<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/crypto, branch v2.6.29</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix module load deadlock with fallback algorithms</title>
<updated>2009-02-26T06:06:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-26T06:06:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a760a6656e6f00bb0144a42a048cf0266646e22c'/>
<id>a760a6656e6f00bb0144a42a048cf0266646e22c</id>
<content type='text'>
With the mandatory algorithm testing at registration, we have
now created a deadlock with algorithms requiring fallbacks.
This can happen if the module containing the algorithm requiring
fallback is loaded first, without the fallback module being loaded
first.  The system will then try to test the new algorithm, find
that it needs to load a fallback, and then try to load that.

As both algorithms share the same module alias, it can attempt
to load the original algorithm again and block indefinitely.

As algorithms requiring fallbacks are a special case, we can fix
this by giving them a different module alias than the rest.  Then
it's just a matter of using the right aliases according to what
algorithms we're trying to find.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With the mandatory algorithm testing at registration, we have
now created a deadlock with algorithms requiring fallbacks.
This can happen if the module containing the algorithm requiring
fallback is loaded first, without the fallback module being loaded
first.  The system will then try to test the new algorithm, find
that it needs to load a fallback, and then try to load that.

As both algorithms share the same module alias, it can attempt
to load the original algorithm again and block indefinitely.

As algorithms requiring fallbacks are a special case, we can fix
this by giving them a different module alias than the rest.  Then
it's just a matter of using the right aliases according to what
algorithms we're trying to find.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ahash - Fix digest size in /proc/crypto</title>
<updated>2009-02-19T06:46:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lee Nipper</name>
<email>lee.nipper@freescale.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-19T06:46:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bb402f16ecf9bcdb944b8fa730f0e43cae519673'/>
<id>bb402f16ecf9bcdb944b8fa730f0e43cae519673</id>
<content type='text'>
crypto_ahash_show changed to use cra_ahash for digestsize reference.

Signed-off-by: Lee Nipper &lt;lee.nipper@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
crypto_ahash_show changed to use cra_ahash for digestsize reference.

Signed-off-by: Lee Nipper &lt;lee.nipper@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: lrw - Fix big endian support</title>
<updated>2009-02-17T12:00:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-17T12:00:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8eb2dfac41c71701bb741f496f0cb7b7e4a3c3f6'/>
<id>8eb2dfac41c71701bb741f496f0cb7b7e4a3c3f6</id>
<content type='text'>
It turns out that LRW has never worked properly on big endian.
This was never discussed because nobody actually used it that
way.  In fact, it was only discovered when Geert Uytterhoeven
loaded it through tcrypt which failed the test on it.

The fix is straightforward, on big endian the to find the nth
bit we should be grouping them by words instead of bytes.  So
setbit128_bbe should xor with 128 - BITS_PER_LONG instead of
128 - BITS_PER_BYTE == 0x78.

Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It turns out that LRW has never worked properly on big endian.
This was never discussed because nobody actually used it that
way.  In fact, it was only discovered when Geert Uytterhoeven
loaded it through tcrypt which failed the test on it.

The fix is straightforward, on big endian the to find the nth
bit we should be grouping them by words instead of bytes.  So
setbit128_bbe should xor with 128 - BITS_PER_LONG instead of
128 - BITS_PER_BYTE == 0x78.

Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: scatterwalk - Avoid flush_dcache_page on slab pages</title>
<updated>2009-02-09T03:30:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-09T03:22:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4f3e797ad07d52d34983354a77b365dfcd48c1b4'/>
<id>4f3e797ad07d52d34983354a77b365dfcd48c1b4</id>
<content type='text'>
It's illegal to call flush_dcache_page on slab pages on a number
of architectures.  So this patch avoids doing so if PageSlab is
true.

In future we can move the flush_dcache_page call to those page
cache users that actually need it.

Reported-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It's illegal to call flush_dcache_page on slab pages on a number
of architectures.  So this patch avoids doing so if PageSlab is
true.

