<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu, branch v3.4.99</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix event scheduling</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T23:10:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-21T15:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=494dac8e333e873cb5266ede3be957680d6194ad'/>
<id>494dac8e333e873cb5266ede3be957680d6194ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26e61e8939b1fe8729572dabe9a9e97d930dd4f6 upstream.

Vince "Super Tester" Weaver reported a new round of syscall fuzzing (Trinity) failures,
with perf WARN_ON()s triggering. He also provided traces of the failures.

This is I think the relevant bit:

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_disable: x86_pmu_disable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926156: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926158: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926159: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926160: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 1, n_added: 0, n_txn: 1
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926161: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926162: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926163: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926166: collect_events: Adding event: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)

So we add the insn:p event (fd[23]).

At this point we should have:

  n_events = 2, n_added = 1, n_txn = 1

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926170: collect_events: Adding event: 0 (ffff8800c9e01800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926172: collect_events: Adding event: 4 (ffff8800cbab2c00)

We try and add the {BP,cycles,br_insn} group (fd[3], fd[4], fd[15]).
These events are 0:cycles and 4:br_insn, the BP event isn't x86_pmu so
that's not visible.

	group_sched_in()
	  pmu-&gt;start_txn() /* nop - BP pmu */
	  event_sched_in()
	     event-&gt;pmu-&gt;add()

So here we should end up with:

  0: n_events = 3, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2
  4: n_events = 4, n_added = 3, n_txn = 3

But seeing the below state on x86_pmu_enable(), the must have failed,
because the 0 and 4 events aren't there anymore.

Looking at group_sched_in(), since the BP is the leader, its
event_sched_in() must have succeeded, for otherwise we would not have
seen the sibling adds.

But since neither 0 or 4 are in the below state; their event_sched_in()
must have failed; but I don't see why, the complete state: 0,0,1:p,4
fits perfectly fine on a core2.

However, since we try and schedule 4 it means the 0 event must have
succeeded!  Therefore the 4 event must have failed, its failure will
have put group_sched_in() into the fail path, which will call:

	event_sched_out()
	  event-&gt;pmu-&gt;del()

on 0 and the BP event.

Now x86_pmu_del() will reduce n_events; but it will not reduce n_added;
giving what we see below:

 n_event = 2, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_enable: x86_pmu_enable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926179: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926181: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926182: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 2, n_added: 2, n_txn: 2
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926186: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state:   1-&gt;0 tag: 1 config: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926190: x86_pmu_enable: S0: hwc-&gt;idx: 33, hwc-&gt;last_cpu: 0, hwc-&gt;last_tag: 1 hwc-&gt;state: 0

So the problem is that x86_pmu_del(), when called from a
group_sched_in() that fails (for whatever reason), and without x86_pmu
TXN support (because the leader is !x86_pmu), will corrupt the n_added
state.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140221150312.GF3104@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26e61e8939b1fe8729572dabe9a9e97d930dd4f6 upstream.

Vince "Super Tester" Weaver reported a new round of syscall fuzzing (Trinity) failures,
with perf WARN_ON()s triggering. He also provided traces of the failures.

This is I think the relevant bit:

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_disable: x86_pmu_disable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926156: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926158: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926159: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926160: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 1, n_added: 0, n_txn: 1
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926161: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926162: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926163: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926166: collect_events: Adding event: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)

So we add the insn:p event (fd[23]).

At this point we should have:

  n_events = 2, n_added = 1, n_txn = 1

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926170: collect_events: Adding event: 0 (ffff8800c9e01800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926172: collect_events: Adding event: 4 (ffff8800cbab2c00)

We try and add the {BP,cycles,br_insn} group (fd[3], fd[4], fd[15]).
These events are 0:cycles and 4:br_insn, the BP event isn't x86_pmu so
that's not visible.

	group_sched_in()
	  pmu-&gt;start_txn() /* nop - BP pmu */
	  event_sched_in()
	     event-&gt;pmu-&gt;add()

So here we should end up with:

  0: n_events = 3, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2
  4: n_events = 4, n_added = 3, n_txn = 3

But seeing the below state on x86_pmu_enable(), the must have failed,
because the 0 and 4 events aren't there anymore.

Looking at group_sched_in(), since the BP is the leader, its
event_sched_in() must have succeeded, for otherwise we would not have
seen the sibling adds.

But since neither 0 or 4 are in the below state; their event_sched_in()
must have failed; but I don't see why, the complete state: 0,0,1:p,4
fits perfectly fine on a core2.

However, since we try and schedule 4 it means the 0 event must have
succeeded!  Therefore the 4 event must have failed, its failure will
have put group_sched_in() into the fail path, which will call:

	event_sched_out()
	  event-&gt;pmu-&gt;del()

on 0 and the BP event.

Now x86_pmu_del() will reduce n_events; but it will not reduce n_added;
giving what we see below:

 n_event = 2, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_enable: x86_pmu_enable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926179: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926181: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926182: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 2, n_added: 2, n_txn: 2
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926186: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state:   1-&gt;0 tag: 1 config: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926190: x86_pmu_enable: S0: hwc-&gt;idx: 33, hwc-&gt;last_cpu: 0, hwc-&gt;last_tag: 1 hwc-&gt;state: 0

So the problem is that x86_pmu_del(), when called from a
group_sched_in() that fails (for whatever reason), and without x86_pmu
TXN support (because the leader is !x86_pmu), will corrupt the n_added
state.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140221150312.GF3104@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/amd/ibs: Fix waking up from S3 for AMD family 10h</title>
<updated>2014-01-29T13:10:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Richter</name>
<email>rric@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-15T14:57:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7e99f2168460c70d96241da3e8ff749f05416222'/>
<id>7e99f2168460c70d96241da3e8ff749f05416222</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bee09ed91cacdbffdbcd3b05de8409c77ec9fcd6 upstream.

On AMD family 10h we see following error messages while waking up from
S3 for all non-boot CPUs leading to a failed IBS initialization:

 Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
 smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x1
 [Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC500 (LVT offset 0) for vector 0x400, but the register is already in use for vector 0xf9 on another cpu
 perf: IBS APIC setup failed on cpu #1
 process: Switch to broadcast mode on CPU1
 CPU1 is up
 ...
 ACPI: Waking up from system sleep state S3

Reason for this is that during suspend the LVT offset for the IBS
vector gets lost and needs to be reinialized while resuming.

The offset is read from the IBSCTL msr. On family 10h the offset needs
to be 1 as offset 0 is used for the MCE threshold interrupt, but
firmware assings it for IBS to 0 too. The kernel needs to reprogram
the vector. The msr is a readonly node msr, but a new value can be
written via pci config space access. The reinitialization is
implemented for family 10h in setup_ibs_ctl() which is forced during
IBS setup.

This patch fixes IBS setup after waking up from S3 by adding
resume/supend hooks for the boot cpu which does the offset
reinitialization.

Marking it as stable to let distros pick up this fix.

Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;rric@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389797849-5565-1-git-send-email-rric.net@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bee09ed91cacdbffdbcd3b05de8409c77ec9fcd6 upstream.

On AMD family 10h we see following error messages while waking up from
S3 for all non-boot CPUs leading to a failed IBS initialization:

 Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
 smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x1
 [Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC500 (LVT offset 0) for vector 0x400, but the register is already in use for vector 0xf9 on another cpu
 perf: IBS APIC setup failed on cpu #1
 process: Switch to broadcast mode on CPU1
 CPU1 is up
 ...
 ACPI: Waking up from system sleep state S3

Reason for this is that during suspend the LVT offset for the IBS
vector gets lost and needs to be reinialized while resuming.

The offset is read from the IBSCTL msr. On family 10h the offset needs
to be 1 as offset 0 is used for the MCE threshold interrupt, but
firmware assings it for IBS to 0 too. The kernel needs to reprogram
the vector. The msr is a readonly node msr, but a new value can be
written via pci config space access. The reinitialization is
implemented for family 10h in setup_ibs_ctl() which is forced during
IBS setup.

This patch fixes IBS setup after waking up from S3 by adding
resume/supend hooks for the boot cpu which does the offset
reinitialization.

Marking it as stable to let distros pick up this fix.

Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;rric@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389797849-5565-1-git-send-email-rric.net@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL</title>
<updated>2013-05-11T20:48:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-03T12:11:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f69c5e4ee3ab858a1fb50943d3aba73915debdc0'/>
<id>f69c5e4ee3ab858a1fb50943d3aba73915debdc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cc23cd6c0c7d7f4bee057607e7ce01568925717 upstream.

We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel
data.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130503121256.230745028@chello.nl
[ Fix build error reported by fengguang.wu@intel.com, propagate error code back. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-v0x9ky3ahzr6nm3c6ilwrili@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7cc23cd6c0c7d7f4bee057607e7ce01568925717 upstream.

We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel
data.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130503121256.230745028@chello.nl
[ Fix build error reported by fengguang.wu@intel.com, propagate error code back. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-v0x9ky3ahzr6nm3c6ilwrili@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix LBR filter</title>
<updated>2013-05-11T20:48:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-03T12:11:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=59be003dc4dab50ccae8d2aaec8843976c67de3a'/>
<id>59be003dc4dab50ccae8d2aaec8843976c67de3a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6e15eb3ba6c0249c9e8c783517d131b47db995ca upstream.

The LBR 'from' adddress is under full userspace control; ensure
we validate it before reading from it.

Note: is_module_text_address() can potentially be quite
expensive; for those running into that with high overhead
in modules optimize it using an RCU backed rb-tree.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130503121256.158211806@chello.nl
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-mk8i82ffzax01cnqo829iy1q@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6e15eb3ba6c0249c9e8c783517d131b47db995ca upstream.

The LBR 'from' adddress is under full userspace control; ensure
we validate it before reading from it.

Note: is_module_text_address() can potentially be quite
expensive; for those running into that with high overhead
in modules optimize it using an RCU backed rb-tree.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130503121256.158211806@chello.nl
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-mk8i82ffzax01cnqo829iy1q@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB</title>
<updated>2013-04-26T04:19:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephane Eranian</name>
<email>eranian@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-16T11:51:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b48c21afcf0f9f01bb37144a5da3274a3590404'/>
<id>6b48c21afcf0f9f01bb37144a5da3274a3590404</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e upstream.

The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.

This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.

A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.

This version of the  patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e upstream.

The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.

This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.

A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.

This version of the  patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf,x86: fix wrmsr_on_cpu() warning on suspend/resume</title>
<updated>2013-03-20T20:05:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-17T22:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d7805638b85ce978f7c0cf1ac49204d4288084f6'/>
<id>d7805638b85ce978f7c0cf1ac49204d4288084f6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2a6e06b2aed6995af401dcd4feb5e79a0c7ea554 upstream.

Commit 1d9d8639c063 ("perf,x86: fix kernel crash with PEBS/BTS after
suspend/resume") fixed a crash when doing PEBS performance profiling
after resuming, but in using init_debug_store_on_cpu() to restore the
DS_AREA mtrr it also resulted in a new WARN_ON() triggering.

init_debug_store_on_cpu() uses "wrmsr_on_cpu()", which in turn uses CPU
cross-calls to do the MSR update.  Which is not really valid at the
early resume stage, and the warning is quite reasonable.  Now, it all
happens to _work_, for the simple reason that smp_call_function_single()
ends up just doing the call directly on the CPU when the CPU number
matches, but we really should just do the wrmsr() directly instead.

This duplicates the wrmsr() logic, but hopefully we can just remove the
wrmsr_on_cpu() version eventually.

Reported-and-tested-by: Parag Warudkar &lt;parag.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2a6e06b2aed6995af401dcd4feb5e79a0c7ea554 upstream.

Commit 1d9d8639c063 ("perf,x86: fix kernel crash with PEBS/BTS after
suspend/resume") fixed a crash when doing PEBS performance profiling
after resuming, but in using init_debug_store_on_cpu() to restore the
DS_AREA mtrr it also resulted in a new WARN_ON() triggering.

init_debug_store_on_cpu() uses "wrmsr_on_cpu()", which in turn uses CPU
cross-calls to do the MSR update.  Which is not really valid at the
early resume stage, and the warning is quite reasonable.  Now, it all
happens to _work_, for the simple reason that smp_call_function_single()
ends up just doing the call directly on the CPU when the CPU number
matches, but we really should just do the wrmsr() directly instead.

This duplicates the wrmsr() logic, but hopefully we can just remove the
wrmsr_on_cpu() version eventually.

Reported-and-tested-by: Parag Warudkar &lt;parag.lkml@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf,x86: fix kernel crash with PEBS/BTS after suspend/resume</title>
<updated>2013-03-20T20:04:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephane Eranian</name>
<email>eranian@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-15T13:26:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9a9b01c04ef4b844f64bbf36987f918e64e304a2'/>
<id>9a9b01c04ef4b844f64bbf36987f918e64e304a2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1d9d8639c063caf6efc2447f5f26aa637f844ff6 upstream.

This patch fixes a kernel crash when using precise sampling (PEBS)
after a suspend/resume. Turns out the CPU notifier code is not invoked
on CPU0 (BP). Therefore, the DS_AREA (used by PEBS) is not restored properly
by the kernel and keeps it power-on/resume value of 0 causing any PEBS
measurement to crash when running on CPU0.

The workaround is to add a hook in the actual resume code to restore
the DS Area MSR value. It is invoked for all CPUS. So for all but CPU0,
the DS_AREA will be restored twice but this is harmless.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1d9d8639c063caf6efc2447f5f26aa637f844ff6 upstream.

This patch fixes a kernel crash when using precise sampling (PEBS)
after a suspend/resume. Turns out the CPU notifier code is not invoked
on CPU0 (BP). Therefore, the DS_AREA (used by PEBS) is not restored properly
by the kernel and keeps it power-on/resume value of 0 causing any PEBS
measurement to crash when running on CPU0.

The workaround is to add a hook in the actual resume code to restore
the DS Area MSR value. It is invoked for all CPUS. So for all but CPU0,
the DS_AREA will be restored twice but this is harmless.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: Hyper-V: register clocksource only if its advertised</title>
<updated>2013-02-28T14:58:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Olaf Hering</name>
<email>[mailto:olaf@aepfle.de]</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-04T01:22:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=507d34bf74e3cef390d74b180ed9695e6bf3dcbb'/>
<id>507d34bf74e3cef390d74b180ed9695e6bf3dcbb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32068f6527b8f1822a30671dedaf59c567325026 upstream.

Enable hyperv_clocksource only if its advertised as a feature.
XenServer 6 returns the signature which is checked in
ms_hyperv_platform(), but it does not offer all features. Currently the
clocksource is enabled unconditionally in ms_hyperv_init_platform(), and
the result is a hanging guest.

Hyper-V spec Bit 1 indicates the availability of Partition Reference
Counter.  Register the clocksource only if this bit is set.

The guest in question prints this in dmesg:
 [    0.000000] Hypervisor detected: Microsoft HyperV
 [    0.000000] HyperV: features 0x70, hints 0x0

This bug can be reproduced easily be setting 'viridian=1' in a HVM domU
.cfg file. A workaround without this patch is to boot the HVM guest with
'clocksource=jiffies'.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering &lt;olaf@aepfle.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359940959-32168-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 32068f6527b8f1822a30671dedaf59c567325026 upstream.

Enable hyperv_clocksource only if its advertised as a feature.
XenServer 6 returns the signature which is checked in
ms_hyperv_platform(), but it does not offer all features. Currently the
clocksource is enabled unconditionally in ms_hyperv_init_platform(), and
the result is a hanging guest.

Hyper-V spec Bit 1 indicates the availability of Partition Reference
Counter.  Register the clocksource only if this bit is set.

The guest in question prints this in dmesg:
 [    0.000000] Hypervisor detected: Microsoft HyperV
 [    0.000000] HyperV: features 0x70, hints 0x0

This bug can be reproduced easily be setting 'viridian=1' in a HVM domU
.cfg file. A workaround without this patch is to boot the HVM guest with
'clocksource=jiffies'.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering &lt;olaf@aepfle.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359940959-32168-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUs</title>
<updated>2013-01-17T16:50:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andre Przywara</name>
<email>andre.przywara@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-31T16:20:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a0f8b51494051c7bf5d994ac33d2b8ce7c0d5867'/>
<id>a0f8b51494051c7bf5d994ac33d2b8ce7c0d5867</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream.

The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of
some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache.
This patch disables it on the affected CPUs.

The issue is similar to that one of last year:
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html
This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another
quirk for newer CPUs.

The performance penalty without the patch depends on the
circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%.

The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same
physical page under different virtual addresses, so different
processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of
PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both
cores of the same compute unit.

More details can be found here:
http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf

CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver.
That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the
just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera).
The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2,
A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the
range of model ids.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara &lt;osp@andrep.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream.

The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of
some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache.
This patch disables it on the affected CPUs.

The issue is similar to that one of last year:
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html
This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another
quirk for newer CPUs.

The performance penalty without the patch depends on the
circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%.

The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same
physical page under different virtual addresses, so different
processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of
PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both
cores of the same compute unit.

More details can be found here:
http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf

CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver.
That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the
just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera).
The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2,
A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the
range of model ids.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara &lt;osp@andrep.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUs</title>
<updated>2013-01-11T17:06:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andre Przywara</name>
<email>andre.przywara@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-31T16:20:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af445c0d36202fe86bc50f0a1831c5661f5b1189'/>
<id>af445c0d36202fe86bc50f0a1831c5661f5b1189</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream.

The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of
some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache.
This patch disables it on the affected CPUs.

The issue is similar to that one of last year:
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html
This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another
quirk for newer CPUs.

The performance penalty without the patch depends on the
circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%.

The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same
physical page under different virtual addresses, so different
processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of
PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both
cores of the same compute unit.

More details can be found here:
http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf

CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver.
That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the
just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera).
The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2,
A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the
range of model ids.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara &lt;osp@andrep.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2bbf0a1427c377350f001fbc6260995334739ad7 upstream.

The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of
some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache.
This patch disables it on the affected CPUs.

The issue is similar to that one of last year:
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html
This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another
quirk for newer CPUs.

The performance penalty without the patch depends on the
circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%.

The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same
physical page under different virtual addresses, so different
processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of
PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both
cores of the same compute unit.

More details can be found here:
http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf

CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver.
That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the
just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera).
The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2,
A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the
range of model ids.

Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara &lt;osp@andrep.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
