<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/include, branch v4.4.85</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: revert x86_64 and arm64 ELF_ET_DYN_BASE base changes</title>
<updated>2017-08-25T00:02:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-18T22:16:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=240628085effc47e86f51fc3fb37bc0e628f9a85'/>
<id>240628085effc47e86f51fc3fb37bc0e628f9a85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c715b72c1ba406f133217b509044c38d8e714a37 upstream.

Moving the x86_64 and arm64 PIE base from 0x555555554000 to 0x000100000000
broke AddressSanitizer.  This is a partial revert of:

  eab09532d400 ("binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE")
  02445990a96e ("arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB")

The AddressSanitizer tool has hard-coded expectations about where
executable mappings are loaded.

The motivation for changing the PIE base in the above commits was to
avoid the Stack-Clash CVEs that allowed executable mappings to get too
close to heap and stack.  This was mainly a problem on 32-bit, but the
64-bit bases were moved too, in an effort to proactively protect those
systems (proofs of concept do exist that show 64-bit collisions, but
other recent changes to fix stack accounting and setuid behaviors will
minimize the impact).

The new 32-bit PIE base is fine for ASan (since it matches the ET_EXEC
base), so only the 64-bit PIE base needs to be reverted to let x86 and
arm64 ASan binaries run again.  Future changes to the 64-bit PIE base on
these architectures can be made optional once a more dynamic method for
dealing with AddressSanitizer is found.  (e.g.  always loading PIE into
the mmap region for marked binaries.)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170807201542.GA21271@beast
Fixes: eab09532d400 ("binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE")
Fixes: 02445990a96e ("arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c715b72c1ba406f133217b509044c38d8e714a37 upstream.

Moving the x86_64 and arm64 PIE base from 0x555555554000 to 0x000100000000
broke AddressSanitizer.  This is a partial revert of:

  eab09532d400 ("binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE")
  02445990a96e ("arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB")

The AddressSanitizer tool has hard-coded expectations about where
executable mappings are loaded.

The motivation for changing the PIE base in the above commits was to
avoid the Stack-Clash CVEs that allowed executable mappings to get too
close to heap and stack.  This was mainly a problem on 32-bit, but the
64-bit bases were moved too, in an effort to proactively protect those
systems (proofs of concept do exist that show 64-bit collisions, but
other recent changes to fix stack accounting and setuid behaviors will
minimize the impact).

The new 32-bit PIE base is fine for ASan (since it matches the ET_EXEC
base), so only the 64-bit PIE base needs to be reverted to let x86 and
arm64 ASan binaries run again.  Future changes to the 64-bit PIE base on
these architectures can be made optional once a more dynamic method for
dealing with AddressSanitizer is found.  (e.g.  always loading PIE into
the mmap region for marked binaries.)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170807201542.GA21271@beast
Fixes: eab09532d400 ("binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE")
Fixes: 02445990a96e ("arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/xen: allow userspace access during hypercalls</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marek Marczykowski-Górecki</name>
<email>marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-26T12:49:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5c7c179eb9e30e978180fdb1ca0833593221b4e5'/>
<id>5c7c179eb9e30e978180fdb1ca0833593221b4e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c54590cac51db8ab5fd30156bdaba34af915e629 upstream.

Userspace application can do a hypercall through /dev/xen/privcmd, and
some for some hypercalls argument is a pointers to user-provided
structure. When SMAP is supported and enabled, hypervisor can't access.
So, lets allow it.

The same applies to HYPERVISOR_dm_op, where additionally privcmd driver
carefully verify buffer addresses.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
[HYPERVISOR_dm_op dropped - not present until 4.11]
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c54590cac51db8ab5fd30156bdaba34af915e629 upstream.

Userspace application can do a hypercall through /dev/xen/privcmd, and
some for some hypercalls argument is a pointers to user-provided
structure. When SMAP is supported and enabled, hypervisor can't access.
So, lets allow it.

The same applies to HYPERVISOR_dm_op, where additionally privcmd driver
carefully verify buffer addresses.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
[HYPERVISOR_dm_op dropped - not present until 4.11]
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGS</title>
<updated>2017-07-21T05:44:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Mattson</name>
<email>jmattson@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-23T18:52:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6ffa92ffaed817cea7625ebf9c7f217e293923be'/>
<id>6ffa92ffaed817cea7625ebf9c7f217e293923be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4531662d1abf6c1f0e5c2b86ddb60e61509786c8 upstream.

Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be
canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP.

Fixes: 0dd376e709975779 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4531662d1abf6c1f0e5c2b86ddb60e61509786c8 upstream.

Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be
canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP.

Fixes: 0dd376e709975779 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE</title>
<updated>2017-07-21T05:44:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-10T22:52:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7eb968cd04d404e6c73cd82c1122f6e06ad2d1e8'/>
<id>7eb968cd04d404e6c73cd82c1122f6e06ad2d1e8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eab09532d40090698b05a07c1c87f39fdbc5fab5 upstream.

The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders
away from ET_EXEC binaries.  (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2
/bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the
loader had been loaded.)

With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header),
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking
at ET_DYN.  However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the
top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space
is unused.

For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are
loaded above the mmap region.  This means they can be made to collide
(CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with
pathological stack regions.

Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap
region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling
back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e.
if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load
instead of falling back to the mmap region).

To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP)
are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an
ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by
the loader.  Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk
of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.

For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use
the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.

Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and
suggestions on how to implement this solution.

Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dsafonov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk &lt;grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Pratyush Anand &lt;panand@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eab09532d40090698b05a07c1c87f39fdbc5fab5 upstream.

The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders
away from ET_EXEC binaries.  (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2
/bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the
loader had been loaded.)

With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header),
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking
at ET_DYN.  However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the
top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space
is unused.

For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are
loaded above the mmap region.  This means they can be made to collide
(CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with
pathological stack regions.

Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap
region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling
back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e.
if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load
instead of falling back to the mmap region).

To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP)
are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an
ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by
the loader.  Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk
of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.

For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use
the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.

Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and
suggestions on how to implement this solution.

Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dsafonov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk &lt;grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: James Hogan &lt;james.hogan@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Pratyush Anand &lt;panand@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/pat: Don't report PAT on CPUs that don't support it</title>
<updated>2017-07-15T09:57:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-04T23:04:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49'/>
<id>646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions</title>
<updated>2017-07-05T12:37:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ladi Prosek</name>
<email>lprosek@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-25T14:42:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b9b3eb5c774eee256a33a6c0863ebad43a693353'/>
<id>b9b3eb5c774eee256a33a6c0863ebad43a693353</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ed071f051e12cf7baa1b69d3becb8f232fdfb7b upstream.

On AMD, the effect of set_nmi_mask called by emulate_iret_real and em_rsm
on hflags is reverted later on in x86_emulate_instruction where hflags are
overwritten with ctxt-&gt;emul_flags (the kvm_set_hflags call). This manifests
as a hang when rebooting Windows VMs with QEMU, OVMF, and &gt;1 vcpu.

Instead of trying to merge ctxt-&gt;emul_flags into vcpu-&gt;arch.hflags after
an instruction is emulated, this commit deletes emul_flags altogether and
makes the emulator access vcpu-&gt;arch.hflags using two new accessors. This
way all changes, on the emulator side as well as in functions called from
the emulator and accessing vcpu state with emul_to_vcpu, are preserved.

More details on the bug and its manifestation with Windows and OVMF:

  It's a KVM bug in the interaction between SMI/SMM and NMI, specific to AMD.
  I believe that the SMM part explains why we started seeing this only with
  OVMF.

  KVM masks and unmasks NMI when entering and leaving SMM. When KVM emulates
  the RSM instruction in em_rsm, the set_nmi_mask call doesn't stick because
  later on in x86_emulate_instruction we overwrite arch.hflags with
  ctxt-&gt;emul_flags, effectively reverting the effect of the set_nmi_mask call.
  The AMD-specific hflag of interest here is HF_NMI_MASK.

  When rebooting the system, Windows sends an NMI IPI to all but the current
  cpu to shut them down. Only after all of them are parked in HLT will the
  initiating cpu finish the restart. If NMI is masked, other cpus never get
  the memo and the initiating cpu spins forever, waiting for
  hal!HalpInterruptProcessorsStarted to drop. That's the symptom we observe.

Fixes: a584539b24b8 ("KVM: x86: pass the whole hflags field to emulator and back")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek &lt;lprosek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ed071f051e12cf7baa1b69d3becb8f232fdfb7b upstream.

On AMD, the effect of set_nmi_mask called by emulate_iret_real and em_rsm
on hflags is reverted later on in x86_emulate_instruction where hflags are
overwritten with ctxt-&gt;emul_flags (the kvm_set_hflags call). This manifests
as a hang when rebooting Windows VMs with QEMU, OVMF, and &gt;1 vcpu.

Instead of trying to merge ctxt-&gt;emul_flags into vcpu-&gt;arch.hflags after
an instruction is emulated, this commit deletes emul_flags altogether and
makes the emulator access vcpu-&gt;arch.hflags using two new accessors. This
way all changes, on the emulator side as well as in functions called from
the emulator and accessing vcpu state with emul_to_vcpu, are preserved.

More details on the bug and its manifestation with Windows and OVMF:

  It's a KVM bug in the interaction between SMI/SMM and NMI, specific to AMD.
  I believe that the SMM part explains why we started seeing this only with
  OVMF.

  KVM masks and unmasks NMI when entering and leaving SMM. When KVM emulates
  the RSM instruction in em_rsm, the set_nmi_mask call doesn't stick because
  later on in x86_emulate_instruction we overwrite arch.hflags with
  ctxt-&gt;emul_flags, effectively reverting the effect of the set_nmi_mask call.
  The AMD-specific hflag of interest here is HF_NMI_MASK.

  When rebooting the system, Windows sends an NMI IPI to all but the current
  cpu to shut them down. Only after all of them are parked in HLT will the
  initiating cpu finish the restart. If NMI is masked, other cpus never get
  the memo and the initiating cpu spins forever, waiting for
  hal!HalpInterruptProcessorsStarted to drop. That's the symptom we observe.

Fixes: a584539b24b8 ("KVM: x86: pass the whole hflags field to emulator and back")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek &lt;lprosek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, pmem: Fix cache flushing for iovec write &lt; 8 bytes</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:27:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T17:00:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b8cd9dd513bf944f5070203f3c0063d9796e4221'/>
<id>b8cd9dd513bf944f5070203f3c0063d9796e4221</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8376efd31d3d7c44bd05be337adde023cc531fa1 upstream.

Commit 11e63f6d920d added cache flushing for unaligned writes from an
iovec, covering the first and last cache line of a &gt;= 8 byte write and
the first cache line of a &lt; 8 byte write.  But an unaligned write of
2-7 bytes can still cover two cache lines, so make sure we flush both
in that case.

Fixes: 11e63f6d920d ("x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8376efd31d3d7c44bd05be337adde023cc531fa1 upstream.

Commit 11e63f6d920d added cache flushing for unaligned writes from an
iovec, covering the first and last cache line of a &gt;= 8 byte write and
the first cache line of a &lt; 8 byte write.  But an unaligned write of
2-7 bytes can still cover two cache lines, so make sure we flush both
in that case.

Fixes: 11e63f6d920d ("x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache cache-bypass assumptions</title>
<updated>2017-04-27T07:09:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-06T16:04:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d1cc3cdd39e90e70ee5fc9a766ad3a6c61426fa8'/>
<id>d1cc3cdd39e90e70ee5fc9a766ad3a6c61426fa8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11e63f6d920d6f2dfd3cd421e939a4aec9a58dcd upstream.

Before we rework the "pmem api" to stop abusing __copy_user_nocache()
for memcpy_to_pmem() we need to fix cases where we may strand dirty data
in the cpu cache. The problem occurs when copy_from_iter_pmem() is used
for arbitrary data transfers from userspace. There is no guarantee that
these transfers, performed by dax_iomap_actor(), will have aligned
destinations or aligned transfer lengths. Backstop the usage
__copy_user_nocache() with explicit cache management in these unaligned
cases.

Yes, copy_from_iter_pmem() is now too big for an inline, but addressing
that is saved for a later patch that moves the entirety of the "pmem
api" into the pmem driver directly.

Fixes: 5de490daec8b ("pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()")
Cc: &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 11e63f6d920d6f2dfd3cd421e939a4aec9a58dcd upstream.

Before we rework the "pmem api" to stop abusing __copy_user_nocache()
for memcpy_to_pmem() we need to fix cases where we may strand dirty data
in the cpu cache. The problem occurs when copy_from_iter_pmem() is used
for arbitrary data transfers from userspace. There is no guarantee that
these transfers, performed by dax_iomap_actor(), will have aligned
destinations or aligned transfer lengths. Backstop the usage
__copy_user_nocache() with explicit cache management in these unaligned
cases.

Yes, copy_from_iter_pmem() is now too big for an inline, but addressing
that is saved for a later patch that moves the entirety of the "pmem
api" into the pmem driver directly.

Fixes: 5de490daec8b ("pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()")
Cc: &lt;x86@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/vdso: Plug race between mapping and ELF header setup</title>
<updated>2017-04-21T07:30:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-10T15:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ec3978e10ecc61834c9f57dd9d00492b137fa01c'/>
<id>ec3978e10ecc61834c9f57dd9d00492b137fa01c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fdc6dd90272ce7e75d744f71535cfbd8d77da81 upstream.

The vsyscall32 sysctl can racy against a concurrent fork when it switches
from disabled to enabled:

    arch_setup_additional_pages()
	if (vdso32_enabled)
           --&gt; No mapping
                                        sysctl.vsysscall32()
                                          --&gt; vdso32_enabled = true
    create_elf_tables()
      ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
        if (vdso32_enabled) {
           --&gt; Add VDSO entry with NULL pointer

Make ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 check whether the VDSO mapping has been set up for
the newly forked process or not.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170410151723.602367196@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fdc6dd90272ce7e75d744f71535cfbd8d77da81 upstream.

The vsyscall32 sysctl can racy against a concurrent fork when it switches
from disabled to enabled:

    arch_setup_additional_pages()
	if (vdso32_enabled)
           --&gt; No mapping
                                        sysctl.vsysscall32()
                                          --&gt; vdso32_enabled = true
    create_elf_tables()
      ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
        if (vdso32_enabled) {
           --&gt; Add VDSO entry with NULL pointer

Make ARCH_DLINFO_IA32 check whether the VDSO mapping has been set up for
the newly forked process or not.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170410151723.602367196@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix potential infoleak in older kernels</title>
<updated>2016-11-10T15:36:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-08T10:17:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dc1555e670c373bfa4ca2e1e2f839d5fe2b4501a'/>
<id>dc1555e670c373bfa4ca2e1e2f839d5fe2b4501a</id>
<content type='text'>
Not upstream as it is not needed there.

So a patch something like this might be a safe way to fix the
potential infoleak in older kernels.

THIS IS UNTESTED. It's a very obvious patch, though, so if it compiles
it probably works. It just initializes the output variable with 0 in
the inline asm description, instead of doing it in the exception
handler.

It will generate slightly worse code (a few unnecessary ALU
operations), but it doesn't have any interactions with the exception
handler implementation.


Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Not upstream as it is not needed there.

So a patch something like this might be a safe way to fix the
potential infoleak in older kernels.

THIS IS UNTESTED. It's a very obvious patch, though, so if it compiles
it probably works. It just initializes the output variable with 0 in
the inline asm description, instead of doing it in the exception
handler.

It will generate slightly worse code (a few unnecessary ALU
operations), but it doesn't have any interactions with the exception
handler implementation.


Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
