<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git, branch v2.6.34.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.34.11</title>
<updated>2012-03-19T00:59:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-19T00:59:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a7ee11132532663e1fface3165a86d811ebad1a0'/>
<id>a7ee11132532663e1fface3165a86d811ebad1a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-27T22:13:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a31deff4d20232dfc8370f0320e8b0925f5655b0'/>
<id>a31deff4d20232dfc8370f0320e8b0925f5655b0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c377411f2494a931ff7facdbb3a6839b1266bcf6 upstream.

Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.

We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.

Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.

Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c377411f2494a931ff7facdbb3a6839b1266bcf6 upstream.

Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.

We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.

Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.

Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>befs: Validate length of long symbolic links.</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Timo Warns</name>
<email>Warns@pre-sense.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-17T15:59:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=56defd4dc08f361bdf74c6cb457aebb1ccf442d1'/>
<id>56defd4dc08f361bdf74c6cb457aebb1ccf442d1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 338d0f0a6fbc82407864606f5b64b75aeb3c70f2 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Timo Warns &lt;warns@pre-sense.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 338d0f0a6fbc82407864606f5b64b75aeb3c70f2 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Timo Warns &lt;warns@pre-sense.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosenberg@vsecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-24T12:38:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=82f7bde2efa36c8ba33fb2b84bdddaaadc3f529e'/>
<id>82f7bde2efa36c8ba33fb2b84bdddaaadc3f529e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 upstream.

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

[PG: 34 uses l2cap_pi(sk)-&gt;... instead of a local chan-&gt;... variable]

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan &lt;padovan@profusion.mobi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 upstream.

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

[PG: 34 uses l2cap_pi(sk)-&gt;... instead of a local chan-&gt;... variable]

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan &lt;padovan@profusion.mobi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/partitions/efi.c: corrupted GUID partition tables can cause kernel oops</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Timo Warns</name>
<email>Warns@pre-sense.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-26T23:25:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f875dea27cc5e837d9db340269e0d0126303f1fb'/>
<id>f875dea27cc5e837d9db340269e0d0126303f1fb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3eb8e74ec72736b9b9d728bad30484ec89c91dde upstream.

The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating GUID partitions (in fs/partitions/efi.c) contains
a bug that causes a kernel oops on certain corrupted GUID partition
tables.

This bug has security impacts, because it allows, for example, to
prepare a storage device that crashes a kernel subsystem upon connecting
the device (e.g., a "USB Stick of (Partial) Death").

	crc = efi_crc32((const unsigned char *) (*gpt), le32_to_cpu((*gpt)-&gt;header_size));

computes a CRC32 checksum over gpt covering (*gpt)-&gt;header_size bytes.
There is no validation of (*gpt)-&gt;header_size before the efi_crc32 call.

A corrupted partition table may have large values for (*gpt)-&gt;header_size.
 In this case, the CRC32 computation access memory beyond the memory
allocated for gpt, which may cause a kernel heap overflow.

Validate value of GUID partition table header size.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout and indenting]
[PG: replace state-&gt;bdev with bdev, since 1493bf217f7f isn't in 34]

Signed-off-by: Timo Warns &lt;warns@pre-sense.de&gt;
Cc: Matt Domsch &lt;Matt_Domsch@dell.com&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eugeneteo@kernel.sg&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@codemonkey.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3eb8e74ec72736b9b9d728bad30484ec89c91dde upstream.

The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating GUID partitions (in fs/partitions/efi.c) contains
a bug that causes a kernel oops on certain corrupted GUID partition
tables.

This bug has security impacts, because it allows, for example, to
prepare a storage device that crashes a kernel subsystem upon connecting
the device (e.g., a "USB Stick of (Partial) Death").

	crc = efi_crc32((const unsigned char *) (*gpt), le32_to_cpu((*gpt)-&gt;header_size));

computes a CRC32 checksum over gpt covering (*gpt)-&gt;header_size bytes.
There is no validation of (*gpt)-&gt;header_size before the efi_crc32 call.

A corrupted partition table may have large values for (*gpt)-&gt;header_size.
 In this case, the CRC32 computation access memory beyond the memory
allocated for gpt, which may cause a kernel heap overflow.

Validate value of GUID partition table header size.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout and indenting]
[PG: replace state-&gt;bdev with bdev, since 1493bf217f7f isn't in 34]

Signed-off-by: Timo Warns &lt;warns@pre-sense.de&gt;
Cc: Matt Domsch &lt;Matt_Domsch@dell.com&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eugeneteo@kernel.sg&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@codemonkey.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rtnetlink: Add missing manual netlink notification in dev_change_net_namespaces</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-10-21T06:24:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e1ca28e57055949c9e644e7bb77f218849aac2be'/>
<id>e1ca28e57055949c9e644e7bb77f218849aac2be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d2237d35748e7f448a9c2d9dc6a85ef637466e24 upstream.

Renato Westphal noticed that since commit a2835763e130c343ace5320c20d33c281e7097b7
"rtnetlink: handle rtnl_link netlink notifications manually" was merged
we no longer send a netlink message when a networking device is moved
from one network namespace to another.

Fix this by adding the missing manual notification in dev_change_net_namespaces.

Since all network devices that are processed by dev_change_net_namspaces are
in the initialized state the complicated tests that guard the manual
rtmsg_ifinfo calls in rollback_registered and register_netdevice are
unnecessary and we can just perform a plain notification.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Tested-by: Renato Westphal &lt;renatowestphal@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d2237d35748e7f448a9c2d9dc6a85ef637466e24 upstream.

Renato Westphal noticed that since commit a2835763e130c343ace5320c20d33c281e7097b7
"rtnetlink: handle rtnl_link netlink notifications manually" was merged
we no longer send a netlink message when a networking device is moved
from one network namespace to another.

Fix this by adding the missing manual notification in dev_change_net_namespaces.

Since all network devices that are processed by dev_change_net_namspaces are
in the initialized state the complicated tests that guard the manual
rtmsg_ifinfo calls in rollback_registered and register_netdevice are
unnecessary and we can just perform a plain notification.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Tested-by: Renato Westphal &lt;renatowestphal@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shan Wei</name>
<email>shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-19T22:52:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c0e3b3980eda70a2c0ec7331ac180c665a7327f1'/>
<id>c0e3b3980eda70a2c0ec7331ac180c665a7327f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde upstream.

At this point, skb-&gt;data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.

For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.

This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb-&gt;head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei &lt;shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde upstream.

At this point, skb-&gt;data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.

For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.

This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb-&gt;head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei &lt;shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gro: Only reset frag0 when skb can be pulled</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-27T13:16:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d17256d40e2f123145f12a38018f235a351da95f'/>
<id>d17256d40e2f123145f12a38018f235a351da95f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 17dd759c67f21e34f2156abcf415e1f60605a188 upstream.

Currently skb_gro_header_slow unconditionally resets frag0 and
frag0_len.  However, when we can't pull on the skb this leaves
the GRO fields in an inconsistent state.

This patch fixes this by only resetting those fields after the
pskb_may_pull test.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 17dd759c67f21e34f2156abcf415e1f60605a188 upstream.

Currently skb_gro_header_slow unconditionally resets frag0 and
frag0_len.  However, when we can't pull on the skb this leaves
the GRO fields in an inconsistent state.

This patch fixes this by only resetting those fields after the
pskb_may_pull test.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet_diag: fix inet_diag_bc_audit()</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-17T20:25:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48e5665af53af5a98a05b70e1d423971447a9d42'/>
<id>48e5665af53af5a98a05b70e1d423971447a9d42</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eeb1497277d6b1a0a34ed36b97e18f2bd7d6de0d upstream.

A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an
infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()

Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid
unaligned accesses.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eeb1497277d6b1a0a34ed36b97e18f2bd7d6de0d upstream.

A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an
infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()

Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid
unaligned accesses.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>taskstats: don't allow duplicate entries in listener mode</title>
<updated>2012-03-14T14:58:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-27T23:18:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2a7739335a332cc6ed24013a6b40e245b31a718'/>
<id>c2a7739335a332cc6ed24013a6b40e245b31a718</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26c4caea9d697043cc5a458b96411b86d7f6babd upstream.

Currently a single process may register exit handlers unlimited times.
It may lead to a bloated listeners chain and very slow process
terminations.

Eg after 10KK sent TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASKs ~300 Mb of
kernel memory is stolen for the handlers chain and "time id" shows 2-7
seconds instead of normal 0.003.  It makes it possible to exhaust all
kernel memory and to eat much of CPU time by triggerring numerous exits
on a single CPU.

The patch limits the number of times a single process may register
itself on a single CPU to one.

One little issue is kept unfixed - as taskstats_exit() is called before
exit_files() in do_exit(), the orphaned listener entry (if it was not
explicitly deregistered) is kept until the next someone's exit() and
implicit deregistration in send_cpu_listeners().  So, if a process
registered itself as a listener exits and the next spawned process gets
the same pid, it would inherit taskstats attributes.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segooon@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26c4caea9d697043cc5a458b96411b86d7f6babd upstream.

Currently a single process may register exit handlers unlimited times.
It may lead to a bloated listeners chain and very slow process
terminations.

Eg after 10KK sent TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASKs ~300 Mb of
kernel memory is stolen for the handlers chain and "time id" shows 2-7
seconds instead of normal 0.003.  It makes it possible to exhaust all
kernel memory and to eat much of CPU time by triggerring numerous exits
on a single CPU.

The patch limits the number of times a single process may register
itself on a single CPU to one.

One little issue is kept unfixed - as taskstats_exit() is called before
exit_files() in do_exit(), the orphaned listener entry (if it was not
explicitly deregistered) is kept until the next someone's exit() and
implicit deregistration in send_cpu_listeners().  So, if a process
registered itself as a listener exits and the next spawned process gets
the same pid, it would inherit taskstats attributes.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segooon@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Balbir Singh &lt;bsingharora@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
