linux-toradex.git/arch, branch v3.18.21 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules kexec: allocate the kexec control page with KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_GFP 2015-08-27T17:26:05+00:00 Martin Schwidefsky schwidefsky@de.ibm.com 2015-04-16T12:47:33+00:00 7ff9eeca341ace0ba30599ee5ab195e9b0f44550 [ Upstream commit 7e01b5acd88b3f3108d8c4ce44e3205d67437202 ] Introduce KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_GFP to allow the architecture code to override the gfp flags of the allocation for the kexec control page. The loop in kimage_alloc_normal_control_pages allocates pages with GFP_KERNEL until a page is found that happens to have an address smaller than the KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT. On systems with a large memory size but a small KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT the loop will keep allocating memory until the oom killer steps in. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 7e01b5acd88b3f3108d8c4ce44e3205d67437202 ]

Introduce KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_GFP to allow the architecture code
to override the gfp flags of the allocation for the kexec control
page. The loop in kimage_alloc_normal_control_pages allocates pages
with GFP_KERNEL until a page is found that happens to have an
address smaller than the KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT. On systems
with a large memory size but a small KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT
the loop will keep allocating memory until the oom killer steps in.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
arm64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize layout 2015-08-27T17:26:01+00:00 Yann Droneaud ydroneaud@opteya.com 2014-11-17T23:02:19+00:00 c4a7bf89fbff80e1ced7ca53c51f81231ace912c [ Upstream commit d6c763afab142a85e4770b4bc2a5f40f256d5c5d ] Since commit 8a0a9bd4db63 ('random: make get_random_int() more random'), get_random_int() returns a random value for each call, so comment and hack introduced in mmap_rnd() as part of commit 1d18c47c735e ('arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management') are incorrects. Commit 1d18c47c735e seems to use the same hack introduced by commit a5adc91a4b44 ('powerpc: Ensure random space between stack and mmaps'), latter copied in commit 5a0efea09f42 ('sparc64: Sharpen address space randomization calculations.'). But both architectures were cleaned up as part of commit fa8cbaaf5a68 ('powerpc+sparc64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize layout') as hack is no more needed since commit 8a0a9bd4db63. So the present patch removes the comment and the hack around get_random_int() on AArch64's mmap_rnd(). Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit d6c763afab142a85e4770b4bc2a5f40f256d5c5d ]

Since commit 8a0a9bd4db63 ('random: make get_random_int() more
random'), get_random_int() returns a random value for each call,
so comment and hack introduced in mmap_rnd() as part of commit
1d18c47c735e ('arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management')
are incorrects.

Commit 1d18c47c735e seems to use the same hack introduced by
commit a5adc91a4b44 ('powerpc: Ensure random space between stack
and mmaps'), latter copied in commit 5a0efea09f42 ('sparc64: Sharpen
address space randomization calculations.').

But both architectures were cleaned up as part of commit
fa8cbaaf5a68 ('powerpc+sparc64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize
layout') as hack is no more needed since commit 8a0a9bd4db63.

So the present patch removes the comment and the hack around
get_random_int() on AArch64's mmap_rnd().

Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
avr32: handle NULL as a valid clock object 2015-08-27T17:25:51+00:00 Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com 2015-07-24T10:49:48+00:00 b332d923c390c581ba3498d136bfb5127b67d76a [ Upstream commit 5c02a4206538da12c040b51778d310df84c6bf6c ] Since NULL is used as valid clock object on optional clocks we have to handle this case in avr32 implementation as well. Fixes: e1824dfe0d8e (net: macb: Adjust tx_clk when link speed changes) Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 5c02a4206538da12c040b51778d310df84c6bf6c ]

Since NULL is used as valid clock object on optional clocks we have to handle
this case in avr32 implementation as well.

