<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v3.14.37</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Avoid math_state_restore() without used_math() in __restore_xstate_sig()</title>
<updated>2015-03-26T14:06:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-13T08:53:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f8ba940346cbd61047effdbe89cd0e13aec18b68'/>
<id>f8ba940346cbd61047effdbe89cd0e13aec18b68</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a7c80ebcac3068b1c3cb27d538d29558c30010c8 upstream.

math_state_restore() assumes it is called with irqs disabled,
but this is not true if the caller is __restore_xstate_sig().

This means that if ia32_fxstate == T and __copy_from_user()
fails, __restore_xstate_sig() returns with irqs disabled too.

This triggers:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:41
   dump_stack
   ___might_sleep
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   __might_sleep
   down_read
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   print_vma_addr
   signal_fault
   sys32_rt_sigreturn

Change __restore_xstate_sig() to call set_used_math()
unconditionally. This avoids enabling and disabling interrupts
in math_state_restore(). If copy_from_user() fails, we can
simply do fpu_finit() by hand.

[ Note: this is only the first step. math_state_restore() should
        not check used_math(), it should set this flag. While
	init_fpu() should simply die. ]

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Riikonen &lt;priikone@iki.fi&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Suresh Siddha &lt;sbsiddha@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150307153844.GB25954@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a7c80ebcac3068b1c3cb27d538d29558c30010c8 upstream.

math_state_restore() assumes it is called with irqs disabled,
but this is not true if the caller is __restore_xstate_sig().

This means that if ia32_fxstate == T and __copy_from_user()
fails, __restore_xstate_sig() returns with irqs disabled too.

This triggers:

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:41
   dump_stack
   ___might_sleep
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   __might_sleep
   down_read
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   print_vma_addr
   signal_fault
   sys32_rt_sigreturn

Change __restore_xstate_sig() to call set_used_math()
unconditionally. This avoids enabling and disabling interrupts
in math_state_restore(). If copy_from_user() fails, we can
simply do fpu_finit() by hand.

[ Note: this is only the first step. math_state_restore() should
        not check used_math(), it should set this flag. While
	init_fpu() should simply die. ]

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Pekka Riikonen &lt;priikone@iki.fi&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Suresh Siddha &lt;sbsiddha@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150307153844.GB25954@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/asm/entry/64: Remove a bogus 'ret_from_fork' optimization</title>
<updated>2015-03-18T12:31:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-05T00:09:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=213c9f19d733b067b278901acf49d67e805a38b0'/>
<id>213c9f19d733b067b278901acf49d67e805a38b0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 956421fbb74c3a6261903f3836c0740187cf038b upstream.

'ret_from_fork' checks TIF_IA32 to determine whether 'pt_regs' and
the related state make sense for 'ret_from_sys_call'.  This is
entirely the wrong check.  TS_COMPAT would make a little more
sense, but there's really no point in keeping this optimization
at all.

This fixes a return to the wrong user CS if we came from int
0x80 in a 64-bit task.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4710be56d76ef994ddf59087aad98c000fbab9a4.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
[ Backported from tip:x86/asm. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 956421fbb74c3a6261903f3836c0740187cf038b upstream.

'ret_from_fork' checks TIF_IA32 to determine whether 'pt_regs' and
the related state make sense for 'ret_from_sys_call'.  This is
entirely the wrong check.  TS_COMPAT would make a little more
sense, but there's really no point in keeping this optimization
at all.

This fixes a return to the wrong user CS if we came from int
0x80 in a 64-bit task.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4710be56d76ef994ddf59087aad98c000fbab9a4.1424989793.git.luto@amacapital.net
[ Backported from tip:x86/asm. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/asm/traps: Disable tracing and kprobes in fixup_bad_iret and sync_regs</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-25T01:39:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=aaef7ece8199e21a21ed4f5d065044cd1ce37f81'/>
<id>aaef7ece8199e21a21ed4f5d065044cd1ce37f81</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ddc6a2199f1da405a2fb68c40db8899b1a8cd87 upstream.

These functions can be executed on the int3 stack, so kprobes
are dangerous. Tracing is probably a bad idea, too.

Fixes: b645af2d5905 ("x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/50e33d26adca60816f3ba968875801652507d0c4.1416870125.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.10:
 - Use __kprobes instead of NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7ddc6a2199f1da405a2fb68c40db8899b1a8cd87 upstream.

These functions can be executed on the int3 stack, so kprobes
are dangerous. Tracing is probably a bad idea, too.

Fixes: b645af2d5905 ("x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/50e33d26adca60816f3ba968875801652507d0c4.1416870125.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.10:
 - Use __kprobes instead of NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment"</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-22T19:27:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=83df3d59f5b53a66adf67569d0689aeb5706bf13'/>
<id>83df3d59f5b53a66adf67569d0689aeb5706bf13</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 upstream.

The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:

        struct user_desc u_info;
        bzero(&amp;u_info, sizeof(u_info));
        u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;

        syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &amp;u_info);

Strictly speaking, this code was never correct.  It should have set
read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
a TLS entry for real.  The actual effect of this code was to
allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.

The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.

This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
expects but should be close enough to keep it working.  In
particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
allocate the same segment both times.

According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.

If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.

Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 upstream.

The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:

        struct user_desc u_info;
        bzero(&amp;u_info, sizeof(u_info));
        u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;

        syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &amp;u_info);

Strictly speaking, this code was never correct.  It should have set
read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
a TLS entry for real.  The actual effect of this code was to
allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.

The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.

This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
expects but should be close enough to keep it working.  In
particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
allocate the same segment both times.

According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.

If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.

Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/tsc: Change Fast TSC calibration failed from error to info</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandre Demers</name>
<email>alexandre.f.demers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-09T06:27:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=16107331facdb20497adbdb99088ebd0bfc9176e'/>
<id>16107331facdb20497adbdb99088ebd0bfc9176e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 520452172e6b318f3a8bd9d4fe1e25066393de25 upstream.

Many users see this message when booting without knowning that it is
of no importance and that TSC calibration may have succeeded by
another way.

As explained by Paul Bolle in
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348488259.1436.22.camel@x61.thuisdomein

  "Fast TSC calibration failed" should not be considered as an error
  since other calibration methods are being tried afterward. At most,
  those send a warning if they fail (not an error). So let's change
  the message from error to warning.

[ tglx: Make if pr_info. It's really not important at all ]

Fixes: c767a54ba065 x86/debug: Add KERN_&lt;LEVEL&gt; to bare printks, convert printks to pr_&lt;level&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Demers &lt;alexandre.f.demers@gmail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418106470-6906-1-git-send-email-alexandre.f.demers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 520452172e6b318f3a8bd9d4fe1e25066393de25 upstream.

Many users see this message when booting without knowning that it is
of no importance and that TSC calibration may have succeeded by
another way.

As explained by Paul Bolle in
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348488259.1436.22.camel@x61.thuisdomein

  "Fast TSC calibration failed" should not be considered as an error
  since other calibration methods are being tried afterward. At most,
  those send a warning if they fail (not an error). So let's change
  the message from error to warning.

[ tglx: Make if pr_info. It's really not important at all ]

Fixes: c767a54ba065 x86/debug: Add KERN_&lt;LEVEL&gt; to bare printks, convert printks to pr_&lt;level&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Demers &lt;alexandre.f.demers@gmail.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418106470-6906-1-git-send-email-alexandre.f.demers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, hyperv: Mark the Hyper-V clocksource as being continuous</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>K. Y. Srinivasan</name>
<email>kys@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-13T00:26:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=10ee480d03d54dbdf38a82711ab58baee9df3e80'/>
<id>10ee480d03d54dbdf38a82711ab58baee9df3e80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32c6590d126836a062b3140ed52d898507987017 upstream.

The Hyper-V clocksource is continuous; mark it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Acked-by: jasowang@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: olaf@aepfle.de
Cc: apw@canonical.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1421108762-3331-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 32c6590d126836a062b3140ed52d898507987017 upstream.

The Hyper-V clocksource is continuous; mark it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Acked-by: jasowang@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: olaf@aepfle.de
Cc: apw@canonical.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1421108762-3331-1-git-send-email-kys@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace/jprobes/x86: Fix conflict between jprobes and function graph tracing</title>
<updated>2015-01-27T16:18:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-12T17:12:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8676ef6461f42c61dd5fb17ba18eb6ccf16e2307'/>
<id>8676ef6461f42c61dd5fb17ba18eb6ccf16e2307</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 237d28db036e411f22c03cfd5b0f6dc2aa9bf3bc upstream.

