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<title>linux-toradex.git/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt, branch v2.6.31.4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>IPv6: Add 'autoconf' and 'disable_ipv6' module parameters</title>
<updated>2009-06-01T10:07:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Haley</name>
<email>brian.haley@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-06-01T10:07:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=56d417b12e57dfe11c9b7ba4bea3882c62a55815'/>
<id>56d417b12e57dfe11c9b7ba4bea3882c62a55815</id>
<content type='text'>
Add 'autoconf' and 'disable_ipv6' parameters to the IPv6 module.

The first controls if IPv6 addresses are autoconfigured from
prefixes received in Router Advertisements.  The IPv6 loopback
(::1) and link-local addresses are still configured.

The second controls if IPv6 addresses are desired at all.  No
IPv6 addresses will be added to any interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley &lt;brian.haley@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Add 'autoconf' and 'disable_ipv6' parameters to the IPv6 module.

The first controls if IPv6 addresses are autoconfigured from
prefixes received in Router Advertisements.  The IPv6 loopback
(::1) and link-local addresses are still configured.

The second controls if IPv6 addresses are desired at all.  No
IPv6 addresses will be added to any interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley &lt;brian.haley@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6</title>
<updated>2009-05-19T04:08:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-19T04:08:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bb803cfbecb03a0cf8dc7e1864f18dda6631af00'/>
<id>bb803cfbecb03a0cf8dc7e1864f18dda6631af00</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c
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<pre>
Conflicts:
	drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe.c
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Doc: fixed descriptions on /proc/sys/net/core/* and /proc/sys/net/unix/*</title>
<updated>2009-05-18T04:19:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Tinggong</name>
<email>wangtinggong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-14T22:49:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=705efc3b03cbee449e4d83b230423894152f7982'/>
<id>705efc3b03cbee449e4d83b230423894152f7982</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Wang Tinggong &lt;wangtinggong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Wang Tinggong &lt;wangtinggong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN</title>
<updated>2009-05-04T18:07:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilpo Järvinen</name>
<email>ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2009-05-04T18:07:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=255cac91c3c9ce7dca7713b93ab03c75b7902e0e'/>
<id>255cac91c3c9ce7dca7713b93ab03c75b7902e0e</id>
<content type='text'>
This should be very safe compared with full enabled, so I see
no reason why it shouldn't be done right away. As ECN can only
be negotiated if the SYN sending party is also supporting it,
somebody in the loop probably knows what he/she is doing. If
SYN does not ask for ECN, the server side SYN-ACK is identical
to what it is without ECN. Thus it's quite safe.

The chosen value is safe w.r.t to existing configs which
choose to currently set manually either 0 or 1 but
silently upgrades those who have not explicitly requested
ECN off.

Whether to just enable both sides comes up time to time but
unless that gets done now we can at least make the servers
aware of ECN already. As there are some known problems to occur
if ECN is enabled, it's currently questionable whether there's
any real gain from enabling clients as servers mostly won't
support it anyway (so we'd hit just the negative sides). After
enabling the servers and getting that deployed, the client end
enable really has some potential gain too.

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This should be very safe compared with full enabled, so I see
no reason why it shouldn't be done right away. As ECN can only
be negotiated if the SYN sending party is also supporting it,
somebody in the loop probably knows what he/she is doing. If
SYN does not ask for ECN, the server side SYN-ACK is identical
to what it is without ECN. Thus it's quite safe.

The chosen value is safe w.r.t to existing configs which
choose to currently set manually either 0 or 1 but
silently upgrades those who have not explicitly requested
ECN off.

Whether to just enable both sides comes up time to time but
unless that gets done now we can at least make the servers
aware of ECN already. As there are some known problems to occur
if ECN is enabled, it's currently questionable whether there's
any real gain from enabling clients as servers mostly won't
support it anyway (so we'd hit just the negative sides). After
enabling the servers and getting that deployed, the client end
enable really has some potential gain too.

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix incorrect disable_ipv6 behavior</title>
<updated>2009-03-19T01:22:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brian Haley</name>
<email>brian.haley@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-03-19T01:22:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9bdd8d40c8c59435664af6049dabe24b7779b203'/>
<id>9bdd8d40c8c59435664af6049dabe24b7779b203</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix the behavior of allowing both sysctl and addrconf_dad_failure()
to set the disable_ipv6 parameter without any bad side-effects.
If DAD fails and accept_dad &gt; 1, we will still set disable_ipv6=1,
but then instead of allowing an RA to add an address then
immediately fail DAD, we simply don't allow the address to be
added in the first place.  This also lets the user set this flag
and disable all IPv6 addresses on the interface, or on the entire
system.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley &lt;brian.haley@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix the behavior of allowing both sysctl and addrconf_dad_failure()
to set the disable_ipv6 parameter without any bad side-effects.
If DAD fails and accept_dad &gt; 1, we will still set disable_ipv6=1,
but then instead of allowing an RA to add an address then
immediately fail DAD, we simply don't allow the address to be
added in the first place.  This also lets the user set this flag
and disable all IPv6 addresses on the interface, or on the entire
system.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley &lt;brian.haley@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Doc: Cleanup whitespaces in ip-sysctl.txt</title>
<updated>2009-02-24T11:47:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesper Dangaard Brouer</name>
<email>jdb@comx.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-23T04:39:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e18f5feb0c851a0e77e315b3d9ef1c432b1a50ec'/>
<id>e18f5feb0c851a0e77e315b3d9ef1c432b1a50ec</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix up whitespaces while going though ip-sysctl.txt anyway.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;hawk@comx.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix up whitespaces while going though ip-sysctl.txt anyway.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;hawk@comx.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Doc: Fix typos in ip-sysctl.txt about rp_filter.</title>
<updated>2009-02-24T11:47:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesper Dangaard Brouer</name>
<email>jdb@comx.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-23T04:37:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bf869c30628cc02295fb919f0d0074f296d5f129'/>
<id>bf869c30628cc02295fb919f0d0074f296d5f129</id>
<content type='text'>
First fix a typo in Stephens patch ;-)

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;hawk@comx.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
First fix a typo in Stephens patch ;-)

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;hawk@comx.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: add loose reverse path filtering</title>
<updated>2009-02-23T03:54:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>shemminger@vyatta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-20T08:25:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c1cf8422f0512c2b14f0d66bce34abb0645c888a'/>
<id>c1cf8422f0512c2b14f0d66bce34abb0645c888a</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend existing reverse path filter option to allow strict or loose
filtering. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_path_filtering).

For compatibility with existing usage, the value 1 is chosen for strict mode
and 2 for loose mode.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extend existing reverse path filter option to allow strict or loose
filtering. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_path_filtering).

For compatibility with existing usage, the value 1 is chosen for strict mode
and 2 for loose mode.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add ARP notify option for devices</title>
<updated>2009-02-01T09:04:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>shemminger@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-01T09:04:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=eefef1cf7653cd4e0aaf743c00ae8345086cdc01'/>
<id>eefef1cf7653cd4e0aaf743c00ae8345086cdc01</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds another inet device option to enable gratuitous ARP
when device is brought up or address change. This is handy for
clusters or virtualization.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge &lt;jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This adds another inet device option to enable gratuitous ARP
when device is brought up or address change. This is handy for
clusters or virtualization.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge &lt;jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: implement emergency route cache rebulds when gc_elasticity is exceeded</title>
<updated>2008-10-28T00:06:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-27T19:28:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1080d709fb9d8cd4392f93476ee46a9d6ea05a5b'/>
<id>1080d709fb9d8cd4392f93476ee46a9d6ea05a5b</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a patch to provide on demand route cache rebuilding.  Currently, our
route cache is rebulid periodically regardless of need.  This introduced
unneeded periodic latency.  This patch offers a better approach.  Using code
provided by Eric Dumazet, we compute the standard deviation of the average hash
bucket chain length while running rt_check_expire.  Should any given chain
length grow to larger that average plus 4 standard deviations, we trigger an
emergency hash table rebuild for that net namespace.  This allows for the common
case in which chains are well behaved and do not grow unevenly to not incur any
latency at all, while those systems (which may be being maliciously attacked),
only rebuild when the attack is detected.  This patch take 2 other factors into
account:
1) chains with multiple entries that differ by attributes that do not affect the
hash value are only counted once, so as not to unduly bias system to rebuilding
if features like QOS are heavily used
2) if rebuilding crosses a certain threshold (which is adjustable via the added
sysctl in this patch), route caching is disabled entirely for that net
namespace, since constant rebuilding is less efficient that no caching at all

Tested successfully by me.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;dada1@cosmosbay.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is a patch to provide on demand route cache rebuilding.  Currently, our
route cache is rebulid periodically regardless of need.  This introduced
unneeded periodic latency.  This patch offers a better approach.  Using code
provided by Eric Dumazet, we compute the standard deviation of the average hash
bucket chain length while running rt_check_expire.  Should any given chain
length grow to larger that average plus 4 standard deviations, we trigger an
emergency hash table rebuild for that net namespace.  This allows for the common
case in which chains are well behaved and do not grow unevenly to not incur any
latency at all, while those systems (which may be being maliciously attacked),
only rebuild when the attack is detected.  This patch take 2 other factors into
account:
1) chains with multiple entries that differ by attributes that do not affect the
hash value are only counted once, so as not to unduly bias system to rebuilding
if features like QOS are heavily used
2) if rebuilding crosses a certain threshold (which is adjustable via the added
sysctl in this patch), route caching is disabled entirely for that net
namespace, since constant rebuilding is less efficient that no caching at all

Tested successfully by me.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;dada1@cosmosbay.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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