linux-toradex.git/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h, branch v5.17 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules KVM: PPC: Book3S 64: Move hcall early register setup to KVM 2021-06-10T12:12:12+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2021-05-28T09:07:24+00:00 04ece7b60b689e1de38b9b0f597f8f94951e4367 System calls / hcalls have a different calling convention than other interrupts, so there is code in the KVMTEST to massage these into the same form as other interrupt handlers. Move this work into the KVM hcall handler. This means teaching KVM a little more about the low level interrupt handler setup, PACA save areas, etc., although that's not obviously worse than the current approach of coming up with an entirely different interrupt register / save convention. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528090752.3542186-5-npiggin@gmail.com 
System calls / hcalls have a different calling convention than
other interrupts, so there is code in the KVMTEST to massage these
into the same form as other interrupt handlers.

Move this work into the KVM hcall handler. This means teaching KVM
a little more about the low level interrupt handler setup, PACA save
areas, etc., although that's not obviously worse than the current
approach of coming up with an entirely different interrupt register
/ save convention.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528090752.3542186-5-npiggin@gmail.com
powerpc/64s: fix scv entry fallback flush vs interrupt 2021-01-20T04:58:19+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2021-01-11T06:24:08+00:00 08685be7761d69914f08c3d6211c543a385a5b9c The L1D flush fallback functions are not recoverable vs interrupts, yet the scv entry flush runs with MSR[EE]=1. This can result in a timer (soft-NMI) or MCE or SRESET interrupt hitting here and overwriting the EXRFI save area, which ends up corrupting userspace registers for scv return. Fix this by disabling RI and EE for the scv entry fallback flush. Fixes: f79643787e0a0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ which also have flush L1D patch backport Reported-by: Tulio Magno Quites Machado Filho <tuliom@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111062408.287092-1-npiggin@gmail.com 
The L1D flush fallback functions are not recoverable vs interrupts,
yet the scv entry flush runs with MSR[EE]=1. This can result in a
timer (soft-NMI) or MCE or SRESET interrupt hitting here and overwriting
the EXRFI save area, which ends up corrupting userspace registers for
scv return.

Fix this by disabling RI and EE for the scv entry fallback flush.

Fixes: f79643787e0a0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+ which also have flush L1D patch backport
Reported-by: Tulio Magno Quites Machado Filho <tuliom@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111062408.287092-1-npiggin@gmail.com
powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses 2020-11-19T12:47:18+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2020-11-17T05:59:13+00:00 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> 
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry 2020-11-19T12:47:15+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2020-11-17T05:59:12+00:00 f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> 
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Merge branch 'scv' support into next 2020-07-23T07:43:44+00:00 Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au 2020-07-23T07:43:44+00:00 335aca5f65f1a39670944930131da5f2276f888f From Nick's cover letter: Linux powerpc new system call instruction and ABI System Call Vectored (scv) ABI ============================== The scv instruction is introduced with POWER9 / ISA3, it comes with an rfscv counter-part. The benefit of these instructions is performance (trading slower SRR0/1 with faster LR/CTR registers, and entering the kernel with MSR[EE] and MSR[RI] left enabled, which can reduce MSR updates. The scv instruction has 128 levels (not enough to cover the Linux system call space). Assignment and advertisement ---------------------------- The proposal is to assign scv levels conservatively, and advertise them with HWCAP feature bits as we add support for more. Linux has not enabled FSCR[SCV] yet, so executing the scv instruction will cause the kernel to log a "SCV facility unavilable" message, and deliver a SIGILL with ILL_ILLOPC to the process. Linux has defined a HWCAP2 bit PPC_FEATURE2_SCV for SCV support, but does not set it. This change allocates the zero level ('scv 0'), advertised with PPC_FEATURE2_SCV, which will be used to provide normal Linux system calls (equivalent to 'sc'). Attempting to execute scv with other levels will cause a SIGILL to be delivered the same as before, but will not log a "SCV facility unavailable" message (because the processor facility is enabled). Calling convention ------------------ The proposal is for scv 0 to provide the standard Linux system call ABI with the following differences from sc convention[1]: - LR is to be volatile across scv calls. This is necessary because the scv instruction clobbers LR. From previous discussion, this should be possible to deal with in GCC clobbers and CFI. - cr1 and cr5-cr7 are volatile. This matches the C ABI and would allow the kernel system call exit to avoid restoring the volatile cr registers (although we probably still would anyway to avoid information leaks). - Error handling: The consensus among kernel, glibc, and musl is to move to using negative return values in r3 rather than CR0[SO]=1 to indicate error, which matches most other architectures, and is closer to a function call. Notes ----- - r0,r4-r8 are documented as volatile in the ABI, but the kernel patch as submitted currently preserves them. This is to leave room for deciding which way to go with these. Some small benefit was found by preserving them[1] but I'm not convinced it's worth deviating from the C function call ABI just for this. Release code should follow the ABI. Previous discussions: https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/208691.html https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/209268.html [1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst [2] https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/209263.html 
From Nick's cover letter:

Linux powerpc new system call instruction and ABI

System Call Vectored (scv) ABI
==============================

The scv instruction is introduced with POWER9 / ISA3, it comes with an
rfscv counter-part. The benefit of these instructions is
performance (trading slower SRR0/1 with faster LR/CTR registers, and
entering the kernel with MSR[EE] and MSR[RI] left enabled, which can
reduce MSR updates. The scv instruction has 128 levels (not enough to
cover the Linux system call space).

Assignment and advertisement
----------------------------
The proposal is to assign scv levels conservatively, and advertise
them with HWCAP feature bits as we add support for more.

Linux has not enabled FSCR[SCV] yet, so executing the scv instruction
will cause the kernel to log a "SCV facility unavilable" message, and
deliver a SIGILL with ILL_ILLOPC to the process. Linux has defined a
HWCAP2 bit PPC_FEATURE2_SCV for SCV support, but does not set it.

This change allocates the zero level ('scv 0'), advertised with
PPC_FEATURE2_SCV, which will be used to provide normal Linux system
calls (equivalent to 'sc').

Attempting to execute scv with other levels will cause a SIGILL to be
delivered the same as before, but will not log a "SCV facility
unavailable" message (because the processor facility is enabled).

Calling convention
------------------
The proposal is for scv 0 to provide the standard Linux system call
ABI with the following differences from sc convention[1]:

- LR is to be volatile across scv calls. This is necessary because the
  scv instruction clobbers LR. From previous discussion, this should
  be possible to deal with in GCC clobbers and CFI.

- cr1 and cr5-cr7 are volatile. This matches the C ABI and would allow
  the kernel system call exit to avoid restoring the volatile cr
  registers (although we probably still would anyway to avoid
  information leaks).

- Error handling: The consensus among kernel, glibc, and musl is to
  move to using negative return values in r3 rather than CR0[SO]=1 to
  indicate error, which matches most other architectures, and is
  closer to a function call.

Notes
-----
- r0,r4-r8 are documented as volatile in the ABI, but the kernel patch
  as submitted currently preserves them. This is to leave room for
  deciding which way to go with these. Some small benefit was found by
  preserving them[1] but I'm not convinced it's worth deviating from
  the C function call ABI just for this. Release code should follow
  the ABI.

Previous discussions:
https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/208691.html
https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/209268.html

[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/powerpc/syscall64-abi.rst
[2] https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/209263.html
powerpc: Select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE 2020-07-23T07:43:23+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2020-07-16T01:35:22+00:00 2384b36f9156c3b815a5ce5f694edc5054ab7625 powerpc return from interrupt and return from system call sequences are context synchronising. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200716013522.338318-1-npiggin@gmail.com 
powerpc return from interrupt and return from system call sequences
are context synchronising.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200716013522.338318-1-npiggin@gmail.com
powerpc/64s: system call support for scv/rfscv instructions 2020-07-22T13:00:27+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2020-06-11T08:12:03+00:00 7fa95f9adaee7e5cbb195d3359741120829e488b Add support for the scv instruction on POWER9 and later CPUs. For now this implements the zeroth scv vector 'scv 0', as identical to 'sc' system calls, with the exception that LR is not preserved, nor are volatile CR registers, and error is not indicated with CR0[SO], but by returning a negative errno. rfscv is implemented to return from scv type system calls. It can not be used to return from sc system calls because those are defined to preserve LR. getpid syscall throughput on POWER9 is improved by 26% (428 to 318 cycles), largely due to reducing mtmsr and mtspr. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> [mpe: Fix ppc64e build] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200611081203.995112-3-npiggin@gmail.com 
Add support for the scv instruction on POWER9 and later CPUs.

For now this implements the zeroth scv vector 'scv 0', as identical to
'sc' system calls, with the exception that LR is not preserved, nor
are volatile CR registers, and error is not indicated with CR0[SO],
but by returning a negative errno.

rfscv is implemented to return from scv type system calls. It can not
be used to return from sc system calls because those are defined to
preserve LR.

getpid syscall throughput on POWER9 is improved by 26% (428 to 318
cycles), largely due to reducing mtmsr and mtspr.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
[mpe: Fix ppc64e build]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200611081203.995112-3-npiggin@gmail.com
powerpc/64s/exception: Move real to virt switch into the common handler 2020-04-01T02:42:11+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2020-02-25T17:35:19+00:00 8729c26e675c356de4179d587af6cd1f16147a39 The real mode interrupt entry points currently use rfid to branch to the common handler in virtual mode. This is a significant amount of code, and forces other code (notably the KVM test) to live in the real mode handler. In the interest of minimising the amount of code that runs unrelocated move the switch to virt mode into the common code, and do it with mtmsrd, which avoids clobbering SRRs (although the post-KVMTEST performance of real-mode interrupt handlers is not a big concern these days). This requires CTR to always be saved (real-mode needs to reach 0xc...) but that's not a huge impact these days. It could be optimized away in future. mpe: Incorporate fix from Nick: It's possible for interrupts to be replayed when TM is enabled and suspended, for example rt_sigreturn, where the mtmsrd MSR_KERNEL in the real-mode entry point to the common handler causes a TM Bad Thing exception (due to attempting to clear suspended). The fix for this is to have replay interrupts go to the _virt entry point and skip the mtmsrd, which matches what happens before this patch. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200225173541.1549955-11-npiggin@gmail.com 
The real mode interrupt entry points currently use rfid to branch to
the common handler in virtual mode. This is a significant amount of
code, and forces other code (notably the KVM test) to live in the
real mode handler.

In the interest of minimising the amount of code that runs unrelocated
move the switch to virt mode into the common code, and do it with
mtmsrd, which avoids clobbering SRRs (although the post-KVMTEST
performance of real-mode interrupt handlers is not a big concern these
days).

This requires CTR to always be saved (real-mode needs to reach 0xc...)
but that's not a huge impact these days. It could be optimized away in
future.

mpe: Incorporate fix from Nick:

It's possible for interrupts to be replayed when TM is enabled and
suspended, for example rt_sigreturn, where the mtmsrd MSR_KERNEL in
the real-mode entry point to the common handler causes a TM Bad Thing
exception (due to attempting to clear suspended).

