linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/syscalls, branch v4.1.5

Merge tag 'stable/for-linus-4.1-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

2015-04-16T19:01:03+00:00

Pull xen features and fixes from David Vrabel:

 - use a single source list of hypercalls, generating other tables etc.
   at build time.

 - add a "Xen PV" APIC driver to support >255 VCPUs in PV guests.

 - significant performance improve to guest save/restore/migration.

 - scsiback/front save/restore support.

 - infrastructure for multi-page xenbus rings.

 - misc fixes.

* tag 'stable/for-linus-4.1-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/pci: Try harder to get PXM information for Xen
  xenbus_client: Extend interface to support multi-page ring
  xen-pciback: also support disabling of bus-mastering and memory-write-invalidate
  xen: support suspend/resume in pvscsi frontend
  xen: scsiback: add LUN of restored domain
  xen-scsiback: define a pr_fmt macro with xen-pvscsi
  xen/mce: fix up xen_late_init_mcelog() error handling
  xen/privcmd: improve performance of MMAPBATCH_V2
  xen: unify foreign GFN map/unmap for auto-xlated physmap guests
  x86/xen/apic: WARN with details.
  x86/xen: Provide a "Xen PV" APIC driver to support >255 VCPUs
  xen/pciback: Don't print scary messages when unsupported by hypervisor.
  xen: use generated hypercall symbols in arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
  xen: use generated hypervisor symbols in arch/x86/xen/trace.c
  xen: synchronize include/xen/interface/xen.h with xen
  xen: build infrastructure for generating hypercall depending symbols
  xen: balloon: Use static attribute groups for sysfs entries
  xen: pcpu: Use static attribute groups for sysfs entry

xen: build infrastructure for generating hypercall depending symbols

2015-03-16T14:49:13+00:00

Today there are several places in the kernel which build tables
containing one entry for each possible Xen hypercall. Create an
infrastructure to be able to generate these tables at build time.

Based-on-patch-by: Jan Beulich 
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel 
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel

x86/asm/entry/64: Remove stub_iopl

2015-03-10T12:56:10+00:00

stub_iopl is no longer needed: pt_regs->flags needs no fixing up
after previous change. Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Will Drewry 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425984307-2143-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/compat: Remove sys32_vm86_warning

2015-03-04T05:16:21+00:00

The check against lastcomm is racy, and the message it produces
isn't necessary.  vm86 support can be disabled on a 32-bit
kernel also, and doesn't have this message.  Switch to
sys_ni_syscall instead.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425439896-8322-4-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86: hook up execveat system call

2014-12-13T20:42:51+00:00

Hook up x86-64, i386 and x32 ABIs.

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale 
Cc: Meredydd Luff 
Cc: Shuah Khan 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Rich Felker 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

bpf: enable bpf syscall on x64 and i386

2014-09-26T19:05:14+00:00

done as separate commit to ease conflict resolution

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

kexec: new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration

2014-08-08T22:57:32+00:00

This is the new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration/interface.  I have
reserved the syscall number only for x86_64 so far.  Other architectures
(including i386) can reserve syscall number when they enable the support
for this new syscall.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Yinghai Lu 
Cc: Eric Biederman 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Matthew Garrett 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: WANG Chao 
Cc: Baoquan He 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shm: add memfd_create() syscall

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap().  It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points.  Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.

memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode.  Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file.  If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.  Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).

Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit.  It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

2014-08-06T15:16:24+00:00

Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
  call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
  with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.

  Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
  hardware rng devices into /dev/random"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
  random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
  random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
  hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
  random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
  hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
  hwrng: create filler thread
  random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
  random: use an improved fast_mix() function
  random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
  random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
  random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
  random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock

random: introduce getrandom(2) system call

2014-08-05T20:41:22+00:00

The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers.  It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.

The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available.  Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.

The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool.  Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.

This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable.  In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not).  However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case.  And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized.  Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.

SYNOPSIS
	#include 

	int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
	The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
	with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
	space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
	cryptographic uses.  It should not be used for Monte Carlo
	simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
	probabilistic sampling.

	If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
	/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool.  The
	/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
	obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
	entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
	If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
	either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
	the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.

	If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
	will be used.  Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
	/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
	initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
	errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).

	The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
	the following function:

            int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
            {
                    int     ret;

                    if (buflen > 256)
                            goto failure;
                    ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
                    if (ret < 0)
                            return ret;
                    if (ret == buflen)
                            return 0;
            failure:
                    errno = EIO;
                    return -1;
            }

RETURN VALUE
       On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
       returned.  This may not be all the bytes requested by the
       caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
       /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
       signal.

       On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
	EINVAL		An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)

	EFAULT		buf is outside the accessible address space.

	EAGAIN		The requested entropy was not available, and
			getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
			GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.

	EINTR		While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
			interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
			of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
			are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
			in the signal(7) man page.

NOTES
	For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
	return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
	entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
	the bytes that have been requested.  This is the recommended
	way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
	with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.

	However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
	block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
	environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
	will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
	who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime.  Since it may
	block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply.  The
	user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
	so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
	would be unfriendly.

	For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
	the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
	bytes than requested was returned.  In the case of
	!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
	happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
	should be careful) should check for this anyway!

	Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
	perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
	GRND_RANDOM.  The cryptographic algorithms used for
	/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
	sufficient for all purposes.  The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
	is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
	deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o 
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown