linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v4.4.77

x86/mm/pat: Don't report PAT on CPUs that don't support it

2017-07-15T09:57:50+00:00

commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Bernhard Held 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas

2017-06-26T05:13:11+00:00

commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Tested-by: Helge Deller  # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau 
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kvm: async_pf: fix rcu_irq_enter() with irqs enabled

2017-06-14T11:16:21+00:00

commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li 
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: x86: Fix load damaged SSEx MXCSR register

2017-05-25T12:30:09+00:00

commit a575813bfe4bc15aba511a5e91e61d242bff8b9d upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
   IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
   PGD 348e12067
   P4D 348e12067
   PUD 348e14067
   PMD 3cbd84067
   PTE 80000003f7e87161

   Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
   CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G           OE   4.11.0+ #8
   task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
   RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
   RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
    do_trap+0x156/0x170
    do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
    ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
    ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
    do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
    invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
   RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
    ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write
a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be
generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values
and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register
values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This
patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
random values and bails out immediately.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Radim Krčmář 
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li 
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kprobes/x86: Fix kernel panic when certain exception-handling addresses are probed

2017-05-14T11:32:55+00:00

commit 75013fb16f8484898eaa8d0b08fed942d790f029 upstream.

Fix to the exception table entry check by using probed address
instead of the address of copied instruction.

This bug may cause unexpected kernel panic if user probe an address
where an exception can happen which should be fixup by __ex_table
(e.g. copy_from_user.)

Unless user puts a kprobe on such address, this doesn't
cause any problem.

This bug has been introduced years ago, by commit:

  464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently").

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Fixes: 464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148829899399.28855.12581062400757221722.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/pci-calgary: Fix iommu_free() comparison of unsigned expression >= 0

2017-05-14T11:32:55+00:00

commit 68dee8e2f2cacc54d038394e70d22411dee89da2 upstream.

commit 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable") has killed
bad_dma_address variable and used instead of macro DMA_ERROR_CODE
which is always zero. Since dma_addr is unsigned, the statement

   dma_addr >= DMA_ERROR_CODE

is always true, and not needed.

arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c: In function ‘iommu_free’:
arch/x86/kernel/pci-calgary_64.c:299:2: warning: comparison of unsigned expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits]
  if (unlikely((dma_addr >= DMA_ERROR_CODE) && (dma_addr < badend))) {

Fixes: 8fd524b355da ("x86: Kill bad_dma_address variable")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky 
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Jon Mason 
Cc: Muli Ben-Yehuda 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7612c0f9dd7c1290407dbf8e809def922006920b.1479161177.git.npajkovsky@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/ioapic: Restore IO-APIC irq_chip retrigger callback

2017-05-14T11:32:55+00:00

commit a9b4f08770b415f30f2fb0f8329a370c8f554aa3 upstream.

commit d32932d02e18 removed the irq_retrigger callback from the IO-APIC
chip and did not add it to the new IO-APIC-IR irq chip.

There is no harm because the interrupts are resent in software when the
retrigger callback is NULL, but it's less efficient. So restore them.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: d32932d02e18  ("x86/irq: Convert IOAPIC to use hierarchical irqdomain interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Ruslan Ruslichenko 
Cc: xe-linux-external@cisco.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484662432-13580-1-git-send-email-rruslich@cisco.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace/x86: Fix triple fault with graph tracing and suspend-to-ram

2017-05-03T04:19:56+00:00

commit 34a477e5297cbaa6ecc6e17c042a866e1cbe80d6 upstream.

On x86-32, with CONFIG_FIRMWARE and multiple CPUs, if you enable function
graph tracing and then suspend to RAM, it will triple fault and reboot when
it resumes.

The first fault happens when booting a secondary CPU:

startup_32_smp()
  load_ucode_ap()
    prepare_ftrace_return()
      ftrace_graph_is_dead()
        (accesses 'kill_ftrace_graph')

The early head_32.S code calls into load_ucode_ap(), which has an an
ftrace hook, so it calls prepare_ftrace_return(), which calls
ftrace_graph_is_dead(), which tries to access the global
'kill_ftrace_graph' variable with a virtual address, causing a fault
because the CPU is still in real mode.

The fix is to add a check in prepare_ftrace_return() to make sure it's
running in protected mode before continuing.  The check makes sure the
stack pointer is a virtual kernel address.  It's a bit of a hack, but
it's not very intrusive and it works well enough.

For reference, here are a few other (more difficult) ways this could
have potentially been fixed:

- Move startup_32_smp()'s call to load_ucode_ap() down to *after* paging
  is enabled.  (No idea what that would break.)

- Track down load_ucode_ap()'s entire callee tree and mark all the
  functions 'notrace'.  (Probably not realistic.)

- Pause graph tracing in ftrace_suspend_notifier_call() or bringup_cpu()
  or __cpu_up(), and ensure that the pause facility can be queried from
  real mode.

Reported-by: Paul Menzel 
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Tested-by: Paul Menzel 
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Cc: "Rafael J . Wysocki" 
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Len Brown 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c1272269a580660703ed2eccf44308e790c7a98.1492123841.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/mce/AMD: Give a name to MCA bank 3 when accessed with legacy MSRs

2017-04-27T07:09:33+00:00

commit 29f72ce3e4d18066ec75c79c857bee0618a3504b upstream.

MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name.
However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed
using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems
when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't
recognize Scalable MCA.

Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on
Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on
Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems
since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored.

Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems.

  WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal
  kobject: (ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name!
  ...
  Call Trace:
   kobject_add_internal
   kobject_add
   kobject_create_and_add
   threshold_create_device
   threshold_init_device

Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/x86: Avoid exposing wrong/stale data in intel_pmu_lbr_read_32()

2017-04-21T07:30:05+00:00

commit f2200ac311302fcdca6556fd0c5127eab6c65a3e upstream.

When the perf_branch_entry::{in_tx,abort,cycles} fields were added,
intel_pmu_lbr_read_32() wasn't updated to initialize them.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 135c5612c460 ("perf/x86/intel: Support Haswell/v4 LBR format")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman