<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch/x86, branch v3.4.84</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KVM: SVM: fix cr8 intercept window</title>
<updated>2014-03-24T04:37:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Radim Krčmář</name>
<email>rkrcmar@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-11T18:11:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=18bd55f61fa9f46082820741d753b3b919244d8a'/>
<id>18bd55f61fa9f46082820741d753b3b919244d8a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 596f3142d2b7be307a1652d59e7b93adab918437 upstream.

We always disable cr8 intercept in its handler, but only re-enable it
if handling KVM_REQ_EVENT, so there can be a window where we do not
intercept cr8 writes, which allows an interrupt to disrupt a higher
priority task.

Fix this by disabling intercepts in the same function that re-enables
them when needed. This fixes BSOD in Windows 2008.

Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 596f3142d2b7be307a1652d59e7b93adab918437 upstream.

We always disable cr8 intercept in its handler, but only re-enable it
if handling KVM_REQ_EVENT, so there can be a window where we do not
intercept cr8 writes, which allows an interrupt to disrupt a higher
priority task.

Fix this by disabling intercepts in the same function that re-enables
them when needed. This fixes BSOD in Windows 2008.

Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Tosatti &lt;mtosatti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/amd/numa: Fix northbridge quirk to assign correct NUMA node</title>
<updated>2014-03-24T04:37:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel J Blueman</name>
<email>daniel@numascale.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-13T11:43:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bb7d79fc8250eaa01ac6f82f9001ffcec0e7ca36'/>
<id>bb7d79fc8250eaa01ac6f82f9001ffcec0e7ca36</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 847d7970defb45540735b3fb4e88471c27cacd85 upstream.

For systems with multiple servers and routed fabric, all
northbridges get assigned to the first server. Fix this by also
using the node reported from the PCI bus. For single-fabric
systems, the northbriges are on PCI bus 0 by definition, which
are on NUMA node 0 by definition, so this is invarient on most
systems.

Tested on fam10h and fam15h single and multi-fabric systems and
candidate for stable.

Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman &lt;daniel@numascale.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Persvold &lt;sp@numascale.com&gt;
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1394710981-3596-1-git-send-email-daniel@numascale.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 847d7970defb45540735b3fb4e88471c27cacd85 upstream.

For systems with multiple servers and routed fabric, all
northbridges get assigned to the first server. Fix this by also
using the node reported from the PCI bus. For single-fabric
systems, the northbriges are on PCI bus 0 by definition, which
are on NUMA node 0 by definition, so this is invarient on most
systems.

Tested on fam10h and fam15h single and multi-fabric systems and
candidate for stable.

Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman &lt;daniel@numascale.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Persvold &lt;sp@numascale.com&gt;
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1394710981-3596-1-git-send-email-daniel@numascale.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/smp/spinlock: Fix leakage of the spinlock interrupt line for every CPU online/offline</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T23:10:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-16T18:08:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=63f12e8d2bea38715b30a6051325230f6ec25a3b'/>
<id>63f12e8d2bea38715b30a6051325230f6ec25a3b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66ff0fe9e7bda8aec99985b24daad03652f7304e upstream.

While we don't use the spinlock interrupt line (see for details
commit f10cd522c5fbfec9ae3cc01967868c9c2401ed23 -
xen: disable PV spinlocks on HVM) - we should still do the proper
init / deinit sequence. We did not do that correctly and for the
CPU init for PVHVM guest we would allocate an interrupt line - but
failed to deallocate the old interrupt line.

This resulted in leakage of an irq_desc but more importantly this splat
as we online an offlined CPU:

