Way, way back it used to be
	_PAGE_NORMAL((x) | ((x & _PAGE_FOW) ? 0 : _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_COW))
Then (in 1.3.54) _PAGE_COW had died.  Result:
	_PAGE_NORMAL((x) | ((x & _PAGE_FOW) ? 0 : _PAGE_FOW))
which is somewhat... obscure.  What it does is simply
	_PAGE_NORMAL((x) | _PAGE_FOW)
and IMO that's easier to follow.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

unused since 2.4 times...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

.. and in arch/* - circa 2.2.7.

Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Make pte_swp_exclusive return bool instead of int.  This will better
reflect how pte_swp_exclusive is actually used in the code.

This fixes swap/swapoff problems on Alpha due pte_swp_exclusive not
returning correct values when _PAGE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE bit resides in upper
32-bits of PTE (like on alpha).

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Magnus Lindholm <linmag7@gmail.com>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250218175735.19882-2-linmag7@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250602041118.GA2675383@ZenIV/
[ Applied as the 'sed' script Al suggested   - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Most architectures simply call pfn_pte().  Centralise that as the normal
definition and remove the definition of mk_pte() from the architectures
which have either that exact definition or something similar.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250402181709.2386022-3-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> # s390
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> writes[1]:

> There was a Spec benchmark (I forget which) which was memory bound and ran
> twice as fast with 32-bit pointers.
>
> I copied the idea from DEC to the ELF abi, but never did all the other work
> to allow the toolchain to take advantage.
>
> Amusingly, a later Spec changed the benchmark data sets to not fit into a
> 32-bit address space, specifically because of this.
>
> I expect one could delete the ELF bit and personality and no one would
> notice. Not even the 10 remaining Alpha users.

In [2] it was pointed out that parts of setarch weren't working
properly on alpha because it has it's own SET_PERSONALITY
implementation.  In the discussion that followed Richard Henderson
pointed out that the 32bit pointer support for alpha was never
completed.

Fix this by removing alpha's 32bit pointer support.

As a bit of paranoia refuse to execute any alpha binaries that have
the EF_ALPHA_32BIT flag set.  Just in case someone somewhere has
binaries that try to use alpha's 32bit pointer support.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAFXwXrkgu=4Qn-v1PjnOR4SG0oUb9LSa0g6QXpBq4ttm52pJOQ@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250103140148.370368-1-glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de [2]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Tested-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87y0zfs26i.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>

Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
 "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
  Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

  CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
  indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
  part of this feature, and just for userspace.

  The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
  return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
  secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
  protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
  the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
  to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
  the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.

  For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
  versions of this patch set"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/

* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
  x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
  x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
  x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
  x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
  x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
  x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
  x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
  selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
  x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
  x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
  x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
  x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
  x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
  x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
  x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
  x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  ...

Add PFN_PTE_SHIFT, update_mmu_cache_range() and flush_icache_pages().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802151406.3735276-8-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.

One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). The goal is to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.

But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.

So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.

Start the process by renaming pte_mkwrite() to pte_mkwrite_novma() and
adding the pte_mkwrite() wrapper in linux/pgtable.h. Apply the same
pattern for pmd_mkwrite(). Since not all archs have a pmd_mkwrite_novma(),
create a new arch config HAS_HUGE_PAGE that can be used to tell if
pmd_mkwrite() should be defined. Otherwise in the !HAS_HUGE_PAGE cases the
compiler would not be able to find pmd_mkwrite_novma().

No functional change.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZjSu7c9sFYZb3q04108stgHff2wfbokGCCgW7riz+8Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

__HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE is now supported by all architectures that
support swp PTEs, so let's drop it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230113171026.582290-27-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>