In future we can move the flush_dcache_page call to those page
cache users that actually need it.

Reported-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix zeroing on free</title>
<updated>2009-02-05T05:48:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-05T05:48:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7b2cd92adc5430b0c1adeb120971852b4ea1ab08'/>
<id>7b2cd92adc5430b0c1adeb120971852b4ea1ab08</id>
<content type='text'>
Geert Uytterhoeven pointed out that we're not zeroing all the
memory when freeing a transform.  This patch fixes it by calling
ksize to ensure that we zero everything in sight.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Geert Uytterhoeven pointed out that we're not zeroing all the
memory when freeing a transform.  This patch fixes it by calling
ksize to ensure that we zero everything in sight.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: shash - Fix module refcount</title>
<updated>2009-02-05T05:19:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger</name>
<email>rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2009-02-05T05:19:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4abfd73e34e7915e62b6f75bd3e9f4014f830910'/>
<id>4abfd73e34e7915e62b6f75bd3e9f4014f830910</id>
<content type='text'>
Module reference counting for shash is incorrect: when
a new shash transformation is created the refcount is not
increased as it should.

Signed-off-by: Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger &lt;rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Module reference counting for shash is incorrect: when
a new shash transformation is created the refcount is not
increased as it should.

Signed-off-by: Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger &lt;rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix algorithm test race that broke aead initialisation</title>
<updated>2009-01-28T03:09:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-28T03:09:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b8e15992b420d09dae831125a623c474c8637cee'/>
<id>b8e15992b420d09dae831125a623c474c8637cee</id>
<content type='text'>
When we complete a test we'll notify everyone waiting on it, drop
the mutex, and then remove the test larval (after reacquiring the
mutex).  If one of the notified parties tries to register another
algorithm with the same driver name prior to the removal of the
test larval, they will fail with EEXIST as only one algorithm of
a given name can be tested at any time.

This broke the initialisation of aead and givcipher algorithms as
they will register two algorithms with the same driver name, in
sequence.

This patch fixes the problem by marking the larval as dead before
we drop the mutex, and also ignoring all dead or dying algorithms
on the registration path.

Tested-by: Andreas Steffen &lt;andreas.steffen@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When we complete a test we'll notify everyone waiting on it, drop
the mutex, and then remove the test larval (after reacquiring the
mutex).  If one of the notified parties tries to register another
algorithm with the same driver name prior to the removal of the
test larval, they will fail with EEXIST as only one algorithm of
a given name can be tested at any time.

This broke the initialisation of aead and givcipher algorithms as
they will register two algorithms with the same driver name, in
sequence.

This patch fixes the problem by marking the larval as dead before
we drop the mutex, and also ignoring all dead or dying algorithms
on the registration path.

Tested-by: Andreas Steffen &lt;andreas.steffen@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccm - Fix handling of null assoc data</title>
<updated>2009-01-27T06:11:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarod Wilson</name>
<email>jarod@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-22T08:58:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=516280e735b034216de97eb7ba080ec6acbfc58f'/>
<id>516280e735b034216de97eb7ba080ec6acbfc58f</id>
<content type='text'>
Its a valid use case to have null associated data in a ccm vector, but
this case isn't being handled properly right now.

The following ccm decryption/verification test vector, using the
rfc4309 implementation regularly triggers a panic, as will any
other vector with null assoc data:

* key: ab2f8a74b71cd2b1ff802e487d82f8b9
* iv: c6fb7d800d13abd8a6b2d8
* Associated Data: [NULL]
* Tag Length: 8
* input: d5e8939fc7892e2b

