linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel/cpu, branch v4.9.121

x86/l1tf: Fix build error seen if CONFIG_KVM_INTEL is disabled

2018-08-17T18:59:28+00:00

commit 1eb46908b35dfbac0ec1848d4b1e39667e0187e9 upstream.

allmodconfig+CONFIG_INTEL_KVM=n results in the following build error.

  ERROR: "l1tf_vmx_mitigation" [arch/x86/kvm/kvm.ko] undefined!

Fixes: 5b76a3cff011 ("KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry")
Reported-by: Meelis Roos 
Cc: Meelis Roos 
Cc: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present

2018-08-15T16:14:55+00:00

commit f8b64d08dde2714c62751d18ba77f4aeceb161d3 upstream.

Move smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id to cpu/common.c so that they're
always present as symbols and not only in the CONFIG_SMP case. Then,
other code using them doesn't need ugly ifdeffery anymore. Get rid of
some ifdeffery.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524864877-111962-2-git-send-email-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu/amd: Limit cpu_core_id fixup to families older than F17h

2018-08-15T16:14:55+00:00

commit b89b41d0b8414690ec0030c134b8bde209e6d06c upstream.

Current cpu_core_id fixup causes downcored F17h configurations to be
incorrect:

  NODE: 0
  processor  0 core id : 0
  processor  1 core id : 1
  processor  2 core id : 2
  processor  3 core id : 4
  processor  4 core id : 5
  processor  5 core id : 0

  NODE: 1
  processor  6 core id : 2
  processor  7 core id : 3
  processor  8 core id : 4
  processor  9 core id : 0
  processor 10 core id : 1
  processor 11 core id : 2

Code that relies on the cpu_core_id, like match_smt(), for example,
which builds the thread siblings masks used by the scheduler, is
mislead.

So, limit the fixup to pre-F17h machines. The new value for cpu_core_id
for F17h and later will represent the CPUID_Fn8000001E_EBX[CoreId],
which is guaranteed to be unique for each core within a socket.

This way we have:

  NODE: 0
  processor  0 core id : 0
  processor  1 core id : 1
  processor  2 core id : 2
  processor  3 core id : 4
  processor  4 core id : 5
  processor  5 core id : 6

  NODE: 1
  processor  6 core id : 8
  processor  7 core id : 9
  processor  8 core id : 10
  processor  9 core id : 12
  processor 10 core id : 13
  processor 11 core id : 14

Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit 
[ Heavily massaged. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Yazen Ghannam 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170731085159.9455-2-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled

2018-08-15T16:14:55+00:00

commit 07d981ad4cf1e78361c6db1c28ee5ba105f96cc1 upstream

The kernel unnecessarily prevents late microcode loading when SMT is
disabled.  It should be safe to allow it if all the primary threads are
online.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/microcode: Do not upload microcode if CPUs are offline

2018-08-15T16:14:54+00:00

commit 30ec26da9967d0d785abc24073129a34c3211777 upstream.

Avoid loading microcode if any of the CPUs are offline, and issue a
warning. Having different microcode revisions on the system at any time
is outright dangerous.

[ Borislav: Massage changelog. ]

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky 
Tested-by: Ashok Raj 
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519352533-15992-4-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180228102846.13447-5-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation

2018-08-15T16:14:53+00:00

commit bc2d8d262cba5736332cbc866acb11b1c5748aa9 upstream

Josh reported that the late SMT evaluation in cpu_smt_state_init() sets
cpu_smt_control to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED in case that 'nosmt' was supplied
on the kernel command line as it cannot differentiate between SMT disabled
by BIOS and SMT soft disable via 'nosmt'. That wreckages the state and
makes the sysfs interface unusable.

Rework this so that during bringup of the non boot CPUs the availability of
SMT is determined in cpu_smt_allowed(). If a newly booted CPU is not a
'primary' thread then set the local cpu_smt_available marker and evaluate
this explicitely right after the initial SMP bringup has finished.

SMT evaulation on x86 is a trainwreck as the firmware has all the
information _before_ booting the kernel, but there is no interface to query
it.

Fixes: 73d5e2b47264 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry

2018-08-15T16:14:53+00:00

commit 8e0b2b916662e09dd4d09e5271cdf214c6b80e62 upstream

Bit 3 of ARCH_CAPABILITIES tells a hypervisor that L1D flush on vmentry is
not needed.  Add a new value to enum vmx_l1d_flush_state, which is used
either if there is no L1TF bug at all, or if bit 3 is set in ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability

2018-08-15T16:14:53+00:00

commit ea156d192f5257a5bf393d33910d3b481bf8a401 upstream

Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations

2018-08-15T16:14:51+00:00

commit d90a7a0ec83fb86622cd7dae23255d3c50a99ec8 upstream

Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.

The possible values are:

  full
	Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
	SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
	/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
	a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  full,force
	Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
	command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
	control is disabled.

  flush
	Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
	potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  flush,nosmt
	Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
	control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
	after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
	hypervisors will issue a warning.

  flush,nowarn
	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
	a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.

  off
	Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.

Default is 'flush'.

Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:

  - 'lt1f=full,force'	: Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
    			  possible.

  - 'l1tf=full'
  - 'l1tf-flush'
  - 'l1tf=flush,nosmt'	: Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
			  SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
			  has been run-time enabled

  - 'l1tf=flush,nowarn'	: Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.

  - 'l1tf=off'		: L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
			  are emitted.

KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.

This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.

Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early

2018-08-15T16:14:50+00:00

commit fee0aede6f4739c87179eca76136f83210953b86 upstream

The CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED state is set (if the processor does not support
SMT) when the sysfs SMT control file is initialized.

That was fine so far as this was only required to make the output of the
control file correct and to prevent writes in that case.

With the upcoming l1tf command line parameter, this needs to be set up
before the L1TF mitigation selection and command line parsing happens.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.121795971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman