linux-toradex.git, branch v4.9.124 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules Linux 4.9.124 2018-08-24T11:12:43+00:00 Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org 2018-08-24T11:12:43+00:00 e8d49e4292d9156a081752dee3f5a0cd12857da9 






reiserfs: fix broken xattr handling (heap corruption, bad retval)
2018-08-24T11:12:43+00:00

Jann Horn
jannh@google.com

2018-08-22T04:59:37+00:00

696d906b168d5b8082bf87dcbb92c67218a7fb1f

commit a13f085d111e90469faf2d9965eb39b11c114d7e upstream.

This fixes the following issues:

- When a buffer size is supplied to reiserfs_listxattr() such that each
  individual name fits, but the concatenation of all names doesn't fit,
  reiserfs_listxattr() overflows the supplied buffer.  This leads to a
  kernel heap overflow (verified using KASAN) followed by an out-of-bounds
  usercopy and is therefore a security bug.

- When a buffer size is supplied to reiserfs_listxattr() such that a
  name doesn't fit, -ERANGE should be returned.  But reiserfs instead just
  truncates the list of names; I have verified that if the only xattr on a
  file has a longer name than the supplied buffer length, listxattr()
  incorrectly returns zero.

With my patch applied, -ERANGE is returned in both cases and the memory
corruption doesn't happen anymore.

Credit for making me clean this code up a bit goes to Al Viro, who pointed
out that the ->actor calling convention is suboptimal and should be
changed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802151539.5373-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 48b32a3553a5 ("reiserfs: use generic xattr handlers")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit a13f085d111e90469faf2d9965eb39b11c114d7e upstream.

This fixes the following issues:

- When a buffer size is supplied to reiserfs_listxattr() such that each
  individual name fits, but the concatenation of all names doesn't fit,
  reiserfs_listxattr() overflows the supplied buffer.  This leads to a
  kernel heap overflow (verified using KASAN) followed by an out-of-bounds
  usercopy and is therefore a security bug.

- When a buffer size is supplied to reiserfs_listxattr() such that a
  name doesn't fit, -ERANGE should be returned.  But reiserfs instead just
  truncates the list of names; I have verified that if the only xattr on a
  file has a longer name than the supplied buffer length, listxattr()
  incorrectly returns zero.

With my patch applied, -ERANGE is returned in both cases and the memory
corruption doesn't happen anymore.

Credit for making me clean this code up a bit goes to Al Viro, who pointed
out that the ->actor calling convention is suboptimal and should be
changed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180802151539.5373-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 48b32a3553a5 ("reiserfs: use generic xattr handlers")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








i2c: imx: Fix race condition in dma read
2018-08-24T11:12:43+00:00

Esben Haabendal
eha@deif.com

2018-08-16T08:43:12+00:00

44745bd15116818e831e4d1ec5fbe668c2fdf942

commit bed4ff1ed4d8f2ef5007c5c6ae1b29c5677a3632 upstream.

This fixes a race condition, where the DMAEN bit ends up being set after
I2C slave has transmitted a byte following the dummy read.  When that
happens, an interrupt is generated instead, and no DMA request is generated
to kickstart the DMA read, and a timeout happens after DMA_TIMEOUT (1 sec).

Fixed by setting the DMAEN bit before the dummy read.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <eha@deif.com>
Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit bed4ff1ed4d8f2ef5007c5c6ae1b29c5677a3632 upstream.

This fixes a race condition, where the DMAEN bit ends up being set after
I2C slave has transmitted a byte following the dummy read.  When that
happens, an interrupt is generated instead, and no DMA request is generated
to kickstart the DMA read, and a timeout happens after DMA_TIMEOUT (1 sec).

Fixed by setting the DMAEN bit before the dummy read.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <eha@deif.com>
Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








PCI: pciehp: Fix unprotected list iteration in IRQ handler
2018-08-24T11:12:43+00:00

Lukas Wunner
lukas@wunner.de

2018-07-19T22:27:34+00:00

86a3d597235d7305e3acad62fe97dc59ec2db76f

commit 1204e35bedf4e5015cda559ed8c84789a6dae24e upstream.

Commit b440bde74f04 ("PCI: Add pci_ignore_hotplug() to ignore hotplug
events for a device") iterates over the devices on a hotplug port's
subordinate bus in pciehp's IRQ handler without acquiring pci_bus_sem.
It is thus possible for a user to cause a crash by concurrently
manipulating the device list, e.g. by disabling slot power via sysfs
on a different CPU or by initiating a remove/rescan via sysfs.

This can't be fixed by acquiring pci_bus_sem because it may sleep.
The simplest fix is to avoid the list iteration altogether and just
check the ignore_hotplug flag on the port itself.  This works because
pci_ignore_hotplug() sets the flag both on the device as well as on its
parent bridge.

We do lose the ability to print the name of the device blocking hotplug
in the debug message, but that's probably bearable.

Fixes: b440bde74f04 ("PCI: Add pci_ignore_hotplug() to ignore hotplug events for a device")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 1204e35bedf4e5015cda559ed8c84789a6dae24e upstream.

Commit b440bde74f04 ("PCI: Add pci_ignore_hotplug() to ignore hotplug
events for a device") iterates over the devices on a hotplug port's
subordinate bus in pciehp's IRQ handler without acquiring pci_bus_sem.
It is thus possible for a user to cause a crash by concurrently
manipulating the device list, e.g. by disabling slot power via sysfs
on a different CPU or by initiating a remove/rescan via sysfs.

This can't be fixed by acquiring pci_bus_sem because it may sleep.
The simplest fix is to avoid the list iteration altogether and just
check the ignore_hotplug flag on the port itself.  This works because
pci_ignore_hotplug() sets the flag both on the device as well as on its
parent bridge.

We do lose the ability to print the name of the device blocking hotplug
in the debug message, but that's probably bearable.

Fixes: b440bde74f04 ("PCI: Add pci_ignore_hotplug() to ignore hotplug events for a device")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








PCI: pciehp: Fix use-after-free on unplug
2018-08-24T11:12:42+00:00

Lukas Wunner
lukas@wunner.de

2018-07-19T22:27:32+00:00

3fcdcdd50c1f9e60bbaab05f9a42079e481c2454

commit 281e878eab191cce4259abbbf1a0322e3adae02c upstream.

When pciehp is unbound (e.g. on unplug of a Thunderbolt device), the
hotplug_slot struct is deregistered and thus freed before freeing the
IRQ.  The IRQ handler and the work items it schedules print the slot
name referenced from the freed structure in various informational and
debug log messages, each time resulting in a quadruple dereference of
freed pointers (hotplug_slot -> pci_slot -> kobject -> name).

At best the slot name is logged as "(null)", at worst kernel memory is
exposed in logs or the driver crashes:

  pciehp 0000:10:00.0:pcie204: Slot((null)): Card not present

An attacker may provoke the bug by unplugging multiple devices on a
Thunderbolt daisy chain at once.  Unplugging can also be simulated by
powering down slots via sysfs.  The bug is particularly easy to trigger
in poll mode.

It has been present since the driver's introduction in 2004:
https://git.kernel.org/tglx/history/c/c16b4b14d980

Fix by rearranging teardown such that the IRQ is freed first.  Run the
work items queued by the IRQ handler to completion before freeing the
hotplug_slot struct by draining the work queue from the ->release_slot
callback which is invoked by pci_hp_deregister().

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 281e878eab191cce4259abbbf1a0322e3adae02c upstream.

When pciehp is unbound (e.g. on unplug of a Thunderbolt device), the
hotplug_slot struct is deregistered and thus freed before freeing the
IRQ.  The IRQ handler and the work items it schedules print the slot
name referenced from the freed structure in various informational and
debug log messages, each time resulting in a quadruple dereference of
freed pointers (hotplug_slot -> pci_slot -> kobject -> name).

At best the slot name is logged as "(null)", at worst kernel memory is
exposed in logs or the driver crashes:

  pciehp 0000:10:00.0:pcie204: Slot((null)): Card not present

An attacker may provoke the bug by unplugging multiple devices on a
Thunderbolt daisy chain at once.  Unplugging can also be simulated by
powering down slots via sysfs.  The bug is particularly easy to trigger
in poll mode.

It has been present since the driver's introduction in 2004:
https://git.kernel.org/tglx/history/c/c16b4b14d980

Fix by rearranging teardown such that the IRQ is freed first.  Run the
work items queued by the IRQ handler to completion before freeing the
hotplug_slot struct by draining the work queue from the ->release_slot
callback which is invoked by pci_hp_deregister().

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








PCI: Skip MPS logic for Virtual Functions (VFs)
2018-08-24T11:12:42+00:00

Myron Stowe
myron.stowe@redhat.com

2018-08-13T18:19:39+00:00

73aae596d106859e1e297ff9a106a8222721b4bd

commit 3dbe97efe8bf450b183d6dee2305cbc032e6b8a4 upstream.

PCIe r4.0, sec 9.3.5.4, "Device Control Register", shows both
Max_Payload_Size (MPS) and Max_Read_request_Size (MRRS) to be 'RsvdP' for
VFs.  Just prior to the table it states:

  "PF and VF functionality is defined in Section 7.5.3.4 except where
   noted in Table 9-16.  For VF fields marked 'RsvdP', the PF setting
   applies to the VF."

All of which implies that with respect to Max_Payload_Size Supported
(MPSS), MPS, and MRRS values, we should not be paying any attention to the
VF's fields, but rather only to the PF's.  Only looking at the PF's fields
also logically makes sense as it's the sole physical interface to the PCIe
bus.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200527
Fixes: 27d868b5e6cf ("PCI: Set MPS to match upstream bridge")
Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
Cc: Dongdong Liu <liudongdong3@huawei.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 3dbe97efe8bf450b183d6dee2305cbc032e6b8a4 upstream.

PCIe r4.0, sec 9.3.5.4, "Device Control Register", shows both
Max_Payload_Size (MPS) and Max_Read_request_Size (MRRS) to be 'RsvdP' for
VFs.  Just prior to the table it states:

  "PF and VF functionality is defined in Section 7.5.3.4 except where
   noted in Table 9-16.  For VF fields marked 'RsvdP', the PF setting
   applies to the VF."

All of which implies that with respect to Max_Payload_Size Supported
(MPSS), MPS, and MRRS values, we should not be paying any attention to the
VF's fields, but rather only to the PF's.  Only looking at the PF's fields
also logically makes sense as it's the sole physical interface to the PCIe
bus.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200527
Fixes: 27d868b5e6cf ("PCI: Set MPS to match upstream bridge")
Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3+
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
Cc: Dongdong Liu <liudongdong3@huawei.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








PCI: hotplug: Don't leak pci_slot on registration failure
2018-08-24T11:12:41+00:00

Lukas Wunner
lukas@wunner.de

2018-07-19T22:27:31+00:00

f2842452e21d088ca997a9eb26669023812402a8

commit 4ce6435820d1f1cc2c2788e232735eb244bcc8a3 upstream.

If addition of sysfs files fails on registration of a hotplug slot, the
struct pci_slot as well as the entry in the slot_list is leaked.  The
issue has been present since the hotplug core was introduced in 2002:
https://git.kernel.org/tglx/history/c/a8a2069f432c

Perhaps the idea was that even though sysfs addition fails, the slot
should still be usable.  But that's not how drivers use the interface,
they abort probe if a non-zero value is returned.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.4.15+
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 4ce6435820d1f1cc2c2788e232735eb244bcc8a3 upstream.

If addition of sysfs files fails on registration of a hotplug slot, the
struct pci_slot as well as the entry in the slot_list is leaked.  The
issue has been present since the hotplug core was introduced in 2002:
https://git.kernel.org/tglx/history/c/a8a2069f432c

Perhaps the idea was that even though sysfs addition fails, the slot
should still be usable.  But that's not how drivers use the interface,
they abort probe if a non-zero value is returned.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.4.15+
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








parisc: Remove unnecessary barriers from spinlock.h
2018-08-24T11:12:41+00:00

John David Anglin
dave.anglin@bell.net

2018-08-12T20:31:17+00:00

eba0611e98f117f034efa6ad7ff488892c33e601

commit 3b885ac1dc35b87a39ee176a6c7e2af9c789d8b8 upstream.

Now that mb() is an instruction barrier, it will slow performance if we issue
unnecessary barriers.

The spinlock defines have a number of unnecessary barriers.  The __ldcw()
define is both a hardware and compiler barrier.  The mb() barriers in the
routines using __ldcw() serve no purpose.

The only barrier needed is the one in arch_spin_unlock().  We need to ensure
all accesses are complete prior to releasing the lock.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 3b885ac1dc35b87a39ee176a6c7e2af9c789d8b8 upstream.

Now that mb() is an instruction barrier, it will slow performance if we issue
unnecessary barriers.

The spinlock defines have a number of unnecessary barriers.  The __ldcw()
define is both a hardware and compiler barrier.  The mb() barriers in the
routines using __ldcw() serve no purpose.

The only barrier needed is the one in arch_spin_unlock().  We need to ensure
all accesses are complete prior to releasing the lock.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








packet: refine ring v3 block size test to hold one frame
2018-08-24T11:12:41+00:00

Willem de Bruijn
willemb@google.com

2018-08-06T14:38:34+00:00

59629848737a9b3a1ff461e3ece1ec3d3bf87ced

commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.

TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.

Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.

In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.

Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.

Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.

TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.

Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.

In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.

Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.

Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>








netfilter: conntrack: dccp: treat SYNC/SYNCACK as invalid if no prior state
2018-08-24T11:12:41+00:00

Florian Westphal
fw@strlen.de

2018-07-17T19:03:15+00:00

f29eb8ee47957892155c8b7ad33abe29f50bc4e4

commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.

When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>






commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.

When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.

Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>