of registering the
port devices; when the disconnect occurs, the attempt to unregister
the ports fails dramatically.

This problem shows up with Keyspan devices and it might affect others
as well.

When the attach method returns a positive value, the patch sets
num_ports to 0.  This tells usb_serial_disconnect() not to try
unregistering any of the ports; instead they are cleaned up by
destroy_serial().

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.27.37</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:40:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-12T18:40:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8521cde0ae1b66dd68228ac674d9f0609767dc0a'/>
<id>8521cde0ae1b66dd68228ac674d9f0609767dc0a</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: catch xtime_nsec underflows and fix them</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:33:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>john stultz</name>
<email>johnstul@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-12-02T02:34:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3ce4d0a0f7184d5fe17747841f628adac60ed262'/>
<id>3ce4d0a0f7184d5fe17747841f628adac60ed262</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c9bacb41c10ba84ff68f238e234d96f35fb64f7 upstream.

Impact: fix time warp bug

Alex Shi, along with Yanmin Zhang have been noticing occasional time
inconsistencies recently. Through their great diagnosis, they found that
the xtime_nsec value used in update_wall_time was occasionally going
negative. After looking through the code for awhile, I realized we have
the possibility for an underflow when three conditions are met in
update_wall_time():

  1) We have accumulated a second's worth of nanoseconds, so we
     incremented xtime.tv_sec and appropriately decrement xtime_nsec.
     (This doesn't cause xtime_nsec to go negative, but it can cause it
      to be small).

  2) The remaining offset value is large, but just slightly less then
     cycle_interval.

  3) clocksource_adjust() is speeding up the clock, causing a
     corrective amount (compensating for the increase in the multiplier
     being multiplied against the unaccumulated offset value) to be
     subtracted from xtime_nsec.

This can cause xtime_nsec to underflow.

Unfortunately, since we notify the NTP subsystem via second_overflow()
whenever we accumulate a full second, and this effects the error
accumulation that has already occured, we cannot simply revert the
accumulated second from xtime nor move the second accumulation to after
the clocksource_adjust call without a change in behavior.

This leaves us with (at least) two options:

1) Simply return from clocksource_adjust() without making a change if we
   notice the adjustment would cause xtime_nsec to go negative.

This would work, but I'm concerned that if a large adjustment was needed
(due to the error being large), it may be possible to get stuck with an
ever increasing error that becomes too large to correct (since it may
always force xtime_nsec negative). This may just be paranoia on my part.

2) Catch xtime_nsec if it is negative, then add back the amount its
   negative to both xtime_nsec and the error.

This second method is consistent with how we've handled earlier rounding
issues, and also has the benefit that the error being added is always in
the oposite direction also always equal or smaller then the correction
being applied. So the risk of a corner case where things get out of
control is lessened.

This patch fixes bug 11970, as tested by Yanmin Zhang
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11970

Reported-by: alex.shi@intel.com
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;johnstul@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yanmin Zhang &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yanmin Zhang &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c9bacb41c10ba84ff68f238e234d96f35fb64f7 upstream.

Impact: fix time warp bug

Alex Shi, along with Yanmin Zhang have been noticing occasional time
inconsistencies recently. Through their great diagnosis, they found that
the xtime_nsec value used in update_wall_time was occasionally going
negative. After looking through the code for awhile, I realized we have
the possibility for an underflow when three conditions are met in
update_wall_time():

  1) We have accumulated a second's worth of nanoseconds, so we
     incremented xtime.tv_sec and appropriately decrement xtime_nsec.
     (This doesn't cause xtime_nsec to go negative, but it can cause it
      to be small).

  2) The remaining offset value is large, but just slightly less then
     cycle_interval.

  3) clocksource_adjust() is speeding up the clock, causing a
     corrective amount (compensating for the increase in the multiplier
     being multiplied against the unaccumulated offset value) to be
     subtracted from xtime_nsec.

This can cause xtime_nsec to underflow.

Unfortunately, since we notify the NTP subsystem via second_overflow()
whenever we accumulate a full second, and this effects the error
accumulation that has already occured, we cannot simply revert the
accumulated second from xtime nor move the second accumulation to after
the clocksource_adjust call without a change in behavior.

This leaves us with (at least) two options:

1) Simply return from clocksource_adjust() without making a change if we
   notice the adjustment would cause xtime_nsec to go negative.

This would work, but I'm concerned that if a large adjustment was needed
(due to the error being large), it may be possible to get stuck with an
ever increasing error that becomes too large to correct (since it may
always force xtime_nsec negative). This may just be paranoia on my part.

2) Catch xtime_nsec if it is negative, then add back the amount its
   negative to both xtime_nsec and the error.

This second method is consistent with how we've handled earlier rounding
issues, and also has the benefit that the error being added is always in
the oposite direction also always equal or smaller then the correction
being applied. So the risk of a corner case where things get out of
control is lessened.

This patch fixes bug 11970, as tested by Yanmin Zhang
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11970

Reported-by: alex.shi@intel.com
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;johnstul@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yanmin Zhang &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yanmin Zhang &lt;yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hpwdt.c: Add new HP BMC controller.</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:33:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Mingarelli</name>
<email>Thomas.Mingarelli@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-03T00:17:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d15ab7d95452998ef87158a6202a8351d52fdd51'/>
<id>d15ab7d95452998ef87158a6202a8351d52fdd51</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d8100c3abfd32986a8820ce4e614b0223a2d22a9 upstream.

Add the PCI-ID for the upcoming new BMC controller for HP hardware.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Mingarelli &lt;Thomas.Mingarelli@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck &lt;wim@iguana.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d8100c3abfd32986a8820ce4e614b0223a2d22a9 upstream.

Add the PCI-ID for the upcoming new BMC controller for HP hardware.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Mingarelli &lt;Thomas.Mingarelli@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck &lt;wim@iguana.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Disallow hypercalls for guest callers in rings &gt; 0 [CVE-2009-3290]</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kiszka</name>
<email>jan.kiszka@siemens.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-07T21:40:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c905930150d0952c4ce008553b377492bcbd29d7'/>
<id>c905930150d0952c4ce008553b377492bcbd29d7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ backport to 2.6.27 by Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt; ]

commit 07708c4af1346ab1521b26a202f438366b7bcffd upstream.

So far unprivileged guest callers running in ring 3 can issue, e.g., MMU
hypercalls. Normally, such callers cannot provide any hand-crafted MMU
command structure as it has to be passed by its physical address, but
they can still crash the guest kernel by passing random addresses.

To close the hole, this patch considers hypercalls valid only if issued
from guest ring 0. This may still be relaxed on a per-hypercall base in
the future once required.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity &lt;avi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ backport to 2.6.27 by Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt; ]

commit 07708c4af1346ab1521b26a202f438366b7bcffd upstream.

So far unprivileged guest callers running in ring 3 can issue, e.g., MMU
hypercalls. Normally, such callers cannot provide any hand-crafted MMU
command structure as it has to be passed by its physical address, but
they can still crash the guest kernel by passing random addresses.

To close the hole, this patch considers hypercalls valid only if issued
from guest ring 0. This may still be relaxed on a per-hypercall base in
the future once required.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity &lt;avi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Increase MIN_GAP to include randomized stack</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:33:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Hocko</name>
<email>mhocko@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-07T21:38:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2578cf95969936c372db29ee2bbc21c9b6a299aa'/>
<id>2578cf95969936c372db29ee2bbc21c9b6a299aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ trivial backport to 2.6.27: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt; ]

commit 80938332d8cf652f6b16e0788cf0ca136befe0b5 upstream.

Currently we are not including randomized stack size when calculating
mmap_base address in arch_pick_mmap_layout for topdown case. This might
cause that mmap_base starts in the stack reserved area because stack is
randomized by 1GB for 64b (8MB for 32b) and the minimum gap is 128MB.

If the stack really grows down to mmap_base then we can get silent mmap
region overwrite by the stack values.

Let's include maximum stack randomization size into MIN_GAP which is
used as the low bound for the gap in mmap.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1252400515-6866-1-git-send-email-mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ trivial backport to 2.6.27: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt; ]

commit 80938332d8cf652f6b16e0788cf0ca136befe0b5 upstream.

Currently we are not including randomized stack size when calculating
mmap_base address in arch_pick_mmap_layout for topdown case. This might
cause that mmap_base starts in the stack reserved area because stack is
randomized by 1GB for 64b (8MB for 32b) and the minimum gap is 128MB.

If the stack really grows down to mmap_base then we can get silent mmap
region overwrite by the stack values.

Let's include maximum stack randomization size into MIN_GAP which is
used as the low bound for the gap in mmap.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1252400515-6866-1-git-send-email-mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Prevent lower dentry from going negative during unlink (CVE-2009-2908)</title>
<updated>2009-10-12T18:33:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-07T21:35:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=da40cf167d517e0f2cdd79a0d0590482a8532585'/>
<id>da40cf167d517e0f2cdd79a0d0590482a8532585</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c2d2056647790c5034d722bd24e9d913ebca73c upstream.

When calling vfs_unlink() on the lower dentry, d_delete() turns the
dentry into a negative dentry when the d_count is 1.  This eventually
caused a NULL pointer deref when a read() or write() was done and the
negative dentry's d_inode was dereferenced in
ecryptfs_read_update_atime() or ecryptfs_getxattr().

Placing mutt's tmpdir in an eCryptfs mount is what initially triggered
the oops and I was able to reproduce it with the following sequence:

open("/tmp/upper/foo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 3
link("/tmp/upper/foo", "/tmp/upper/bar") = 0
unlink("/tmp/upper/foo")                = 0
open("/tmp/upper/bar", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 4
unlink("/tmp/upper/bar")                = 0
write(4, "eCryptfs test\n"..., 14 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
+++ killed by SIGKILL +++

https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/387073

Reported-by: Loïc Minier &lt;loic.minier@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9c2d2056647790c5034d722bd24e9d913ebca73c upstream.

When calling vfs_unlink() on the lower dentry, d_delete() turns the
dentry into a negative dentry when the d_count is 1.  This eventually
caused a NULL pointer deref when a read() or write() was done and the
negative dentry's d_inode was dereferenced in
ecryptfs_read_update_atime() or ecryptfs_getxattr().

Placing mutt's tmpdir in an eCryptfs mount is what initially triggered
the oops and I was able to reproduce it with the following sequence:

open("/tmp/upper/foo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 3
link("/tmp/upper/foo", "/tmp/upper/bar") = 0
unlink("/tmp/upper/foo")                = 0
open("/tmp/upper/bar", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600) = 4
unlink("/tmp/upper/bar")                = 0
write(4, "eCryptfs test\n"..., 14 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
+++ killed by SIGKILL +++

https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/387073

Reported-by: Loïc Minier &lt;loic.minier@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Kleikamp &lt;shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Chuck Ebbert &lt;cebbert@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

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