<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/arm64/kernel, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64, mailmap: update email address for Peter Collingbourne</title>
<updated>2026-07-29T00:37:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Collingbourne</name>
<email>peter@pcc.me.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-18T17:29:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1fcac73551425c6924cca5cc29f10a5caf80907b'/>
<id>1fcac73551425c6924cca5cc29f10a5caf80907b</id>
<content type='text'>
I am no longer at Google.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260718172923.8297-1-peter@pcc.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne &lt;peter@pcc.me.uk&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kacinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Kepplinger &lt;martink@posteo.de&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I am no longer at Google.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260718172923.8297-1-peter@pcc.me.uk
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne &lt;peter@pcc.me.uk&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kacinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Kepplinger &lt;martink@posteo.de&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: kprobes: Allow reentering kprobes while single-stepping</title>
<updated>2026-07-17T18:03:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pu Hu</name>
<email>hupu@transsion.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T06:32:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=23f851ac0078a908bf3422d6467ebc1db5828c46'/>
<id>23f851ac0078a908bf3422d6467ebc1db5828c46</id>
<content type='text'>
A kprobe can be hit while another kprobe is in KPROBE_HIT_SS state. This
can happen when tracing or perf code runs from the debug exception path
while the first kprobe is preparing or executing its out-of-line
single-step instruction.

Currently arm64 treats a kprobe hit in KPROBE_HIT_SS as unrecoverable,
the same as a hit in KPROBE_REENTER. This is too strict. A hit in
KPROBE_HIT_SS is still a one-level reentry and can be handled by saving
the current kprobe state and setting up single-step for the new probe,
just like reentry from KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE or KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE.

The truly unrecoverable case is hitting another kprobe while already in
KPROBE_REENTER, because the reentry save area has already been consumed.

Move KPROBE_HIT_SS to the recoverable reentry cases and leave
KPROBE_REENTER as the unrecoverable nested reentry case.

This change also requires saving saved_irqflag in struct prev_kprobe.
When a nested kprobe calls kprobes_save_local_irqflag(), it overwrites
kcb-&gt;saved_irqflag with the currently masked DAIF value, losing the
outer kprobe's original DAIF state. Without this fix, when the outer
kprobe's single-step finishes, kprobes_restore_local_irqflag() applies
the wrong DAIF mask and leaves interrupts permanently disabled.

Extend struct prev_kprobe with a saved_irqflag field and save/restore it
alongside kp and status. This ensures the outer kprobe's original
interrupt state is preserved across reentry.

This mirrors the x86 fix in commit 6a5022a56ac3
("kprobes/x86: Allow to handle reentered kprobe on single-stepping").

Signed-off-by: Pu Hu &lt;hupu@transsion.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia &lt;hongyan.xia@transsion.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A kprobe can be hit while another kprobe is in KPROBE_HIT_SS state. This
can happen when tracing or perf code runs from the debug exception path
while the first kprobe is preparing or executing its out-of-line
single-step instruction.

Currently arm64 treats a kprobe hit in KPROBE_HIT_SS as unrecoverable,
the same as a hit in KPROBE_REENTER. This is too strict. A hit in
KPROBE_HIT_SS is still a one-level reentry and can be handled by saving
the current kprobe state and setting up single-step for the new probe,
just like reentry from KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE or KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE.

The truly unrecoverable case is hitting another kprobe while already in
KPROBE_REENTER, because the reentry save area has already been consumed.

Move KPROBE_HIT_SS to the recoverable reentry cases and leave
KPROBE_REENTER as the unrecoverable nested reentry case.

This change also requires saving saved_irqflag in struct prev_kprobe.
When a nested kprobe calls kprobes_save_local_irqflag(), it overwrites
kcb-&gt;saved_irqflag with the currently masked DAIF value, losing the
outer kprobe's original DAIF state. Without this fix, when the outer
kprobe's single-step finishes, kprobes_restore_local_irqflag() applies
the wrong DAIF mask and leaves interrupts permanently disabled.

Extend struct prev_kprobe with a saved_irqflag field and save/restore it
alongside kp and status. This ensures the outer kprobe's original
interrupt state is preserved across reentry.

This mirrors the x86 fix in commit 6a5022a56ac3
("kprobes/x86: Allow to handle reentered kprobe on single-stepping").

Signed-off-by: Pu Hu &lt;hupu@transsion.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia &lt;hongyan.xia@transsion.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: kprobes: Only handle faults originating from XOL slot</title>
<updated>2026-07-17T18:03:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pu Hu</name>
<email>hupu@transsion.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T06:32:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=879a6754d3d11e30af24b7dc486f561510d62641'/>
<id>879a6754d3d11e30af24b7dc486f561510d62641</id>
<content type='text'>
kprobe_fault_handler() currently treats any page fault taken while in
KPROBE_HIT_SS or KPROBE_REENTER state as a kprobe single-step fault. This
assumption does not hold: perf or tracing code may run from the debug
exception path during the single-step window and take its own page fault.

When the fault is handled as a kprobe fault, the PC is rewritten to the
probe address, corrupting the exception recovery context for the real
fault. A typical reproducer is running perf with preemptirq tracepoints
and dwarf callchains while a kprobe is installed on a frequently
executed function.

Fix this in two layers:

1. At function entry, bail out immediately for simulated kprobes
   (ainsn.xol_insn == NULL), since they have no XOL slot and any fault
   taken during their execution cannot be a single-step fault.

2. For kprobes with an XOL slot, only handle the fault when the
   faulting PC matches the XOL instruction address. Faults from any
   other PC are left to the normal page fault handler.

This follows the same principle as the x86 fix in commit 6381c24cd6d5
("kprobes/x86: Fix page-fault handling logic").

Signed-off-by: Pu Hu &lt;hupu@transsion.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia &lt;hongyan.xia@transsion.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kprobe_fault_handler() currently treats any page fault taken while in
KPROBE_HIT_SS or KPROBE_REENTER state as a kprobe single-step fault. This
assumption does not hold: perf or tracing code may run from the debug
exception path during the single-step window and take its own page fault.

When the fault is handled as a kprobe fault, the PC is rewritten to the
probe address, corrupting the exception recovery context for the real
fault. A typical reproducer is running perf with preemptirq tracepoints
and dwarf callchains while a kprobe is installed on a frequently
executed function.

Fix this in two layers:

1. At function entry, bail out immediately for simulated kprobes
   (ainsn.xol_insn == NULL), since they have no XOL slot and any fault
   taken during their execution cannot be a single-step fault.

2. For kprobes with an XOL slot, only handle the fault when the
   faulting PC matches the XOL instruction address. Faults from any
   other PC are left to the normal page fault handler.

This follows the same principle as the x86 fix in commit 6381c24cd6d5
("kprobes/x86: Fix page-fault handling logic").

Signed-off-by: Pu Hu &lt;hupu@transsion.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hongyan Xia &lt;hongyan.xia@transsion.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates"</title>
<updated>2026-07-17T16:25:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T16:25:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=26b483d52417253d88a3a01262ac85914a7aec8e'/>
<id>26b483d52417253d88a3a01262ac85914a7aec8e</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8.

Sashiko points out that updating 'orig_x0' after secure_computing()
has returned is too late to handle the case where a seccomp filter is
re-evaluated after initially returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. This means
that a tracer can manipulate the first argument of the syscall behind
seccomp's back.

For now, revert the initial fix and we'll have another crack at it soon.
Since the incorrect fix was cc'd to stable, do the same here with an
appropriate fixes tag.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260716120640.6590-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8.

Sashiko points out that updating 'orig_x0' after secure_computing()
has returned is too late to handle the case where a seccomp filter is
re-evaluated after initially returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. This means
that a tracer can manipulate the first argument of the syscall behind
seccomp's back.

For now, revert the initial fix and we'll have another crack at it soon.
Since the incorrect fix was cc'd to stable, do the same here with an
appropriate fixes tag.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260716120640.6590-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync with tracer updates</title>
<updated>2026-07-16T13:38:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-16T12:06:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8'/>
<id>e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8</id>
<content type='text'>
When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941
("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_
the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially
manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had
passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run
seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has
run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be
incomplete.

On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return
value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall
restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path,
the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early
during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by
syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not
directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the
tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This
means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale
value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by
the actual syscall.

Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a
potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because
compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being
skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in
that case).

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yiqi Sun &lt;sunyiqixm@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260529065444.1336608-1-sunyiqixm@gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace")
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941
("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_
the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially
manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had
passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run
seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has
run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be
incomplete.

On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return
value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall
restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path,
the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early
during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by
syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not
directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the
tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This
means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale
value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by
the actual syscall.

Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a
potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because
compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being
skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in
that case).

Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yiqi Sun &lt;sunyiqixm@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260529065444.1336608-1-sunyiqixm@gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace")
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Avoid eager DVMSync reclaim batches with C1-Pro SME erratum</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T11:00:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Catalin Marinas</name>
<email>catalin.marinas@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T10:37:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=534eb6940a89ff7ca3f2ab6582f3548ca97674c3'/>
<id>534eb6940a89ff7ca3f2ab6582f3548ca97674c3</id>
<content type='text'>
The C1-Pro SME DVMSync workaround currently samples mm_cpumask() from
arch_tlbbatch_add_pending(). It requires a DSB after every batched TLBI
so that the mask read is ordered after the hardware DVMSync, defeating
much of the reclaim batching benefit.

Introduce the sme_active_cpus mask tracking which CPUs run in user-space
with SME enabled and use it for batch flushing instead of accumulating
the mm_cpumask() of the unmapped pages.

Fixes: 0baba94a9779 ("arm64: errata: Work around early CME DVMSync acknowledgement")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Joshua Liu &lt;josliu@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The C1-Pro SME DVMSync workaround currently samples mm_cpumask() from
arch_tlbbatch_add_pending(). It requires a DSB after every batched TLBI
so that the mask read is ordered after the hardware DVMSync, defeating
much of the reclaim batching benefit.

Introduce the sme_active_cpus mask tracking which CPUs run in user-space
with SME enabled and use it for batch flushing instead of accumulating
the mm_cpumask() of the unmapped pages.

Fixes: 0baba94a9779 ("arm64: errata: Work around early CME DVMSync acknowledgement")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Joshua Liu &lt;josliu@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpu/hotplug: Fix NULL kobject warning in cpuhp_smt_enable()</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T10:47:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jinjie Ruan</name>
<email>ruanjinjie@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T07:52:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f9a82544c7174851f5c7524622f5966dcafd3a47'/>
<id>f9a82544c7174851f5c7524622f5966dcafd3a47</id>
<content type='text'>
On arm64, when booting with `maxcpus` greater than the number of present
CPUs (e.g., QEMU -smp cpus=4,maxcpus=8), some CPUs are marked as 'present'
but have not yet been registered via register_cpu(). Consequently,
the per-cpu device objects for these CPUs are not yet initialized.

In cpuhp_smt_enable(), the code iterates over all present CPUs. Calling
_cpu_up() for these unregistered CPUs eventually leads to
sysfs_create_group() being called with a NULL kobject (or a kobject
without a directory), triggering the following warning in
fs/sysfs/group.c:

  WARNING: fs/sysfs/group.c:137 at internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc, CPU#2: sh/181
  [...]
  Call trace:
    internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc (P)
    sysfs_create_group+0x18/0x24
    topology_add_dev+0x1c/0x28
    cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x104/0x20c
    __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x94/0x11c
    _cpu_up+0x200/0x37c

When booting with ACPI, arm64 smp_prepare_cpus() currently sets all
enumerated CPUs as "present" regardless of their status in the MADT. This
causes issues with SMT hotplug control. For instance, with QEMU's
"-smp 4,maxcpus=8" configuration, the MADT GICC entries are populated as
follows:

1. The first four CPUs: `Enabled` set but `Online Capable` not set.

2. The remaining four CPUs: `Online Capable` set but `Enabled` not set
   to support potential hot-plugging.

Fix this by:

1. When booting with ACPI, checking the ACPI_MADT_ENABLED flag in the GICC
   entry before calling set_cpu_present() during SMP initialization.

2. Properly managing the present mask in acpi_map_cpu() and
   acpi_unmap_cpu() to support actual CPU hotplug events, This aligns with
   other architectures like x86 and LoongArch.

3. Update the arm64 CPU hotplug documentation to no longer state that all
   online-capable vCPUs are marked as present by the kernel at boot time.

This ensures that only physically available or explicitly enabled CPUs
are in the present mask, keeping the SMT control logic consistent with
the actual hardware state.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Yicong Yang &lt;yangyicong@hisilicon.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#gic-cpu-interface-gicc-structure
Fixes: eed4583bcf9a ("arm64: Kconfig: Enable HOTPLUG_SMT")
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On arm64, when booting with `maxcpus` greater than the number of present
CPUs (e.g., QEMU -smp cpus=4,maxcpus=8), some CPUs are marked as 'present'
but have not yet been registered via register_cpu(). Consequently,
the per-cpu device objects for these CPUs are not yet initialized.

In cpuhp_smt_enable(), the code iterates over all present CPUs. Calling
_cpu_up() for these unregistered CPUs eventually leads to
sysfs_create_group() being called with a NULL kobject (or a kobject
without a directory), triggering the following warning in
fs/sysfs/group.c:

  WARNING: fs/sysfs/group.c:137 at internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc, CPU#2: sh/181
  [...]
  Call trace:
    internal_create_group+0x41c/0x4bc (P)
    sysfs_create_group+0x18/0x24
    topology_add_dev+0x1c/0x28
    cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x104/0x20c
    __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x94/0x11c
    _cpu_up+0x200/0x37c

When booting with ACPI, arm64 smp_prepare_cpus() currently sets all
enumerated CPUs as "present" regardless of their status in the MADT. This
causes issues with SMT hotplug control. For instance, with QEMU's
"-smp 4,maxcpus=8" configuration, the MADT GICC entries are populated as
follows:

1. The first four CPUs: `Enabled` set but `Online Capable` not set.

2. The remaining four CPUs: `Online Capable` set but `Enabled` not set
   to support potential hot-plugging.

Fix this by:

1. When booting with ACPI, checking the ACPI_MADT_ENABLED flag in the GICC
   entry before calling set_cpu_present() during SMP initialization.

2. Properly managing the present mask in acpi_map_cpu() and
   acpi_unmap_cpu() to support actual CPU hotplug events, This aligns with
   other architectures like x86 and LoongArch.

3. Update the arm64 CPU hotplug documentation to no longer state that all
   online-capable vCPUs are marked as present by the kernel at boot time.

This ensures that only physically available or explicitly enabled CPUs
are in the present mask, keeping the SMT control logic consistent with
the actual hardware state.

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Yicong Yang &lt;yangyicong@hisilicon.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#gic-cpu-interface-gicc-structure
Fixes: eed4583bcf9a ("arm64: Kconfig: Enable HOTPLUG_SMT")
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: smp: Fix hot-unplug tearing by forcing unregistration</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T10:47:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jinjie Ruan</name>
<email>ruanjinjie@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T07:52:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=18a4e5cf633fad5c40ac9d936c51bf38db68796d'/>
<id>18a4e5cf633fad5c40ac9d936c51bf38db68796d</id>
<content type='text'>
Sashiko review pointed out the following issue[1].

Commit eba4675008a6 ("arm64: arch_register_cpu() variant to check if
an ACPI handle is now available.") introduced architectural safety
blocks inside arch_unregister_cpu(). If a hot-unplug operation is
determined to be a physical hardware removal (where _STA evaluates to
!ACPI_STA_DEVICE_PRESENT), or if firmware evaluation fails, it aborts
the unregistration transaction early to protect unreadied arm64
infrastructure.

However, returning early from arch_unregister_cpu() causes a catastrophic
state tearing because the generic ACPI layer (acpi_processor_post_eject())
unconditionally continues its cleanup flow. This leaves the stale sysfs
device leaked in the memory, deadlocking any subsequent hot-add attempts
on the same CPU.

Fix it by simplifying arch_unregister_cpu() to always proceed with
the unregistration, as a pr_err_once() warning is sufficient to make
it more visible for currently not supported physical CPU removal.
Also remove the redundant NULL check on acpi_handle as it cannot be
NULL when calling arch_unregister_cpu().

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260520022023.126670-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com [1]
Fixes: eba4675008a6 ("arm64: arch_register_cpu() variant to check if an ACPI handle is now available.")
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sashiko review pointed out the following issue[1].

