<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/frv, branch v4.4.134</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour</title>
<updated>2018-05-26T06:48:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-24T07:31:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=177a981885cf9588ca5cbcaf2ce65ab0d4b4abb3'/>
<id>177a981885cf9588ca5cbcaf2ce65ab0d4b4abb3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30d6e0a4190d37740e9447e4e4815f06992dd8c3 upstream.

There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for
futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr,
and comparison of the result.

Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed
assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser.

This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined
behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in
commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with
FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump.

And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was
also reported to cause undefined behaviour report.

Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess:
remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true.
We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets
optimized away anyway).

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt; [s390]
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@mellanox.com&gt; [for tile]
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) &lt;dvhart@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt; [core/arm64]
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson &lt;stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi&gt;
Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Kuo &lt;rkuo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 30d6e0a4190d37740e9447e4e4815f06992dd8c3 upstream.

There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for
futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr,
and comparison of the result.

Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed
assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser.

This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined
behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in
commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with
FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump.

And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was
also reported to cause undefined behaviour report.

Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess:
remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true.
We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets
optimized away anyway).

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Russell King &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt; [s390]
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@mellanox.com&gt; [for tile]
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) &lt;dvhart@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt; [core/arm64]
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@parisc-linux.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson &lt;stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi&gt;
Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vineet Gupta &lt;vgupta@synopsys.com&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Richard Kuo &lt;rkuo@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073105.3901-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>frv: declare jiffies to be located in the .data section</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T09:51:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Kaehlcke</name>
<email>mka@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-02T21:46:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1b15e77f444af1acbe1055e48da536e5ce4cc193'/>
<id>1b15e77f444af1acbe1055e48da536e5ce4cc193</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60b0a8c3d2480f3b57282b47b7cae7ee71c48635 upstream.

Commit 7c30f352c852 ("jiffies.h: declare jiffies and jiffies_64 with
____cacheline_aligned_in_smp") removed a section specification from the
jiffies declaration that caused conflicts on some platforms.

Unfortunately this change broke the build for frv:

  kernel/built-in.o: In function `__do_softirq': (.text+0x6460): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against symbol
      `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  kernel/built-in.o: In function `__do_softirq': (.text+0x6574): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against symbol
      `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  kernel/built-in.o: In function `pwq_activate_delayed_work': workqueue.c:(.text+0x15b9c): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against
      symbol `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  ...

Add __jiffy_arch_data to the declaration of jiffies and use it on frv to
include the section specification.  For all other platforms
__jiffy_arch_data (currently) has no effect.

Fixes: 7c30f352c852 ("jiffies.h: declare jiffies and jiffies_64 with ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170516221333.177280-1-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 60b0a8c3d2480f3b57282b47b7cae7ee71c48635 upstream.

Commit 7c30f352c852 ("jiffies.h: declare jiffies and jiffies_64 with
____cacheline_aligned_in_smp") removed a section specification from the
jiffies declaration that caused conflicts on some platforms.

Unfortunately this change broke the build for frv:

  kernel/built-in.o: In function `__do_softirq': (.text+0x6460): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against symbol
      `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  kernel/built-in.o: In function `__do_softirq': (.text+0x6574): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against symbol
      `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  kernel/built-in.o: In function `pwq_activate_delayed_work': workqueue.c:(.text+0x15b9c): relocation truncated to fit: R_FRV_GPREL12 against
      symbol `jiffies' defined in *ABS* section in .tmp_vmlinux1
  ...

Add __jiffy_arch_data to the declaration of jiffies and use it on frv to
include the section specification.  For all other platforms
__jiffy_arch_data (currently) has no effect.

Fixes: 7c30f352c852 ("jiffies.h: declare jiffies and jiffies_64 with ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170516221333.177280-1-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:13:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741'/>
<id>4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>frv: fix clear_user()</title>
<updated>2016-09-24T08:07:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-19T00:54:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ad3817096cf97fad790f45a38c53d5bb39c1b5be'/>
<id>ad3817096cf97fad790f45a38c53d5bb39c1b5be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b8767a8f00cc6538ba6b1cf0f88502e2fd2eb90 upstream.

It should check access_ok().  Otherwise a bunch of places turn into
trivially exploitable rootholes.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3b8767a8f00cc6538ba6b1cf0f88502e2fd2eb90 upstream.

It should check access_ok().  Otherwise a bunch of places turn into
trivially exploitable rootholes.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmap_atomic_to_page() has no users, remove it</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T23:11:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Pitre</name>
<email>nicolas.pitre@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-09T22:58:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=77c5b5da02f0a30d61144a546c4ef3657e3b817d'/>
<id>77c5b5da02f0a30d61144a546c4ef3657e3b817d</id>
<content type='text'>
Removal started in commit 5bbeed12bdc3 ("sparc32: drop unused
kmap_atomic_to_page").  Let's do it across the whole tree.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Removal started in commit 5bbeed12bdc3 ("sparc32: drop unused
kmap_atomic_to_page").  Let's do it across the whole tree.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'v4.3-rc4' into locking/core, to pick up fixes before applying new changes</title>
<updated>2015-10-06T15:10:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-06T15:10:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=82fc167c392a1700f9adbde639730ee8c8122474'/>
<id>82fc167c392a1700f9adbde639730ee8c8122474</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'strscpy' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmetcalf/linux-tile</title>
<updated>2015-10-04T15:31:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-04T15:31:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=30c44659f4a3e7e1f9f47e895591b4b40bf62671'/>
<id>30c44659f4a3e7e1f9f47e895591b4b40bf62671</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull strscpy string copy function implementation from Chris Metcalf.

Chris sent this during the merge window, but I waffled back and forth on
the pull request, which is why it's going in only now.

The new "strscpy()" function is definitely easier to use and more secure
than either strncpy() or strlcpy(), both of which are horrible nasty
interfaces that have serious and irredeemable problems.

strncpy() has a useless return value, and doesn't NUL-terminate an
overlong result.  To make matters worse, it pads a short result with
zeroes, which is a performance disaster if you have big buffers.

strlcpy(), by contrast, is a mis-designed "fix" for strlcpy(), lacking
the insane NUL padding, but having a differently broken return value
which returns the original length of the source string.  Which means
that it will read characters past the count from the source buffer, and
you have to trust the source to be properly terminated.  It also makes
error handling fragile, since the test for overflow is unnecessarily
subtle.

strscpy() avoids both these problems, guaranteeing the NUL termination
(but not excessive padding) if the destination size wasn't zero, and
making the overflow condition very obvious by returning -E2BIG.  It also
doesn't read past the size of the source, and can thus be used for
untrusted source data too.

So why did I waffle about this for so long?

Every time we introduce a new-and-improved interface, people start doing
these interminable series of trivial conversion patches.

And every time that happens, somebody does some silly mistake, and the
conversion patch to the improved interface actually makes things worse.
Because the patch is mindnumbing and trivial, nobody has the attention
span to look at it carefully, and it's usually done over large swatches
of source code which means that not every conversion gets tested.

So I'm pulling the strscpy() support because it *is* a better interface.
But I will refuse to pull mindless conversion patches.  Use this in
places where it makes sense, but don't do trivial patches to fix things
that aren't actually known to be broken.

* 'strscpy' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmetcalf/linux-tile:
  tile: use global strscpy() rather than private copy
  string: provide strscpy()
  Make asm/word-at-a-time.h available on all architectures
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull strscpy string copy function implementation from Chris Metcalf.

Chris sent this during the merge window, but I waffled back and forth on
the pull request, which is why it's going in only now.