genirq: Flags mismatch irq 71. 0002cc20 (spinlock1) vs. 0002cc20 (spinlock1)
Pid: 2542, comm: init.late Not tainted 3.9.0-rc6upstream #1
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff811156de&gt;] __setup_irq+0x23e/0x4a0
 [&lt;ffffffff81194191&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x221/0x250
 [&lt;ffffffff811161bb&gt;] request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff8104c6f0&gt;] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff813a8423&gt;] bind_ipi_to_irqhandler+0xa3/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff81303758&gt;] ? kasprintf+0x38/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8104c6f0&gt;] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff810cad35&gt;] ? update_max_interval+0x15/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff816605db&gt;] xen_init_lock_cpu+0x3c/0x78
 [&lt;ffffffff81660029&gt;] xen_hvm_cpu_notify+0x29/0x33
 [&lt;ffffffff81676bdd&gt;] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff810bb2a9&gt;] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff8109402b&gt;] __cpu_notify+0x1b/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff8166834a&gt;] _cpu_up+0xa0/0x14b
 [&lt;ffffffff816684ce&gt;] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec
 [&lt;ffffffff8165f754&gt;] store_online+0x94/0xd0
 [&lt;ffffffff8141d15b&gt;] dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff81218f44&gt;] sysfs_write_file+0xf4/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff811a2864&gt;] vfs_write+0xb4/0x130
 [&lt;ffffffff811a302a&gt;] sys_write+0x5a/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff8167ada9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
cpu 1 spinlock event irq -16
smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2

And if one looks at the /proc/interrupts right after
offlining (CPU1):

  70:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock0
  71:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock1
  77:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock2

There is the oddity of the 'spinlock1' still being present.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 66ff0fe9e7bda8aec99985b24daad03652f7304e upstream.

While we don't use the spinlock interrupt line (see for details
commit f10cd522c5fbfec9ae3cc01967868c9c2401ed23 -
xen: disable PV spinlocks on HVM) - we should still do the proper
init / deinit sequence. We did not do that correctly and for the
CPU init for PVHVM guest we would allocate an interrupt line - but
failed to deallocate the old interrupt line.

This resulted in leakage of an irq_desc but more importantly this splat
as we online an offlined CPU:

genirq: Flags mismatch irq 71. 0002cc20 (spinlock1) vs. 0002cc20 (spinlock1)
Pid: 2542, comm: init.late Not tainted 3.9.0-rc6upstream #1
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff811156de&gt;] __setup_irq+0x23e/0x4a0
 [&lt;ffffffff81194191&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x221/0x250
 [&lt;ffffffff811161bb&gt;] request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff8104c6f0&gt;] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff813a8423&gt;] bind_ipi_to_irqhandler+0xa3/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff81303758&gt;] ? kasprintf+0x38/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8104c6f0&gt;] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff810cad35&gt;] ? update_max_interval+0x15/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff816605db&gt;] xen_init_lock_cpu+0x3c/0x78
 [&lt;ffffffff81660029&gt;] xen_hvm_cpu_notify+0x29/0x33
 [&lt;ffffffff81676bdd&gt;] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff810bb2a9&gt;] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff8109402b&gt;] __cpu_notify+0x1b/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff8166834a&gt;] _cpu_up+0xa0/0x14b
 [&lt;ffffffff816684ce&gt;] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec
 [&lt;ffffffff8165f754&gt;] store_online+0x94/0xd0
 [&lt;ffffffff8141d15b&gt;] dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff81218f44&gt;] sysfs_write_file+0xf4/0x170
 [&lt;ffffffff811a2864&gt;] vfs_write+0xb4/0x130
 [&lt;ffffffff811a302a&gt;] sys_write+0x5a/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff8167ada9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
cpu 1 spinlock event irq -16
smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2

And if one looks at the /proc/interrupts right after
offlining (CPU1):

  70:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock0
  71:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock1
  77:          0          0  xen-percpu-ipi       spinlock2

There is the oddity of the 'spinlock1' still being present.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/smp: Fix leakage of timer interrupt line for every CPU online/offline.</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T23:10:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-16T17:49:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=32ed904ec15d37d35afae9ce784951ec955d20a5'/>
<id>32ed904ec15d37d35afae9ce784951ec955d20a5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 888b65b4bc5e7fcbbb967023300cd5d44dba1950 upstream.

In the PVHVM path when we do CPU online/offline path we would
leak the timer%d IRQ line everytime we do a offline event. The
online path (xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents via
x86_cpuinit.setup_percpu_clockev) would allocate a new interrupt
line for the timer%d.

But we would still use the old interrupt line leading to:

kernel BUG at /home/konrad/ssd/konrad/linux/kernel/hrtimer.c:1261!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810b9e21&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff810b9e21&gt;] hrtimer_interrupt+0x261/0x270
.. snip..
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff810445ef&gt;] xen_timer_interrupt+0x2f/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81104825&gt;] ? stop_machine_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff8111434c&gt;] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff811175b9&gt;] handle_percpu_irq+0x49/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff813a74a3&gt;] __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1c3/0x2f0
 [&lt;ffffffff813a760a&gt;] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x2a/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8167c26d&gt;] xen_hvm_callback_vector+0x6d/0x80
 &lt;EOI&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff81666d01&gt;] ? start_secondary+0x193/0x1a8
 [&lt;ffffffff81666cfd&gt;] ? start_secondary+0x18f/0x1a8

There is also the oddity (timer1) in the /proc/interrupts after
offlining CPU1:

  64:       1121          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
  78:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
  84:          0       2483  xen-percpu-virq      timer2

This patch fixes it.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 888b65b4bc5e7fcbbb967023300cd5d44dba1950 upstream.

In the PVHVM path when we do CPU online/offline path we would
leak the timer%d IRQ line everytime we do a offline event. The
online path (xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents via
x86_cpuinit.setup_percpu_clockev) would allocate a new interrupt
line for the timer%d.

But we would still use the old interrupt line leading to:

kernel BUG at /home/konrad/ssd/konrad/linux/kernel/hrtimer.c:1261!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810b9e21&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff810b9e21&gt;] hrtimer_interrupt+0x261/0x270
.. snip..
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff810445ef&gt;] xen_timer_interrupt+0x2f/0x1b0
 [&lt;ffffffff81104825&gt;] ? stop_machine_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff8111434c&gt;] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff811175b9&gt;] handle_percpu_irq+0x49/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff813a74a3&gt;] __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1c3/0x2f0
 [&lt;ffffffff813a760a&gt;] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x2a/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff8167c26d&gt;] xen_hvm_callback_vector+0x6d/0x80
 &lt;EOI&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff81666d01&gt;] ? start_secondary+0x193/0x1a8
 [&lt;ffffffff81666cfd&gt;] ? start_secondary+0x18f/0x1a8

There is also the oddity (timer1) in the /proc/interrupts after
offlining CPU1:

  64:       1121          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
  78:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
  84:          0       2483  xen-percpu-virq      timer2

This patch fixes it.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/boot: Disable BIOS SMP MP table search.</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T23:10:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T12:30:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=79b6a2d6bd21bf90b38dbad0cf9210235944e8f9'/>
<id>79b6a2d6bd21bf90b38dbad0cf9210235944e8f9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bd49940a35ec7d488ae63bd625639893b3385b97 upstream.

As the initial domain we are able to search/map certain regions
of memory to harvest configuration data. For all low-level we
use ACPI tables - for interrupts we use exclusively ACPI _PRT
(so DSDT) and MADT for INT_SRC_OVR.

The SMP MP table is not used at all. As a matter of fact we do
not even support machines that only have SMP MP but no ACPI tables.

Lets follow how Moorestown does it and just disable searching
for BIOS SMP tables.

This also fixes an issue on HP Proliant BL680c G5 and DL380 G6:

