<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace, branch v6.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Replace GPL 2.0+ README.legal boilerplate with SPDX</title>
<updated>2023-09-19T10:05:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Geert Uytterhoeven</name>
<email>geert@linux-m68k.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-18T10:14:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6fcb13972bc2b41211e1dddb02f5e73199addc75'/>
<id>6fcb13972bc2b41211e1dddb02f5e73199addc75</id>
<content type='text'>
Upstream Linux never had a "README.legal" file, but it was present
in early source releases of Linux/m68k.  It contained a simple copyright
notice and a link to a version of the "COPYING" file that predated the
addition of the "only valid GPL version is v2" clause.

Get rid of the references to non-existent files by replacing the
boilerplate with SPDX license identifiers.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/d91725ff1ed5d4b6ba42474e2ebfeebe711cba23.1695031668.git.geert@linux-m68k.org

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Upstream Linux never had a "README.legal" file, but it was present
in early source releases of Linux/m68k.  It contained a simple copyright
notice and a link to a version of the "COPYING" file that predated the
addition of the "only valid GPL version is v2" clause.

Get rid of the references to non-existent files by replacing the
boilerplate with SPDX license identifiers.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/d91725ff1ed5d4b6ba42474e2ebfeebe711cba23.1695031668.git.geert@linux-m68k.org

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/ptrace: Split gpr32_set_common</title>
<updated>2023-08-16T13:54:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-22T10:01:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9a32584bc108c8fe4d02fa33b16caf686e4a788a'/>
<id>9a32584bc108c8fe4d02fa33b16caf686e4a788a</id>
<content type='text'>
objtool reports the following warning:

  arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.o: warning: objtool:
    gpr32_set_common+0x23c (.text+0x860): redundant UACCESS disable

gpr32_set_common() conditionally opens and closes UACCESS based on
whether kbuf pointer is NULL or not. This is wackelig.

Split gpr32_set_common() in two fonctions, one for user one for
kernel.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
[mpe: Fix oops in gpr32_set_common_user() due to NULL kbuf]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/b8d6ae4483fcfd17524e79d803c969694a85cc02.1687428075.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
objtool reports the following warning:

  arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.o: warning: objtool:
    gpr32_set_common+0x23c (.text+0x860): redundant UACCESS disable

gpr32_set_common() conditionally opens and closes UACCESS based on
whether kbuf pointer is NULL or not. This is wackelig.

Split gpr32_set_common() in two fonctions, one for user one for
kernel.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
[mpe: Fix oops in gpr32_set_common_user() due to NULL kbuf]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/b8d6ae4483fcfd17524e79d803c969694a85cc02.1687428075.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T07:36:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Gray</name>
<email>bgray@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-19T07:36:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f'/>
<id>97228ca375c78bfd960767dcd4919c981add306f</id>
<content type='text'>
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.

However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.

Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.

Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.

However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.

Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.

Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/ptrace: Expose DEXCR and HDEXCR registers to ptrace</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T07:36:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Gray</name>
<email>bgray@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-19T07:36:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=884ad5c52da253e5d38f947cd8d1d9412a47429c'/>
<id>884ad5c52da253e5d38f947cd8d1d9412a47429c</id>
<content type='text'>
The DEXCR register is of interest when ptracing processes. Currently it
is static, but eventually will be dynamically controllable by a process.
If a process can control its own, then it is useful for it to be
ptrace-able to (e.g., for checkpoint-restore functionality).

It is also relevant to core dumps (the NPHIE aspect in particular),
which use the ptrace mechanism (or is it the other way around?) to
decide what to dump. The HDEXCR is useful here too, as the NPHIE aspect
may be set in the HDEXCR without being set in the DEXCR. Although the
HDEXCR is per-cpu and we don't track it in the task struct (it's useless
in normal operation), it would be difficult to imagine why a hypervisor
would set it to different values within a guest. A hypervisor cannot
safely set NPHIE differently at least, as that would break programs.

Expose a read-only view of the userspace DEXCR and HDEXCR to ptrace.
The HDEXCR is always readonly, and is useful for diagnosing the core
dumps (as the HDEXCR may set NPHIE without the DEXCR setting it).

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
[mpe: Use lower_32_bits() rather than open coding]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-7-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The DEXCR register is of interest when ptracing processes. Currently it
is static, but eventually will be dynamically controllable by a process.
If a process can control its own, then it is useful for it to be
ptrace-able to (e.g., for checkpoint-restore functionality).

It is also relevant to core dumps (the NPHIE aspect in particular),
which use the ptrace mechanism (or is it the other way around?) to
decide what to dump. The HDEXCR is useful here too, as the NPHIE aspect
may be set in the HDEXCR without being set in the DEXCR. Although the
HDEXCR is per-cpu and we don't track it in the task struct (it's useless
in normal operation), it would be difficult to imagine why a hypervisor
would set it to different values within a guest. A hypervisor cannot
safely set NPHIE differently at least, as that would break programs.

Expose a read-only view of the userspace DEXCR and HDEXCR to ptrace.
The HDEXCR is always readonly, and is useful for diagnosing the core
dumps (as the HDEXCR may set NPHIE without the DEXCR setting it).

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
[mpe: Use lower_32_bits() rather than open coding]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-7-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/ptrace: Add missing &lt;linux/regset.h&gt; include</title>
<updated>2023-06-19T07:36:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Gray</name>
<email>bgray@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-19T07:36:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=81e30a5412e4bcdc9d338ffa0cf1f4b90bc63abc'/>
<id>81e30a5412e4bcdc9d338ffa0cf1f4b90bc63abc</id>
<content type='text'>
ptrace-decl.h uses user_regset_get2_fn (among other things) from
regset.h. While all current users of ptrace-decl.h include regset.h
before it anyway, it adds an implicit ordering dependency and breaks
source tooling that tries to inspect ptrace-decl.h by itself.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-3-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ptrace-decl.h uses user_regset_get2_fn (among other things) from
regset.h. While all current users of ptrace-decl.h include regset.h
before it anyway, it adds an implicit ordering dependency and breaks
source tooling that tries to inspect ptrace-decl.h by itself.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray &lt;bgray@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey &lt;ruscur@russell.cc&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-3-bgray@linux.ibm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Don't try to copy PPR for task with NULL pt_regs</title>
<updated>2023-03-28T11:11:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-26T22:15:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fd7276189450110ed835eb0a334e62d2f1c4e3be'/>
<id>fd7276189450110ed835eb0a334e62d2f1c4e3be</id>
<content type='text'>
powerpc sets up PF_KTHREAD and PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL pt_regs, which
from my (arguably very short) checking is not commonly done for other
archs. This is fine, except when PF_IO_WORKER's have been created and
the task does something that causes a coredump to be generated. Then we
get this crash:

  Kernel attempted to read user page (160) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000160
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c3a60
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: bochs drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper xts binfmt_misc ecb ctr syscopyarea sysfillrect cbc sysimgblt drm_ttm_helper aes_generic ttm sg libaes evdev joydev virtio_balloon vmx_crypto gf128mul drm dm_mod fuse loop configfs drm_panel_orientation_quirks ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid xhci_pci xhci_hcd usbcore usb_common sd_mod
  CPU: 1 PID: 1982 Comm: ppc-crash Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2+ #88
  Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
  NIP:  c0000000000c3a60 LR: c000000000039944 CTR: c0000000000398e0
  REGS: c0000000041833b0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.3.0-rc2+)
  MSR:  800000000280b033 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 88082828  XER: 200400f8
  ...
  NIP memcpy_power7+0x200/0x7d0
  LR  ppr_get+0x64/0xb0
  Call Trace:
    ppr_get+0x40/0xb0 (unreliable)
    __regset_get+0x180/0x1f0
    regset_get_alloc+0x64/0x90
    elf_core_dump+0xb98/0x1b60
    do_coredump+0x1c34/0x24a0
    get_signal+0x71c/0x1410
    do_notify_resume+0x140/0x6f0
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x29c/0x320
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x6c/0xa0
    interrupt_return_srr_user+0x8/0x138

Because ppr_get() is trying to copy from a PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL
pt_regs.

Check for a valid pt_regs in both ppc_get/ppr_set, and return an error
if not set. The actual error value doesn't seem to be important here, so
just pick -EINVAL.

Fixes: fa439810cc1b ("powerpc/ptrace: Enable support for NT_PPPC_TAR, NT_PPC_PPR, NT_PPC_DSCR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[mpe: Trim oops in change log, add Fixes &amp; Cc stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/d9f63344-fe7c-56ae-b420-4a1a04a2ae4c@kernel.dk
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
powerpc sets up PF_KTHREAD and PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL pt_regs, which
from my (arguably very short) checking is not commonly done for other
archs. This is fine, except when PF_IO_WORKER's have been created and
the task does something that causes a coredump to be generated. Then we
get this crash:

  Kernel attempted to read user page (160) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000160
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c3a60
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: bochs drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper xts binfmt_misc ecb ctr syscopyarea sysfillrect cbc sysimgblt drm_ttm_helper aes_generic ttm sg libaes evdev joydev virtio_balloon vmx_crypto gf128mul drm dm_mod fuse loop configfs drm_panel_orientation_quirks ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid xhci_pci xhci_hcd usbcore usb_common sd_mod
  CPU: 1 PID: 1982 Comm: ppc-crash Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2+ #88
  Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
  NIP:  c0000000000c3a60 LR: c000000000039944 CTR: c0000000000398e0
  REGS: c0000000041833b0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.3.0-rc2+)
  MSR:  800000000280b033 &lt;SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;  CR: 88082828  XER: 200400f8
  ...
  NIP memcpy_power7+0x200/0x7d0
  LR  ppr_get+0x64/0xb0
  Call Trace:
    ppr_get+0x40/0xb0 (unreliable)
    __regset_get+0x180/0x1f0
    regset_get_alloc+0x64/0x90
    elf_core_dump+0xb98/0x1b60
    do_coredump+0x1c34/0x24a0
    get_signal+0x71c/0x1410
    do_notify_resume+0x140/0x6f0
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x29c/0x320
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x6c/0xa0
    interrupt_return_srr_user+0x8/0x138

Because ppr_get() is trying to copy from a PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL
pt_regs.

Check for a valid pt_regs in both ppc_get/ppr_set, and return an error
if not set. The actual error value doesn't seem to be important here, so
just pick -EINVAL.

Fixes: fa439810cc1b ("powerpc/ptrace: Enable support for NT_PPPC_TAR, NT_PPC_PPR, NT_PPC_DSCR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[mpe: Trim oops in change log, add Fixes &amp; Cc stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://msgid.link/d9f63344-fe7c-56ae-b420-4a1a04a2ae4c@kernel.dk
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: ptrace: user_regset_copyin_ignore() always returns 0</title>
<updated>2022-11-15T22:30:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sergey Shtylyov</name>
<email>s.shtylyov@omp.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-14T21:22:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=18b9fe54d9a6f600ea5037d41f681637286be621'/>
<id>18b9fe54d9a6f600ea5037d41f681637286be621</id>
<content type='text'>
user_regset_copyin_ignore() always returns 0, so checking its result seems
pointless -- don't do this anymore...

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix gpr32_set_common()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221014212235.10770-11-s.shtylyov@omp.ru
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Cc: Brian Cain &lt;bcain@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Dinh Nguyen &lt;dinguyen@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson &lt;stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi&gt;
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.osdn.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
user_regset_copyin_ignore() always returns 0, so checking its result seems
pointless -- don't do this anymore...

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix gpr32_set_common()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221014212235.10770-11-s.shtylyov@omp.ru
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Cc: Brian Cain &lt;bcain@quicinc.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Dinh Nguyen &lt;dinguyen@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jonas Bonn &lt;jonas@southpole.se&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson &lt;stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi&gt;
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.osdn.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Fix all occurences of duplicate words</title>
<updated>2022-07-25T02:05:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-18T09:51:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b461880c20777d317b4ad24ef040918860133ca'/>
<id>2b461880c20777d317b4ad24ef040918860133ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Since commit 87c78b612f4f ("powerpc: Fix all occurences of "the the"")
fixed "the the", there's now a steady stream of patches fixing other
duplicate words.

Just fix them all at once, to save the overhead of dealing with
individual patches for each case.

This leaves a few cases of "that that", which in some contexts is
correct.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220718095158.326606-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since commit 87c78b612f4f ("powerpc: Fix all occurences of "the the"")
fixed "the the", there's now a steady stream of patches fixing other
duplicate words.

Just fix them all at once, to save the overhead of dealing with
individual patches for each case.

This leaves a few cases of "that that", which in some contexts is
correct.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220718095158.326606-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/32: Fix overread/overwrite of thread_struct via ptrace</title>
<updated>2022-06-09T13:32:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-06T14:34:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8e1278444446fc97778a5e5c99bca1ce0bbc5ec9'/>
<id>8e1278444446fc97778a5e5c99bca1ce0bbc5ec9</id>
<content type='text'>
The ptrace PEEKUSR/POKEUSR (aka PEEKUSER/POKEUSER) API allows a process
to read/write registers of another process.

To get/set a register, the API takes an index into an imaginary address
space called the "USER area", where the registers of the process are
laid out in some fashion.

The kernel then maps that index to a particular register in its own data
structures and gets/sets the value.

The API only allows a single machine-word to be read/written at a time.
So 4 bytes on 32-bit kernels and 8 bytes on 64-bit kernels.

The way floating point registers (FPRs) are addressed is somewhat
complicated, because double precision float values are 64-bit even on
32-bit CPUs. That means on 32-bit kernels each FPR occupies two
word-sized locations in the USER area. On 64-bit kernels each FPR
occupies one word-sized location in the USER area.

Internally the kernel stores the FPRs in an array of u64s, or if VSX is
enabled, an array of pairs of u64s where one half of each pair stores
the FPR. Which half of the pair stores the FPR depends on the kernel's
endianness.