The new "strscpy()" function is definitely easier to use and more secure
than either strncpy() or strlcpy(), both of which are horrible nasty
interfaces that have serious and irredeemable problems.

strncpy() has a useless return value, and doesn't NUL-terminate an
overlong result.  To make matters worse, it pads a short result with
zeroes, which is a performance disaster if you have big buffers.

strlcpy(), by contrast, is a mis-designed "fix" for strlcpy(), lacking
the insane NUL padding, but having a differently broken return value
which returns the original length of the source string.  Which means
that it will read characters past the count from the source buffer, and
you have to trust the source to be properly terminated.  It also makes
error handling fragile, since the test for overflow is unnecessarily
subtle.

strscpy() avoids both these problems, guaranteeing the NUL termination
(but not excessive padding) if the destination size wasn't zero, and
making the overflow condition very obvious by returning -E2BIG.  It also
doesn't read past the size of the source, and can thus be used for
untrusted source data too.

So why did I waffle about this for so long?

Every time we introduce a new-and-improved interface, people start doing
these interminable series of trivial conversion patches.

And every time that happens, somebody does some silly mistake, and the
conversion patch to the improved interface actually makes things worse.
Because the patch is mindnumbing and trivial, nobody has the attention
span to look at it carefully, and it's usually done over large swatches
of source code which means that not every conversion gets tested.

So I'm pulling the strscpy() support because it *is* a better interface.
But I will refuse to pull mindless conversion patches.  Use this in
places where it makes sense, but don't do trivial patches to fix things
that aren't actually known to be broken.

* 'strscpy' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmetcalf/linux-tile:
  tile: use global strscpy() rather than private copy
  string: provide strscpy()
  Make asm/word-at-a-time.h available on all architectures
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atomic, arch: Audit atomic_{read,set}()</title>
<updated>2015-09-23T07:54:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-18T09:13:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=62e8a3258bda118f24ff462fe04cfbe75b8189b5'/>
<id>62e8a3258bda118f24ff462fe04cfbe75b8189b5</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch makes sure that atomic_{read,set}() are at least
{READ,WRITE}_ONCE().

We already had the 'requirement' that atomic_read() should use
ACCESS_ONCE(), and most archs had this, but a few were lacking.
All are now converted to use READ_ONCE().

And, by a symmetry and general paranoia argument, upgrade atomic_set()
to use WRITE_ONCE().

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: james.hogan@imgtec.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch makes sure that atomic_{read,set}() are at least
{READ,WRITE}_ONCE().

We already had the 'requirement' that atomic_read() should use
ACCESS_ONCE(), and most archs had this, but a few were lacking.
All are now converted to use READ_ONCE().

And, by a symmetry and general paranoia argument, upgrade atomic_set()
to use WRITE_ONCE().

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: james.hogan@imgtec.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Revert "PCI: Call pci_read_bridge_bases() from core instead of arch code"</title>
<updated>2015-09-15T18:18:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjorn Helgaas</name>
<email>bhelgaas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-15T18:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=237865f195f6b10e4724ce49eeb3972641da882a'/>
<id>237865f195f6b10e4724ce49eeb3972641da882a</id>
<content type='text'>
Revert dff22d2054b5 ("PCI: Call pci_read_bridge_bases() from core instead
of arch code").

Reading PCI bridge windows is not arch-specific in itself, but there is PCI
core code that doesn't work correctly if we read them too early.  For
example, Hannes found this case on an ARM Freescale i.mx6 board:

  pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x01000000-0x01efffff]
  pci 0000:00:00.0: PCI bridge to [bus 01-ff]
  pci 0000:00:00.0: BAR 8: no space for [mem size 0x01000000] (mem window)
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 2: failed to assign [mem size 0x00200000]
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 1: failed to assign [mem size 0x00004000]
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 0: failed to assign [mem size 0x00000100]

The 00:00.0 mem window needs to be at least 3MB: the 01:00.0 device needs
0x204100 of space, and mem windows are megabyte-aligned.

Bus sizing can increase a bridge window size, but never *decrease* it (see
d65245c3297a ("PCI: don't shrink bridge resources")).  Prior to
dff22d2054b5, ARM didn't read bridge windows at all, so the "original size"
was zero, and we assigned a 3MB window.

After dff22d2054b5, we read the bridge windows before sizing the bus.  The
firmware programmed a 16MB window (size 0x01000000) in 00:00.0, and since
we never decrease the size, we kept 16MB even though we only needed 3MB.
But 16MB doesn't fit in the host bridge aperture, so we failed to assign
space for the window and the downstream devices.

