<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git, branch v4.4.56</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Linux 4.4.56</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:17:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-22T11:17:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0136bca4e0f65075b0b4716a270f8b04c6c46abc'/>
<id>0136bca4e0f65075b0b4716a270f8b04c6c46abc</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Add missing error handling to FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-04T09:27:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=99d403faba47e5adeb11dbf1094972fc78c29a75'/>
<id>99d403faba47e5adeb11dbf1094972fc78c29a75</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9bbb25afeb182502ca4f2c4f3f88af0681b34cae upstream.

Thomas spotted that fixup_pi_state_owner() can return errors and we
fail to unlock the rt_mutex in that case.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.867401760@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9bbb25afeb182502ca4f2c4f3f88af0681b34cae upstream.

Thomas spotted that fixup_pi_state_owner() can return errors and we
fail to unlock the rt_mutex in that case.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.867401760@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Fix potential use-after-free in FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-04T09:27:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=44854c191e2cb62d369eb9927e6b6683c11d6b04'/>
<id>44854c191e2cb62d369eb9927e6b6683c11d6b04</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c236c8e95a3d395b0494e7108f0d41cf36ec107c upstream.

While working on the futex code, I stumbled over this potential
use-after-free scenario. Dmitry triggered it later with syzkaller.

pi_mutex is a pointer into pi_state, which we drop the reference on in
unqueue_me_pi(). So any access to that pointer after that is bad.

Since other sites already do rt_mutex_unlock() with hb-&gt;lock held, see
for example futex_lock_pi(), simply move the unlock before
unqueue_me_pi().

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.801744246@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c236c8e95a3d395b0494e7108f0d41cf36ec107c upstream.

While working on the futex code, I stumbled over this potential
use-after-free scenario. Dmitry triggered it later with syzkaller.

pi_mutex is a pointer into pi_state, which we drop the reference on in
unqueue_me_pi(). So any access to that pointer after that is bad.

Since other sites already do rt_mutex_unlock() with hb-&gt;lock held, see
for example futex_lock_pi(), simply move the unlock before
unqueue_me_pi().

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.801744246@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/perf: Fix CR4.PCE propagation to use active_mm instead of mm</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T19:59:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=62f57041fbdf15db6336542384a4b36f1f387299'/>
<id>62f57041fbdf15db6336542384a4b36f1f387299</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5dc855d44c2ad960a86f593c60461f1ae1566b6d upstream.

If one thread mmaps a perf event while another thread in the same mm
is in some context where active_mm != mm (which can happen in the
scheduler, for example), refresh_pce() would write the wrong value
to CR4.PCE.  This broke some PAPI tests.

Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7911d3f7af14 ("perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5b38a76ea50e405f9abe07a13dfaef87c173a1.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5dc855d44c2ad960a86f593c60461f1ae1566b6d upstream.

If one thread mmaps a perf event while another thread in the same mm
is in some context where active_mm != mm (which can happen in the
scheduler, for example), refresh_pce() would write the wrong value
to CR4.PCE.  This broke some PAPI tests.

Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7911d3f7af14 ("perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5b38a76ea50e405f9abe07a13dfaef87c173a1.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/kasan: Fix boot with KASAN=y and PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-13T16:33:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8e0ec20539f8c626463ae43fcaeb218e3b2b5dc4'/>
<id>8e0ec20539f8c626463ae43fcaeb218e3b2b5dc4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit be3606ff739d1c1be36389f8737c577ad87e1f57 upstream.

The kernel doesn't boot with both PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y and KASAN=y
options selected. With branch profiling enabled we end up calling
ftrace_likely_update() before kasan_early_init(). ftrace_likely_update() is
built with KASAN instrumentation, so calling it before kasan has been
initialized leads to crash.

Use DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING define to make sure that we don't call
ftrace_likely_update() from early code before kasan_early_init().

Fixes: ef7f0d6a6ca8 ("x86_64: add KASan support")
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: lkp@01.org
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170313163337.1704-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit be3606ff739d1c1be36389f8737c577ad87e1f57 upstream.

The kernel doesn't boot with both PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y and KASAN=y
options selected. With branch profiling enabled we end up calling
ftrace_likely_update() before kasan_early_init(). ftrace_likely_update() is
built with KASAN instrumentation, so calling it before kasan has been
initialized leads to crash.

Use DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING define to make sure that we don't call
ftrace_likely_update() from early code before kasan_early_init().

Fixes: ef7f0d6a6ca8 ("x86_64: add KASan support")
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: lkp@01.org
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170313163337.1704-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypto: lock inode while setting encryption policy</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-15T13:48:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3a19419c50c6ee386ca6d22a23acc2df51583d3d'/>
<id>3a19419c50c6ee386ca6d22a23acc2df51583d3d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8906a8223ad4909b391c5628f7991ebceda30e52 upstream.

i_rwsem needs to be acquired while setting an encryption policy so that
concurrent calls to FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are correctly
serialized (especially the -&gt;get_context() + -&gt;set_context() pair), and
so that new files cannot be created in the directory during or after the
-&gt;empty_dir() check.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8906a8223ad4909b391c5628f7991ebceda30e52 upstream.

i_rwsem needs to be acquired while setting an encryption policy so that
concurrent calls to FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are correctly
serialized (especially the -&gt;get_context() + -&gt;set_context() pair), and
so that new files cannot be created in the directory during or after the
-&gt;empty_dir() check.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special files</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-19T22:20:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fd74e8d258da9f9678da6bf88a0b02b2c1b71d0c'/>
<id>fd74e8d258da9f9678da6bf88a0b02b2c1b71d0c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42d97eb0ade31e1bc537d086842f5d6e766d9d51 upstream.

Attempting to link a device node, named pipe, or socket file into an
encrypted directory through rename(2) or link(2) always failed with
EPERM.  This happened because fscrypt_has_permitted_context() saw that
the file was unencrypted and forbid creating the link.  This behavior
was unexpected because such files are never encrypted; only regular
files, directories, and symlinks can be encrypted.

To fix this, make fscrypt_has_permitted_context() always return true on
special files.

This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset.

Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42d97eb0ade31e1bc537d086842f5d6e766d9d51 upstream.

Attempting to link a device node, named pipe, or socket file into an
encrypted directory through rename(2) or link(2) always failed with
EPERM.  This happened because fscrypt_has_permitted_context() saw that
the file was unencrypted and forbid creating the link.  This behavior
was unexpected because such files are never encrypted; only regular
files, directories, and symlinks can be encrypted.

To fix this, make fscrypt_has_permitted_context() always return true on
special files.

This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset.

Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net sched actions: decrement module reference count after table flush.</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Mashak</name>
<email>mrv@mojatatu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T16:00:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c10ffe988f15a0306d5d8cb1c6b475c9fe2fc2c9'/>
<id>c10ffe988f15a0306d5d8cb1c6b475c9fe2fc2c9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit edb9d1bff4bbe19b8ae0e71b1f38732591a9eeb2 ]

When tc actions are loaded as a module and no actions have been installed,
flushing them would result in actions removed from the memory, but modules
reference count not being decremented, so that the modules would not be
unloaded.

Following is example with GACT action:

% sudo modprobe act_gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions ls action gact
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  1
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  2
% sudo rmmod act_gact
rmmod: ERROR: Module act_gact is in use
....

After the fix:
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 1
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 2
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 3
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  3
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
% sudo rmmod act_gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
%

Fixes: f97017cdefef ("net-sched: Fix actions flushing")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak &lt;mrv@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit edb9d1bff4bbe19b8ae0e71b1f38732591a9eeb2 ]

When tc actions are loaded as a module and no actions have been installed,
flushing them would result in actions removed from the memory, but modules
reference count not being decremented, so that the modules would not be
unloaded.

Following is example with GACT action:

% sudo modprobe act_gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions ls action gact
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  1
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  2
% sudo rmmod act_gact
rmmod: ERROR: Module act_gact is in use
....

After the fix:
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 1
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 2
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 3
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  3
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
act_gact               16384  0
% sudo rmmod act_gact
% lsmod
Module                  Size  Used by
%

Fixes: f97017cdefef ("net-sched: Fix actions flushing")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak &lt;mrv@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: fix memory leak during tear-down of unsuccessful connection request</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-12T23:01:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=676fe978525d3d3f583e1f6463f3b25623e81afd'/>
<id>676fe978525d3d3f583e1f6463f3b25623e81afd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72ef9c4125c7b257e3a714d62d778ab46583d6a3 ]

This patch fixes a memory leak, which happens if the connection request
is not fulfilled between parsing the DCCP options and handling the SYN
(because e.g. the backlog is full), because we forgot to free the
list of ack vectors.

Reported-by: Jianwen Ji &lt;jiji@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 72ef9c4125c7b257e3a714d62d778ab46583d6a3 ]

This patch fixes a memory leak, which happens if the connection request
is not fulfilled between parsing the DCCP options and handling the SYN
(because e.g. the backlog is full), because we forgot to free the
list of ack vectors.

Reported-by: Jianwen Ji &lt;jiji@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp/tcp: fix routing redirect race</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jon Maxwell</name>
<email>jmaxwell37@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-10T05:40:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4ab956b561334866dfe1b17d9c7567313e07cfa2'/>
<id>4ab956b561334866dfe1b17d9c7567313e07cfa2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa5ac0b4b11784ac6f932c0ad4c6b67cda0 ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst &amp;&amp; dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk-&gt;icsk_ack.quick &amp;&amp; !icsk-&gt;icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk-&gt;sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()-&gt;__sk_dst_check()-&gt; dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst-&gt;obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320610d6 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver &lt;egarver@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Sowa &lt;hsowa@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell &lt;jmaxwell37@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa5ac0b4b11784ac6f932c0ad4c6b67cda0 ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst &amp;&amp; dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk-&gt;icsk_ack.quick &amp;&amp; !icsk-&gt;icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk-&gt;sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()-&gt;__sk_dst_check()-&gt; dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk-&gt;sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst-&gt;obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320610d6 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver &lt;egarver@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Sowa &lt;hsowa@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell &lt;jmaxwell37@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
