<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/kvm, branch v3.10.60</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nadav Amit</name>
<email>namit@cs.technion.ac.il</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-18T19:39:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0efb0baaa7d349bce883bbcaed45319baa33a309'/>
<id>0efb0baaa7d349bce883bbcaed45319baa33a309</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 234f3ce485d54017f15cf5e0699cff4100121601 upstream.

Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do.  During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur.  The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.

This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.

This fixes CVE-2014-3647.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 234f3ce485d54017f15cf5e0699cff4100121601 upstream.

Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do.  During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur.  The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.

This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.

This fixes CVE-2014-3647.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Fix wrong masking on relative jump/call</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nadav Amit</name>
<email>namit@cs.technion.ac.il</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-18T19:39:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d092975d028dcb428f926511e0129705bf714d5c'/>
<id>d092975d028dcb428f926511e0129705bf714d5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05c83ec9b73c8124555b706f6af777b10adf0862 upstream.

Relative jumps and calls do the masking according to the operand size, and not
according to the address size as the KVM emulator does today.

This patch fixes KVM behavior.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 05c83ec9b73c8124555b706f6af777b10adf0862 upstream.

Relative jumps and calls do the masking according to the operand size, and not
according to the address size as the KVM emulator does today.

This patch fixes KVM behavior.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86: don't kill guest on unknown exit reason</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael S. Tsirkin</name>
<email>mst@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-18T13:21:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e56b9c47d05e4d18e9ddc0cdf8b2716f4de17a25'/>
<id>e56b9c47d05e4d18e9ddc0cdf8b2716f4de17a25</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bc19dc3754fc066c43799659f0d848631c44cfe upstream.

KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN is a kvm bug, we don't really know whether it was
triggered by a priveledged application.  Let's not kill the guest: WARN
and inject #UD instead.

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2bc19dc3754fc066c43799659f0d848631c44cfe upstream.

KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN is a kvm bug, we don't really know whether it was
triggered by a priveledged application.  Let's not kill the guest: WARN
and inject #UD instead.

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nadav Amit</name>
<email>namit@cs.technion.ac.il</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-16T00:24:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ea30614738b5faf98a1a695f78ce11447d4eb072'/>
<id>ea30614738b5faf98a1a695f78ce11447d4eb072</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 upstream.

Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).

Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD.  To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.

Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:

According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."

According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers.  If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."

This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 upstream.

Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).

Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD.  To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.

Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:

According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."

According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers.  If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."

This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@cs.technion.ac.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Honig</name>
<email>ahonig@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-27T21:42:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ca09be78c8d5d2a4fe38ec97a61b3c7fc3463794'/>
<id>ca09be78c8d5d2a4fe38ec97a61b3c7fc3463794</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2febc839133280d5a5e8e1179c94ea674489dae2 upstream.

There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM.  In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization.  If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.

This fixes CVE-2014-3611.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2febc839133280d5a5e8e1179c94ea674489dae2 upstream.

There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM.  In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization.  If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.

This fixes CVE-2014-3611.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Prevent host from panicking on shared MSR writes.</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Honig</name>
<email>ahonig@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-27T18:16:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1bea37d63c16c5988d83ac2431c38e0f0a55cf37'/>
<id>1bea37d63c16c5988d83ac2431c38e0f0a55cf37</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b3c3104c3f4f706e99365c3e0d2aa61b95f969f upstream.

The previous patch blocked invalid writes directly when the MSR
is written.  As a precaution, prevent future similar mistakes by
gracefulling handle GPs caused by writes to shared MSRs.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
[Remove parts obsoleted by Nadav's patch. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b3c3104c3f4f706e99365c3e0d2aa61b95f969f upstream.

The previous patch blocked invalid writes directly when the MSR
is written.  As a precaution, prevent future similar mistakes by
gracefulling handle GPs caused by writes to shared MSRs.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
[Remove parts obsoleted by Nadav's patch. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, flags: Rename X86_EFLAGS_BIT1 to X86_EFLAGS_FIXED</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>H. Peter Anvin</name>
<email>hpa@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-27T23:10:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f03d6fef32533a2d62d65656afba90ccd3a57d6'/>
<id>9f03d6fef32533a2d62d65656afba90ccd3a57d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1adfa76a95fe4444124a502f7cc858a39d5b8e01 upstream.

Bit 1 in the x86 EFLAGS is always set.  Name the macro something that
actually tries to explain what it is all about, rather than being a
tautology.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-f10rx5vjjm6tfnt8o1wseb3v@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1adfa76a95fe4444124a502f7cc858a39d5b8e01 upstream.

Bit 1 in the x86 EFLAGS is always set.  Name the macro something that
actually tries to explain what it is all about, rather than being a
tautology.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-f10rx5vjjm6tfnt8o1wseb3v@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86: fix stale mmio cache bug</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:35:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Matlack</name>
<email>dmatlack@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-18T22:46:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=973af5283c036d199360a4f82ce442815bf5378b'/>
<id>973af5283c036d199360a4f82ce442815bf5378b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56f17dd3fbc44adcdbc3340fe3988ddb833a47a7 upstream.

The following events can lead to an incorrect KVM_EXIT_MMIO bubbling
up to userspace:

(1) Guest accesses gpa X without a memory slot. The gfn is cached in
struct kvm_vcpu_arch (mmio_gfn). On Intel EPT-enabled hosts, KVM sets
the SPTE write-execute-noread so that future accesses cause
EPT_MISCONFIGs.

(2) Host userspace creates a memory slot via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION
covering the page just accessed.

(3) Guest attempts to read or write to gpa X again. On Intel, this
generates an EPT_MISCONFIG. The memory slot generation number that
was incremented in (2) would normally take care of this but we fast
path mmio faults through quickly_check_mmio_pf(), which only checks
the per-vcpu mmio cache. Since we hit the cache, KVM passes a
KVM_EXIT_MMIO up to userspace.

This patch fixes the issue by using the memslot generation number
to validate the mmio cache.

Signed-off-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
[xiaoguangrong: adjust the code to make it simpler for stable-tree fix.]
Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 56f17dd3fbc44adcdbc3340fe3988ddb833a47a7 upstream.

The following events can lead to an incorrect KVM_EXIT_MMIO bubbling
up to userspace:

(1) Guest accesses gpa X without a memory slot. The gfn is cached in
struct kvm_vcpu_arch (mmio_gfn). On Intel EPT-enabled hosts, KVM sets
the SPTE write-execute-noread so that future accesses cause
EPT_MISCONFIGs.

(2) Host userspace creates a memory slot via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION
covering the page just accessed.

(3) Guest attempts to read or write to gpa X again. On Intel, this
generates an EPT_MISCONFIG. The memory slot generation number that
was incremented in (2) would normally take care of this but we fast
path mmio faults through quickly_check_mmio_pf(), which only checks
the per-vcpu mmio cache. Since we hit the cache, KVM passes a
KVM_EXIT_MMIO up to userspace.

This patch fixes the issue by using the memslot generation number
to validate the mmio cache.

Signed-off-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
[xiaoguangrong: adjust the code to make it simpler for stable-tree fix.]
Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong &lt;xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Matlack &lt;dmatlack@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: handle idiv overflow at kvm_write_tsc</title>
<updated>2014-10-05T21:54:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Tosatti</name>
<email>mtosatti@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-12T02:31:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bdbdc4076c10ae9d3a83b37c79fc74827e776bf9'/>
<id>bdbdc4076c10ae9d3a83b37c79fc74827e776bf9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8915aa27d5efbb9185357175b0acf884325565f9 upstream.

Its possible that idivl overflows (due to large delta stored in usdiff,
valid scenario).

Create an exception handler to catch the overflow exception (division by zero
is protected by vcpu-&gt;arch.virtual_tsc_khz check), and interpret it accordingly
(delta is larger than USEC_PER_SEC).

Fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=969644

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn &lt;hahn@univention.de&gt;
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn &lt;hahn@univention.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8915aa27d5efbb9185357175b0acf884325565f9 upstream.

Its possible that idivl overflows (due to large delta stored in usdiff,
valid scenario).

Create an exception handler to catch the overflow exception (division by zero
is protected by vcpu-&gt;arch.virtual_tsc_khz check), and interpret it accordingly
(delta is larger than USEC_PER_SEC).

Fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=969644

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov &lt;gleb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn &lt;hahn@univention.de&gt;
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn &lt;hahn@univention.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: nVMX: fix "acknowledge interrupt on exit" when APICv is in use</title>
<updated>2014-09-05T23:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wanpeng Li</name>
<email>wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-05T04:42:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d175e30c03decba32c5373379f5bab065267a074'/>
<id>d175e30c03decba32c5373379f5bab065267a074</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56cc2406d68c0f09505c389e276f27a99f495cbd upstream.

After commit 77b0f5d (KVM: nVMX: Ack and write vector info to intr_info
if L1 asks us to), "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior can be
emulated. To do so, KVM will ask the APIC for the interrupt vector if
during a nested vmexit if VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT is set.  With APICv,
kvm_get_apic_interrupt would return -1 and give the following WARNING:

Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81493563&gt;] dump_stack+0x49/0x5e
 [&lt;ffffffff8103f0eb&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0x7c/0x96
 [&lt;ffffffffa059709a&gt;] ? nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffff8103f11a&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x17
 [&lt;ffffffffa059709a&gt;] nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa0594295&gt;] ? nested_vmx_exit_handled+0x6a/0x39e [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa0537931&gt;] ? kvm_apic_has_interrupt+0x80/0xd5 [kvm]
 [&lt;ffffffffa05972ec&gt;] vmx_check_nested_events+0xc3/0xd3 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa051ebe9&gt;] inject_pending_event+0xd0/0x16e [kvm]
 [&lt;ffffffffa051efa0&gt;] vcpu_enter_guest+0x319/0x704 [kvm]

To fix this, we cannot rely on the processor's virtual interrupt delivery,
because "acknowledge interrupt on exit" must only update the virtual
ISR/PPR/IRR registers (and SVI, which is just a cache of the virtual ISR)
but it should not deliver the interrupt through the IDT.  Thus, KVM has
to deliver the interrupt "by hand", similar to the treatment of EOI in
commit fc57ac2c9ca8 (KVM: lapic: sync highest ISR to hardware apic on
EOI, 2014-05-14).

The patch modifies kvm_cpu_get_interrupt to always acknowledge an
interrupt; there are only two callers, and the other is not affected
because it is never reached with kvm_apic_vid_enabled() == true.  Then it
modifies apic_set_isr and apic_clear_irr to update SVI and RVI in addition
to the registers.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: "Zhang, Yang Z" &lt;yang.z.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Liu, RongrongX &lt;rongrongx.liu@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Felipe Reyes &lt;freyes@suse.com&gt;
Fixes: 77b0f5d67ff2781f36831cba79674c3e97bd7acf
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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<pre>
commit 56cc2406d68c0f09505c389e276f27a99f495cbd upstream.

After commit 77b0f5d (KVM: nVMX: Ack and write vector info to intr_info
if L1 asks us to), "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior can be
emulated. To do so, KVM will ask the APIC for the interrupt vector if
during a nested vmexit if VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT is set.  With APICv,
kvm_get_apic_interrupt would return -1 and give the following WARNING:

Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81493563&gt;] dump_stack+0x49/0x5e
 [&lt;ffffffff8103f0eb&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0x7c/0x96
 [&lt;ffffffffa059709a&gt;] ? nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffff8103f11a&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x17
 [&lt;ffffffffa059709a&gt;] nested_vmx_vmexit+0xa4/0x233 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa0594295&gt;] ? nested_vmx_exit_handled+0x6a/0x39e [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa0537931&gt;] ? kvm_apic_has_interrupt+0x80/0xd5 [kvm]
 [&lt;ffffffffa05972ec&gt;] vmx_check_nested_events+0xc3/0xd3 [kvm_intel]
 [&lt;ffffffffa051ebe9&gt;] inject_pending_event+0xd0/0x16e [kvm]
 [&lt;ffffffffa051efa0&gt;] vcpu_enter_guest+0x319/0x704 [kvm]

To fix this, we cannot rely on the processor's virtual interrupt delivery,
because "acknowledge interrupt on exit" must only update the virtual
ISR/PPR/IRR registers (and SVI, which is just a cache of the virtual ISR)
but it should not deliver the interrupt through the IDT.  Thus, KVM has
to deliver the interrupt "by hand", similar to the treatment of EOI in
commit fc57ac2c9ca8 (KVM: lapic: sync highest ISR to hardware apic on
EOI, 2014-05-14).

The patch modifies kvm_cpu_get_interrupt to always acknowledge an
interrupt; there are only two callers, and the other is not affected
because it is never reached with kvm_apic_vid_enabled() == true.  Then it
modifies apic_set_isr and apic_clear_irr to update SVI and RVI in addition
to the registers.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: "Zhang, Yang Z" &lt;yang.z.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Liu, RongrongX &lt;rongrongx.liu@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Felipe Reyes &lt;freyes@suse.com&gt;
Fixes: 77b0f5d67ff2781f36831cba79674c3e97bd7acf
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li &lt;wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
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