linux-toradex.git/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt, branch v4.19-rc5

ipc: reorganize initialization of kern_ipc_perm.seq

2018-08-22T17:52:51+00:00

ipc_addid() initializes kern_ipc_perm.seq after having called idr_alloc()
(within ipc_idr_alloc()).

Thus a parallel semop() or msgrcv() that uses ipc_obtain_object_check()
may see an uninitialized value.

The patch moves the initialization of kern_ipc_perm.seq before the calls
of idr_alloc().

Notes:
1) This patch has a user space visible side effect:
If /proc/sys/kernel/*_next_id is used (i.e.: checkpoint/restore) and
if semget()/msgget()/shmget() fails in the final step of adding the id
to the rhash tree, then .._next_id is cleared. Before the patch, is
remained unmodified.

There is no change of the behavior after a successful ..get() call: It
always clears .._next_id, there is no impact to non checkpoint/restore
code as that code does not use .._next_id.

2) The patch correctly documents that after a call to ipc_idr_alloc(),
the full tear-down sequence must be used. The callers of ipc_addid()
do not fullfill that, i.e. more bugfixes are required.

The patch is a squash of a patch from Dmitry and my own changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180712185241.4017-3-manfred@colorfullife.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2827ef6b3385deb07eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Herbert Xu 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel/hung_task.c: allow to set checking interval separately from timeout

2018-08-22T17:52:47+00:00

Currently task hung checking interval is equal to timeout, as the result
hung is detected anywhere between timeout and 2*timeout.  This is fine for
most interactive environments, but this hurts automated testing setups
(syzbot).  In an automated setup we need to strictly order CPU lockup <
RCU stall < workqueue lockup < task hung < silent loss, so that RCU stall
is not detected as task hung and task hung is not detected as silent
machine loss.  The large variance in task hung detection timeout requires
setting silent machine loss timeout to a very large value (e.g.  if task
hung is 3 mins, then silent loss need to be set to ~7 mins).  The
additional 3 minutes significantly reduce testing efficiency because
usually we crash kernel within a minute, and this can add hours to bug
localization process as it needs to do dozens of tests.

Allow setting checking interval separately from timeout.  This allows to
set timeout to, say, 3 minutes, but checking interval to 10 secs.

The interval is controlled via a new hung_task_check_interval_secs sysctl,
similar to the existing hung_task_timeout_secs sysctl.  The default value
of 0 results in the current behavior: checking interval is equal to
timeout.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update hung_task_timeout_max's comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180611111004.203513-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Tetsuo Handa 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Drivers: HV: Send one page worth of kmsg dump over Hyper-V during panic

2018-07-08T13:54:31+00:00

In the VM mode on Hyper-V, currently, when the kernel panics, an error
code and few register values are populated in an MSR and the Hypervisor
notified. This information is collected on the host. The amount of
information currently collected is found to be limited and not very
actionable. To gather more actionable data, such as stack trace, the
proposal is to write one page worth of kmsg data on an allocated page
and the Hypervisor notified of the page address through the MSR.

- Sysctl option to control the behavior, with ON by default.

Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan 
Cc: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: Sunil Muthuswamy 
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

taint: add taint for randstruct

2018-04-11T17:28:35+00:00

Since the randstruct plugin can intentionally produce extremely unusual
kernel structure layouts (even performance pathological ones), some
maintainers want to be able to trivially determine if an Oops is coming
from a randstruct-built kernel, so as to keep their sanity when
debugging.  This adds the new flag and initializes taint_mask
immediately when built with randstruct.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

taint: consolidate documentation

2018-04-11T17:28:34+00:00

This consolidates the taint bit documentation into a single place with
both numeric and letter values.  Additionally adds the missing TAINT_AUX
documentation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

doc: update kptr_restrict documentation

2017-12-21T20:39:27+00:00

Recently the behaviour of printk specifier %pK was changed. The
documentation does not currently mirror this.

Update documentation for sysctl kptr_restrict.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding 
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

Documentation: Better document the hardlockup_panic sysctl

2017-12-11T21:55:29+00:00

Commit ac1f591249d95372f ("kernel/watchdog.c: add sysctl knob
hardlockup_panic") added the hardlockup_panic sysctl, but did not add it
to Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt.  Add this, and reference it from the
corresponding entry in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt.

Signed-off-by: Scott Wood 
Acked-by: Christoph von Recklinghausen 
Acked-by: Don Zickus 
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

Merge tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2017-09-23T02:16:41+00:00

Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
 "Major additions:

   - sysctl and seccomp operation to discover available actions
     (tyhicks)

   - new per-filter configurable logging infrastructure and sysctl
     (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_LOG to log allowed syscalls (tyhicks)

   - SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as the new strictest possible action

   - self-tests for new behaviors"

[ This is the seccomp part of the security pull request during the merge
  window that was nixed due to unrelated problems   - Linus ]

* tag 'seccomp-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  samples: Unrename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
  selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing
  seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action
  seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
  seccomp: Rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
  seccomp: Action to log before allowing
  seccomp: Filter flag to log all actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
  seccomp: Selftest for detection of filter flag support
  seccomp: Sysctl to configure actions that are allowed to be logged
  seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available
  seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions
  seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
  selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests
  selftests/seccomp: Add simple seccomp overhead benchmark
  selftests/seccomp: Add tests for basic ptrace actions

perf: Fix documentation for sysctls perf_event_paranoid and perf_event_mlock_kb

2017-08-22T16:24:54+00:00

Fix misprint CAP_IOC_LOCK -> CAP_IPC_LOCK. This capability have nothing
to do with raw tracepoints. This part is about bypassing mlock limits.

Sysctl kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1 allows raw and ftrace function
tracepoints without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150322916080.129746.11285255474738558340.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

seccomp: Sysctl to display available actions

2017-08-14T20:46:43+00:00

This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of
seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to
right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value
(allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap
errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for
userspace code as well as the system administrator.

The path to the sysctl is:

  /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail

libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions
the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current
kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel
headers that were installed where the userspace code was built.

In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which
actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure
exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this
level of logging configuration will come in a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook