linux-toradex.git/Documentation, branch v4.9.90

omapdrm: panel: fix compatible vendor string for td028ttec1

2018-03-24T10:00:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit c1b9d4c75cd549e08bd0596d7f9dcc20f7f6e8fa ]

The vendor name was "toppoly" but other panels and the vendor list
have defined it as "tpo". So let's fix it in driver and bindings.

We keep the old definition in parallel to stay compatible with
potential older DTB setup.

Signed-off-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller 
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dt-bindings: mfd: axp20x: Add "xpowers,master-mode" property for AXP806 PMICs

2018-03-24T10:00:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8461cf20d17e0090e9236b73d25b31be4f7fadc5 ]

commit b101829a029a ("mfd: axp20x: Fix AXP806 access errors on cold boot")
was intended to fix the case where a board uses an AXP806 in slave mode,
but the boot loader leaves it in master mode for lack of AXP806 support.
But now the driver breaks on boards where the PMIC is operating in master
mode. To let the device tree describe which mode of operation is needed,
this patch introduces a new property "xpowers,master-mode".

Fixes: 204ae2963e10 ("mfd: axp20x: Add bindings for AXP806 PMIC")
Signed-off-by: Rask Ingemann Lambertsen 
Acked-by: Chen-Yu Tsai 
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arm: spear13xx: Fix dmas cells

2018-02-22T14:43:53+00:00

commit cdd10409914184c7eee5ae3e11beb890c9c16c61 upstream.

The "dmas" cells for the designware DMA controller need to have only 3
properties apart from the phandle: request line, src master and
destination master. But the commit 6e8887f60f60 updated it incorrectly
while moving from platform code to DT. Fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+
Fixes: 6e8887f60f60 ("ARM: SPEAr13xx: Pass generic DW DMAC platform data from DT")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar 
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount option

2018-02-22T14:43:48+00:00

commit 9f0372488cc9243018a812e8cfbf27de650b187b upstream.

The grpid option is currently described as being the same as nogrpid.

Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández 
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option

2018-02-13T11:36:01+00:00

(cherry picked from commit 12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd)

The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the
original pv indirect calls in place.

That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify
paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines.

As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much
other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel
vulnerable to Spectre v2.  It was probably a debug option from the early
paravirt days.  So just remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Ashok Raj 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Jun Nakajima 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Rusty Russell 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Asit Mallick 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Jason Baron 
Cc: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Alok Kataria 
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation: Document array_index_nospec

2018-02-13T11:35:59+00:00

(cherry picked from commit f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da)

Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon 
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/pti: Document fix wrong index

2018-01-23T18:57:10+00:00

commit 98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421 upstream.

In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index.

Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation

2018-01-17T08:38:59+00:00

commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream.

Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect
branch speculation vulnerability.

Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms.
This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features.

The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.

[ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS
  	integration becomes simple ]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation

2018-01-17T08:38:58+00:00

commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream.

Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder

2018-01-17T08:38:57+00:00

commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream.

As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman