Since we have a native 8250 driver carrying the Intel MID serial devices the
specific support is not needed anymore. This patch removes it for Intel MID.

Note that the console device name is changed from ttyMFDx to ttySx.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Intel's Quark X1000 SoC contains a set of registers called
Isolated Memory Regions. IMRs are accessed over the IOSF mailbox
interface. IMRs are areas carved out of memory that define
read/write access rights to the various system agents within the
Quark system. For a given agent in the system it is possible to
specify if that agent may read or write an area of memory
defined by an IMR with a granularity of 1 KiB.

Quark_SecureBootPRM_330234_001.pdf section 4.5 details the
concept of IMRs quark-x1000-datasheet.pdf section 12.7.4 details
the implementation of IMRs in silicon.

eSRAM flush, CPU Snoop write-only, CPU SMM Mode, CPU non-SMM
mode, RMU and PCIe Virtual Channels (VC0 and VC1) can have
individual read/write access masks applied to them for a given
memory region in Quark X1000. This enables IMRs to treat each
memory transaction type listed above on an individual basis and
to filter appropriately based on the IMR access mask for the
memory region. Quark supports eight IMRs.

Since all of the DMA capable SoC components in the X1000 are
mapped to VC0 it is possible to define sections of memory as
invalid for DMA write operations originating from Ethernet, USB,
SD and any other DMA capable south-cluster component on VC0.
Similarly it is possible to mark kernel memory as non-SMM mode
read/write only or to mark BIOS runtime memory as SMM mode
accessible only depending on the particular memory footprint on
a given system.

On an IMR violation Quark SoC X1000 systems are configured to
reset the system, so ensuring that the IMR memory map is
consistent with the EFI provided memory map is critical to
ensure no IMR violations reset the system.

The API for accessing IMRs is based on MTRR code but doesn't
provide a /proc or /sys interface to manipulate IMRs. Defining
the size and extent of IMRs is exclusively the domain of
in-kernel code.

Quark firmware sets up a series of locked IMRs around pieces of
memory that firmware owns such as ACPI runtime data. During boot
a series of unlocked IMRs are placed around items in memory to
guarantee no DMA modification of those items can take place.
Grub also places an unlocked IMR around the kernel boot params
data structure and compressed kernel image. It is necessary for
the kernel to tear down all unlocked IMRs in order to ensure
that the kernel's view of memory passed via the EFI memory map
is consistent with the IMR memory map. Without tearing down all
unlocked IMRs on boot transitory IMRs such as those used to
protect the compressed kernel image will cause IMR violations and system reboots.

The IMR init code tears down all unlocked IMRs and sets a
protective IMR around the kernel .text and .rodata as one
contiguous block. This sanitizes the IMR memory map with respect
to the EFI memory map and protects the read-only portions of the
kernel from unwarranted DMA access.

Tested-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.schevchenko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com>
Cc: andy.shevchenko@gmail.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422635379-12476-2-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This is very useful for debugging issues with the recently added
pagetable switching code for EFI virtual mode.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>

It can take some time to validate the image, make sure
{allyes|allmod}config doesn't enable it.

I'd say randconfig will cover it often enough, and the failure is also
borderline build coverage related: you cannot really make the decoder
test fail via source level changes, only with changes in the build
environment, so I agree with Andi that we can disable this one too.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Gortmaker paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Suggested-and-acked-by: Andi Kleen andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

It's incredibly difficult to diagnose early EFI boot issues without
special hardware because earlyprintk=vga doesn't work on EFI systems.

Add support for writing to the EFI framebuffer, via earlyprintk=efi,
which will actually give users a chance of providing debug output.

Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>

Merge Kconfig menu diet patches from Dave Hansen:
 "I think the "Kernel Hacking" menu has gotten a bit out of hand.  It is
  over 120 lines long on my system with everything enabled and options
  are scattered around it haphazardly.

        http://sr71.net/~dave/linux/kconfig-horror.png

  Let's try to introduce some sanity.  This set takes that 120 lines
  down to 55 and makes it vastly easier to find some things.  It's a
  start.

  This set stands on its own, but there is plenty of room for follow-up
  patches.  The arch-specific debug options still end up getting stuck
  in the top-level "kernel hacking" menu.  OPTIMIZE_INLINING, for
  instance, could obviously go in to the "compiler options" menu, but
  the fact that it is defined in arch/ in a separate Kconfig file keeps
  it on its own for the moment.

  The Signed-off-by's in here look funky.  I changed employers while
  working on this set, so I have signoffs from both email addresses"

* emailed patches from Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>:
  hang and lockup detection menu
  kconfig: consolidate printk options
  group locking debugging options
  consolidate compilation option configs
  consolidate runtime testing configs
  order memory debugging Kconfig options
  consolidate per-arch stack overflow debugging options

Original posting:

	http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20121214184202.F54094D9@kernel.stglabs.ibm.com

Several architectures have similar stack debugging config options.
They all pretty much do the same thing, some with slightly
differing help text.

This patch changes the architectures to instead enable a Kconfig
boolean, and then use that boolean in the generic Kconfig.debug
to present the actual menu option.  This removes a bunch of
duplication and adds consistency across arches.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> [for tile]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull x86 FPU changes from Ingo Molnar:
 "There are two bigger changes in this tree:

   - Add an [early-use-]safe static_cpu_has() variant and other
     robustness improvements, including the new X86_DEBUG_STATIC_CPU_HAS
     configurable debugging facility, motivated by recent obscure FPU
     code bugs, by Borislav Petkov

   - Reimplement FPU detection code in C and drop the old asm code, by
     Peter Anvin."

* 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, fpu: Use static_cpu_has_safe before alternatives
  x86: Add a static_cpu_has_safe variant
  x86: Sanity-check static_cpu_has usage
  x86, cpu: Add a synthetic, always true, cpu feature
  x86: Get rid of ->hard_math and all the FPU asm fu

static_cpu_has may be used only after alternatives have run. Before that
it always returns false if constant folding with __builtin_constant_p()
doesn't happen. And you don't want that.

This patch is the result of me debugging an issue where I overzealously
put static_cpu_has in code which executed before alternatives have run
and had to spend some time with scratching head and cursing at the
monitor.

So add a jump to a warning which screams loudly when we use this
function too early. The alternatives patch that check away in
conjunction with patching the rest of the kernel image.

[ hpa: factored this into its own configuration option.  If we want to
  have an overarching option, it should be an option which selects
  other options, not as a group option in the source code. ]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1370772454-6106-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>

It is sometimes very helpful to be able to pinpoint the location which
causes a double fault before it turns into a triple fault and the
machine reboots. We have this for 32-bit already so extend it to 64-bit.
On 64-bit we get the register snapshot at #DF time and not from the
first exception which actually causes the #DF. It should be close
enough, though.

[ hpa: and definitely better than nothing, which is what we have now. ]

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368093749-31296-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>