The fix for this is to have replay interrupts go to the _virt entry
point and skip the mtmsrd, which matches what happens before this
patch.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200225173541.1549955-11-npiggin@gmail.com
Merge tag 'powerpc-5.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux 2019-07-13T23:08:36+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2019-07-13T23:08:36+00:00 192f0f8e9db7efe4ac98d47f5fa4334e43c1204d Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: "Notable changes: - Removal of the NPU DMA code, used by the out-of-tree Nvidia driver, as well as some other functions only used by drivers that haven't (yet?) made it upstream. - A fix for a bug in our handling of hardware watchpoints (eg. perf record -e mem: ...) which could lead to register corruption and kernel crashes. - Enable HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP, which allows us to use large pages for vmalloc when using the Radix MMU. - A large but incremental rewrite of our exception handling code to use gas macros rather than multiple levels of nested CPP macros. And the usual small fixes, cleanups and improvements. Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Andreas Schwab, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Anton Blanchard, Arnd Bergmann, Athira Rajeev, Cédric Le Goater, Christian Lamparter, Christophe Leroy, Christophe Lombard, Christoph Hellwig, Daniel Axtens, Denis Efremov, Enrico Weigelt, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Geert Uytterhoeven, Geliang Tang, Gen Zhang, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo Romero, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Madhavan Srinivasan, Masahiro Yamada, Mathieu Malaterre, Michael Neuling, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nicholas Piggin, Nishad Kamdar, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Ravi Bangoria, Sachin Sant, Sam Bobroff, Satheesh Rajendran, Segher Boessenkool, Shaokun Zhang, Shawn Anastasio, Stewart Smith, Suraj Jitindar Singh, Thiago Jung Bauermann, YueHaibing" * tag 'powerpc-5.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (163 commits) powerpc/powernv/idle: Fix restore of SPRN_LDBAR for POWER9 stop state. powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap space ocxl: Update for AFU descriptor template version 1.1 powerpc/boot: pass CONFIG options in a simpler and more robust way powerpc/boot: add {get, put}_unaligned_be32 to xz_config.h powerpc/irq: Don't WARN continuously in arch_local_irq_restore() powerpc/module64: Use symbolic instructions names. powerpc/module32: Use symbolic instructions names. powerpc: Move PPC_HA() PPC_HI() and PPC_LO() to ppc-opcode.h powerpc/module64: Fix comment in R_PPC64_ENTRY handling powerpc/boot: Add lzo support for uImage powerpc/boot: Add lzma support for uImage powerpc/boot: don't force gzipped uImage powerpc/8xx: Add microcode patch to move SMC parameter RAM. powerpc/8xx: Use IO accessors in microcode programming. powerpc/8xx: replace #ifdefs by IS_ENABLED() in microcode.c powerpc/8xx: refactor programming of microcode CPM params. powerpc/8xx: refactor printing of microcode patch name. powerpc/8xx: Refactor microcode write powerpc/8xx: refactor writing of CPM microcode arrays ... 
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
 "Notable changes:

   - Removal of the NPU DMA code, used by the out-of-tree Nvidia driver,
     as well as some other functions only used by drivers that haven't
     (yet?) made it upstream.

   - A fix for a bug in our handling of hardware watchpoints (eg. perf
     record -e mem: ...) which could lead to register corruption and
     kernel crashes.

   - Enable HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP, which allows us to use large pages for
     vmalloc when using the Radix MMU.

   - A large but incremental rewrite of our exception handling code to
     use gas macros rather than multiple levels of nested CPP macros.

  And the usual small fixes, cleanups and improvements.

  Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Andreas Schwab,
  Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Anton Blanchard, Arnd Bergmann,
  Athira Rajeev, Cédric Le Goater, Christian Lamparter, Christophe
  Leroy, Christophe Lombard, Christoph Hellwig, Daniel Axtens, Denis
  Efremov, Enrico Weigelt, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Geert
  Uytterhoeven, Geliang Tang, Gen Zhang, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz,
  Gustavo Romero, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Madhavan Srinivasan, Masahiro
  Yamada, Mathieu Malaterre, Michael Neuling, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N.
  Rao, Nicholas Piggin, Nishad Kamdar, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Ravi
  Bangoria, Sachin Sant, Sam Bobroff, Satheesh Rajendran, Segher
  Boessenkool, Shaokun Zhang, Shawn Anastasio, Stewart Smith, Suraj
  Jitindar Singh, Thiago Jung Bauermann, YueHaibing"

* tag 'powerpc-5.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (163 commits)
  powerpc/powernv/idle: Fix restore of SPRN_LDBAR for POWER9 stop state.
  powerpc/eeh: Handle hugepages in ioremap space
  ocxl: Update for AFU descriptor template version 1.1
  powerpc/boot: pass CONFIG options in a simpler and more robust way
  powerpc/boot: add {get, put}_unaligned_be32 to xz_config.h
  powerpc/irq: Don't WARN continuously in arch_local_irq_restore()
  powerpc/module64: Use symbolic instructions names.
  powerpc/module32: Use symbolic instructions names.
  powerpc: Move PPC_HA() PPC_HI() and PPC_LO() to ppc-opcode.h
  powerpc/module64: Fix comment in R_PPC64_ENTRY handling
  powerpc/boot: Add lzo support for uImage
  powerpc/boot: Add lzma support for uImage
  powerpc/boot: don't force gzipped uImage
  powerpc/8xx: Add microcode patch to move SMC parameter RAM.
  powerpc/8xx: Use IO accessors in microcode programming.
  powerpc/8xx: replace #ifdefs by IS_ENABLED() in microcode.c
  powerpc/8xx: refactor programming of microcode CPM params.
  powerpc/8xx: refactor printing of microcode patch name.
  powerpc/8xx: Refactor microcode write
  powerpc/8xx: refactor writing of CPM microcode arrays
  ...
powerpc/64s/exception: remove bad stack branch 2019-07-02T11:39:49+00:00 Nicholas Piggin npiggin@gmail.com 2019-06-28T06:33:18+00:00 0a882e28468f48ab3d9a36dde0a5723ea29ed1ed The bad stack test in interrupt handlers has a few problems. For performance it is taken in the common case, which is a fetch bubble and a waste of i-cache. For code development and maintainence, it requires yet another stack frame setup routine, and that constrains all exception handlers to follow the same register save pattern which inhibits future optimisation. Remove the test/branch and replace it with a trap. Teach the program check handler to use the emergency stack for this case. This does not result in quite so nice a message, however the SRR0 and SRR1 of the crashed interrupt can be seen in r11 and r12, as is the original r1 (adjusted by INT_FRAME_SIZE). These are the most important parts to debugging the issue. The original r9-12 and cr0 is lost, which is the main downside. kernel BUG at linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:847! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] BE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted NIP: c000000000009108 LR: c000000000cadbcc CTR: c0000000000090f0 REGS: c0000000fffcbd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted MSR: 9000000000021032 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28222448 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000009100 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 000000000000003d fffffffffffffd00 c0000000018cfb00 c0000000f02b3166 GPR04: fffffffffffffffd 0000000000000007 fffffffffffffffb 0000000000000030 GPR08: 0000000000000037 0000000028222448 0000000000000000 c000000000ca8de0 GPR12: 9000000002009032 c000000001ae0000 c000000000010a00 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: c0000000f00322c0 c000000000f85200 0000000000000004 ffffffffffffffff GPR24: fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000000000a GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000f02b391c c0000000f02b3167 NIP [c000000000009108] decrementer_common+0x18/0x160 LR [c000000000cadbcc] .vsnprintf+0x3ec/0x4f0 Call Trace: Instruction dump: 996d098a 994d098b 38610070 480246ed 48005518 60000000 38200000 718a4000 7c2a0b78 3821fd00 41c20008 e82d0970 <0981fd00> f92101a0 f9610170 f9810178 Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> 
The bad stack test in interrupt handlers has a few problems. For
performance it is taken in the common case, which is a fetch bubble
and a waste of i-cache.

For code development and maintainence, it requires yet another stack
frame setup routine, and that constrains all exception handlers to
follow the same register save pattern which inhibits future
optimisation.

Remove the test/branch and replace it with a trap. Teach the program
check handler to use the emergency stack for this case.

This does not result in quite so nice a message, however the SRR0 and
SRR1 of the crashed interrupt can be seen in r11 and r12, as is the
original r1 (adjusted by INT_FRAME_SIZE). These are the most important
parts to debugging the issue.

The original r9-12 and cr0 is lost, which is the main downside.

  kernel BUG at linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:847!
  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  BE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
  NIP:  c000000000009108 LR: c000000000cadbcc CTR: c0000000000090f0
  REGS: c0000000fffcbd70 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
  MSR:  9000000000021032 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 28222448  XER: 20040000
  CFAR: c000000000009100 IRQMASK: 0
  GPR00: 000000000000003d fffffffffffffd00 c0000000018cfb00 c0000000f02b3166
  GPR04: fffffffffffffffd 0000000000000007 fffffffffffffffb 0000000000000030
  GPR08: 0000000000000037 0000000028222448 0000000000000000 c000000000ca8de0
  GPR12: 9000000002009032 c000000001ae0000 c000000000010a00 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: c0000000f00322c0 c000000000f85200 0000000000000004 ffffffffffffffff
  GPR24: fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000000000a
  GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000f02b391c c0000000f02b3167
  NIP [c000000000009108] decrementer_common+0x18/0x160
  LR [c000000000cadbcc] .vsnprintf+0x3ec/0x4f0
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  996d098a 994d098b 38610070 480246ed 48005518 60000000 38200000 718a4000
  7c2a0b78 3821fd00 41c20008 e82d0970 <0981fd00> f92101a0 f9610170 f9810178

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>