<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/crypto, branch v3.10.24</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: update consumers of MSG_MORE to recognize MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST</title>
<updated>2013-12-12T06:36:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shawn Landden</name>
<email>shawn@churchofgit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-25T06:36:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=eb050d976ccdff8c5499a826c19a818868824393'/>
<id>eb050d976ccdff8c5499a826c19a818868824393</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 upstream.

Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.

algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.

This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.

v3: also fix udp

Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawnlandden@gmail.com&gt;
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawn@churchofgit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 upstream.

Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.

algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.

This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.

v3: also fix udp

Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawnlandden@gmail.com&gt;
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawn@churchofgit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: authenc - Find proper IV address in ablkcipher callback</title>
<updated>2013-12-12T06:36:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Lendacky</name>
<email>thomas.lendacky@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-12T17:46:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1c651d3627a2d3ba10f2f116303ca620e17b14d5'/>
<id>1c651d3627a2d3ba10f2f116303ca620e17b14d5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fc019c7122dfcd69c50142b57a735539aec5da95 upstream.

When performing an asynchronous ablkcipher operation the authenc
completion callback routine is invoked, but it does not locate and use
the proper IV.

The callback routine, crypto_authenc_encrypt_done, is updated to use
the same method of calculating the address of the IV as is done in
crypto_authenc_encrypt function which sets up the callback.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fc019c7122dfcd69c50142b57a735539aec5da95 upstream.

When performing an asynchronous ablkcipher operation the authenc
completion callback routine is invoked, but it does not locate and use
the proper IV.

The callback routine, crypto_authenc_encrypt_done, is updated to use
the same method of calculating the address of the IV as is done in
crypto_authenc_encrypt function which sets up the callback.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccm - Fix handling of zero plaintext when computing mac</title>
<updated>2013-12-12T06:36:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Horia Geanta</name>
<email>horia.geanta@freescale.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-28T13:11:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bf2e52300b9e5a329c5f76ba8d77e33ade976b1c'/>
<id>bf2e52300b9e5a329c5f76ba8d77e33ade976b1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5638cabf3e4883f38dfb246c30980cebf694fbda upstream.

There are cases when cryptlen can be zero in crypto_ccm_auth():
-encryptiom: input scatterlist length is zero (no plaintext)
-decryption: input scatterlist contains only the mac
plus the condition of having different source and destination buffers
(or else scatterlist length = max(plaintext_len, ciphertext_len)).

These are not handled correctly, leading to crashes like:

root@p4080ds:~/crypto# insmod tcrypt.ko mode=45
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at crypto/scatterwalk.c:37!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=8 P4080 DS
Modules linked in: tcrypt(+) crc32c xts xcbc vmac pcbc ecb gcm ghash_generic gf128mul ccm ctr seqiv
CPU: 3 PID: 1082 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #14
task: ee12c5b0 ti: eecd0000 task.ti: eecd0000
NIP: c0204d98 LR: f9225848 CTR: c0204d80
REGS: eecd1b70 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (3.11.0)
MSR: 00029002 &lt;CE,EE,ME&gt;  CR: 22044022  XER: 20000000

GPR00: f9225c94 eecd1c20 ee12c5b0 eecd1c28 ee879400 ee879400 00000000 ee607464
GPR08: 00000001 00000001 00000000 006b0000 c0204d80 00000000 00000002 c0698e20
GPR16: ee987000 ee895000 fffffff4 ee879500 00000100 eecd1d58 00000001 00000000
GPR24: ee879400 00000020 00000000 00000000 ee5b2800 ee607430 00000004 ee607460
NIP [c0204d98] scatterwalk_start+0x18/0x30
LR [f9225848] get_data_to_compute+0x28/0x2f0 [ccm]
Call Trace:
[eecd1c20] [f9225974] get_data_to_compute+0x154/0x2f0 [ccm] (unreliable)
[eecd1c70] [f9225c94] crypto_ccm_auth+0x184/0x1d0 [ccm]
[eecd1cb0] [f9225d40] crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x60/0x2d0 [ccm]
[eecd1cf0] [c020d77c] __test_aead+0x3ec/0xe20
[eecd1e20] [c020f35c] test_aead+0x6c/0xe0
[eecd1e40] [c020f420] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xd0
[eecd1e60] [c020e5e4] alg_test+0x114/0x2e0
[eecd1ee0] [c020bd1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x60
[eecd1ef0] [c0047058] kthread+0xa8/0xb0
[eecd1f40] [c000eb0c] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
0f080000 81290024 552807fe 0f080000 5529003a 4bffffb4 90830000 39400000
39000001 8124000c 2f890000 7d28579e &lt;0f090000&gt; 81240008 91230004 4e800020
---[ end trace 6d652dfcd1be37bd ]---

Cc: Jussi Kivilinna &lt;jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5638cabf3e4883f38dfb246c30980cebf694fbda upstream.

There are cases when cryptlen can be zero in crypto_ccm_auth():
-encryptiom: input scatterlist length is zero (no plaintext)
-decryption: input scatterlist contains only the mac
plus the condition of having different source and destination buffers
(or else scatterlist length = max(plaintext_len, ciphertext_len)).

