<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kernel, branch v4.4.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T08:40:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-18T11:12:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=da0933ceec963ee0e9d477535901cd9a696362b1'/>
<id>da0933ceec963ee0e9d477535901cd9a696362b1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 723f2828a98c8ca19842042f418fb30dd8cfc0f7 upstream.

Blacklist Broadwell X model 79 for late loading due to an erratum.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171018111225.25635-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 723f2828a98c8ca19842042f418fb30dd8cfc0f7 upstream.

Blacklist Broadwell X model 79 for late loading due to an erratum.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171018111225.25635-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-02T18:04:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d25fea066a8ed4457a9f8b23eb78204b9b6896cf'/>
<id>d25fea066a8ed4457a9f8b23eb78204b9b6896cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 814fb7bb7db5433757d76f4c4502c96fc53b0b5e upstream.

[Please apply to 4.4-stable.  Note: the backport includes the
fpstate_init() call in xstateregs_set(), since fix is useless without
it.  It was added by commit 91c3dba7dbc1 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PTRACE
frames for XSAVES"), but it doesn't make sense to backport that whole
commit.]

On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers.  ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.

However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value.  However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault.  This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit.  In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.

Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.

The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.

Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything.  But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().

This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():

    WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
    CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
    RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
    RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
    RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
    RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
    RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
    FS:  00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
    Call Trace:
    Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff &lt;0f&gt; ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f

Here is a C reproducer.  The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output.  However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly.  With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.

    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include &lt;stdbool.h&gt;
    #include &lt;inttypes.h&gt;
    #include &lt;linux/elf.h&gt;
    #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/ptrace.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/uio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/wait.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
        int pid = fork();
        uint64_t xstate[512];
        struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };

        if (pid == 0) {
            bool tracee = true;
            for (int i = 0; i &lt; sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) &amp;&amp; tracee; i++)
                tracee = (fork() != 0);
            uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
            asm volatile("   movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
                         "   mov %0, %%rbx\n"
                         "1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
                         "   mov %0, %%rax\n"
                         "   cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
                         "   je 1b\n"
                         : "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
            printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted!  tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
                   tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
        } else {
            usleep(100000);
            ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
            wait(NULL);
            ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &amp;iov);
            xstate[65] = -1;
            ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &amp;iov);
            ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
            wait(NULL);
        }
        return 1;
    }

Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Hao &lt;haokexin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu &lt;yu-cheng.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 814fb7bb7db5433757d76f4c4502c96fc53b0b5e upstream.

[Please apply to 4.4-stable.  Note: the backport includes the
fpstate_init() call in xstateregs_set(), since fix is useless without
it.  It was added by commit 91c3dba7dbc1 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PTRACE
frames for XSAVES"), but it doesn't make sense to backport that whole
commit.]

On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers.  ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.

However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value.  However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault.  This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit.  In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.

Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.

The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.

Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything.  But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().

This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():

    WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
    CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
    RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
    RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
    RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
    RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
    RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
    FS:  00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
    Call Trace:
    Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff &lt;0f&gt; ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f

Here is a C reproducer.  The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output.  However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly.  With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.

    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include &lt;stdbool.h&gt;
    #include &lt;inttypes.h&gt;
    #include &lt;linux/elf.h&gt;
    #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/ptrace.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/uio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/wait.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
        int pid = fork();
        uint64_t xstate[512];
        struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };

        if (pid == 0) {
            bool tracee = true;
            for (int i = 0; i &lt; sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) &amp;&amp; tracee; i++)
                tracee = (fork() != 0);
            uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
            asm volatile("   movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
                         "   mov %0, %%rbx\n"
                         "1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
                         "   mov %0, %%rax\n"
                         "   cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
                         "   je 1b\n"
                         : "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
            printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted!  tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
                   tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
        } else {
            usleep(100000);
            ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
            wait(NULL);
            ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &amp;iov);
            xstate[65] = -1;
            ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &amp;iov);
            ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
            wait(NULL);
        }
        return 1;
    }

Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers3@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Hao &lt;haokexin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu &lt;yu-cheng.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix LBR related crashes on Intel Atom</title>
<updated>2017-08-25T00:02:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephane Eranian</name>
<email>eranian@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-03T22:33:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ce1b98a30571b1022d6ce86d9876a7a7dbf9aed5'/>
<id>ce1b98a30571b1022d6ce86d9876a7a7dbf9aed5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fc2e83077b05a061afe9b24f2fdff7a0434eb67 upstream.

This patches fixes the LBR kernel crashes on Intel Atom.

The kernel was assuming that if the CPU supports 64-bit format
LBR, then it has an LBR_SELECT MSR. Atom uses 64-bit LBR format
but does not have LBR_SELECT. That was causing NULL pointer
dereferences in a couple of places.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
Fixes: 96f3eda67fcf ("perf/x86/intel: Fix static checker warning in lbr enable")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449182000-31524-2-git-send-email-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Denys Zagorui &lt;dzagorui@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fc2e83077b05a061afe9b24f2fdff7a0434eb67 upstream.

This patches fixes the LBR kernel crashes on Intel Atom.

The kernel was assuming that if the CPU supports 64-bit format
LBR, then it has an LBR_SELECT MSR. Atom uses 64-bit LBR format
but does not have LBR_SELECT. That was causing NULL pointer
dereferences in a couple of places.

Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
Fixes: 96f3eda67fcf ("perf/x86/intel: Fix static checker warning in lbr enable")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449182000-31524-2-git-send-email-eranian@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Denys Zagorui &lt;dzagorui@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: async_pf: make rcu irq exit if not triggered from idle task</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:08:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-01T12:20:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bbccdb1e442be9b705564479d8b0c55b9b202dad'/>
<id>bbccdb1e442be9b705564479d8b0c55b9b202dad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 337c017ccdf2653d0040099433fc1a2b1beb5926 upstream.

 WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1242 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:323 rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 CPU: 5 PID: 1242 Comm: unity-settings- Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #1
 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x207/0x6b0
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0xda/0xba0
  ? kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1b2/0x270
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30
 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup_rcu+0x90/0x1e0

I encounter this when trying to stress the async page fault in L1 guest w/
L2 guests running.

Commit 9b132fbe5419 (Add rcu user eqs exception hooks for async page
fault) adds rcu_irq_enter/exit() to kvm_async_pf_task_wait() to exit cpu
idle eqs when needed, to protect the code that needs use rcu.  However,
we need to call the pair even if the function calls schedule(), as seen
from the above backtrace.

This patch fixes it by informing the RCU subsystem exit/enter the irq
towards/away from idle for both n.halted and !n.halted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mce/AMD: Make the init code more robust</title>
<updated>2017-08-07T02:19:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-26T21:58:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b99f1a84d5cc3215668e524ab2016d49d78772c'/>
<id>6b99f1a84d5cc3215668e524ab2016d49d78772c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0dad3a3014a0b9e72521ff44f17e0054f43dcdea ]

If mce_device_init() fails then the mce device pointer is NULL and the
AMD mce code happily dereferences it.

Add a sanity check.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf &lt;markus@trippelsdorf.de&gt;
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ioapic: Pass the correct data to unmask_ioapic_irq()</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seunghun Han</name>
<email>kkamagui@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T09:20:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=71de40fd4f6482da11fde38c9d3e6d5d2bc91fa0'/>
<id>71de40fd4f6482da11fde38c9d3e6d5d2bc91fa0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e708e35ba6d89ff785b225cd07dcccab04fa954a upstream.

One of the rarely executed code pathes in check_timer() calls
unmask_ioapic_irq() passing irq_get_chip_data(0) as argument.

That's wrong as unmask_ioapic_irq() expects a pointer to the irq data of
interrupt 0. irq_get_chip_data(0) returns NULL, so the following
dereference in unmask_ioapic_irq() causes a kernel panic.

The issue went unnoticed in the first place because irq_get_chip_data()
returns a void pointer so the compiler cannot do a type check on the
argument. The code path was added for machines with broken configuration,
but it seems that those machines are either not running current kernels or
simply do not longer exist.

Hand in irq_get_irq_data(0) as argument which provides the correct data.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]

Fixes: 4467715a44cc ("x86/irq: Move irq_cfg.irq_2_pin into io_apic.c")
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500369644-45767-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e708e35ba6d89ff785b225cd07dcccab04fa954a upstream.

One of the rarely executed code pathes in check_timer() calls
unmask_ioapic_irq() passing irq_get_chip_data(0) as argument.

That's wrong as unmask_ioapic_irq() expects a pointer to the irq data of
interrupt 0. irq_get_chip_data(0) returns NULL, so the following
dereference in unmask_ioapic_irq() causes a kernel panic.

The issue went unnoticed in the first place because irq_get_chip_data()
returns a void pointer so the compiler cannot do a type check on the
argument. The code path was added for machines with broken configuration,
but it seems that those machines are either not running current kernels or
simply do not longer exist.

Hand in irq_get_irq_data(0) as argument which provides the correct data.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]

Fixes: 4467715a44cc ("x86/irq: Move irq_cfg.irq_2_pin into io_apic.c")
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500369644-45767-1-git-send-email-kkamagui@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/acpi: Prevent out of bound access caused by broken ACPI tables</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seunghun Han</name>
<email>kkamagui@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T11:03:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fa7ddee3485f17c28fe4079954c5716036de6152'/>
<id>fa7ddee3485f17c28fe4079954c5716036de6152</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dad5ab0db8deac535d03e3fe3d8f2892173fa6a4 upstream.

The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han &lt;kkamagui@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@rjwysocki.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/pat: Don't report PAT on CPUs that don't support it</title>
<updated>2017-07-15T09:57:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-04T23:04:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49'/>
<id>646b65808b0da1fb2f72daf4dabdd9bc8e398f49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 99c13b8c8896d7bcb92753bf0c63a8de4326e78d upstream.

The pat_enabled() logic is broken on CPUs which do not support PAT and
where the initialization code fails to call pat_init(). Due to that the
enabled flag stays true and pat_enabled() returns true wrongfully.

As a consequence the mappings, e.g. for Xorg, are set up with the wrong
caching mode and the required MTRR setups are omitted.

To cure this the following changes are required:

  1) Make pat_enabled() return true only if PAT initialization was
     invoked and successful.

  2) Invoke init_cache_modes() unconditionally in setup_arch() and
     remove the extra callsites in pat_disable() and the pat disabled
     code path in pat_init().

Also rename __pat_enabled to pat_disabled to reflect the real purpose of
this variable.

Fixes: 9cd25aac1f44 ("x86/mm/pat: Emulate PAT when it is disabled")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Bernhard Held &lt;berny156@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LRH.2.02.1707041749300.3456@file01.intranet.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas</title>
<updated>2017-06-26T05:13:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-19T11:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741'/>
<id>4b359430674caa2c98d0049a6941f157d2a33741</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt; # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context]
[wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide]
[wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: async_pf: fix rcu_irq_enter() with irqs enabled</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T11:16:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-26T14:56:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a8bbdf1921fde7643eb22b508acc2fa0239021bf'/>
<id>a8bbdf1921fde7643eb22b508acc2fa0239021bf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
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commit bbaf0e2b1c1b4f88abd6ef49576f0efb1734eae5 upstream.

native_safe_halt enables interrupts, and you just shouldn't
call rcu_irq_enter() with interrupts enabled.  Reorder the
call with the following local_irq_disable() to respect the
invariant.

Reported-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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