<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/Documentation/sysctl, branch v3.14.57</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm, pcp: allow restoring percpu_pagelist_fraction default</title>
<updated>2014-07-09T18:18:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-23T20:22:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1f8e5d4325ab2b4b328ca4eabcd2a687103d0565'/>
<id>1f8e5d4325ab2b4b328ca4eabcd2a687103d0565</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cd2b0a34ab8e4db971920eef8982f985441adfb upstream.

Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Oleg Drokin &lt;green@linuxhacker.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7cd2b0a34ab8e4db971920eef8982f985441adfb upstream.

Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Oleg Drokin &lt;green@linuxhacker.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hung_task: check the value of "sysctl_hung_task_timeout_sec"</title>
<updated>2014-05-06T14:59:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liu Hua</name>
<email>sdu.liu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-07T22:38:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dfe468daba552b4d474db75ff54562691150bb78'/>
<id>dfe468daba552b4d474db75ff54562691150bb78</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 80df28476505ed4e6701c3448c63c9229a50c655 upstream.

As sysctl_hung_task_timeout_sec is unsigned long, when this value is
larger then LONG_MAX/HZ, the function schedule_timeout_interruptible in
watchdog will return immediately without sleep and with print :

  schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff83

and then the funtion watchdog will call schedule_timeout_interruptible
again and again.  The screen will be filled with

	"schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff83"

This patch does some check and correction in sysctl, to let the function
schedule_timeout_interruptible allways get the valid parameter.

Signed-off-by: Liu Hua &lt;sdu.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Satoru Takeuchi &lt;satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 80df28476505ed4e6701c3448c63c9229a50c655 upstream.

As sysctl_hung_task_timeout_sec is unsigned long, when this value is
larger then LONG_MAX/HZ, the function schedule_timeout_interruptible in
watchdog will return immediately without sleep and with print :

  schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff83

and then the funtion watchdog will call schedule_timeout_interruptible
again and again.  The screen will be filled with

	"schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff83"

This patch does some check and correction in sysctl, to let the function
schedule_timeout_interruptible allways get the valid parameter.

Signed-off-by: Liu Hua &lt;sdu.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Satoru Takeuchi &lt;satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2014-01-31T16:59:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-31T16:59:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ab5318788c6725b6d5c95aff28e63af4c35a0e2c'/>
<id>ab5318788c6725b6d5c95aff28e63af4c35a0e2c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull core debug changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "This contains mostly kernel debugging related updates:

   - make hung_task detection more configurable to distros
   - add final bits for x86 UV NMI debugging, with related KGDB changes
   - update the mailing-list of MAINTAINERS entries I'm involved with"

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  hung_task: Display every hung task warning
  sysctl: Add neg_one as a standard constraint
  x86/uv/nmi, kgdb/kdb: Fix UV NMI handler when KDB not configured
  x86/uv/nmi: Fix Sparse warnings
  kgdb/kdb: Fix no KDB config problem
  MAINTAINERS: Restore "L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" entries
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull core debug changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "This contains mostly kernel debugging related updates:

   - make hung_task detection more configurable to distros
   - add final bits for x86 UV NMI debugging, with related KGDB changes
   - update the mailing-list of MAINTAINERS entries I'm involved with"

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  hung_task: Display every hung task warning
  sysctl: Add neg_one as a standard constraint
  x86/uv/nmi, kgdb/kdb: Fix UV NMI handler when KDB not configured
  x86/uv/nmi: Fix Sparse warnings
  kgdb/kdb: Fix no KDB config problem
  MAINTAINERS: Restore "L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" entries
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: document improved handling of swappiness==0</title>
<updated>2014-01-30T00:22:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aaron Tomlin</name>
<email>atomlin@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-29T22:05:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8582cb96b0bfd6891766d8c30d759bf21aad3b4d'/>
<id>8582cb96b0bfd6891766d8c30d759bf21aad3b4d</id>
<content type='text'>
Prior to commit fe35004fbf9e ("mm: avoid swapping out with
swappiness==0") setting swappiness to 0, reclaim code could still evict
recently used user anonymous memory to swap even though there is a
significant amount of RAM used for page cache.

The behaviour of setting swappiness to 0 has since changed.  When set,
the reclaim code does not initiate swap until the amount of free pages
and file-backed pages, is less than the high water mark in a zone.

Let's update the documentation to reflect this.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove comma, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Bryn M. Reeves &lt;bmr@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satoru Moriya &lt;satoru.moriya@hds.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Prior to commit fe35004fbf9e ("mm: avoid swapping out with
swappiness==0") setting swappiness to 0, reclaim code could still evict
recently used user anonymous memory to swap even though there is a
significant amount of RAM used for page cache.

The behaviour of setting swappiness to 0 has since changed.  When set,
the reclaim code does not initiate swap until the amount of free pages
and file-backed pages, is less than the high water mark in a zone.

Let's update the documentation to reflect this.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove comma, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Bryn M. Reeves &lt;bmr@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satoru Moriya &lt;satoru.moriya@hds.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hung_task: Display every hung task warning</title>
<updated>2014-01-25T11:13:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aaron Tomlin</name>
<email>atomlin@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-20T17:34:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=270750dbc18a71b23d660df110e433ff9616a2d4'/>
<id>270750dbc18a71b23d660df110e433ff9616a2d4</id>
<content type='text'>
When khungtaskd detects hung tasks, it prints out
backtraces from a number of those tasks.

Limiting the number of backtraces being printed
out can result in the user not seeing the information
necessary to debug the issue. The hung_task_warnings
sysctl controls this feature.

This patch makes it possible for hung_task_warnings
to accept a special value to print an unlimited
number of backtraces when khungtaskd detects hung
tasks.

The special value is -1. To use this value it is
necessary to change types from ulong to int.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1390239253-24030-3-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com
[ Build warning fix. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When khungtaskd detects hung tasks, it prints out
backtraces from a number of those tasks.

Limiting the number of backtraces being printed
out can result in the user not seeing the information
necessary to debug the issue. The hung_task_warnings
sysctl controls this feature.

This patch makes it possible for hung_task_warnings
to accept a special value to print an unlimited
number of backtraces when khungtaskd detects hung
tasks.

The special value is -1. To use this value it is
necessary to change types from ulong to int.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1390239253-24030-3-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com
[ Build warning fix. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load</title>
<updated>2014-01-24T00:37:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-23T23:55:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7984754b99b6c89054edc405e9d9d35810a91d36'/>
<id>7984754b99b6c89054edc405e9d9d35810a91d36</id>
<content type='text'>
For general-purpose (i.e.  distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec.  However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled).  Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set.  With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.

The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard.  Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.

In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:

1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
   verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.

1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed.  4 is the state of things now.  The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For general-purpose (i.e.  distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build
with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they
want to do with kexec.  However, in the face of trying to lock down a
system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load
(much like module loading can be disabled).  Without this, it is too easy
for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM
and modules_disabled are set.  With this change, it is still possible to
load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack
of image) can't be altered.

The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect"
enforcement is hard.  Without a verified boot, along with verified
modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a
better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of
discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation.

In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios:

1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based
   verification of kexec images.
2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images.
3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it.
4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all.

1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has
landed.  4 is the state of things now.  The gap between 2 and 4 is too
large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2
and 1 are not possible for a system.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable</title>
<updated>2014-01-22T00:19:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jerome Marchand</name>
<email>jmarchan@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-21T23:49:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=49f0ce5f92321cdcf741e35f385669a421013cb7'/>
<id>49f0ce5f92321cdcf741e35f385669a421013cb7</id>
<content type='text'>
Some applications that run on HPC clusters are designed around the
availability of RAM and the overcommit ratio is fine tuned to get the
maximum usage of memory without swapping.  With growing memory, the
1%-of-all-RAM grain provided by overcommit_ratio has become too coarse
for these workload (on a 2TB machine it represents no less than 20GB).

This patch adds the new overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable that allow a
much finer grain.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build]
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand &lt;jmarchan@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Some applications that run on HPC clusters are designed around the
availability of RAM and the overcommit ratio is fine tuned to get the
maximum usage of memory without swapping.  With growing memory, the
1%-of-all-RAM grain provided by overcommit_ratio has become too coarse
for these workload (on a 2TB machine it represents no less than 20GB).

This patch adds the new overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable that allow a
much finer grain.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build]
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand &lt;jmarchan@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Cox &lt;alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/numa: Drop sysctl_numa_balancing_settle_count sysctl</title>
<updated>2013-12-17T14:24:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-12T07:23:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1bd53a7efdc988163ec4c25f656df38dbe500632'/>
<id>1bd53a7efdc988163ec4c25f656df38dbe500632</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 887c290e (sched/numa: Decide whether to favour task or group weights
based on swap candidate relationships) drop the check against
sysctl_numa_balancing_settle_count, this patch remove the sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1386833006-6600-1-git-send-email-liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 887c290e (sched/numa: Decide whether to favour task or group weights
based on swap candidate relationships) drop the check against
sysctl_numa_balancing_settle_count, this patch remove the sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi &lt;n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1386833006-6600-1-git-send-email-liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vsprintf: check real user/group id for %pK</title>
<updated>2013-11-13T03:09:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Mallon</name>
<email>rmallon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-12T23:08:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=312b4e226951f707e120b95b118cbc14f3d162b2'/>
<id>312b4e226951f707e120b95b118cbc14f3d162b2</id>
<content type='text'>
Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
permission by the real user id.  This is problematic with files which
use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time.  If a setuid
binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
leaked.

This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04:

  $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
  00000000 T startup_32

  $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
  pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'

This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
setuid binaries may leak more information.

Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having
CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids.
If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the
pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged.

Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct
the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.

This is a only temporary solution to the issue.  The correct solution is
to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK
with a function which checks the open() time permission.  %pK uses in
printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and
instead protected by using dmesg_restrict.

Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon &lt;rmallon@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
permission by the real user id.  This is problematic with files which
use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time.  If a setuid
binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
leaked.

This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04:

  $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
  00000000 T startup_32

  $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
  pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'

This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
setuid binaries may leak more information.

Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having
CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids.
If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the
pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged.

Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct
the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.

This is a only temporary solution to the issue.  The correct solution is
to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK
with a function which checks the open() time permission.  %pK uses in
printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and
instead protected by using dmesg_restrict.

Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon &lt;rmallon@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: improve the description for dirty_background_ratio/dirty_ratio sysctl</title>
<updated>2013-11-13T03:09:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Liu</name>
<email>wenqing.lz@taobao.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-12T23:08:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=715ea41e60277f28f84d6c937737350e00955d56'/>
<id>715ea41e60277f28f84d6c937737350e00955d56</id>
<content type='text'>
Now dirty_background_ratio/dirty_ratio contains a percentage of total
avaiable memory, which contains free pages and reclaimable pages.  The
number of these pages is not equal to the number of total system memory.
But they are described as a percentage of total system memory in
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt.  So we need to fix them to avoid
misunderstanding.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu &lt;wenqing.lz@taobao.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Landley &lt;rob@landley.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now dirty_background_ratio/dirty_ratio contains a percentage of total
avaiable memory, which contains free pages and reclaimable pages.  The
number of these pages is not equal to the number of total system memory.
But they are described as a percentage of total system memory in
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt.  So we need to fix them to avoid
misunderstanding.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Liu &lt;wenqing.lz@taobao.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Landley &lt;rob@landley.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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