The resulting panic looks like so:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff810064ddaec0 RIP: 
 [&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;] :ccm:get_data_to_compute+0x1a6/0x1d6
PGD 8063 PUD 0 
Oops: 0002 [1] SMP 
last sysfs file: /module/libata/version
CPU 0
Modules linked in: crypto_tester_kmod(U) seqiv krng ansi_cprng chainiv rng ctr aes_generic aes_x86_64 ccm cryptomgr testmgr_cipher testmgr aead crypto_blkcipher crypto_a
lgapi des ipv6 xfrm_nalgo crypto_api autofs4 hidp l2cap bluetooth nfs lockd fscache nfs_acl sunrpc ip_conntrack_netbios_ns ipt_REJECT xt_state ip_conntrack nfnetlink xt_
tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables dm_mirror dm_log dm_multipath scsi_dh dm_mod video hwmon backlight sbs i2c_ec button battery asus_acpi acpi_memhotplug ac lp sg 
snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_oss joydev snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss ide_cd snd_pcm floppy parport_p
c shpchp e752x_edac snd_timer e1000 i2c_i801 edac_mc snd soundcore snd_page_alloc i2c_core cdrom parport serio_raw pcspkr ata_piix libata sd_mod scsi_mod ext3 jbd uhci_h
cd ohci_hcd ehci_hcd
Pid: 12844, comm: crypto-tester Tainted: G      2.6.18-128.el5.fips1 #1
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;] :ccm:get_data_to_compute+0x1a6/0x1d6
RSP: 0018:ffff8100134434e8  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8100104898b0 RCX: ffffffffab6aea10
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff8100104898c0 RDI: ffff810064ddaec0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8100104898b0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8100103bac84 R11: ffff8100104898b0 R12: ffff810010489858
R13: ffff8100104898b0 R14: ffff8100103bac00 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00002ab881adfd30(0000) GS:ffffffff803ac000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: ffff810064ddaec0 CR3: 0000000012a88000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Process crypto-tester (pid: 12844, threadinfo ffff810013442000, task ffff81003d165860)
Stack:  ffff8100103bac00 ffff8100104898e8 ffff8100134436f8 ffffffff00000000
 0000000000000000 ffff8100104898b0 0000000000000000 ffff810010489858
 0000000000000000 ffff8100103bac00 ffff8100134436f8 ffffffff8864c634
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff8864c634&gt;] :ccm:crypto_ccm_auth+0x12d/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff8864cf73&gt;] :ccm:crypto_ccm_decrypt+0x161/0x23a
 [&lt;ffffffff88633643&gt;] :crypto_tester_kmod:cavs_test_rfc4309_ccm+0x4a5/0x559
[...]

The above is from a RHEL5-based kernel, but upstream is susceptible too.

The fix is trivial: in crypto/ccm.c:crypto_ccm_auth(), pctx-&gt;ilen contains
whatever was in memory when pctx was allocated if assoclen is 0. The tested
fix is to simply add an else clause setting pctx-&gt;ilen to 0 for the
assoclen == 0 case, so that get_data_to_compute() doesn't try doing
things its not supposed to.

Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Its a valid use case to have null associated data in a ccm vector, but
this case isn't being handled properly right now.

The following ccm decryption/verification test vector, using the
rfc4309 implementation regularly triggers a panic, as will any
other vector with null assoc data:

* key: ab2f8a74b71cd2b1ff802e487d82f8b9
* iv: c6fb7d800d13abd8a6b2d8
* Associated Data: [NULL]
* Tag Length: 8
* input: d5e8939fc7892e2b

The resulting panic looks like so:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff810064ddaec0 RIP: 
 [&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;] :ccm:get_data_to_compute+0x1a6/0x1d6
PGD 8063 PUD 0 
Oops: 0002 [1] SMP 
last sysfs file: /module/libata/version
CPU 0
Modules linked in: crypto_tester_kmod(U) seqiv krng ansi_cprng chainiv rng ctr aes_generic aes_x86_64 ccm cryptomgr testmgr_cipher testmgr aead crypto_blkcipher crypto_a
lgapi des ipv6 xfrm_nalgo crypto_api autofs4 hidp l2cap bluetooth nfs lockd fscache nfs_acl sunrpc ip_conntrack_netbios_ns ipt_REJECT xt_state ip_conntrack nfnetlink xt_
tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables dm_mirror dm_log dm_multipath scsi_dh dm_mod video hwmon backlight sbs i2c_ec button battery asus_acpi acpi_memhotplug ac lp sg 
snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_oss joydev snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss ide_cd snd_pcm floppy parport_p
c shpchp e752x_edac snd_timer e1000 i2c_i801 edac_mc snd soundcore snd_page_alloc i2c_core cdrom parport serio_raw pcspkr ata_piix libata sd_mod scsi_mod ext3 jbd uhci_h
cd ohci_hcd ehci_hcd
Pid: 12844, comm: crypto-tester Tainted: G      2.6.18-128.el5.fips1 #1
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8864c4d7&gt;] :ccm:get_data_to_compute+0x1a6/0x1d6
RSP: 0018:ffff8100134434e8  EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8100104898b0 RCX: ffffffffab6aea10
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff8100104898c0 RDI: ffff810064ddaec0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8100104898b0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8100103bac84 R11: ffff8100104898b0 R12: ffff810010489858
R13: ffff8100104898b0 R14: ffff8100103bac00 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00002ab881adfd30(0000) GS:ffffffff803ac000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: ffff810064ddaec0 CR3: 0000000012a88000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Process crypto-tester (pid: 12844, threadinfo ffff810013442000, task ffff81003d165860)
Stack:  ffff8100103bac00 ffff8100104898e8 ffff8100134436f8 ffffffff00000000
 0000000000000000 ffff8100104898b0 0000000000000000 ffff810010489858
 0000000000000000 ffff8100103bac00 ffff8100134436f8 ffffffff8864c634
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff8864c634&gt;] :ccm:crypto_ccm_auth+0x12d/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff8864cf73&gt;] :ccm:crypto_ccm_decrypt+0x161/0x23a
 [&lt;ffffffff88633643&gt;] :crypto_tester_kmod:cavs_test_rfc4309_ccm+0x4a5/0x559
[...]

The above is from a RHEL5-based kernel, but upstream is susceptible too.

The fix is trivial: in crypto/ccm.c:crypto_ccm_auth(), pctx-&gt;ilen contains
whatever was in memory when pctx was allocated if assoclen is 0. The tested
fix is to simply add an else clause setting pctx-&gt;ilen to 0 for the
assoclen == 0 case, so that get_data_to_compute() doesn't try doing
things its not supposed to.

Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: blkcipher - Fix WARN_ON handling in walk_done</title>
<updated>2009-01-27T06:11:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-16T03:40:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bac1b5c4696f217afeac5b29874a337bc39da717'/>
<id>bac1b5c4696f217afeac5b29874a337bc39da717</id>
<content type='text'>
When we get left-over bits from a slow walk, it means that the
underlying cipher has gone troppo.  However, as we're handling
that case we should ensure that the caller terminates the walk.

This patch does this by setting walk-&gt;nbytes to zero.

Reported-by: Roel Kluin &lt;roel.kluin@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When we get left-over bits from a slow walk, it means that the
underlying cipher has gone troppo.  However, as we're handling
that case we should ensure that the caller terminates the walk.

This patch does this by setting walk-&gt;nbytes to zero.

Reported-by: Roel Kluin &lt;roel.kluin@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Huang Ying &lt;ying.huang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Fix zero-length IV crash</title>
<updated>2009-01-15T04:33:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-13T00:26:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=29b37f42127f7da511560a40ea74f5047da40c13'/>
<id>29b37f42127f7da511560a40ea74f5047da40c13</id>
<content type='text'>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.

This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As it is if an algorithm with a zero-length IV is used (e.g.,
NULL encryption) with authenc, authenc may generate an SG entry
of length zero, which will trigger a BUG check in the hash layer.

This patch fixes it by skipping the IV SG generation if the IV
size is zero.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
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