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<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S, branch v4.4.73</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64: kernel: Add support for Privileged Access Never</title>
<updated>2015-07-27T10:08:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morse</name>
<email>james.morse@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-22T18:05:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=338d4f49d6f7114a017d294ccf7374df4f998edc'/>
<id>338d4f49d6f7114a017d294ccf7374df4f998edc</id>
<content type='text'>
'Privileged Access Never' is a new arm8.1 feature which prevents
privileged code from accessing any virtual address where read or write
access is also permitted at EL0.

This patch enables the PAN feature on all CPUs, and modifies {get,put}_user
helpers temporarily to permit access.

This will catch kernel bugs where user memory is accessed directly.
'Unprivileged loads and stores' using ldtrb et al are unaffected by PAN.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
[will: use ALTERNATIVE in asm and tidy up pan_enable check]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
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<pre>
'Privileged Access Never' is a new arm8.1 feature which prevents
privileged code from accessing any virtual address where read or write
access is also permitted at EL0.

This patch enables the PAN feature on all CPUs, and modifies {get,put}_user
helpers temporarily to permit access.

This will catch kernel bugs where user memory is accessed directly.
'Unprivileged loads and stores' using ldtrb et al are unaffected by PAN.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
[will: use ALTERNATIVE in asm and tidy up pan_enable check]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: __clear_user: handle exceptions on strb</title>
<updated>2014-11-13T15:21:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle McMartin</name>
<email>kyle@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-12T21:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=97fc15436b36ee3956efad83e22a557991f7d19d'/>
<id>97fc15436b36ee3956efad83e22a557991f7d19d</id>
<content type='text'>
ARM64 currently doesn't fix up faults on the single-byte (strb) case of
__clear_user... which means that we can cause a nasty kernel panic as an
ordinary user with any multiple PAGE_SIZE+1 read from /dev/zero.
i.e.: dd if=/dev/zero of=foo ibs=1 count=1 (or ibs=65537, etc.)

This is a pretty obscure bug in the general case since we'll only
__do_kernel_fault (since there's no extable entry for pc) if the
mmap_sem is contended. However, with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, we'll
always fault.

if (!down_read_trylock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem)) {
	if (!user_mode(regs) &amp;&amp; !search_exception_tables(regs-&gt;pc))
		goto no_context;
retry:
	down_read(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
} else {
	/*
	 * The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
	 * which
	 * case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
	 * down_read().
	 */
	might_sleep();
	if (!user_mode(regs) &amp;&amp; !search_exception_tables(regs-&gt;pc))
		goto no_context;
}

Fix that by adding an extable entry for the strb instruction, since it
touches user memory, similar to the other stores in __clear_user.

Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin &lt;kyle@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miloš Prchlík &lt;mprchlik@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
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<pre>
ARM64 currently doesn't fix up faults on the single-byte (strb) case of
__clear_user... which means that we can cause a nasty kernel panic as an
ordinary user with any multiple PAGE_SIZE+1 read from /dev/zero.
i.e.: dd if=/dev/zero of=foo ibs=1 count=1 (or ibs=65537, etc.)

This is a pretty obscure bug in the general case since we'll only
__do_kernel_fault (since there's no extable entry for pc) if the
mmap_sem is contended. However, with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, we'll
always fault.

if (!down_read_trylock(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem)) {
	if (!user_mode(regs) &amp;&amp; !search_exception_tables(regs-&gt;pc))
		goto no_context;
retry:
	down_read(&amp;mm-&gt;mmap_sem);
} else {
	/*
	 * The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
	 * which
	 * case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
	 * down_read().
	 */
	might_sleep();
	if (!user_mode(regs) &amp;&amp; !search_exception_tables(regs-&gt;pc))
		goto no_context;
}

Fix that by adding an extable entry for the strb instruction, since it
touches user memory, similar to the other stores in __clear_user.

Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin &lt;kyle@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miloš Prchlík &lt;mprchlik@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: User access library functions</title>
<updated>2012-09-17T12:42:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Catalin Marinas</name>
<email>catalin.marinas@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-05T11:49:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0aea86a2176c22647a5b683768f858d880d5e05b'/>
<id>0aea86a2176c22647a5b683768f858d880d5e05b</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch add support for various user access functions. These
functions use the standard LDR/STR instructions and not the LDRT/STRT
variants in order to allow kernel addresses (after set_fs(KERNEL_DS)).

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar &lt;santosh.shilimkar@ti.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
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<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch add support for various user access functions. These
functions use the standard LDR/STR instructions and not the LDRT/STRT
variants in order to allow kernel addresses (after set_fs(KERNEL_DS)).

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar &lt;santosh.shilimkar@ti.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
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