Fixes: e1824dfe0d8e (net: macb: Adjust tx_clk when link speed changes)
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
x86/efi: Use all 64 bit of efi_memmap in setup_e820() 2015-08-27T17:25:49+00:00 Dmitry Skorodumov sdmitry@parallels.com 2015-07-28T14:38:32+00:00 3c239f5a90855526c93c38687c1437a153d737eb [ Upstream commit 7cc03e48965453b5df1cce5062c826189b04b960 ] The efi_info structure stores low 32 bits of memory map in efi_memmap and high 32 bits in efi_memmap_hi. While constructing pointer in the setup_e820(), need to take into account all 64 bit of the pointer. It is because on 64bit machine the function efi_get_memory_map() may return full 64bit pointer and before the patch that pointer was truncated. The issue is triggered on Parallles virtual machine and fixed with this patch. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Skorodumov <sdmitry@parallels.com> Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 7cc03e48965453b5df1cce5062c826189b04b960 ]

The efi_info structure stores low 32 bits of memory map
in efi_memmap and high 32 bits in efi_memmap_hi.

While constructing pointer in the setup_e820(), need
to take into account all 64 bit of the pointer.

It is because on 64bit machine the function
efi_get_memory_map() may return full 64bit pointer and before
the patch that pointer was truncated.

The issue is triggered on Parallles virtual machine and
fixed with this patch.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Skorodumov <sdmitry@parallels.com>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
tile: use free_bootmem_late() for initrd 2015-08-27T17:25:45+00:00 Chris Metcalf cmetcalf@ezchip.com 2015-07-23T18:11:09+00:00 ba86d5813c5a676d076c2d580ddc1cbb1b013ebf [ Upstream commit 3f81d2447b37ac697b3c600039f2c6b628c06e21 ] We were previously using free_bootmem() and just getting lucky that nothing too bad happened. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 3f81d2447b37ac697b3c600039f2c6b628c06e21 ]

We were previously using free_bootmem() and just getting lucky
that nothing too bad happened.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
s390/sclp: clear upper register halves in _sclp_print_early 2015-08-27T17:25:40+00:00 Martin Schwidefsky schwidefsky@de.ibm.com 2015-07-06T15:58:19+00:00 d9698525c8e9f5236d74e36df8a828b6dcc23861 [ Upstream commit f9c87a6f46d508eae0d9ae640be98d50f237f827 ] If the kernel is compiled with gcc 5.1 and the XZ compression option the decompress_kernel function calls _sclp_print_early in 64-bit mode while the content of the upper register half of %r6 is non-zero. This causes a specification exception on the servc instruction in _sclp_servc. The _sclp_print_early function saves and restores the upper registers halves but it fails to clear them for the 31-bit code of the mini sclp driver. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit f9c87a6f46d508eae0d9ae640be98d50f237f827 ]

If the kernel is compiled with gcc 5.1 and the XZ compression option
the decompress_kernel function calls _sclp_print_early in 64-bit mode
while the content of the upper register half of %r6 is non-zero.
This causes a specification exception on the servc instruction in
_sclp_servc.

The _sclp_print_early function saves and restores the upper registers
halves but it fails to clear them for the 31-bit code of the mini sclp
driver.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
kvm: x86: fix kvm_apic_has_events to check for NULL pointer 2015-08-27T17:25:37+00:00 Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com 2015-05-30T12:31:24+00:00 4b8ec51eb5e94596b4a3d465b93a3d18375b98b9 [ Upstream commit ce40cd3fc7fa40a6119e5fe6c0f2bc0eb4541009 ] Malicious (or egregiously buggy) userspace can trigger it, but it should never happen in normal operation. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit ce40cd3fc7fa40a6119e5fe6c0f2bc0eb4541009 ]

Malicious (or egregiously buggy) userspace can trigger it, but it
should never happen in normal operation.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_from_user32 2015-08-27T17:25:37+00:00 Amanieu d'Antras amanieu@gmail.com 2015-08-06T22:46:26+00:00 6f03dcb145cc383bdbef043039d13fc674c8062e [ Upstream commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 ] This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a positive si_code value. The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and copy_siginfo_to_user. copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits of si_code. This fixes the following information leaks: x86: 8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32. (si_code = __SI_CHLD) x86: 100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1) sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a 64-bit process. (si_code = any) parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code to a different process. These bugs are also fixed for consistency. Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 ]

This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.

copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.

This fixes the following information leaks:
x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
       (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
       64-bit process. (si_code = any)

parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_to_user 2015-08-27T17:25:36+00:00 Amanieu d'Antras amanieu@gmail.com 2015-08-06T22:46:29+00:00 ad98e577ca49e4bc3c2d3afede2c5918dde55ba4 [ Upstream commit c08a75d950725cdd87c19232a5a3850c51520359 ] commit 26135022f85105ad725cda103fa069e29e83bd16 upstream. This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel stack data to user mode. Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same si_code value is shared between multiple signals. This is solved by checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code. Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit c08a75d950725cdd87c19232a5a3850c51520359 ]

commit 26135022f85105ad725cda103fa069e29e83bd16 upstream.

This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to
user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel
stack data to user mode.

Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same
si_code value is shared between multiple signals.  This is solved by
checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
ARM: OMAP2+: hwmod: Fix _wait_target_ready() for hwmods without sysc 2015-08-27T17:25:28+00:00 Roger Quadros rogerq@ti.com 2015-07-16T13:16:44+00:00 a513c1125b097786fa123b65336938e89de37ab6 [ Upstream commit 9a258afa928b45e6dd2efcac46ccf7eea705d35a ] For hwmods without sysc, _init_mpu_rt_base(oh) won't be called and so _find_mpu_rt_port(oh) will return NULL thus preventing ready state check on those modules after the module is enabled. This can potentially cause a bus access error if the module is accessed before the module is ready. Fix this by unconditionally calling _init_mpu_rt_base() during hwmod _init(). Do ioremap only if we need SYSC access. Eventhough _wait_target_ready() check doesn't really need MPU RT port but just the PRCM registers, we still mandate that the hwmod must have an MPU RT port if ready state check needs to be done. Else it would mean that the module is not accessible by MPU so there is no point in waiting for target to be ready. e.g. this fixes the below DCAN bus access error on AM437x-gp-evm. [ 16.672978] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 16.677885] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1580 at drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c:147 l3_interrupt_handler+0x234/0x35c() [ 16.687946] 44000000.ocp:L3 Custom Error: MASTER M2 (64-bit) TARGET L4_PER_0 (Read): Data Access in User mode during Functional access [ 16.700654] Modules linked in: xhci_hcd btwilink ti_vpfe dwc3 videobuf2_core ov2659 bluetooth v4l2_common videodev ti_am335x_adc kfifo_buf industrialio c_can_platform videobuf2_dma_contig media snd_soc_tlv320aic3x pixcir_i2c_ts c_can dc [ 16.731144] CPU: 0 PID: 1580 Comm: rpc.statd Not tainted 3.14.26-02561-gf733aa036398 #180 [ 16.739747] Backtrace: [ 16.742336] [<c0011108>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c00112a4>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [ 16.750285] r6:00000093 r5:00000009 r4:eab5b8a8 r3:00000000 [ 16.756252] [<c001128c>] (show_stack) from [<c05a4418>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) [ 16.763870] [<c05a43f8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0037120>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x6c/0x8c) [ 16.772408] [<c00370b4>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c00371e4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x40) [ 16.781550] r8:c05d1f90 r7:c0730844 r6:c0730448 r5:80080003 r4:ed0cd210 [ 16.788626] [<c00371b0>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c027fa94>] (l3_interrupt_handler+0x234/0x35c) [ 16.797968] r3:ed0cd480 r2:c0730508 [ 16.801747] [<c027f860>] (l3_interrupt_handler) from [<c0063758>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x54/0x1bc) [ 16.811533] r10:ed005600 r9:c084855b r8:0000002a r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:0000002a [ 16.819780] r4:ed0e6d80 [ 16.822453] [<c0063704>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c00638f0>] (handle_irq_event+0x30/0x40) [ 16.831789] r10:eb2b6938 r9:eb2b6960 r8:bf011420 r7:fa240100 r6:00000000 r5:0000002a [ 16.840052] r4:ed005600 [ 16.842744] [<c00638c0>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c00661d8>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x74/0x128) [ 16.851702] r4:ed005600 r3:00000000 [ 16.855479] [<c0066164>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0063068>] (generic_handle_irq+0x28/0x38) [ 16.864523] r4:0000002a r3:c0066164 [ 16.868294] [<c0063040>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c000ef60>] (handle_IRQ+0x38/0x8c) [ 16.876612] r4:c081c640 r3:00000202 [ 16.880380] [<c000ef28>] (handle_IRQ) from [<c00084f0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x30/0x5c) [ 16.888328] r6:eab5ba38 r5:c0804460 r4:fa24010c r3:00000100 [ 16.894303] [<c00084c0>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c05a8d80>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x50) [ 16.902193] Exception stack(0xeab5ba38 to 0xeab5ba80) [ 16.907499] ba20: 00000000 00000006 [ 16.916108] ba40: fa1d0000 fa1d0008 ed3d3000 eab5bab4 ed3d3460 c0842af4 bf011420 eb2b6960 [ 16.924716] ba60: eb2b6938 eab5ba8c eab5ba90 eab5ba80 bf035220 bf07702c 600f0013 ffffffff [ 16.933317] r7:eab5ba6c r6:ffffffff r5:600f0013 r4:bf07702c [ 16.939317] [<bf077000>] (c_can_plat_read_reg_aligned_to_16bit [c_can_platform]) from [<bf035220>] (c_can_get_berr_counter+0x38/0x64 [c_can]) [ 16.952696] [<bf0351e8>] (c_can_get_berr_counter [c_can]) from [<bf010294>] (can_fill_info+0x124/0x15c [can_dev]) [ 16.963480] r5:ec8c9740 r4:ed3d3000 [ 16.967253] [<bf010170>] (can_fill_info [can_dev]) from [<c0502fa8>] (rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x58c/0x8fc) [ 16.976749] r6:ec8c9740 r5:ed3d3000 r4:eb2b6780 [ 16.981613] [<c0502a1c>] (rtnl_fill_ifinfo) from [<c0503408>] (rtnl_dump_ifinfo+0xf0/0x1dc) [ 16.990401] r10:ec8c9740 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:ebd4d1b4 r5:ed3d3000 [ 16.998671] r4:00000000 [ 17.001342] [<c0503318>] (rtnl_dump_ifinfo) from [<c050e6e4>] (netlink_dump+0xa8/0x1e0) [ 17.009772] r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:c0503318 r7:ebf3e6c0 r6:ebd4d1b4 r5:ec8c9740 [ 17.018050] r4:ebd4d000 [ 17.020714] [<c050e63c>] (netlink_dump) from [<c050ec10>] (__netlink_dump_start+0x104/0x154) [ 17.029591] r6:eab5bd34 r5:ec8c9980 r4:ebd4d000 [ 17.034454] [<c050eb0c>] (__netlink_dump_start) from [<c0505604>] (rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x110/0x1f4) [ 17.043778] r7:00000000 r6:ec8c9980 r5:00000f40 r4:ebf3e6c0 [ 17.049743] [<c05054f4>] (rtnetlink_rcv_msg) from [<c05108e8>] (netlink_rcv_skb+0xb4/0xc8) [ 17.058449] r8:eab5bdac r7:ec8c9980 r6:c05054f4 r5:ec8c9980 r4:ebf3e6c0 [ 17.065534] [<c0510834>] (netlink_rcv_skb) from [<c0504134>] (rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x2c) [ 17.073854] r6:ebd4d000 r5:00000014 r4:ec8c9980 r3:c0504110 [ 17.079846] [<c0504110>] (rtnetlink_rcv) from [<c05102ac>] (netlink_unicast+0x180/0x1ec) [ 17.088363] r4:ed0c6800 r3:c0504110 [ 17.092113] [<c051012c>] (netlink_unicast) from [<c0510670>] (netlink_sendmsg+0x2ac/0x380) [ 17.100813] r10:00000000 r8:00000008 r7:ec8c9980 r6:ebd4d000 r5:eab5be70 r4:eab5bee4 [ 17.109083] [<c05103c4>] (netlink_sendmsg) from [<c04dfdb4>] (sock_sendmsg+0x90/0xb0) [ 17.117305] r10:00000000 r9:eab5a000 r8:becdda3c r7:0000000c r6:ea978400 r5:eab5be70 [ 17.125563] r4:c05103c4 [ 17.128225] [<c04dfd24>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c04e1c28>] (SyS_sendto+0xb8/0xdc) [ 17.136001] r6:becdda5c r5:00000014 r4:ecd37040 [ 17.140876] [<c04e1b70>] (SyS_sendto) from [<c000e680>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) [ 17.148923] r10:00000000 r8:c000e804 r7:00000122 r6:becdda5c r5:0000000c r4:becdda5c [ 17.157169] ---[ end trace 2b71e15b38f58bad ]--- Fixes: 6423d6df1440 ("ARM: OMAP2+: hwmod: check for module address space during init") Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> 
[ Upstream commit 9a258afa928b45e6dd2efcac46ccf7eea705d35a ]

For hwmods without sysc, _init_mpu_rt_base(oh) won't be called and so
_find_mpu_rt_port(oh) will return NULL thus preventing ready state check
on those modules after the module is enabled.

This can potentially cause a bus access error if the module is accessed
before the module is ready.

Fix this by unconditionally calling _init_mpu_rt_base() during hwmod
_init(). Do ioremap only if we need SYSC access.

Eventhough _wait_target_ready() check doesn't really need MPU RT port but
just the PRCM registers, we still mandate that the hwmod must have an
MPU RT port if ready state check needs to be done. Else it would mean that
the module is not accessible by MPU so there is no point in waiting
for target to be ready.

e.g. this fixes the below DCAN bus access error on AM437x-gp-evm.

[   16.672978] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   16.677885] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1580 at drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c:147 l3_interrupt_handler+0x234/0x35c()
[   16.687946] 44000000.ocp:L3 Custom Error: MASTER M2 (64-bit) TARGET L4_PER_0 (Read): Data Access in User mode during Functional access
[   16.700654] Modules linked in: xhci_hcd btwilink ti_vpfe dwc3 videobuf2_core ov2659 bluetooth v4l2_common videodev ti_am335x_adc kfifo_buf industrialio c_can_platform videobuf2_dma_contig media snd_soc_tlv320aic3x pixcir_i2c_ts c_can dc
[   16.731144] CPU: 0 PID: 1580 Comm: rpc.statd Not tainted 3.14.26-02561-gf733aa036398 #180
[   16.739747] Backtrace:
[   16.742336] [<c0011108>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c00112a4>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
[   16.750285]  r6:00000093 r5:00000009 r4:eab5b8a8 r3:00000000
[   16.756252] [<c001128c>] (show_stack) from [<c05a4418>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[   16.763870] [<c05a43f8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0037120>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x6c/0x8c)
[   16.772408] [<c00370b4>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c00371e4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x40)
[   16.781550]  r8:c05d1f90 r7:c0730844 r6:c0730448 r5:80080003 r4:ed0cd210
[   16.788626] [<c00371b0>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c027fa94>] (l3_interrupt_handler+0x234/0x35c)
[   16.797968]  r3:ed0cd480 r2:c0730508
[   16.801747] [<c027f860>] (l3_interrupt_handler) from [<c0063758>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x54/0x1bc)
[   16.811533]  r10:ed005600 r9:c084855b r8:0000002a r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:0000002a
[   16.819780]  r4:ed0e6d80
[   16.822453] [<c0063704>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c00638f0>] (handle_irq_event+0x30/0x40)
[   16.831789]  r10:eb2b6938 r9:eb2b6960 r8:bf011420 r7:fa240100 r6:00000000 r5:0000002a
[   16.840052]  r4:ed005600
[   16.842744] [<c00638c0>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c00661d8>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x74/0x128)
[   16.851702]  r4:ed005600 r3:00000000
[   16.855479] [<c0066164>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0063068>] (generic_handle_irq+0x28/0x38)
[   16.864523]  r4:0000002a r3:c0066164
[   16.868294] [<c0063040>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c000ef60>] (handle_IRQ+0x38/0x8c)
[   16.876612]  r4:c081c640 r3:00000202
[   16.880380] [<c000ef28>] (handle_IRQ) from [<c00084f0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x30/0x5c)
[   16.888328]  r6:eab5ba38 r5:c0804460 r4:fa24010c r3:00000100
[   16.894303] [<c00084c0>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c05a8d80>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x50)
[   16.902193] Exception stack(0xeab5ba38 to 0xeab5ba80)
[   16.907499] ba20:                                                       00000000 00000006
[   16.916108] ba40: fa1d0000 fa1d0008 ed3d3000 eab5bab4 ed3d3460 c0842af4 bf011420 eb2b6960
[   16.924716] ba60: eb2b6938 eab5ba8c eab5ba90 eab5ba80 bf035220 bf07702c 600f0013 ffffffff
[   16.933317]  r7:eab5ba6c r6:ffffffff r5:600f0013 r4:bf07702c
[   16.939317] [<bf077000>] (c_can_plat_read_reg_aligned_to_16bit [c_can_platform]) from [<bf035220>] (c_can_get_berr_counter+0x38/0x64 [c_can])
[   16.952696] [<bf0351e8>] (c_can_get_berr_counter [c_can]) from [<bf010294>] (can_fill_info+0x124/0x15c [can_dev])
[   16.963480]  r5:ec8c9740 r4:ed3d3000
[   16.967253] [<bf010170>] (can_fill_info [can_dev]) from [<c0502fa8>] (rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x58c/0x8fc)
[   16.976749]  r6:ec8c9740 r5:ed3d3000 r4:eb2b6780
[   16.981613] [<c0502a1c>] (rtnl_fill_ifinfo) from [<c0503408>] (rtnl_dump_ifinfo+0xf0/0x1dc)
[   16.990401]  r10:ec8c9740 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:ebd4d1b4 r5:ed3d3000
[   16.998671]  r4:00000000
[   17.001342] [<c0503318>] (rtnl_dump_ifinfo) from [<c050e6e4>] (netlink_dump+0xa8/0x1e0)
[   17.009772]  r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:c0503318 r7:ebf3e6c0 r6:ebd4d1b4 r5:ec8c9740
[   17.018050]  r4:ebd4d000
[   17.020714] [<c050e63c>] (netlink_dump) from [<c050ec10>] (__netlink_dump_start+0x104/0x154)
[   17.029591]  r6:eab5bd34 r5:ec8c9980 r4:ebd4d000
[   17.034454] [<c050eb0c>] (__netlink_dump_start) from [<c0505604>] (rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x110/0x1f4)
[   17.043778]  r7:00000000 r6:ec8c9980 r5:00000f40 r4:ebf3e6c0
[   17.049743] [<c05054f4>] (rtnetlink_rcv_msg) from [<c05108e8>] (netlink_rcv_skb+0xb4/0xc8)
[   17.058449]  r8:eab5bdac r7:ec8c9980 r6:c05054f4 r5:ec8c9980 r4:ebf3e6c0
[   17.065534] [<c0510834>] (netlink_rcv_skb) from [<c0504134>] (rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x2c)
[   17.073854]  r6:ebd4d000 r5:00000014 r4:ec8c9980 r3:c0504110
[   17.079846] [<c0504110>] (rtnetlink_rcv) from [<c05102ac>] (netlink_unicast+0x180/0x1ec)
[   17.088363]  r4:ed0c6800 r3:c0504110
[   17.092113] [<c051012c>] (netlink_unicast) from [<c0510670>] (netlink_sendmsg+0x2ac/0x380)
[   17.100813]  r10:00000000 r8:00000008 r7:ec8c9980 r6:ebd4d000 r5:eab5be70 r4:eab5bee4
[   17.109083] [<c05103c4>] (netlink_sendmsg) from [<c04dfdb4>] (sock_sendmsg+0x90/0xb0)
[   17.117305]  r10:00000000 r9:eab5a000 r8:becdda3c r7:0000000c r6:ea978400 r5:eab5be70
[   17.125563]  r4:c05103c4
[   17.128225] [<c04dfd24>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c04e1c28>] (SyS_sendto+0xb8/0xdc)
[   17.136001]  r6:becdda5c r5:00000014 r4:ecd37040
[   17.140876] [<c04e1b70>] (SyS_sendto) from [<c000e680>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
[   17.148923]  r10:00000000 r8:c000e804 r7:00000122 r6:becdda5c r5:0000000c r4:becdda5c
[   17.157169] ---[ end trace 2b71e15b38f58bad ]---

Fixes: 6423d6df1440 ("ARM: OMAP2+: hwmod: check for module address space during init")
Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>