Commit eba4675008a6 ("arm64: arch_register_cpu() variant to check if
an ACPI handle is now available.") introduced architectural safety
blocks inside arch_unregister_cpu(). If a hot-unplug operation is
determined to be a physical hardware removal (where _STA evaluates to
!ACPI_STA_DEVICE_PRESENT), or if firmware evaluation fails, it aborts
the unregistration transaction early to protect unreadied arm64
infrastructure.

However, returning early from arch_unregister_cpu() causes a catastrophic
state tearing because the generic ACPI layer (acpi_processor_post_eject())
unconditionally continues its cleanup flow. This leaves the stale sysfs
device leaked in the memory, deadlocking any subsequent hot-add attempts
on the same CPU.

Fix it by simplifying arch_unregister_cpu() to always proceed with
the unregistration, as a pr_err_once() warning is sufficient to make
it more visible for currently not supported physical CPU removal.
Also remove the redundant NULL check on acpi_handle as it cannot be
NULL when calling arch_unregister_cpu().

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260520022023.126670-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com [1]
Fixes: eba4675008a6 ("arm64: arch_register_cpu() variant to check if an ACPI handle is now available.")
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan &lt;ruanjinjie@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux</title>
<updated>2026-06-26T15:40:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-26T15:40:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e7c93451eeb06b67b4eb23017824b3dee90b360e'/>
<id>e7c93451eeb06b67b4eb23017824b3dee90b360e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "Small crop of arm64 fixes for -rc1. We've got a build fix for a new
  randconfig permutation, a fix for a long-standing truncation issue
  with hardware watchpoints and a KVM initialisation fix for the newly
  merged remapping of the kernel data and bss sections:

   - Fix randconfig build failure due to missing include of asm/insn.h

   - Reject unaligned hardware watchpoints which were silently being
     truncated

   - Fix crash in KVM initialisation by deferring the read-only
     remapping of the kernel data and bss sections"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: mm: Defer read-only remap of data/bss linear alias
  arm64/hw_breakpoint: reject unaligned watchpoints that would truncate BAS
  arm64: static_call: include asm/insns.h
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "Small crop of arm64 fixes for -rc1. We've got a build fix for a new
  randconfig permutation, a fix for a long-standing truncation issue
  with hardware watchpoints and a KVM initialisation fix for the newly
  merged remapping of the kernel data and bss sections:

   - Fix randconfig build failure due to missing include of asm/insn.h

   - Reject unaligned hardware watchpoints which were silently being
     truncated

   - Fix crash in KVM initialisation by deferring the read-only
     remapping of the kernel data and bss sections"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: mm: Defer read-only remap of data/bss linear alias
  arm64/hw_breakpoint: reject unaligned watchpoints that would truncate BAS
  arm64: static_call: include asm/insns.h
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/hw_breakpoint: reject unaligned watchpoints that would truncate BAS</title>
<updated>2026-06-19T16:04:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Breno Leitao</name>
<email>leitao@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-09T13:15:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4cc70f75853bebac022334b6a86b953348072f74'/>
<id>4cc70f75853bebac022334b6a86b953348072f74</id>
<content type='text'>
hw_breakpoint_arch_parse() positions the BAS bit pattern in
hw-&gt;ctrl.len with

	offset = hw-&gt;address &amp; alignment_mask;	/* 0..7 */
	hw-&gt;ctrl.len &lt;&lt;= offset;

ctrl.len is an 8-bit bitfield (struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl::len is
u32 :8), so the shift silently drops any bits past bit 7.  For
non-compat AArch64 watchpoints the offset is unbounded relative to
ctrl.len: a perf_event_open(PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT) caller asking for
HW_BREAKPOINT_W with bp_addr=page+1 and bp_len=HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8
ends up with 0xff &lt;&lt; 1 = 0x1fe, stored as 0xfe.  The kernel programs
WCR.BAS=0xfe and the hardware watches bytes [1..7] instead of the
requested [1..8] -- the eighth byte is silently dropped.  The
syscall still returns success, leaving userspace to discover the
gap by empirical probing.

The same class affects HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_{2,4} when offset pushes the
high BAS bit past bit 7 (e.g. LEN_4 with offset=5 yields 0xe0
instead of 0x1e0).  No memory-safety impact -- the value is masked
into 8 bits before encoding -- but debuggers and perf users observe
missed events on bytes they thought they were watching.

The AArch32 branch immediately above already rejects unrepresentable
(offset, len) combinations via an explicit switch.  Mirror that for
the non-compat branch by checking that the shifted pattern fits in
the BAS field, returning -EINVAL when it does not.

GDB and similar debuggers are unaffected by the stricter check.
aarch64_linux_set_debug_regs() already treats EINVAL on
NT_ARM_HW_WATCH as a downgrade signal: it clears
kernel_supports_any_contiguous_range, calls aarch64_downgrade_regs()
to round the BAS up to a legacy 0x01/03/0f/ff mask with an aligned
base, and retries -- the same fallback path that PR-20207 introduced.
The new -EINVAL is therefore reachable only from a raw
perf_event_open() that pairs an unaligned base with an oversized
bp_len, which is precisely the bug.

Reproducer:

  struct perf_event_attr a = {
      .type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, .size = sizeof(a),
      .bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_W,
      .bp_addr = (uintptr_t)(buf + 1),
      .bp_len = HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8,
      .exclude_kernel = 1, .exclude_hv = 1,
  };
  int fd = perf_event_open(&amp;a, 0, -1, -1, 0);
  /* before this fix: succeeds, watches 7 bytes (buf+1..buf+7)   */
  /* after  this fix: fails with EINVAL                          */

Fixes: b08fb180bb88 ("arm64: Allow hw watchpoint at varied offset from base address")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
hw_breakpoint_arch_parse() positions the BAS bit pattern in
hw-&gt;ctrl.len with

	offset = hw-&gt;address &amp; alignment_mask;	/* 0..7 */
	hw-&gt;ctrl.len &lt;&lt;= offset;

ctrl.len is an 8-bit bitfield (struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl::len is
u32 :8), so the shift silently drops any bits past bit 7.  For
non-compat AArch64 watchpoints the offset is unbounded relative to
ctrl.len: a perf_event_open(PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT) caller asking for
HW_BREAKPOINT_W with bp_addr=page+1 and bp_len=HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8
ends up with 0xff &lt;&lt; 1 = 0x1fe, stored as 0xfe.  The kernel programs
WCR.BAS=0xfe and the hardware watches bytes [1..7] instead of the
requested [1..8] -- the eighth byte is silently dropped.  The
syscall still returns success, leaving userspace to discover the
gap by empirical probing.

The same class affects HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_{2,4} when offset pushes the
high BAS bit past bit 7 (e.g. LEN_4 with offset=5 yields 0xe0
instead of 0x1e0).  No memory-safety impact -- the value is masked
into 8 bits before encoding -- but debuggers and perf users observe
missed events on bytes they thought they were watching.

The AArch32 branch immediately above already rejects unrepresentable
(offset, len) combinations via an explicit switch.  Mirror that for
the non-compat branch by checking that the shifted pattern fits in
the BAS field, returning -EINVAL when it does not.

GDB and similar debuggers are unaffected by the stricter check.
aarch64_linux_set_debug_regs() already treats EINVAL on
NT_ARM_HW_WATCH as a downgrade signal: it clears
kernel_supports_any_contiguous_range, calls aarch64_downgrade_regs()
to round the BAS up to a legacy 0x01/03/0f/ff mask with an aligned
base, and retries -- the same fallback path that PR-20207 introduced.
The new -EINVAL is therefore reachable only from a raw
perf_event_open() that pairs an unaligned base with an oversized
bp_len, which is precisely the bug.

Reproducer:

  struct perf_event_attr a = {
      .type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, .size = sizeof(a),
      .bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_W,
      .bp_addr = (uintptr_t)(buf + 1),
      .bp_len = HW_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8,
      .exclude_kernel = 1, .exclude_hv = 1,
  };
  int fd = perf_event_open(&amp;a, 0, -1, -1, 0);
  /* before this fix: succeeds, watches 7 bytes (buf+1..buf+7)   */
  /* after  this fix: fails with EINVAL                          */

Fixes: b08fb180bb88 ("arm64: Allow hw watchpoint at varied offset from base address")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