I think this is a defect in the PCI core: we shouldn't rely on the firmware
to assign sensible windows.

Ray reported a similar problem, also on ARM, with Broadcom iProc.

Issues like this are too hard to fix right now, so revert dff22d2054b5.

Reported-by: Hannes &lt;oe5hpm@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ray Jui &lt;rjui@broadcom.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAa04yFQEUJm7Jj1qMT57-LG7ZGtnhNDBe=PpSRa70Mj+XhW-A@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/55F75BB8.4070405@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu &lt;yinghai@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Revert dff22d2054b5 ("PCI: Call pci_read_bridge_bases() from core instead
of arch code").

Reading PCI bridge windows is not arch-specific in itself, but there is PCI
core code that doesn't work correctly if we read them too early.  For
example, Hannes found this case on an ARM Freescale i.mx6 board:

  pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x01000000-0x01efffff]
  pci 0000:00:00.0: PCI bridge to [bus 01-ff]
  pci 0000:00:00.0: BAR 8: no space for [mem size 0x01000000] (mem window)
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 2: failed to assign [mem size 0x00200000]
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 1: failed to assign [mem size 0x00004000]
  pci 0000:01:00.0: BAR 0: failed to assign [mem size 0x00000100]

The 00:00.0 mem window needs to be at least 3MB: the 01:00.0 device needs
0x204100 of space, and mem windows are megabyte-aligned.

Bus sizing can increase a bridge window size, but never *decrease* it (see
d65245c3297a ("PCI: don't shrink bridge resources")).  Prior to
dff22d2054b5, ARM didn't read bridge windows at all, so the "original size"
was zero, and we assigned a 3MB window.

After dff22d2054b5, we read the bridge windows before sizing the bus.  The
firmware programmed a 16MB window (size 0x01000000) in 00:00.0, and since
we never decrease the size, we kept 16MB even though we only needed 3MB.
But 16MB doesn't fit in the host bridge aperture, so we failed to assign
space for the window and the downstream devices.

I think this is a defect in the PCI core: we shouldn't rely on the firmware
to assign sensible windows.

Ray reported a similar problem, also on ARM, with Broadcom iProc.

Issues like this are too hard to fix right now, so revert dff22d2054b5.

Reported-by: Hannes &lt;oe5hpm@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ray Jui &lt;rjui@broadcom.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAa04yFQEUJm7Jj1qMT57-LG7ZGtnhNDBe=PpSRa70Mj+XhW-A@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/55F75BB8.4070405@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yinghai Lu &lt;yinghai@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi &lt;lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com&gt;</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2015-09-03T22:46:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-03T22:46:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ca520cab25e0e8da717c596ccaa2c2b3650cfa09'/>
<id>ca520cab25e0e8da717c596ccaa2c2b3650cfa09</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull locking and atomic updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Main changes in this cycle are:

   - Extend atomic primitives with coherent logic op primitives
     (atomic_{or,and,xor}()) and deprecate the old partial APIs
     (atomic_{set,clear}_mask())

     The old ops were incoherent with incompatible signatures across
     architectures and with incomplete support.  Now every architecture
     supports the primitives consistently (by Peter Zijlstra)

   - Generic support for 'relaxed atomics':

       - _acquire/release/relaxed() flavours of xchg(), cmpxchg() and {add,sub}_return()
       - atomic_read_acquire()
       - atomic_set_release()

     This came out of porting qwrlock code to arm64 (by Will Deacon)

   - Clean up the fragile static_key APIs that were causing repeat bugs,
     by introducing a new one:

       DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(name);
       DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(name);

     which define a key of different types with an initial true/false
     value.

