<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v4.4.87</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix LBR related crashes on Intel Atom</title>
<updated>2017-08-25T00:02:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephane Eranian</name>
<email>eranian@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-03T22:33:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ce1b98a30571b1022d6ce86d9876a7a7dbf9aed5'/>
<id>ce1b98a30571b1022d6ce86d9876a7a7dbf9aed5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fc2e83077b05a061afe9b24f2fdff7a0434eb67 upstream.

This patches fixes the LBR kernel crashes on Intel Atom.

The kernel was assuming that if the CPU supports 64-bit format
LBR, then it has an LBR_SELECT MSR. Atom uses 64-bit LBR format
but does not have LBR_SELECT. That was causing NULL pointer
dereferences in a couple of places.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
Fixes: 96f3eda67fcf ("perf/x86/intel: Fix static checker warning in lbr enable")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449182000-31524-2-git-send-email-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Denys Zagorui &lt;dzagorui@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fc2e83077b05a061afe9b24f2fdff7a0434eb67 upstream.

This patches fixes the LBR kernel crashes on Intel Atom.

The kernel was assuming that if the CPU supports 64-bit format
LBR, then it has an LBR_SELECT MSR. Atom uses 64-bit LBR format
but does not have LBR_SELECT. That was causing NULL pointer
dereferences in a couple of places.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
Fixes: 96f3eda67fcf ("perf/x86/intel: Fix static checker warning in lbr enable")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449182000-31524-2-git-send-email-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Denys Zagorui &lt;dzagorui@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: async_pf: make rcu irq exit if not triggered from idle task</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:08:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-01T12:20:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bbccdb1e442be9b705564479d8b0c55b9b202dad'/>
<id>bbccdb1e442be9b705564479d8b0c55b9b202dad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mce/AMD: Make the init code more robust</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-26T21:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b99f1a84d5cc3215668e524ab2016d49d78772c'/>
<id>6b99f1a84d5cc3215668e524ab2016d49d78772c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ioapic: Pass the correct data to unmask_ioapic_irq()</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seunghun Han</name>
<email>kkamagui@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T09:20:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=71de40fd4f6482da11fde38c9d3e6d5d2bc91fa0'/>
<id>71de40fd4f6482da11fde38c9d3e6d5d2bc91fa0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e708e35ba6d89ff785b225cd07dcccab04fa954a upstream.

One of the rarely executed code pathes in check_timer() calls
unmask_ioapic_irq() passing irq_get_chip_data(0) as argument.

That's wrong as unmask_ioapic_irq() expects a pointer to the irq data of
interrupt 0. irq_get_chip_data(0) returns NULL, so the following
dereference in unmask_ioapic_irq() causes a kernel panic.

The issue went unnoticed in the first place because irq_get_chip_data()
returns a void pointer so the compiler cannot do a type check on the
argument. The code path was added for machines with broken configuration,
but it seems that those machines are either not running current kernels or
simply do not longer exist.

Hand in irq_get_irq_data(0) as argument which provides the correct data.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]

Fixes: 4467715a44cc ("x86/irq: Move irq_cfg.irq_2_pin into io_apic.c")
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500369644-45767-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e708e35ba6d89ff785b225cd07dcccab04fa954a upstream.

One of the rarely executed code pathes in check_timer() calls
unmask_ioapic_irq() passing irq_get_chip_data(0) as argument.

That's wrong as unmask_ioapic_irq() expects a pointer to the irq data of
interrupt 0. irq_get_chip_data(0) returns NULL, so the following
dereference in unmask_ioapic_irq() causes a kernel panic.

The issue went unnoticed in the first place because irq_get_chip_data()
returns a void pointer so the compiler cannot do a type check on the
argument. The code path was added for machines with broken configuration,
but it seems that those machines are either not running current kernels or
simply do not longer exist.

Hand in irq_get_irq_data(0) as argument which provides the correct data.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]

Fixes: 4467715a44cc ("x86/irq: Move irq_cfg.irq_2_pin into io_apic.c")
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500369644-45767-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/acpi: Prevent out of bound access caused by broken ACPI tables</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seunghun Han</name>
<email>kkamagui@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T11:03:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fa7ddee3485f17c28fe4079954c5716036de6152'/>
<id>fa7ddee3485f17c28fe4079954c5716036de6152</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/pat: Don't report PAT on CPUs that don't support it</title>
<updated>2017-07-15T09:57:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-04T23:04:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49'/>
<id>646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:13:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741'/>
<id>4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: async_pf: fix rcu_irq_enter() with irqs enabled</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T11:16:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-26T14:56:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a8bbdf1921fde7643eb22b508acc2fa0239021bf'/>
<id>a8bbdf1921fde7643eb22b508acc2fa0239021bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Fix load damaged SSEx MXCSR register</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:30:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-11T09:58:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e9c9e7588ef5a7dac583eb54dccef4f801b68adf'/>
<id>e9c9e7588ef5a7dac583eb54dccef4f801b68adf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a575813bfe4bc15aba511a5e91e61d242bff8b9d upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
   IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
   PGD 348e12067
   P4D 348e12067
   PUD 348e14067
   PMD 3cbd84067
   PTE 80000003f7e87161

   Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
   CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G           OE   4.11.0+ #8
   task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
   RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
   RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
    do_trap+0x156/0x170
    do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
    ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
    ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
    do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
    invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
   RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
    ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write
a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be
generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values
and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register
values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This
patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
random values and bails out immediately.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a575813bfe4bc15aba511a5e91e61d242bff8b9d upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
   IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
   PGD 348e12067
   P4D 348e12067
   PUD 348e14067
   PMD 3cbd84067
   PTE 80000003f7e87161

   Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
   CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G           OE   4.11.0+ #8
   task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
   RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
   RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
    do_trap+0x156/0x170
    do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
    ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
    ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
    do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
    invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
   RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
    ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write
a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be
generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values
and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register
values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This
patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
random values and bails out immediately.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes/x86: Fix kernel panic when certain exception-handling addresses are probed</title>
<updated>2017-05-14T11:32:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-28T16:23:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d2e1efbd6786ceb603966a55ff68222622db0343'/>
<id>d2e1efbd6786ceb603966a55ff68222622db0343</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 75013fb16f8484898eaa8d0b08fed942d790f029 upstream.

Fix to the exception table entry check by using probed address
instead of the address of copied instruction.

This bug may cause unexpected kernel panic if user probe an address
where an exception can happen which should be fixup by __ex_table
(e.g. copy_from_user.)

Unless user puts a kprobe on such address, this doesn't
cause any problem.

This bug has been introduced years ago, by commit:

  464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently").

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148829899399.28855.12581062400757221722.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 75013fb16f8484898eaa8d0b08fed942d790f029 upstream.

Fix to the exception table entry check by using probed address
instead of the address of copied instruction.

This bug may cause unexpected kernel panic if user probe an address
where an exception can happen which should be fixup by __ex_table
(e.g. copy_from_user.)

Unless user puts a kprobe on such address, this doesn't
cause any problem.

This bug has been introduced years ago, by commit:

  464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently").

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 464846888d9a ("x86/kprobes: Fix a bug which can modify kernel code permanently")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148829899399.28855.12581062400757221722.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
