Pull Intel Quark SoC support from Ingo Molnar: "This adds support for Intel Quark X1000 SoC boards, used in the low power 32-bit x86 Intel Galileo microcontroller board intended for the Arduino space. There's been some preparatory core x86 patches for Quark CPU quirks merged already, but this rounds it all up and adds Kconfig enablement. It's a clean hardware enablement addition tree at this point" * 'x86-platform-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/intel/quark: Fix simple_return.cocci warnings x86/intel/quark: Fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings x86/intel/quark: Add Intel Quark platform support x86/intel/quark: Add Isolated Memory Regions for Quark X1000
Pull locking fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Two fixes: the paravirt spin_unlock() corruption/crash fix, and an rtmutex NULL dereference crash fix" * 'locking-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/spinlocks/paravirt: Fix memory corruption on unlock locking/rtmutex: Avoid a NULL pointer dereference on deadlock
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This contains: - EFI fixes - a boot printout fix - ASLR/kASLR fixes - intel microcode driver fixes - other misc fixes Most of the linecount comes from an EFI revert" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/ASLR: Avoid PAGE_SIZE redefinition for UML subarch x86/microcode/intel: Handle truncated microcode images more robustly x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems x86/mm/init: Fix incorrect page size in init_memory_mapping() printks x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address calculation Documentation/x86: Fix path in zero-page.txt x86/apic: Fix the devicetree build in certain configs Revert "efi/libstub: Call get_memory_map() to obtain map and desc sizes" x86/efi: Avoid triple faults during EFI mixed mode calls
Commit f47233c2d34 ("x86/mm/ASLR: Propagate base load address
calculation") causes PAGE_SIZE redefinition warnings for UML
subarch builds. This is caused by added includes that were
leftovers from previous patch versions are are not actually
needed (especially page_types.h inlcude in module.c). Drop
those stray includes.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502201017240.28769@pobox.suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since _PAGE_PROTNONE aliases _PAGE_GLOBAL it is only valid if
_PAGE_PRESENT is clear. Make pte_protnone() and pmd_protnone() check
for this.
This fixes a 64-bit Xen PV guest regression introduced by 8a0516ed8b90
("mm: convert p[te|md]_numa users to p[te|md]_protnone_numa"). Any
userspace process would endlessly fault.
In a 64-bit PV guest, userspace page table entries have _PAGE_GLOBAL set
by the hypervisor. This meant that any fault on a present userspace
entry (e.g., a write to a read-only mapping) would be misinterpreted as
a NUMA hinting fault and the fault would not be correctly handled,
resulting in the access endlessly faulting.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull ASLR and kASLR fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add a global flag announcing KASLR state so that relevant code can do
informed decisions based on its setting. (Jiri Kosina)
- Fix a stack randomization entropy decrease bug. (Hector Marco-Gisbert)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Commit:
e2b32e678513 ("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address")
makes the base address for module to be unconditionally randomized in
case when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is defined and "nokaslr" option isn't
present on the commandline.
This is not consistent with how choose_kernel_location() decides whether
it will randomize kernel load base.
Namely, CONFIG_HIBERNATION disables kASLR (unless "kaslr" option is
explicitly specified on kernel commandline), which makes the state space
larger than what module loader is looking at. IOW CONFIG_HIBERNATION &&
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is a valid config option, kASLR wouldn't be applied
by default in that case, but module loader is not aware of that.
Instead of fixing the logic in module.c, this patch takes more generic
aproach. It introduces a new bootparam setup data_type SETUP_KASLR and
uses that to pass the information whether kaslr has been applied during
kernel decompression, and sets a global 'kaslr_enabled' variable
accordingly, so that any kernel code (module loading, livepatching, ...)
can make decisions based on its value.
x86 module loader is converted to make use of this flag.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1502101411280.10719@pobox.suse.cz
[ Always dump correct kaslr status when panicking ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Intel's Quark X1000 SoC contains a set of registers called Isolated Memory Regions. IMRs are accessed over the IOSF mailbox interface. IMRs are areas carved out of memory that define read/write access rights to the various system agents within the Quark system. For a given agent in the system it is possible to specify if that agent may read or write an area of memory defined by an IMR with a granularity of 1 KiB. Quark_SecureBootPRM_330234_001.pdf section 4.5 details the concept of IMRs quark-x1000-datasheet.pdf section 12.7.4 details the implementation of IMRs in silicon. eSRAM flush, CPU Snoop write-only, CPU SMM Mode, CPU non-SMM mode, RMU and PCIe Virtual Channels (VC0 and VC1) can have individual read/write access masks applied to them for a given memory region in Quark X1000. This enables IMRs to treat each memory transaction type listed above on an individual basis and to filter appropriately based on the IMR access mask for the memory region. Quark supports eight IMRs. Since all of the DMA capable SoC components in the X1000 are mapped to VC0 it is possible to define sections of memory as invalid for DMA write operations originating from Ethernet, USB, SD and any other DMA capable south-cluster component on VC0. Similarly it is possible to mark kernel memory as non-SMM mode read/write only or to mark BIOS runtime memory as SMM mode accessible only depending on the particular memory footprint on a given system. On an IMR violation Quark SoC X1000 systems are configured to reset the system, so ensuring that the IMR memory map is consistent with the EFI provided memory map is critical to ensure no IMR violations reset the system. The API for accessing IMRs is based on MTRR code but doesn't provide a /proc or /sys interface to manipulate IMRs. Defining the size and extent of IMRs is exclusively the domain of in-kernel code. Quark firmware sets up a series of locked IMRs around pieces of memory that firmware owns such as ACPI runtime data. During boot a series of unlocked IMRs are placed around items in memory to guarantee no DMA modification of those items can take place. Grub also places an unlocked IMR around the kernel boot params data structure and compressed kernel image. It is necessary for the kernel to tear down all unlocked IMRs in order to ensure that the kernel's view of memory passed via the EFI memory map is consistent with the IMR memory map. Without tearing down all unlocked IMRs on boot transitory IMRs such as those used to protect the compressed kernel image will cause IMR violations and system reboots. The IMR init code tears down all unlocked IMRs and sets a protective IMR around the kernel .text and .rodata as one contiguous block. This sanitizes the IMR memory map with respect to the EFI memory map and protects the read-only portions of the kernel from unwarranted DMA access. Tested-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.schevchenko@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ong, Boon Leong <boon.leong.ong@intel.com> Cc: andy.shevchenko@gmail.com Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422635379-12476-2-git-send-email-pure.logic@nexus-software.ie Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Without this patch: LD init/built-in.o arch/x86/built-in.o: In function `dtb_lapic_setup': kernel/devicetree.c:155: undefined reference to `apic_force_enable' Makefile:923: recipe for target 'vmlinux' failed make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422905231-16067-1-git-send-email-ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull asm-generic uaccess.h cleanup from Arnd Bergmann: "Like in 3.19, I once more have a multi-stage cleanup for one asm-generic header file, this time the work was done by Michael Tsirkin and cleans up the uaccess.h file in asm-generic, as well as all architectures for which the respective maintainers did not pick up his patches directly" * tag 'asm-generic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: (37 commits) sparc32: nocheck uaccess coding style tweaks sparc64: nocheck uaccess coding style tweaks xtensa: macro whitespace fixes sh: macro whitespace fixes parisc: macro whitespace fixes m68k: macro whitespace fixes m32r: macro whitespace fixes frv: macro whitespace fixes cris: macro whitespace fixes avr32: macro whitespace fixes arm64: macro whitespace fixes arm: macro whitespace fixes alpha: macro whitespace fixes blackfin: macro whitespace fixes sparc64: uaccess_64 macro whitespace fixes sparc32: uaccess_32 macro whitespace fixes avr32: whitespace fix sh: fix put_user sparse errors metag: fix put_user sparse errors ia64: fix put_user sparse errors ...