     Then allow:

       static_branch_likely()
       static_branch_unlikely()

     to take a key of either type and emit the right instruction for the
     case.  To be able to know the 'type' of the static key we encode it
     in the jump entry (by Peter Zijlstra)

   - Static key self-tests (by Jason Baron)

   - qrwlock optimizations (by Waiman Long)

   - small futex enhancements (by Davidlohr Bueso)

   - ... and misc other changes"

* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (63 commits)
  jump_label/x86: Work around asm build bug on older/backported GCCs
  locking, ARM, atomics: Define our SMP atomics in terms of _relaxed() operations
  locking, include/llist: Use linux/atomic.h instead of asm/cmpxchg.h
  locking/qrwlock: Make use of _{acquire|release|relaxed}() atomics
  locking/qrwlock: Implement queue_write_unlock() using smp_store_release()
  locking/lockref: Remove homebrew cmpxchg64_relaxed() macro definition
  locking, asm-generic: Add _{relaxed|acquire|release}() variants for 'atomic_long_t'
  locking, asm-generic: Rework atomic-long.h to avoid bulk code duplication
  locking/atomics: Add _{acquire|release|relaxed}() variants of some atomic operations
  locking, compiler.h: Cast away attributes in the WRITE_ONCE() magic
  locking/static_keys: Make verify_keys() static
  jump label, locking/static_keys: Update docs
  locking/static_keys: Provide a selftest
  jump_label: Provide a self-test
  s390/uaccess, locking/static_keys: employ static_branch_likely()
  x86, tsc, locking/static_keys: Employ static_branch_likely()
  locking/static_keys: Add selftest
  locking/static_keys: Add a new static_key interface
  locking/static_keys: Rework update logic
  locking/static_keys: Add static_key_{en,dis}able() helpers
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull locking and atomic updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Main changes in this cycle are:

   - Extend atomic primitives with coherent logic op primitives
     (atomic_{or,and,xor}()) and deprecate the old partial APIs
     (atomic_{set,clear}_mask())

     The old ops were incoherent with incompatible signatures across
     architectures and with incomplete support.  Now every architecture
     supports the primitives consistently (by Peter Zijlstra)

   - Generic support for 'relaxed atomics':

       - _acquire/release/relaxed() flavours of xchg(), cmpxchg() and {add,sub}_return()
       - atomic_read_acquire()
       - atomic_set_release()

     This came out of porting qwrlock code to arm64 (by Will Deacon)

   - Clean up the fragile static_key APIs that were causing repeat bugs,
     by introducing a new one:

       DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(name);
       DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(name);

     which define a key of different types with an initial true/false
     value.

     Then allow:

       static_branch_likely()
       static_branch_unlikely()

     to take a key of either type and emit the right instruction for the
     case.  To be able to know the 'type' of the static key we encode it
     in the jump entry (by Peter Zijlstra)

   - Static key self-tests (by Jason Baron)

   - qrwlock optimizations (by Waiman Long)

   - small futex enhancements (by Davidlohr Bueso)

   - ... and misc other changes"

* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (63 commits)
  jump_label/x86: Work around asm build bug on older/backported GCCs
  locking, ARM, atomics: Define our SMP atomics in terms of _relaxed() operations
  locking, include/llist: Use linux/atomic.h instead of asm/cmpxchg.h
  locking/qrwlock: Make use of _{acquire|release|relaxed}() atomics
  locking/qrwlock: Implement queue_write_unlock() using smp_store_release()
  locking/lockref: Remove homebrew cmpxchg64_relaxed() macro definition
  locking, asm-generic: Add _{relaxed|acquire|release}() variants for 'atomic_long_t'
  locking, asm-generic: Rework atomic-long.h to avoid bulk code duplication
  locking/atomics: Add _{acquire|release|relaxed}() variants of some atomic operations
  locking, compiler.h: Cast away attributes in the WRITE_ONCE() magic
  locking/static_keys: Make verify_keys() static
  jump label, locking/static_keys: Update docs
  locking/static_keys: Provide a selftest
  jump_label: Provide a self-test
  s390/uaccess, locking/static_keys: employ static_branch_likely()
  x86, tsc, locking/static_keys: Employ static_branch_likely()
  locking/static_keys: Add selftest
  locking/static_keys: Add a new static_key interface
  locking/static_keys: Rework update logic
  locking/static_keys: Add static_key_{en,dis}able() helpers
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
