linux-toradex.git/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s32, branch master

powerpc/32: Automatically adapt TASK_SIZE based on constraints

2026-01-07T04:01:05+00:00

At the time being, TASK_SIZE can be customized by the user via Kconfig
but it is not possible to check all constraints in Kconfig. Impossible
setups are detected at compile time with BUILD_BUG() but that leads
to build failure when setting crazy values. It is not a problem on its
own because the user will usually either use the default value or set
a well thought value. However build robots generate crazy random
configs that lead to build failures, and build robots see it as a
regression every time a patch adds such a constraint.

So instead of failing the build when the custom TASK_SIZE is too
big, just adjust it to the maximum possible value matching the setup.

Several architectures already calculate TASK_SIZE based on other
parameters and options.

In order to do so, move MODULES_VADDR calculation into task_size_32.h
and ensure that:
- On book3s/32, userspace and module area have their own segments (256M)
- On 8xx, userspace has its own full PGDIR entries (4M)

Then TASK_SIZE is guaranteed to be correct so remove related
BUILD_BUG()s.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6a2575420770d075cd090b5a316730a2ffafdee4.1766574657.git.chleroy@kernel.org

powerpc/32s: Fix segments setup when TASK_SIZE is not a multiple of 256M

2026-01-07T04:01:04+00:00

For book3s/32 it is assumed that TASK_SIZE is a multiple of 256 Mbytes,
but Kconfig allows any value for TASK_SIZE.

In all relevant calculations, align TASK_SIZE to the upper 256 Mbytes
boundary.

Also use ASM_CONST() in the definition of TASK_SIZE to ensure it is
seen as an unsigned constant.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8928d906079e156c59794c41e826a684eaaaebb4.1766574657.git.chleroy@kernel.org

powerpc, mm: Fix mprotect on book3s 32-bit

2025-11-18T07:04:17+00:00

On 32-bit book3s with hash-MMUs, tlb_flush() was a no-op. This was
unnoticed because all uses until recently were for unmaps, and thus
handled by __tlb_remove_tlb_entry().

After commit 4a18419f71cd ("mm/mprotect: use mmu_gather") in kernel 5.19,
tlb_gather_mmu() started being used for mprotect as well. This caused
mprotect to simply not work on these machines:

  int *ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
                  MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
  *ptr = 1; // force HPTE to be created
  mprotect(ptr, 4096, PROT_READ);
  *ptr = 2; // should segfault, but succeeds

Fixed by making tlb_flush() actually flush TLB pages. This finally
agrees with the behaviour of boot3s64's tlb_flush().

Fixes: 4a18419f71cd ("mm/mprotect: use mmu_gather")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy 
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) 
Signed-off-by: Dave Vasilevsky 
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251116-vasi-mprotect-g3-v3-1-59a9bd33ba00@vasilevsky.ca

powerpc/32: Remove PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT to fix startup failure

2025-09-16T10:46:00+00:00

PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT is an old macro that is used to tell kernel whether
kernel text has to be mapped read-only or read-write based on build
time options.

But nowadays, with functionnalities like jump_labels, static links,
etc ... more only less all kernels need to be read-write at some
point, and some combinations of configs failed to work due to
innacurate setting of PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT. On the other hand, today
we have CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX which implements a more controlled
access to kernel modifications.

Instead of trying to keep PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT accurate with all
possible options that may imply kernel text modification, always
set kernel text read-write at startup and rely on
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX to provide accurate protection.

Do this by passing PAGE_KERNEL_X to map_kernel_page() in
__maping_ram_chunk() instead of passing PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT. Once
this is done, the only remaining user of PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT is
mmu_mark_initmem_nx() which uses it in a call to setibat().
As setibat() ignores the RW/RO, we can seamlessly replace
PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT by PAGE_KERNEL_X here as well and get rid of
PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT completely.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/342b4120-911c-4723-82ec-d8c9b03a8aef@mailbox.org/
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan 
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8e2d793abf87ae3efb8f6dce10f974ac0eda61b8.1757412205.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

mm/memblock: add memblock_alloc_or_panic interface

2025-01-26T04:22:38+00:00

Before SLUB initialization, various subsystems used memblock_alloc to
allocate memory.  In most cases, when memory allocation fails, an
immediate panic is required.  To simplify this behavior and reduce
repetitive checks, introduce `memblock_alloc_or_panic`.  This function
ensures that memory allocation failures result in a panic automatically,
improving code readability and consistency across subsystems that require
this behavior.

[guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com: arch/s390: save_area_alloc default failure behavior changed to panic]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250109033136.2845676-1-guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Z2fknmnNtiZbCc7x@kernel.org/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250102072528.650926-1-guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guo Weikang 
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven 	[m68k]
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev 	[s390]
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) 
Cc: Alexander Gordeev 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

asm-generic: introduce text-patching.h

2024-11-07T22:25:15+00:00

Several architectures support text patching, but they name the header
files that declare patching functions differently.

Make all such headers consistently named text-patching.h and add an empty
header in asm-generic for architectures that do not support text patching.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241023162711.2579610-4-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven  # m68k
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Tested-by: kdevops 
Cc: Andreas Larsson 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel 
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Cc: Brian Cain 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Christophe Leroy 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dinh Nguyen 
Cc: Guo Ren 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Huacai Chen 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Johannes Berg 
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 
Cc: Kent Overstreet 
Cc: Liam R. Howlett 
Cc: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Max Filippov 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Song Liu 
Cc: Stafford Horne 
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

powerpc/32s: Reduce default size of module/execmem area

2024-08-30T11:29:54+00:00

book3s/32 platforms have usually more memory than 8xx, but it is still
not worth reserving a full segment (256 Mbytes) for module text.
64Mbytes should be far enough.

Also fix TASK_SIZE when EXECMEM is not selected, and add a build
verification for overlap of module execmem space with user segments.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://msgid.link/c1f6a4e47f177d919561c6e97d31af5564923cf6.1724173828.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

powerpc: use CONFIG_EXECMEM instead of CONFIG_MODULES where appropriate

2024-05-14T07:31:44+00:00

There are places where CONFIG_MODULES guards the code that depends on
memory allocation being done with module_alloc().

Replace CONFIG_MODULES with CONFIG_EXECMEM in such places.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) 
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain

powerpc: Handle error in mark_rodata_ro() and mark_initmem_nx()

2024-03-17T02:33:21+00:00

mark_rodata_ro() and mark_initmem_nx() use functions that can
fail like set_memory_nx() and set_memory_ro(), leading to a not
protected kernel.

In case of failure, panic.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/7
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://msgid.link/b16329611deb89e1af505d43f0e2a91310584d26.1710587887.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

powerpc/32s: Introduce _PAGE_READ and remove _PAGE_USER

2023-10-19T06:12:47+00:00

On 603 MMU, TLB missed are handled by SW and there are separated
DTLB and ITLB. It is therefore possible to implement execute-only
protection by not loading DTLB when read access is not permitted.

To do that, _PAGE_READ flag is needed but there is no bit available
for it in PTE. On the other hand the only real use of _PAGE_USER is
to implement PAGE_NONE by clearing _PAGE_USER.

As _PAGE_NONE can also be implemented by clearing _PAGE_READ, remove
_PAGE_USER and add _PAGE_READ. Then use the virtual address to know
whether user rights or kernel rights are to be used.

With that change, 603 MMU now honors execute-only protection.

For hash (604) MMU it is more tricky because hash table is common to
load/store and execute. Nevertheless it is still possible to check
whether _PAGE_READ is set before loading hash table for a load/store
access. At least it can't be read unless it is executed first.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman 
Link: https://msgid.link/b7702dd5a041ec59055ed2880f4952e94c087a2e.1695659959.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu