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<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/virt: Move SEV-specific parsing into arch/x86/virt/svm</title>
<updated>2024-10-15T17:54:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavan Kumar Paluri</name>
<email>papaluri@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-14T13:09:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4ae47fa7e8f95be17d4ff9c317a1193bbb4a3998'/>
<id>4ae47fa7e8f95be17d4ff9c317a1193bbb4a3998</id>
<content type='text'>
Move SEV-specific kernel command line option parsing support from
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c to arch/x86/virt/svm/cmdline.c so that both
host and guest related SEV command line options can be supported.

No functional changes intended.

Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri &lt;papaluri@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014130948.1476946-2-papaluri@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move SEV-specific kernel command line option parsing support from
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c to arch/x86/virt/svm/cmdline.c so that both
host and guest related SEV command line options can be supported.

No functional changes intended.

Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri &lt;papaluri@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241014130948.1476946-2-papaluri@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host initialization support</title>
<updated>2024-01-29T16:20:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brijesh Singh</name>
<email>brijesh.singh@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-26T04:11:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=216d106c7ff7b3dcabacf2b5dc6c9c40eba7495c'/>
<id>216d106c7ff7b3dcabacf2b5dc6c9c40eba7495c</id>
<content type='text'>
The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The APM Volume 2 section
on Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) details a number of steps needed to
detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host:

 - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
 - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
   registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
   restrictions
 - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
 - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
 - Configure IOMMU

RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
processor. It is defined by the PPR document for each respective CPU
family. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible
with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined
behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will
handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader
compatibility.

SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag which may be
enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-5-michael.roth@amd.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The APM Volume 2 section
on Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) details a number of steps needed to
detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host:

 - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
 - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
   registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
   restrictions
 - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
 - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
 - Configure IOMMU

RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
processor. It is defined by the PPR document for each respective CPU
family. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible
with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined
behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will
handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader
compatibility.

SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag which may be
enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra &lt;ashish.kalra@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth &lt;michael.roth@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-5-michael.roth@amd.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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