To handle the different layouts of the FPRs depending on VSX/no-VSX and
big/little endian, the TS_FPR() macro was introduced.

Unfortunately the TS_FPR() macro does not take into account the fact
that the addressing of each FPR differs between 32-bit and 64-bit
kernels. It just takes the index into the "USER area" passed from
userspace and indexes into the fp_state.fpr array.

On 32-bit there are 64 indexes that address FPRs, but only 32 entries in
the fp_state.fpr array, meaning the user can read/write 256 bytes past
the end of the array. Because the fp_state sits in the middle of the
thread_struct there are various fields than can be overwritten,
including some pointers. As such it may be exploitable.

It has also been observed to cause systems to hang or otherwise
misbehave when using gdbserver, and is probably the root cause of this
report which could not be easily reproduced:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/dc38afe9-6b78-f3f5-666b-986939e40fc6@keymile.com/

Rather than trying to make the TS_FPR() macro even more complicated to
fix the bug, or add more macros, instead add a special-case for 32-bit
kernels. This is more obvious and hopefully avoids a similar bug
happening again in future.

Note that because 32-bit kernels never have VSX enabled the code doesn't
need to consider TS_FPRWIDTH/OFFSET at all. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to
ensure that 32-bit &amp;&amp; VSX is never enabled.

Fixes: 87fec0514f61 ("powerpc: PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSER of FPR registers in little endian builds")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Reported-by: Ariel Miculas &lt;ariel.miculas@belden.com&gt;
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609133245.573565-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ptrace PEEKUSR/POKEUSR (aka PEEKUSER/POKEUSER) API allows a process
to read/write registers of another process.

To get/set a register, the API takes an index into an imaginary address
space called the "USER area", where the registers of the process are
laid out in some fashion.

The kernel then maps that index to a particular register in its own data
structures and gets/sets the value.

The API only allows a single machine-word to be read/written at a time.
So 4 bytes on 32-bit kernels and 8 bytes on 64-bit kernels.

The way floating point registers (FPRs) are addressed is somewhat
complicated, because double precision float values are 64-bit even on
32-bit CPUs. That means on 32-bit kernels each FPR occupies two
word-sized locations in the USER area. On 64-bit kernels each FPR
occupies one word-sized location in the USER area.

Internally the kernel stores the FPRs in an array of u64s, or if VSX is
enabled, an array of pairs of u64s where one half of each pair stores
the FPR. Which half of the pair stores the FPR depends on the kernel's
endianness.

To handle the different layouts of the FPRs depending on VSX/no-VSX and
big/little endian, the TS_FPR() macro was introduced.

Unfortunately the TS_FPR() macro does not take into account the fact
that the addressing of each FPR differs between 32-bit and 64-bit
kernels. It just takes the index into the "USER area" passed from
userspace and indexes into the fp_state.fpr array.

On 32-bit there are 64 indexes that address FPRs, but only 32 entries in
the fp_state.fpr array, meaning the user can read/write 256 bytes past
the end of the array. Because the fp_state sits in the middle of the
thread_struct there are various fields than can be overwritten,
including some pointers. As such it may be exploitable.

It has also been observed to cause systems to hang or otherwise
misbehave when using gdbserver, and is probably the root cause of this
report which could not be easily reproduced:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/dc38afe9-6b78-f3f5-666b-986939e40fc6@keymile.com/

Rather than trying to make the TS_FPR() macro even more complicated to
fix the bug, or add more macros, instead add a special-case for 32-bit
kernels. This is more obvious and hopefully avoids a similar bug
happening again in future.

Note that because 32-bit kernels never have VSX enabled the code doesn't
need to consider TS_FPRWIDTH/OFFSET at all. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to
ensure that 32-bit &amp;&amp; VSX is never enabled.

Fixes: 87fec0514f61 ("powerpc: PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSER of FPR registers in little endian builds")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Reported-by: Ariel Miculas &lt;ariel.miculas@belden.com&gt;
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609133245.573565-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Finalise cleanup around ABI use</title>
<updated>2022-05-19T13:11:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-09T05:36:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b89492c03e5c0a2c259b97d7d4c1bb9b02860aa'/>
<id>5b89492c03e5c0a2c259b97d7d4c1bb9b02860aa</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that we have CONFIG_PPC64_ELF_ABI_V1 and CONFIG_PPC64_ELF_ABI_V2,
get rid of all indirect detection of ABI version.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/709d9d69523c14c8a9fba4486395dca0f2d675b1.1652074503.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that we have CONFIG_PPC64_ELF_ABI_V1 and CONFIG_PPC64_ELF_ABI_V2,
get rid of all indirect detection of ABI version.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/709d9d69523c14c8a9fba4486395dca0f2d675b1.1652074503.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