9f-&gt;100 for 1:1 PTE
Freeing 9f-100 pfn range: 97 pages freed
1-1 mapping on 9f-&gt;100
.. snip..
e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
Xen: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009efff] usable
Xen: [mem 0x000000000009f400-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
Xen: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cfd1dfff] usable
.. snip..
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x00000000-0x000003ff]
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x0009fc00-0x0009ffff]
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff]
found SMP MP-table at [mem 0x000f4fa0-0x000f4faf] mapped at [ffff8800000f4fa0]
(XEN) mm.c:908:d0 Error getting mfn 100 (pfn 5555555555555555) from L1 entry 0000000000100461 for l1e_owner=0, pg_owner=0
(XEN) mm.c:4995:d0 ptwr_emulate: could not get_page_from_l1e()
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff81ac07e2&gt;] xen_set_pte_init+0x66/0x71
. snip..
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.6.0-rc6upstream-00188-gb6fb969-dirty #2 HP ProLiant BL680c G5
.. snip..
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81ad31c6&gt;] __early_ioremap+0x18a/0x248
 [&lt;ffffffff81624731&gt;] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
 [&lt;ffffffff81ad32ac&gt;] early_ioremap+0x13/0x15
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc140&gt;] get_mpc_size+0x2f/0x67
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc284&gt;] smp_scan_config+0x10c/0x136
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc2e4&gt;] default_find_smp_config+0x36/0x5a
 [&lt;ffffffff81ac3085&gt;] setup_arch+0x5b3/0xb5b
 [&lt;ffffffff81624731&gt;] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
 [&lt;ffffffff81abca7f&gt;] start_kernel+0x90/0x390
 [&lt;ffffffff81abc356&gt;] x86_64_start_reservations+0x131/0x136
 [&lt;ffffffff81abfa83&gt;] xen_start_kernel+0x65f/0x661
(XEN) Domain 0 crashed: 'noreboot' set - not rebooting.

which is that ioremap would end up mapping 0xff using _PAGE_IOMAP
(which is what early_ioremap sticks as a flag) - which meant
we would get MFN 0xFF (pte ff461, which is OK), and then it would
also map 0x100 (b/c ioremap tries to get page aligned request, and
it was trying to map 0xf4fa0 + PAGE_SIZE - so it mapped the next page)
as _PAGE_IOMAP. Since 0x100 is actually a RAM page, and the _PAGE_IOMAP
bypasses the P2M lookup we would happily set the PTE to 1000461.
Xen would deny the request since we do not have access to the
Machine Frame Number (MFN) of 0x100. The P2M[0x100] is for example
0x80140.

Fixes-Oracle-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.oracle.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=13665
Acked-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bd49940a35ec7d488ae63bd625639893b3385b97 upstream.

As the initial domain we are able to search/map certain regions
of memory to harvest configuration data. For all low-level we
use ACPI tables - for interrupts we use exclusively ACPI _PRT
(so DSDT) and MADT for INT_SRC_OVR.

The SMP MP table is not used at all. As a matter of fact we do
not even support machines that only have SMP MP but no ACPI tables.

Lets follow how Moorestown does it and just disable searching
for BIOS SMP tables.

This also fixes an issue on HP Proliant BL680c G5 and DL380 G6:

9f-&gt;100 for 1:1 PTE
Freeing 9f-100 pfn range: 97 pages freed
1-1 mapping on 9f-&gt;100
.. snip..
e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
Xen: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009efff] usable
Xen: [mem 0x000000000009f400-0x00000000000fffff] reserved
Xen: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cfd1dfff] usable
.. snip..
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x00000000-0x000003ff]
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x0009fc00-0x0009ffff]
Scan for SMP in [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff]
found SMP MP-table at [mem 0x000f4fa0-0x000f4faf] mapped at [ffff8800000f4fa0]
(XEN) mm.c:908:d0 Error getting mfn 100 (pfn 5555555555555555) from L1 entry 0000000000100461 for l1e_owner=0, pg_owner=0
(XEN) mm.c:4995:d0 ptwr_emulate: could not get_page_from_l1e()
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff81ac07e2&gt;] xen_set_pte_init+0x66/0x71
. snip..
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.6.0-rc6upstream-00188-gb6fb969-dirty #2 HP ProLiant BL680c G5
.. snip..
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81ad31c6&gt;] __early_ioremap+0x18a/0x248
 [&lt;ffffffff81624731&gt;] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
 [&lt;ffffffff81ad32ac&gt;] early_ioremap+0x13/0x15
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc140&gt;] get_mpc_size+0x2f/0x67
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc284&gt;] smp_scan_config+0x10c/0x136
 [&lt;ffffffff81acc2e4&gt;] default_find_smp_config+0x36/0x5a
 [&lt;ffffffff81ac3085&gt;] setup_arch+0x5b3/0xb5b
 [&lt;ffffffff81624731&gt;] ? printk+0x48/0x4a
 [&lt;ffffffff81abca7f&gt;] start_kernel+0x90/0x390
 [&lt;ffffffff81abc356&gt;] x86_64_start_reservations+0x131/0x136
 [&lt;ffffffff81abfa83&gt;] xen_start_kernel+0x65f/0x661
(XEN) Domain 0 crashed: 'noreboot' set - not rebooting.

which is that ioremap would end up mapping 0xff using _PAGE_IOMAP
(which is what early_ioremap sticks as a flag) - which meant
we would get MFN 0xFF (pte ff461, which is OK), and then it would
also map 0x100 (b/c ioremap tries to get page aligned request, and
it was trying to map 0xf4fa0 + PAGE_SIZE - so it mapped the next page)
as _PAGE_IOMAP. Since 0x100 is actually a RAM page, and the _PAGE_IOMAP
bypasses the P2M lookup we would happily set the PTE to 1000461.
Xen would deny the request since we do not have access to the
Machine Frame Number (MFN) of 0x100. The P2M[0x100] is for example
0x80140.

Fixes-Oracle-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.oracle.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=13665
Acked-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Yijing Wang &lt;wangyijing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86: Fix event scheduling</title>
<updated>2014-03-11T23:10:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-21T15:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=494dac8e333e873cb5266ede3be957680d6194ad'/>
<id>494dac8e333e873cb5266ede3be957680d6194ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26e61e8939b1fe8729572dabe9a9e97d930dd4f6 upstream.

Vince "Super Tester" Weaver reported a new round of syscall fuzzing (Trinity) failures,
with perf WARN_ON()s triggering. He also provided traces of the failures.

This is I think the relevant bit:

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_disable: x86_pmu_disable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926156: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926158: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926159: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926160: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 1, n_added: 0, n_txn: 1
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926161: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926162: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926163: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926166: collect_events: Adding event: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)

So we add the insn:p event (fd[23]).

At this point we should have:

  n_events = 2, n_added = 1, n_txn = 1

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926170: collect_events: Adding event: 0 (ffff8800c9e01800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926172: collect_events: Adding event: 4 (ffff8800cbab2c00)

We try and add the {BP,cycles,br_insn} group (fd[3], fd[4], fd[15]).
These events are 0:cycles and 4:br_insn, the BP event isn't x86_pmu so
that's not visible.

	group_sched_in()
	  pmu-&gt;start_txn() /* nop - BP pmu */
	  event_sched_in()
	     event-&gt;pmu-&gt;add()

So here we should end up with:

  0: n_events = 3, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2
  4: n_events = 4, n_added = 3, n_txn = 3

But seeing the below state on x86_pmu_enable(), the must have failed,
because the 0 and 4 events aren't there anymore.

Looking at group_sched_in(), since the BP is the leader, its
event_sched_in() must have succeeded, for otherwise we would not have
seen the sibling adds.

But since neither 0 or 4 are in the below state; their event_sched_in()
must have failed; but I don't see why, the complete state: 0,0,1:p,4
fits perfectly fine on a core2.

However, since we try and schedule 4 it means the 0 event must have
succeeded!  Therefore the 4 event must have failed, its failure will
have put group_sched_in() into the fail path, which will call:

	event_sched_out()
	  event-&gt;pmu-&gt;del()

on 0 and the BP event.

Now x86_pmu_del() will reduce n_events; but it will not reduce n_added;
giving what we see below:

 n_event = 2, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_enable: x86_pmu_enable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926179: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926181: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926182: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 2, n_added: 2, n_txn: 2
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926186: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state:   1-&gt;0 tag: 1 config: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926190: x86_pmu_enable: S0: hwc-&gt;idx: 33, hwc-&gt;last_cpu: 0, hwc-&gt;last_tag: 1 hwc-&gt;state: 0

So the problem is that x86_pmu_del(), when called from a
group_sched_in() that fails (for whatever reason), and without x86_pmu
TXN support (because the leader is !x86_pmu), will corrupt the n_added
state.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140221150312.GF3104@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26e61e8939b1fe8729572dabe9a9e97d930dd4f6 upstream.

Vince "Super Tester" Weaver reported a new round of syscall fuzzing (Trinity) failures,
with perf WARN_ON()s triggering. He also provided traces of the failures.

This is I think the relevant bit:

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_disable: x86_pmu_disable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926153: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926156: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926158: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926159: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926160: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 1, n_added: 0, n_txn: 1
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926161: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926162: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926163: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926166: collect_events: Adding event: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)

So we add the insn:p event (fd[23]).

At this point we should have:

  n_events = 2, n_added = 1, n_txn = 1

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926170: collect_events: Adding event: 0 (ffff8800c9e01800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926172: collect_events: Adding event: 4 (ffff8800cbab2c00)

We try and add the {BP,cycles,br_insn} group (fd[3], fd[4], fd[15]).
These events are 0:cycles and 4:br_insn, the BP event isn't x86_pmu so
that's not visible.

	group_sched_in()
	  pmu-&gt;start_txn() /* nop - BP pmu */
	  event_sched_in()
	     event-&gt;pmu-&gt;add()

So here we should end up with:

  0: n_events = 3, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2
  4: n_events = 4, n_added = 3, n_txn = 3

But seeing the below state on x86_pmu_enable(), the must have failed,
because the 0 and 4 events aren't there anymore.

Looking at group_sched_in(), since the BP is the leader, its
event_sched_in() must have succeeded, for otherwise we would not have
seen the sibling adds.

But since neither 0 or 4 are in the below state; their event_sched_in()
must have failed; but I don't see why, the complete state: 0,0,1:p,4
fits perfectly fine on a core2.

However, since we try and schedule 4 it means the 0 event must have
succeeded!  Therefore the 4 event must have failed, its failure will
have put group_sched_in() into the fail path, which will call:

	event_sched_out()
	  event-&gt;pmu-&gt;del()

on 0 and the BP event.

Now x86_pmu_del() will reduce n_events; but it will not reduce n_added;
giving what we see below:

 n_event = 2, n_added = 2, n_txn = 2

	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_enable: x86_pmu_enable
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926177: x86_pmu_state: Events: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926179: x86_pmu_state:   0: state: .R config: ffffffffffffffff (          (null))
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926181: x86_pmu_state:   33: state: AR config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926182: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: n_events: 2, n_added: 2, n_txn: 2
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926184: x86_pmu_state: Assignment: {
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926186: x86_pmu_state:   0-&gt;33 tag: 1 config: 0 (ffff88011ac99800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state:   1-&gt;0 tag: 1 config: 1 (ffff880119ec8800)
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926188: x86_pmu_state: }
	&gt;    pec_1076_warn-2804  [000] d...   147.926190: x86_pmu_enable: S0: hwc-&gt;idx: 33, hwc-&gt;last_cpu: 0, hwc-&gt;last_tag: 1 hwc-&gt;state: 0

So the problem is that x86_pmu_del(), when called from a
group_sched_in() that fails (for whatever reason), and without x86_pmu
TXN support (because the leader is !x86_pmu), will corrupt the n_added
state.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140221150312.GF3104@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)</title>
<updated>2014-02-06T19:05:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Honig</name>
<email>ahonig@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-19T22:12:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cd1e02030a6f006234061a306454c4e3e4d4701a'/>
<id>cd1e02030a6f006234061a306454c4e3e4d4701a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c upstream.

Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash.  If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be.  If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.

This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.

Reported-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/kvm_apic_get_reg/apic_get_reg/]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Vinson Lee &lt;vlee@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c upstream.

Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash.  If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be.  If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.

This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.

Reported-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: s/kvm_apic_get_reg/apic_get_reg/]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Vinson Lee &lt;vlee@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/x86/amd/ibs: Fix waking up from S3 for AMD family 10h</title>
<updated>2014-01-29T13:10:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Richter</name>
<email>rric@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-15T14:57:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7e99f2168460c70d96241da3e8ff749f05416222'/>
<id>7e99f2168460c70d96241da3e8ff749f05416222</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bee09ed91cacdbffdbcd3b05de8409c77ec9fcd6 upstream.

On AMD family 10h we see following error messages while waking up from
S3 for all non-boot CPUs leading to a failed IBS initialization:

 Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
 smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x1
 [Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC500 (LVT offset 0) for vector 0x400, but the register is already in use for vector 0xf9 on another cpu
 perf: IBS APIC setup failed on cpu #1
 process: Switch to broadcast mode on CPU1
 CPU1 is up
 ...
 ACPI: Waking up from system sleep state S3

Reason for this is that during suspend the LVT offset for the IBS
vector gets lost and needs to be reinialized while resuming.

The offset is read from the IBSCTL msr. On family 10h the offset needs
to be 1 as offset 0 is used for the MCE threshold interrupt, but
firmware assings it for IBS to 0 too. The kernel needs to reprogram
the vector. The msr is a readonly node msr, but a new value can be
written via pci config space access. The reinitialization is
implemented for family 10h in setup_ibs_ctl() which is forced during
IBS setup.

This patch fixes IBS setup after waking up from S3 by adding
resume/supend hooks for the boot cpu which does the offset
reinitialization.

Marking it as stable to let distros pick up this fix.

Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;rric@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389797849-5565-1-git-send-email-rric.net@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bee09ed91cacdbffdbcd3b05de8409c77ec9fcd6 upstream.

On AMD family 10h we see following error messages while waking up from
S3 for all non-boot CPUs leading to a failed IBS initialization:

 Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
 smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x1
 [Firmware Bug]: cpu 1, try to use APIC500 (LVT offset 0) for vector 0x400, but the register is already in use for vector 0xf9 on another cpu
 perf: IBS APIC setup failed on cpu #1
 process: Switch to broadcast mode on CPU1
 CPU1 is up
 ...
 ACPI: Waking up from system sleep state S3

Reason for this is that during suspend the LVT offset for the IBS
vector gets lost and needs to be reinialized while resuming.

The offset is read from the IBSCTL msr. On family 10h the offset needs
to be 1 as offset 0 is used for the MCE threshold interrupt, but
firmware assings it for IBS to 0 too. The kernel needs to reprogram
the vector. The msr is a readonly node msr, but a new value can be
written via pci config space access. The reinitialization is
implemented for family 10h in setup_ibs_ctl() which is forced during
IBS setup.

This patch fixes IBS setup after waking up from S3 by adding
resume/supend hooks for the boot cpu which does the offset
reinitialization.

Marking it as stable to let distros pick up this fix.

Signed-off-by: Robert Richter &lt;rric@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389797849-5565-1-git-send-email-rric.net@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)</title>
<updated>2014-01-29T13:10:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Honig</name>
<email>ahonig@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-20T18:23:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=777f8f3bcde8dc29bac9ab7e4e94dd84887ba50d'/>
<id>777f8f3bcde8dc29bac9ab7e4e94dd84887ba50d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd upstream.

In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page.  This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached.  It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.

This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest.  Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).

Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')

Reported-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
[ lizf: backported to 3.4: based on Paolo's backport hints for &lt;3.10 ]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd upstream.

In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page.  This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached.  It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.

This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest.  Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).

Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')

Reported-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig &lt;ahonig@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
[ lizf: backported to 3.4: based on Paolo's backport hints for &lt;3.10 ]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, fpu, amd: Clear exceptions in AMD FXSAVE workaround</title>
<updated>2014-01-15T23:27:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-12T03:15:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a63f31f1f2cdb459b121f644ccbd07ae84f45d4e'/>
<id>a63f31f1f2cdb459b121f644ccbd07ae84f45d4e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0 upstream.

Before we do an EMMS in the AMD FXSAVE information leak workaround we
need to clear any pending exceptions, otherwise we trap with a
floating-point exception inside this code.

Reported-by: halfdog &lt;me@halfdog.net&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFxQnY_PCG_n4=0w-VG=YLXL-yr7oMxyy0WU2gCBAf3ydg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0 upstream.

Before we do an EMMS in the AMD FXSAVE information leak workaround we
need to clear any pending exceptions, otherwise we trap with a
floating-point exception inside this code.

Reported-by: halfdog &lt;me@halfdog.net&gt;
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFxQnY_PCG_n4=0w-VG=YLXL-yr7oMxyy0WU2gCBAf3ydg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
