linux-toradex.git/arch/Kconfig, branch v4.1.10

Merge tag 'powerpc-4.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mpe/linux

2015-04-16T18:53:32+00:00

Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:

- Numerous minor fixes, cleanups etc.

- More EEH work from Gavin to remove its dependency on device_nodes.

- Memory hotplug implemented entirely in the kernel from Nathan
Fontenot.

- Removal of redundant CONFIG_PPC_OF by Kevin Hao.

- Rewrite of VPHN parsing logic & tests from Greg Kurz.

- A fix from Nish Aravamudan to reduce memory usage by clamping
nodes_possible_map.

- Support for pstore on powernv from Hari Bathini.

- Removal of old powerpc specific byte swap routines by David Gibson.

- Fix from Vasant Hegde to prevent the flash driver telling you it was
flashing your firmware when it wasn't.

- Patch from Ben Herrenschmidt to add an OPAL heartbeat driver.

- Fix for an oops causing get/put_cpu_var() imbalance in perf by Jan
Stancek.

- Some fixes for migration from Tyrel Datwyler.

- A new syscall to switch the cpu endian by Michael Ellerman.

- Large series from Wei Yang to implement SRIOV, reviewed and acked by
Bjorn.

- A fix for the OPAL sensor driver from Cédric Le Goater.

- Fixes to get STRICT_MM_TYPECHECKS building again by Michael Ellerman.

- Large series from Daniel Axtens to make our PCI hooks per PHB rather
than per machine.

- Small patch from Sam Bobroff to explicitly abort non-suspended
transactions on syscalls, plus a test to exercise it.

- Numerous reworks and fixes for the 24x7 PMU from Sukadev Bhattiprolu.

- Small patch to enable the hard lockup detector from Anton Blanchard.

- Fix from Dave Olson for missing L2 cache information on some CPUs.

- Some fixes from Michael Ellerman to get Cell machines booting again.

- Freescale updates from Scott: Highlights include BMan device tree
nodes, an MSI erratum workaround, a couple minor performance
improvements, config updates, and misc fixes/cleanup.

* tag 'powerpc-4.1-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mpe/linux: (196 commits)
powerpc/powermac: Fix build error seen with powermac smp builds
powerpc/pseries: Fix compile of memory hotplug without CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
powerpc: Remove PPC32 code from pseries specific find_and_init_phbs()
powerpc/cell: Fix iommu breakage caused by controller_ops change
powerpc/eeh: Fix crash in eeh_add_device_early() on Cell
powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Fail 24x7 initcall if create_events_from_catalog() fails
powerpc/pseries: Correct memory hotplug locking
powerpc: Fix missing L2 cache size in /sys/devices/system/cpu
powerpc: Add ppc64 hard lockup detector support
oprofile: Disable oprofile NMI timer on ppc64
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Add missing put_cpu_var()
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Break up single_24x7_request
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Define update_event_count()
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Whitespace cleanup
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Define add_event_to_24x7_request()
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Rename hv_24x7_event_update
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Move debug prints to separate function
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Drop event_24x7_request()
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Use pr_devel() to log message
...

Conflicts:
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/Makefile

mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE

2015-04-14T23:49:05+00:00

The arch_randomize_brk() function is used on several architectures,
even those that don't support ET_DYN ASLR. To avoid bulky extern/#define
tricks, consolidate the support under CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for
the architectures that support it, while still handling CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert 
Cc: Russell King 
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "David A. Long" 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Arun Chandran 
Cc: Yann Droneaud 
Cc: Min-Hua Chen 
Cc: Paul Burton 
Cc: Alex Smith 
Cc: Markos Chandras 
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan 
Cc: Jeff Bailey 
Cc: Michael Holzheu 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Behan Webster 
Cc: Ismael Ripoll 
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available

2015-04-14T23:49:05+00:00

When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert 
Cc: Russell King 
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: "David A. Long" 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Arun Chandran 
Cc: Yann Droneaud 
Cc: Min-Hua Chen 
Cc: Paul Burton 
Cc: Alex Smith 
Cc: Markos Chandras 
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan 
Cc: Jeff Bailey 
Cc: Michael Holzheu 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Behan Webster 
Cc: Ismael Ripoll 
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lib/ioremap.c: add huge I/O map capability interfaces

2015-04-14T23:49:04+00:00

Add ioremap_pud_enabled() and ioremap_pmd_enabled(), which return 1 when
I/O mappings with pud/pmd are enabled on the kernel.

ioremap_huge_init() calls arch_ioremap_pud_supported() and
arch_ioremap_pmd_supported() to initialize the capabilities at boot-time.

A new kernel option "nohugeiomap" is also added, so that user can disable
the huge I/O map capabilities when necessary.

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Robert Elliott 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: define default PGTABLE_LEVELS to two

2015-04-14T23:49:02+00:00

By this time all architectures which support more than two page table
levels should be covered.  This patch add default definiton of
PGTABLE_LEVELS equal 2.

We also add assert to detect inconsistence between CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS
and __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED/__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck 
Cc: Richard Henderson 
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Fenghua Yu 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Jeff Dike 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Koichi Yasutake 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

oprofile: Disable oprofile NMI timer on ppc64

2015-04-11T10:49:27+00:00

We want to enable the hard lockup detector on ppc64, but right now
that enables the oprofile NMI timer too.

We'd prefer not to enable the oprofile NMI timer, it adds another
element to our PMU testing and it requires us to increase our
exported symbols (eg cpu_khz).

Modify the config entry for OPROFILE_NMI_TIMER to disable it on PPC64.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard 
Acked-by: Robert Richter 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman

seccomp: Document two-phase seccomp and arch-provided seccomp_data

2014-09-03T21:58:17+00:00

The description of how archs should implement seccomp filters was
still strictly correct, but it failed to describe the newly
available optimizations.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall

2014-07-18T19:13:37+00:00

This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).

In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski

uprobes: Kconfig dependency fix

2014-03-18T20:39:33+00:00

Suggested change from Oleg Nesterov. Fixes incomplete dependencies
for uprobes feature.

Signed-off-by: David A. Long 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov

stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG

2013-12-20T08:38:40+00:00

This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of
"None", "Regular", and "Strong":

   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
   CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG

"Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option.

"Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the
kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in
gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack
protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all.

For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are:

-fstack-protector-all:
  Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking
  suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial
  use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users
  (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still
  low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not
  suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option
  from the kernel many years ago.

-fstack-protector:
  Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8
  (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local
  char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with
  string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those
  functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no
  measurable performance or size overhead.

-fstack-protector-strong
  Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not
  just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to
  stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a
  canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions
  with only a small change in performance. Based on the original
  design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any
  of:

    - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side
      of an assignment or function argument
    - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
      regardless of array type or length
    - uses register local variables

  https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU

Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with
gcc-4.9 in three configurations:

  - defconfig
	11430641 kernel text size
	36110 function bodies

  - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
	11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%)
	1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%)

  - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch
	11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%)
	7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%)

With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack
protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used
during decompression and was never used before, the exposure
here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the
stack guard is back to normal.

Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel
builds for the last 8 months with no problems.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: Michal Marek 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Paul Mundt 
Cc: James Hogan 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Shawn Guo 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
[ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar