<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/arch, branch v4.4.58</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/hyperv: Handle unknown NMIs on one CPU when unknown_nmi_panic</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Semwal</name>
<email>sumit.semwal@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-25T16:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e4ce31c0265dc6086fb4f13d88deef50d20cdb24'/>
<id>e4ce31c0265dc6086fb4f13d88deef50d20cdb24</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;

[ Upstream commit 59107e2f48831daedc46973ce4988605ab066de3 ]

There is a feature in Hyper-V ('Debug-VM --InjectNonMaskableInterrupt')
which injects NMI to the guest. We may want to crash the guest and do kdump
on this NMI by enabling unknown_nmi_panic. To make kdump succeed we need to
allow the kdump kernel to re-establish VMBus connection so it will see
VMBus devices (storage, network,..).

To properly unload VMBus making it possible to start over during kdump we
need to do the following:

 - Send an 'unload' message to the hypervisor. This can be done on any CPU
   so we do this the crashing CPU.

 - Receive the 'unload finished' reply message. WS2012R2 delivers this
   message to the CPU which was used to establish VMBus connection during
   module load and this CPU may differ from the CPU sending 'unload'.

Receiving a VMBus message means the following:

 - There is a per-CPU slot in memory for one message. This slot can in
   theory be accessed by any CPU.

 - We get an interrupt on the CPU when a message was placed into the slot.

 - When we read the message we need to clear the slot and signal the fact
   to the hypervisor. In case there are more messages to this CPU pending
   the hypervisor will deliver the next message. The signaling is done by
   writing to an MSR so this can only be done on the appropriate CPU.

To avoid doing cross-CPU work on crash we have vmbus_wait_for_unload()
function which checks message slots for all CPUs in a loop waiting for the
'unload finished' messages. However, there is an issue which arises when
these conditions are met:

 - We're crashing on a CPU which is different from the one which was used
   to initially contact the hypervisor.

 - The CPU which was used for the initial contact is blocked with interrupts
   disabled and there is a message pending in the message slot.

In this case we won't be able to read the 'unload finished' message on the
crashing CPU. This is reproducible when we receive unknown NMIs on all CPUs
simultaneously: the first CPU entering panic() will proceed to crash and
all other CPUs will stop themselves with interrupts disabled.

The suggested solution is to handle unknown NMIs for Hyper-V guests on the
first CPU which gets them only. This will allow us to rely on VMBus
interrupt handler being able to receive the 'unload finish' message in
case it is delivered to a different CPU.

The issue is not reproducible on WS2016 as Debug-VM delivers NMI to the
boot CPU only, WS2012R2 and earlier Hyper-V versions are affected.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: Haiyang Zhang &lt;haiyangz@microsoft.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161202100720.28121-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;

[ Upstream commit 59107e2f48831daedc46973ce4988605ab066de3 ]

There is a feature in Hyper-V ('Debug-VM --InjectNonMaskableInterrupt')
which injects NMI to the guest. We may want to crash the guest and do kdump
on this NMI by enabling unknown_nmi_panic. To make kdump succeed we need to
allow the kdump kernel to re-establish VMBus connection so it will see
VMBus devices (storage, network,..).

To properly unload VMBus making it possible to start over during kdump we
need to do the following:

 - Send an 'unload' message to the hypervisor. This can be done on any CPU
   so we do this the crashing CPU.

 - Receive the 'unload finished' reply message. WS2012R2 delivers this
   message to the CPU which was used to establish VMBus connection during
   module load and this CPU may differ from the CPU sending 'unload'.

Receiving a VMBus message means the following:

 - There is a per-CPU slot in memory for one message. This slot can in
   theory be accessed by any CPU.

 - We get an interrupt on the CPU when a message was placed into the slot.

 - When we read the message we need to clear the slot and signal the fact
   to the hypervisor. In case there are more messages to this CPU pending
   the hypervisor will deliver the next message. The signaling is done by
   writing to an MSR so this can only be done on the appropriate CPU.

To avoid doing cross-CPU work on crash we have vmbus_wait_for_unload()
function which checks message slots for all CPUs in a loop waiting for the
'unload finished' messages. However, there is an issue which arises when
these conditions are met:

 - We're crashing on a CPU which is different from the one which was used
   to initially contact the hypervisor.

 - The CPU which was used for the initial contact is blocked with interrupts
   disabled and there is a message pending in the message slot.

In this case we won't be able to read the 'unload finished' message on the
crashing CPU. This is reproducible when we receive unknown NMIs on all CPUs
simultaneously: the first CPU entering panic() will proceed to crash and
all other CPUs will stop themselves with interrupts disabled.

The suggested solution is to handle unknown NMIs for Hyper-V guests on the
first CPU which gets them only. This will allow us to rely on VMBus
interrupt handler being able to receive the 'unload finish' message in
case it is delivered to a different CPU.

The issue is not reproducible on WS2016 as Debug-VM delivers NMI to the
boot CPU only, WS2012R2 and earlier Hyper-V versions are affected.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: Haiyang Zhang &lt;haiyangz@microsoft.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161202100720.28121-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: do not re-use pirq number cached in pci device msi msg data</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Semwal</name>
<email>sumit.semwal@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-25T16:18:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ec52364445a497a0045c61145f0d795b606c23bb'/>
<id>ec52364445a497a0045c61145f0d795b606c23bb</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;

[ Upstream commit c74fd80f2f41d05f350bb478151021f88551afe8 ]

Revert the main part of commit:
af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")

That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see
if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use
that pirq.  At the time, that was the correct behavior.  However, a
later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap
all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX
vectors; specifically the Qemu commit:
c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload")

Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the
kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message
data.  All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the
pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors.

This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers
under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for
each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to
the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX
vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs.  So the MSIX
setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector
for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that
pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails.

This is discussed in more detail at:
https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html

Fixes: af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
From: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;

[ Upstream commit c74fd80f2f41d05f350bb478151021f88551afe8 ]

Revert the main part of commit:
af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")

That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see
if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use
that pirq.  At the time, that was the correct behavior.  However, a
later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap
all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX
vectors; specifically the Qemu commit:
c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload")

Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the
kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message
data.  All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the
pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors.

This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers
under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for
each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to
the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX
vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs.  So the MSIX
setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector
for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that
pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails.

This is discussed in more detail at:
https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html

Fixes: af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;dan.streetman@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: add dma properties to UART nodes</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Ferre</name>
<email>nicolas.ferre@atmel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-26T16:30:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e1af444e52ce1b08cd6534e61f8da7aa55b31880'/>
<id>e1af444e52ce1b08cd6534e61f8da7aa55b31880</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b1708b72a0959a032cd2eebb77fa9086ea3e0c84 upstream.

The dmas/dma-names properties are added to the UART nodes. Note that additional
properties are needed to enable them at the board level: check bindings for
details.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre &lt;nicolas.ferre@atmel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni &lt;alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b1708b72a0959a032cd2eebb77fa9086ea3e0c84 upstream.

The dmas/dma-names properties are added to the UART nodes. Note that additional
properties are needed to enable them at the board level: check bindings for
details.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre &lt;nicolas.ferre@atmel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni &lt;alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: at91: pm: cpu_idle: switch DDR to power-down mode</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:35:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Ferre</name>
<email>nicolas.ferre@microchip.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-14T08:38:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2705b183263bd6e2969a648d2c7353716ca1d7a8'/>
<id>2705b183263bd6e2969a648d2c7353716ca1d7a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60b89f1928af80b546b5c3fd8714a62f6f4b8844 upstream.

On some DDR controllers, compatible with the sama5d3 one,
the sequence to enter/exit/re-enter the self-refresh mode adds
more constrains than what is currently written in the at91_idle
driver. An actual access to the DDR chip is needed between exit
and re-enter of this mode which is somehow difficult to implement.
This sequence can completely hang the SoC. It is particularly
experienced on parts which embed a L2 cache if the code run
between IDLE calls fits in it...

Moreover, as the intention is to enter and exit pretty rapidly
from IDLE, the power-down mode is a good candidate.

So now we use power-down instead of self-refresh. As we can
simplify the code for sama5d3 compatible DDR controllers,
we instantiate a new sama5d3_ddr_standby() function.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre &lt;nicolas.ferre@microchip.com&gt;
Fixes: 017b5522d5e3 ("ARM: at91: Add new binding for sama5d3-ddramc")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni &lt;alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 60b89f1928af80b546b5c3fd8714a62f6f4b8844 upstream.

On some DDR controllers, compatible with the sama5d3 one,
the sequence to enter/exit/re-enter the self-refresh mode adds
more constrains than what is currently written in the at91_idle
driver. An actual access to the DDR chip is needed between exit
and re-enter of this mode which is somehow difficult to implement.
This sequence can completely hang the SoC. It is particularly
experienced on parts which embed a L2 cache if the code run
between IDLE calls fits in it...

Moreover, as the intention is to enter and exit pretty rapidly
from IDLE, the power-down mode is a good candidate.

So now we use power-down instead of self-refresh. As we can
simplify the code for sama5d3 compatible DDR controllers,
we instantiate a new sama5d3_ddr_standby() function.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre &lt;nicolas.ferre@microchip.com&gt;
Fixes: 017b5522d5e3 ("ARM: at91: Add new binding for sama5d3-ddramc")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni &lt;alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc/boot: Fix zImage TOC alignment</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T10:13:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Ellerman</name>
<email>mpe@ellerman.id.au</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-07T05:14:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b24473976b985fd1c1d57a9ea934f9792bf654cc'/>
<id>b24473976b985fd1c1d57a9ea934f9792bf654cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 97ee351b50a49717543533cfb85b4bf9d88c9680 upstream.

Recent toolchains force the TOC to be 256 byte aligned. We need to
enforce this alignment in the zImage linker script, otherwise pointers
to our TOC variables (__toc_start) could be incorrect. If the actual
start of the TOC and __toc_start don't have the same value we crash
early in the zImage wrapper.

Suggested-by: Alan Modra &lt;amodra@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 97ee351b50a49717543533cfb85b4bf9d88c9680 upstream.

Recent toolchains force the TOC to be 256 byte aligned. We need to
enforce this alignment in the zImage linker script, otherwise pointers
to our TOC variables (__toc_start) could be incorrect. If the actual
start of the TOC and __toc_start don't have the same value we crash
early in the zImage wrapper.

Suggested-by: Alan Modra &lt;amodra@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/pci: fix use after free in dma_init</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T10:13:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Ott</name>
<email>sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-15T07:41:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=68ea3948ed3d48dd1e0897b121f37da6f14ffbcc'/>
<id>68ea3948ed3d48dd1e0897b121f37da6f14ffbcc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dba599091c191d209b1499511a524ad9657c0e5a upstream.

After a failure during registration of the dma_table (because of the
function being in error state) we free its memory but don't reset the
associated pointer to zero.

When we then receive a notification from firmware (about the function
being in error state) we'll try to walk and free the dma_table again.

Fix this by resetting the dma_table pointer. In addition to that make
sure that we free the iommu_bitmap when appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott &lt;sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dba599091c191d209b1499511a524ad9657c0e5a upstream.

After a failure during registration of the dma_table (because of the
function being in error state) we free its memory but don't reset the
associated pointer to zero.

When we then receive a notification from firmware (about the function
being in error state) we'll try to walk and free the dma_table again.

Fix this by resetting the dma_table pointer. In addition to that make
sure that we free the iommu_bitmap when appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott &lt;sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix illegal opcode emulation</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T10:13:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Huth</name>
<email>thuth@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-18T19:01:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=50730d7f361f9915ec7063a629500119b0e8c3b6'/>
<id>50730d7f361f9915ec7063a629500119b0e8c3b6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 708e75a3ee750dce1072134e630d66c4e6eaf63c upstream.

If kvmppc_handle_exit_pr() calls kvmppc_emulate_instruction() to emulate
one instruction (in the BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_H_EMUL_ASSIST case), it calls
kvmppc_core_queue_program() afterwards if kvmppc_emulate_instruction()
returned EMULATE_FAIL, so the guest gets an program interrupt for the
illegal opcode.
However, the kvmppc_emulate_instruction() also tried to inject a
program exception for this already, so the program interrupt gets
injected twice and the return address in srr0 gets destroyed.
All other callers of kvmppc_emulate_instruction() are also injecting
a program interrupt, and since the callers have the right knowledge
about the srr1 flags that should be used, it is the function
kvmppc_emulate_instruction() that should _not_ inject program
interrupts, so remove the kvmppc_core_queue_program() here.

This fixes the issue discovered by Laurent Vivier with kvm-unit-tests
where the logs are filled with these messages when the test tries
to execute an illegal instruction:

     Couldn't emulate instruction 0x00000000 (op 0 xop 0)
     kvmppc_handle_exit_pr: emulation at 700 failed (00000000)

Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf &lt;agraf@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Laurent Vivier &lt;lvivier@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 708e75a3ee750dce1072134e630d66c4e6eaf63c upstream.

If kvmppc_handle_exit_pr() calls kvmppc_emulate_instruction() to emulate
one instruction (in the BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_H_EMUL_ASSIST case), it calls
kvmppc_core_queue_program() afterwards if kvmppc_emulate_instruction()
returned EMULATE_FAIL, so the guest gets an program interrupt for the
illegal opcode.
However, the kvmppc_emulate_instruction() also tried to inject a
program exception for this already, so the program interrupt gets
injected twice and the return address in srr0 gets destroyed.
All other callers of kvmppc_emulate_instruction() are also injecting
a program interrupt, and since the callers have the right knowledge
about the srr1 flags that should be used, it is the function
kvmppc_emulate_instruction() that should _not_ inject program
interrupts, so remove the kvmppc_core_queue_program() here.

This fixes the issue discovered by Laurent Vivier with kvm-unit-tests
where the logs are filled with these messages when the test tries
to execute an illegal instruction:

     Couldn't emulate instruction 0x00000000 (op 0 xop 0)
     kvmppc_handle_exit_pr: emulation at 700 failed (00000000)

Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf &lt;agraf@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Laurent Vivier &lt;lvivier@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/qspinlock: Don't kick CPU if IRQ is not initialized</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T10:13:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Lagerwall</name>
<email>ross.lagerwall@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-22T12:05:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e2d9577854f5a5469bcf7a3d1b17ca5e9b9ba673'/>
<id>e2d9577854f5a5469bcf7a3d1b17ca5e9b9ba673</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 707e59ba494372a90d245f18b0c78982caa88e48 upstream.

The following commit:

  1fb3a8b2cfb2 ("xen/spinlock: Fix locking path engaging too soon under PVHVM.")

... moved the initalization of the kicker interrupt until after
native_cpu_up() is called.

However, when using qspinlocks, a CPU may try to kick another CPU that is
spinning (because it has not yet initialized its kicker interrupt), resulting
in the following crash during boot:

  kernel BUG at /build/linux-Ay7j_C/linux-4.4.0/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:1210!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  ...
  RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff814c97c9&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff814c97c9&gt;] xen_send_IPI_one+0x59/0x60
  ...
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff8102be9e&gt;] xen_qlock_kick+0xe/0x10
   [&lt;ffffffff810cabc2&gt;] __pv_queued_spin_unlock+0xb2/0xf0
   [&lt;ffffffff810ca6d1&gt;] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
   [&lt;ffffffff81052936&gt;] ? check_tsc_warp+0x76/0x150
   [&lt;ffffffff81052aa6&gt;] check_tsc_sync_source+0x96/0x160
   [&lt;ffffffff81051e28&gt;] native_cpu_up+0x3d8/0x9f0
   [&lt;ffffffff8102b315&gt;] xen_hvm_cpu_up+0x35/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff8108198c&gt;] _cpu_up+0x13c/0x180
   [&lt;ffffffff81081a4a&gt;] cpu_up+0x7a/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81f80dfc&gt;] smp_init+0x7f/0x81
   [&lt;ffffffff81f5a121&gt;] kernel_init_freeable+0xef/0x212
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f30&gt;] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f3e&gt;] kernel_init+0xe/0xe0
   [&lt;ffffffff8182488f&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f30&gt;] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80

To fix this, only send the kick if the target CPU's interrupt has been
initialized. This check isn't racy, because the target is waiting for
the spinlock, so it won't have initialized the interrupt in the
meantime.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 707e59ba494372a90d245f18b0c78982caa88e48 upstream.

The following commit:

  1fb3a8b2cfb2 ("xen/spinlock: Fix locking path engaging too soon under PVHVM.")

... moved the initalization of the kicker interrupt until after
native_cpu_up() is called.

However, when using qspinlocks, a CPU may try to kick another CPU that is
spinning (because it has not yet initialized its kicker interrupt), resulting
in the following crash during boot:

  kernel BUG at /build/linux-Ay7j_C/linux-4.4.0/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:1210!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  ...
  RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff814c97c9&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff814c97c9&gt;] xen_send_IPI_one+0x59/0x60
  ...
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff8102be9e&gt;] xen_qlock_kick+0xe/0x10
   [&lt;ffffffff810cabc2&gt;] __pv_queued_spin_unlock+0xb2/0xf0
   [&lt;ffffffff810ca6d1&gt;] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
   [&lt;ffffffff81052936&gt;] ? check_tsc_warp+0x76/0x150
   [&lt;ffffffff81052aa6&gt;] check_tsc_sync_source+0x96/0x160
   [&lt;ffffffff81051e28&gt;] native_cpu_up+0x3d8/0x9f0
   [&lt;ffffffff8102b315&gt;] xen_hvm_cpu_up+0x35/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff8108198c&gt;] _cpu_up+0x13c/0x180
   [&lt;ffffffff81081a4a&gt;] cpu_up+0x7a/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81f80dfc&gt;] smp_init+0x7f/0x81
   [&lt;ffffffff81f5a121&gt;] kernel_init_freeable+0xef/0x212
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f30&gt;] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f3e&gt;] kernel_init+0xe/0xe0
   [&lt;ffffffff8182488f&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
   [&lt;ffffffff81817f30&gt;] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80

To fix this, only send the kick if the target CPU's interrupt has been
initialized. This check isn't racy, because the target is waiting for
the spinlock, so it won't have initialized the interrupt in the
meantime.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ghash-clmulni - Fix load failure</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T10:13:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang, Rui Y</name>
<email>rui.y.wang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-29T14:45:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c78c3376ec6707f4e2177906928b12cb6cd8c5a9'/>
<id>c78c3376ec6707f4e2177906928b12cb6cd8c5a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a020a723c65eb8ffa7c237faca26521a024e582 upstream.

ghash_clmulni_intel fails to load on Linux 4.3+ with the following message:
"modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'ghash_clmulni_intel': Invalid argument"

After 8996eafdc ("crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zero") all ahash
drivers are required to implement import()/export(), and must have a non-
zero statesize.

This patch has been tested with the algif_hash interface. The calculated
digest values, after several rounds of import()s and export()s, match those
calculated by tcrypt.

Signed-off-by: Rui Wang &lt;rui.y.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3a020a723c65eb8ffa7c237faca26521a024e582 upstream.

ghash_clmulni_intel fails to load on Linux 4.3+ with the following message:
"modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'ghash_clmulni_intel': Invalid argument"

After 8996eafdc ("crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zero") all ahash
drivers are required to implement import()/export(), and must have a non-
zero statesize.

This patch has been tested with the algif_hash interface. The calculated
digest values, after several rounds of import()s and export()s, match those
calculated by tcrypt.

Signed-off-by: Rui Wang &lt;rui.y.wang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Sumit Semwal &lt;sumit.semwal@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/perf: Fix CR4.PCE propagation to use active_mm instead of mm</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:04:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T19:59:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=62f57041fbdf15db6336542384a4b36f1f387299'/>
<id>62f57041fbdf15db6336542384a4b36f1f387299</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5dc855d44c2ad960a86f593c60461f1ae1566b6d upstream.

If one thread mmaps a perf event while another thread in the same mm
is in some context where active_mm != mm (which can happen in the
scheduler, for example), refresh_pce() would write the wrong value
to CR4.PCE.  This broke some PAPI tests.

Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7911d3f7af14 ("perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5b38a76ea50e405f9abe07a13dfaef87c173a1.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5dc855d44c2ad960a86f593c60461f1ae1566b6d upstream.

If one thread mmaps a perf event while another thread in the same mm
is in some context where active_mm != mm (which can happen in the
scheduler, for example), refresh_pce() would write the wrong value
to CR4.PCE.  This broke some PAPI tests.

Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7911d3f7af14 ("perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5b38a76ea50e405f9abe07a13dfaef87c173a1.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
