Pull powerpc fix from Michael Ellerman:
 - powerpc/dma: dma_set_coherent_mask() should not be GPL only from Ben

* tag 'powerpc-4.3-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  powerpc/dma: dma_set_coherent_mask() should not be GPL only

When turning this from inline to an exported function I was a bit
over-eager and made it GPL only. This prevents the use of pretty much
all non-GPL PCI driver which is a bit over the top. Let's bring it
back in line with other architecture.

Fixes: 817820b0226a ("powerpc/iommu: Support "hybrid" iommu/direct DMA ops for coherent_mask < dma_mask")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:

 - Revert "Use the POWER8 Micro Partition Prefetch Engine in KVM HV on
   POWER8" from Paul
 - Handle irq_happened flag correctly in off-line loop from Paul
 - Validate rtas.entry before calling enter_rtas() from Vasant

* tag 'powerpc-4.3-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  powerpc/rtas: Validate rtas.entry before calling enter_rtas()
  powerpc/powernv: Handle irq_happened flag correctly in off-line loop
  powerpc: Revert "Use the POWER8 Micro Partition Prefetch Engine in KVM HV on POWER8"

Currently we do not validate rtas.entry before calling enter_rtas(). This
leads to a kernel oops when user space calls rtas system call on a powernv
platform (see below). This patch adds code to validate rtas.entry before
making enter_rtas() call.

  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 4 [#1]
  SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA PowerNV
  task: c000000004294b80 ti: c0000007e1a78000 task.ti: c0000007e1a78000
  NIP: 0000000000000000 LR: 0000000000009c14 CTR: c000000000423140
  REGS: c0000007e1a7b920 TRAP: 0e40   Not tainted  (3.18.17-340.el7_1.pkvm3_1_0.2400.1.ppc64le)
  MSR: 1000000000081000 <HV,ME>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c000000000009c0c SOFTE: 0
  NIP [0000000000000000]           (null)
  LR [0000000000009c14] 0x9c14
  Call Trace:
  [c0000007e1a7bba0] [c00000000041a7f4] avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x54/0x110 (unreliable)
  [c0000007e1a7bd80] [c00000000002ddc0] ppc_rtas+0x150/0x2d0
  [c0000007e1a7be30] [c000000000009358] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+
Fixes: 55190f88789a ("powerpc: Add skeleton PowerNV platform")
Reported-by: NAGESWARA R. SASTRY <nasastry@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Reword change log, trim oops, and add stable + fixes]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

This fixes a bug where it is possible for an off-line CPU to fail to go
into a low-power state (nap/sleep/winkle), and to become unresponsive to
requests from the KVM subsystem to wake up and run a VCPU. What can
happen is that a maskable interrupt of some kind (external, decrementer,
hypervisor doorbell, or HMI) after we have called local_irq_disable() at
the beginning of pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self() and before interrupts are
hard-disabled inside power7_nap/sleep/winkle(). In this situation, the
pending event is marked in the irq_happened flag in the PACA. This
pending event prevents power7_nap/sleep/winkle from going to the
requested low-power state; instead they return immediately. We don't
deal with any of these pending event flags in the off-line loop in
pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self() because power7_nap et al. return 0 in this case,
so we will have srr1 == 0, and none of the processing to clear
interrupts or doorbells will be done.

Usually, the most obvious symptom of this is that a KVM guest will fail
with a console message saying "KVM: couldn't grab cpu N".

This fixes the problem by making sure we handle the irq_happened flags
properly. First, we hard-disable before the off-line loop. Once we have
hard-disabled, the irq_happened flags can't change underneath us. We
unconditionally clear the DEC and HMI flags: there is no processing of
timer interrupts while off-line, and the necessary HMI processing is all
done in lower-level code. We leave the EE and DBELL flags alone for the
first iteration of the loop, so that we won't fail to respond to a
split-core request that came in just before hard-disabling. Within the
loop, we handle external interrupts if the EE bit is set in irq_happened
as well as if the low-power state was interrupted by an external
interrupt. (We don't need to do the msgclr for a pending doorbell in
irq_happened, because doorbells are edge-triggered and don't remain
pending in hardware.) Then we clear both the EE and DBELL flags, and
once clear, they cannot be set again (until this CPU comes online again,
that is).

This also fixes the debug check to not be done when we just ran a KVM
guest or when the sleep didn't happen because of a pending event in
irq_happened.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

This reverts commit 9678cdaae939 ("Use the POWER8 Micro Partition
Prefetch Engine in KVM HV on POWER8") because the original commit had
multiple, partly self-cancelling bugs, that could cause occasional
memory corruption.

In fact the logmpp instruction was incorrectly using register r0 as the
source of the buffer address and operation code, and depending on what
was in r0, it would either do nothing or corrupt the 64k page pointed to
by r0.

The logmpp instruction encoding and the operation code definitions could
be corrected, but then there is the problem that there is no clearly
defined way to know when the hardware has finished writing to the
buffer.

The original commit attempted to work around this by aborting the
write-out before starting the prefetch, but this is ineffective in the
case where the virtual core is now executing on a different physical
core from the one where the write-out was initiated.

These problems plus advice from the hardware designers not to use the
function (since the measured performance improvement from using the
feature was actually mostly negative), mean that reverting the code is
the best option.

Fixes: 9678cdaae939 ("Use the POWER8 Micro Partition Prefetch Engine in KVM HV on POWER8")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 - Re-enable CONFIG_SCSI_DH in our defconfigs
 - Remove unused os_area_db_id_video_mode
 - cxl: fix leak of IRQ names in cxl_free_afu_irqs() from Andrew
 - cxl: fix leak of ctx->irq_bitmap when releasing context via kernel API from Andrew
 - cxl: fix leak of ctx->mapping when releasing kernel API contexts from Andrew
 - cxl: Workaround malformed pcie packets on some cards from Philippe
 - cxl: Fix number of allocated pages in SPA from Christophe Lombard
 - Fix checkstop in native_hpte_clear() with lockdep from Cyril
 - Panic on unhandled Machine Check on powernv from Daniel
 - selftests/powerpc: Fix build failure of load_unaligned_zeropad test

* tag 'powerpc-4.3-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  selftests/powerpc: Fix build failure of load_unaligned_zeropad test
  powerpc/powernv: Panic on unhandled Machine Check
  powerpc: Fix checkstop in native_hpte_clear() with lockdep
  cxl: Fix number of allocated pages in SPA
  cxl: Workaround malformed pcie packets on some cards
  cxl: fix leak of ctx->mapping when releasing kernel API contexts
  cxl: fix leak of ctx->irq_bitmap when releasing context via kernel API
  cxl: fix leak of IRQ names in cxl_free_afu_irqs()
  powerpc/ps3: Remove unused os_area_db_id_video_mode
  powerpc/configs: Re-enable CONFIG_SCSI_DH

All unrecovered machine check errors on PowerNV should cause an
immediate panic. There are 2 reasons that this is the right policy:
it's not safe to continue, and we're already trying to reboot.

Firstly, if we go through the recovery process and do not successfully
recover, we can't be sure about the state of the machine, and it is
not safe to recover and proceed.

Linux knows about the following sources of Machine Check Errors:
- Uncorrectable Errors (UE)
- Effective - Real Address Translation (ERAT)
- Segment Lookaside Buffer (SLB)
- Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
- Unknown/Unrecognised

In the SLB, TLB and ERAT cases, we can further categorise these as
parity errors, multihit errors or unknown/unrecognised.

We can handle SLB errors by flushing and reloading the SLB. We can
handle TLB and ERAT multihit errors by flushing the TLB. (It appears
we may not handle TLB and ERAT parity errors: I will investigate
further and send a followup patch if appropriate.)

This leaves us with uncorrectable errors. Uncorrectable errors are
usually the result of ECC memory detecting an error that it cannot
correct, but they also crop up in the context of PCI cards failing
during DMA writes, and during CAPI error events.

There are several types of UE, and there are 3 places a UE can occur:
Skiboot, the kernel, and userspace. For Skiboot errors, we have the
facility to make some recoverable. For userspace, we can simply kill
(SIGBUS) the affected process. We have no meaningful way to deal with
UEs in kernel space or in unrecoverable sections of Skiboot.

Currently, these unrecovered UEs fall through to
machine_check_expection() in traps.c, which calls die(), which OOPSes
and sends SIGBUS to the process. This sometimes allows us to stumble
onwards. For example we've seen UEs kill the kernel eehd and
khugepaged. However, the process killed could have held a lock, or it
could have been a more important process, etc: we can no longer make
any assertions about the state of the machine. Similarly if we see a
UE in skiboot (and again we've seen this happen), we're not in a
position where we can make any assertions about the state of the
machine.

Likewise, for unknown or unrecognised errors, we're not able to say
anything about the state of the machine.

Therefore, if we have an unrecovered MCE, the most appropriate thing
to do is to panic.

The second reason is that since e784b6499d9c ("powerpc/powernv: Invoke
opal_cec_reboot2() on unrecoverable machine check errors."), we
attempt a special OPAL reboot on an unhandled MCE. This is so the
hardware can record error data for later debugging.

The comments in that commit assert that we are heading down the panic
path anyway. At the moment this is not always true. With UEs in kernel
space, for instance, they are marked as recoverable by the hardware,
so if the attempt to reboot failed (e.g. old Skiboot), we wouldn't
panic() but would simply die() and OOPS. It doesn't make sense to be
staggering on if we've just tried to reboot: we should panic().

Explicitly panic() on unrecovered MCEs on PowerNV.
Update the comments appropriately.

This fixes some hangs following EEH events on cxlflash setups.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

native_hpte_clear() is called in real mode from two places:
- Early in boot during htab initialisation if firmware assisted dump is
  active.
- Late in the kexec path.

In both contexts there is no need to disable interrupts are they are
already disabled. Furthermore, locking around the tlbie() is only required
for pre POWER5 hardware.

On POWER5 or newer hardware concurrent tlbie()s work as expected and on pre
POWER5 hardware concurrent tlbie()s could result in deadlock. This code
would only be executed at crashdump time, during which all bets are off,
concurrent tlbie()s are unlikely and taking locks is unsafe therefore the
best course of action is to simply do nothing. Concurrent tlbie()s are not
possible in the first case as secondary CPUs have not come up yet.

Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

For some reason, only the little-endian flavor of
powerpc provided the zero_bytemask() implementation.

Reported-by: Michal Sojka <sojkam1@fel.cvut.cz>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>