If the function graph tracer traces a jprobe callback, the system will
crash. This can easily be demonstrated by compiling the jprobe
sample module that is in the kernel tree, loading it and running the
function graph tracer.

 # modprobe jprobe_example.ko
 # echo function_graph &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
 # ls

The first two commands end up in a nice crash after the first fork.
(do_fork has a jprobe attached to it, so "ls" just triggers that fork)

The problem is caused by the jprobe_return() that all jprobe callbacks
must end with. The way jprobes works is that the function a jprobe
is attached to has a breakpoint placed at the start of it (or it uses
ftrace if fentry is supported). The breakpoint handler (or ftrace callback)
will copy the stack frame and change the ip address to return to the
jprobe handler instead of the function. The jprobe handler must end
with jprobe_return() which swaps the stack and does an int3 (breakpoint).
This breakpoint handler will then put back the saved stack frame,
simulate the instruction at the beginning of the function it added
a breakpoint to, and then continue on.

For function tracing to work, it hijakes the return address from the
stack frame, and replaces it with a hook function that will trace
the end of the call. This hook function will restore the return
address of the function call.

If the function tracer traces the jprobe handler, the hook function
for that handler will not be called, and its saved return address
will be used for the next function. This will result in a kernel crash.

To solve this, pause function tracing before the jprobe handler is called
and unpause it before it returns back to the function it probed.

Some other updates:

Used a variable "saved_sp" to hold kcb-&gt;jprobe_saved_sp. This makes the
code look a bit cleaner and easier to understand (various tries to fix
this bug required this change).

Note, if fentry is being used, jprobes will change the ip address before
the function graph tracer runs and it will not be able to trace the
function that the jprobe is probing.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150114154329.552437962@goodmis.org

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 237d28db036e411f22c03cfd5b0f6dc2aa9bf3bc upstream.

If the function graph tracer traces a jprobe callback, the system will
crash. This can easily be demonstrated by compiling the jprobe
sample module that is in the kernel tree, loading it and running the
function graph tracer.

 # modprobe jprobe_example.ko
 # echo function_graph &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
 # ls

The first two commands end up in a nice crash after the first fork.
(do_fork has a jprobe attached to it, so "ls" just triggers that fork)

The problem is caused by the jprobe_return() that all jprobe callbacks
must end with. The way jprobes works is that the function a jprobe
is attached to has a breakpoint placed at the start of it (or it uses
ftrace if fentry is supported). The breakpoint handler (or ftrace callback)
will copy the stack frame and change the ip address to return to the
jprobe handler instead of the function. The jprobe handler must end
with jprobe_return() which swaps the stack and does an int3 (breakpoint).
This breakpoint handler will then put back the saved stack frame,
simulate the instruction at the beginning of the function it added
a breakpoint to, and then continue on.

For function tracing to work, it hijakes the return address from the
stack frame, and replaces it with a hook function that will trace
the end of the call. This hook function will restore the return
address of the function call.

If the function tracer traces the jprobe handler, the hook function
for that handler will not be called, and its saved return address
will be used for the next function. This will result in a kernel crash.

To solve this, pause function tracing before the jprobe handler is called
and unpause it before it returns back to the function it probed.

Some other updates:

Used a variable "saved_sp" to hold kcb-&gt;jprobe_saved_sp. This makes the
code look a bit cleaner and easier to understand (various tries to fix
this bug required this change).

Note, if fentry is being used, jprobes will change the ip address before
the function graph tracer runs and it will not be able to trace the
function that the jprobe is probing.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150114154329.552437962@goodmis.org

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/intel/uncore: Make sure only uncore events are collected</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-10T20:23:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ec9c772a1cb7436c278da5eb0aadb2589a62b485'/>
<id>ec9c772a1cb7436c278da5eb0aadb2589a62b485</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af91568e762d04931dcbdd6bef4655433d8b9418 upstream.

The uncore_collect_events functions assumes that event group
might contain only uncore events which is wrong, because it
might contain any type of events.

This bug leads to uncore framework touching 'not' uncore events,
which could end up all sorts of bugs.

One was triggered by Vince's perf fuzzer, when the uncore code
touched breakpoint event private event space as if it was uncore
event and caused BUG:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff82822068
   IP: [&lt;ffffffff81020338&gt;] uncore_assign_events+0x188/0x250
   ...

The code in uncore_assign_events() function was looking for
event-&gt;hw.idx data while the event was initialized as a
breakpoint with different members in event-&gt;hw union.

This patch forces uncore_collect_events() to collect only uncore
events.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yan, Zheng &lt;zheng.z.yan@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418243031-20367-2-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit af91568e762d04931dcbdd6bef4655433d8b9418 upstream.

The uncore_collect_events functions assumes that event group
might contain only uncore events which is wrong, because it
might contain any type of events.

This bug leads to uncore framework touching 'not' uncore events,
which could end up all sorts of bugs.

One was triggered by Vince's perf fuzzer, when the uncore code
touched breakpoint event private event space as if it was uncore
event and caused BUG:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffff82822068
   IP: [&lt;ffffffff81020338&gt;] uncore_assign_events+0x188/0x250
   ...

The code in uncore_assign_events() function was looking for
event-&gt;hw.idx data while the event was initialized as a
breakpoint with different members in event-&gt;hw union.

This patch forces uncore_collect_events() to collect only uncore
events.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yan, Zheng &lt;zheng.z.yan@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418243031-20367-2-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/tls: Don't validate lm in set_thread_area() after all</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-17T22:48:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e990e54996c037f654f5016c78bc03efd6e65e8b'/>
<id>e990e54996c037f654f5016c78bc03efd6e65e8b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3fb2f4237bb452eb4e98f6a5dbd5a445b4fed9d0 upstream.

It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue.  GCC, when
compiling this in a 32-bit program:

struct user_desc desc = {
	.entry_number    = idx,
	.base_addr       = base,
	.limit           = 0xfffff,
	.seg_32bit       = 1,
	.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
	.read_exec_only  = 0,
	.limit_in_pages  = 1,
	.seg_not_present = 0,
	.useable         = 0,
};

will leave .lm uninitialized.  This means that anything in the
kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable.

Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area().  The value never did
anything in the first place.

Fixes: 0e58af4e1d21 ("x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d7875b60e28c512f6a6fc0baf5714d58e7eaadbb.1418856405.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3fb2f4237bb452eb4e98f6a5dbd5a445b4fed9d0 upstream.

It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue.  GCC, when
compiling this in a 32-bit program:

struct user_desc desc = {
	.entry_number    = idx,
	.base_addr       = base,
	.limit           = 0xfffff,
	.seg_32bit       = 1,
	.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
	.read_exec_only  = 0,
	.limit_in_pages  = 1,
	.seg_not_present = 0,
	.useable         = 0,
};

will leave .lm uninitialized.  This means that anything in the
kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable.

Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area().  The value never did
anything in the first place.

Fixes: 0e58af4e1d21 ("x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d7875b60e28c512f6a6fc0baf5714d58e7eaadbb.1418856405.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:00:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-06T03:03:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c06c656494797804aa7f603df37208b61792d0d1'/>
<id>c06c656494797804aa7f603df37208b61792d0d1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.

paravirt_enabled has the following effects:

 - Disables the F00F bug workaround warning.  There is no F00F bug
   workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
   works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists.  This
   is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
   KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.

 - Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection.  On a KVM paravirt system,
   there should be no APM BIOS anyway.

 - Disables tboot.  I think that the tboot code should check the
   CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.

 - paravirt_enabled disables espfix32.  espfix32 should *not* be
   disabled under KVM paravirt.

The last point is the purpose of this patch.  It fixes a leak of the
high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
guests.  Fixes CVE-2014-8134.

Suggested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b upstream.

paravirt_enabled has the following effects:

 - Disables the F00F bug workaround warning.  There is no F00F bug
   workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
   works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists.  This
   is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
   KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.

 - Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection.  On a KVM paravirt system,
   there should be no APM BIOS anyway.

 - Disables tboot.  I think that the tboot code should check the
   CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.

 - paravirt_enabled disables espfix32.  espfix32 should *not* be
   disabled under KVM paravirt.

The last point is the purpose of this patch.  It fixes a leak of the
high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
guests.  Fixes CVE-2014-8134.

Suggested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
