This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer
(see Documentation/kasan.txt).

1/8 of kernel addresses reserved for shadow memory. There was no
big enough hole for this, so virtual addresses for shadow were
stolen from vmalloc area.

At early boot stage the whole shadow region populated with just
one physical page (kasan_zero_page). Later, this page reused
as readonly zero shadow for some memory that KASan currently
don't track (vmalloc).
After mapping the physical memory, pages for shadow memory are
allocated and mapped.

Functions like memset/memmove/memcpy do a lot of memory accesses.
If bad pointer passed to one of these function it is important
to catch this. Compiler's instrumentation cannot do this since
these functions are written in assembly.
KASan replaces memory functions with manually instrumented variants.
Original functions declared as weak symbols so strong definitions
in mm/kasan/kasan.c could replace them. Original functions have aliases
with '__' prefix in name, so we could call non-instrumented variant
if needed.
Some files built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c).
Original mem* function replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants
to disable memory access checks for such files.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

For more control over which functions are called with the MMU off or
with the UEFI 1:1 mapping active, annotate some assembler routines as
position independent. This is done by introducing ENDPIPROC(), which
replaces the ENDPROC() declaration of those routines.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

This patch optimize copy_to-from-in_user for arm 64bit architecture. The
copy template is used as template file for all the copy*.S files. Minor
change was made to it to accommodate the copy to/from/in user files.

Signed-off-by: Feng Kan <fkan@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: Balamurugan Shanmugam <bshanmugam@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

This converts the memcpy.S to use the copy template file. The copy
template file was based originally on the memcpy.S

Signed-off-by: Feng Kan <fkan@apm.com>
Signed-off-by: Balamurugan Shanmugam <bshanmugam@apm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: removed tmp3(w) .req statements as they are not used]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

The cost of changing a cacheline from shared to exclusive state can be
significant, especially when this is triggered by an exclusive store,
since it may result in having to retry the transaction.

This patch makes use of prfm to prefetch cachelines for write prior to
ldxr/stxr loops when using the ll/sc atomic routines.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

On CPUs which support the LSE atomic instructions introduced in ARMv8.1,
it makes sense to use them in preference to ll/sc sequences.

This patch introduces runtime patching of our bitops functions so that
LSE atomic instructions are used instead.

Reviewed-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

In order to patch in the new atomic instructions at runtime, we need to
generate wrappers around the out-of-line exclusive load/store atomics.

This patch adds a new Kconfig option, CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS. which
causes our atomic functions to branch to the out-of-line ll/sc
implementations. To avoid the register spill overhead of the PCS, the
out-of-line functions are compiled with specific compiler flags to
force out-of-line save/restore of any registers that are usually
caller-saved.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

'Privileged Access Never' is a new arm8.1 feature which prevents
privileged code from accessing any virtual address where read or write
access is also permitted at EL0.

This patch enables the PAN feature on all CPUs, and modifies {get,put}_user
helpers temporarily to permit access.

This will catch kernel bugs where user memory is accessed directly.
'Unprivileged loads and stores' using ldtrb et al are unaffected by PAN.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[will: use ALTERNATIVE in asm and tidy up pan_enable check]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

The AArch64 instruction set contains load/store pair memory accessors,
so use these in our copy_*_user routines to transfer 16 bytes per
iteration.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

ARM64 currently doesn't fix up faults on the single-byte (strb) case of
__clear_user... which means that we can cause a nasty kernel panic as an
ordinary user with any multiple PAGE_SIZE+1 read from /dev/zero.
i.e.: dd if=/dev/zero of=foo ibs=1 count=1 (or ibs=65537, etc.)

This is a pretty obscure bug in the general case since we'll only
__do_kernel_fault (since there's no extable entry for pc) if the
mmap_sem is contended. However, with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, we'll
always fault.

if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
	if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
		goto no_context;
retry:
	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
	/*
	 * The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
	 * which
	 * case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
	 * down_read().
	 */
	might_sleep();
	if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
		goto no_context;
}

Fix that by adding an extable entry for the strb instruction, since it
touches user memory, similar to the other stores in __clear_user.

Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Miloš Prchlík <mprchlik@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>