These are not handled correctly, leading to crashes like:

root@p4080ds:~/crypto# insmod tcrypt.ko mode=45
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at crypto/scatterwalk.c:37!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=8 P4080 DS
Modules linked in: tcrypt(+) crc32c xts xcbc vmac pcbc ecb gcm ghash_generic gf128mul ccm ctr seqiv
CPU: 3 PID: 1082 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 3.11.0 #14
task: ee12c5b0 ti: eecd0000 task.ti: eecd0000
NIP: c0204d98 LR: f9225848 CTR: c0204d80
REGS: eecd1b70 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (3.11.0)
MSR: 00029002 &lt;CE,EE,ME&gt;  CR: 22044022  XER: 20000000

GPR00: f9225c94 eecd1c20 ee12c5b0 eecd1c28 ee879400 ee879400 00000000 ee607464
GPR08: 00000001 00000001 00000000 006b0000 c0204d80 00000000 00000002 c0698e20
GPR16: ee987000 ee895000 fffffff4 ee879500 00000100 eecd1d58 00000001 00000000
GPR24: ee879400 00000020 00000000 00000000 ee5b2800 ee607430 00000004 ee607460
NIP [c0204d98] scatterwalk_start+0x18/0x30
LR [f9225848] get_data_to_compute+0x28/0x2f0 [ccm]
Call Trace:
[eecd1c20] [f9225974] get_data_to_compute+0x154/0x2f0 [ccm] (unreliable)
[eecd1c70] [f9225c94] crypto_ccm_auth+0x184/0x1d0 [ccm]
[eecd1cb0] [f9225d40] crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x60/0x2d0 [ccm]
[eecd1cf0] [c020d77c] __test_aead+0x3ec/0xe20
[eecd1e20] [c020f35c] test_aead+0x6c/0xe0
[eecd1e40] [c020f420] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xd0
[eecd1e60] [c020e5e4] alg_test+0x114/0x2e0
[eecd1ee0] [c020bd1c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x60
[eecd1ef0] [c0047058] kthread+0xa8/0xb0
[eecd1f40] [c000eb0c] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
0f080000 81290024 552807fe 0f080000 5529003a 4bffffb4 90830000 39400000
39000001 8124000c 2f890000 7d28579e &lt;0f090000&gt; 81240008 91230004 4e800020
---[ end trace 6d652dfcd1be37bd ]---

Cc: Jussi Kivilinna &lt;jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta &lt;horia.geanta@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: update consumers of MSG_MORE to recognize MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST</title>
<updated>2013-12-08T15:29:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shawn Landden</name>
<email>shawn@churchofgit.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-25T06:36:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=86a243440a102e315438c6faf57881796533528d'/>
<id>86a243440a102e315438c6faf57881796533528d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 ]

Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.

algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.

This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.

v3: also fix udp

Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawnlandden@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawn@churchofgit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 ]

Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.

algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.

This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.

v3: also fix udp

Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawnlandden@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;therbert@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden &lt;shawn@churchofgit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic</title>
<updated>2013-12-08T15:29:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-21T02:14:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2f73d7fde99d702cba6a05062c27605a6eef1b78'/>
<id>2f73d7fde99d702cba6a05062c27605a6eef1b78</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c ]

This patch now always passes msg-&gt;msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size &lt;= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.

This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.

Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.

Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.

Changes since RFC:

Set msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.

With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys-&gt;msg_namelen == 0)
	msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL
".

This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.

Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.

Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c ]

This patch now always passes msg-&gt;msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size &lt;= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.

This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.

Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.

Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.

Changes since RFC:

Set msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.

With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys-&gt;msg_namelen == 0)
	msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL
".

This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.

Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.

Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>X.509: Remove certificate date checks</title>
<updated>2013-12-04T18:57:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-18T16:40:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d8f0a31aa3ccf94e1902ff6c0c68410e3b68ecca'/>
<id>d8f0a31aa3ccf94e1902ff6c0c68410e3b68ecca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 124df926090b32a998483f6e43ebeccdbe5b5302 upstream.

Remove the certificate date checks that are performed when a certificate is
parsed.  There are two checks: a valid from and a valid to.  The first check is
causing a lot of problems with system clocks that don't keep good time and the
second places an implicit expiry date upon the kernel when used for module
signing, so do we really need them?

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Alexander Holler &lt;holler@ahsoftware.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 124df926090b32a998483f6e43ebeccdbe5b5302 upstream.

Remove the certificate date checks that are performed when a certificate is
parsed.  There are two checks: a valid from and a valid to.  The first check is
causing a lot of problems with system clocks that don't keep good time and the
second places an implicit expiry date upon the kernel when used for module
signing, so do we really need them?

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Alexander Holler &lt;holler@ahsoftware.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ansi_cprng - Fix off by one error in non-block size request</title>
<updated>2013-11-29T19:11:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-17T12:33:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d8a7dd7122d411662e7ccf9986070fbe2ac2aeb2'/>
<id>d8a7dd7122d411662e7ccf9986070fbe2ac2aeb2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 714b33d15130cbb5ab426456d4e3de842d6c5b8a upstream.

Stephan Mueller reported to me recently a error in random number generation in
the ansi cprng. If several small requests are made that are less than the
instances block size, the remainder for loop code doesn't increment
rand_data_valid in the last iteration, meaning that the last bytes in the
rand_data buffer gets reused on the subsequent smaller-than-a-block request for
random data.

The fix is pretty easy, just re-code the for loop to make sure that
rand_data_valid gets incremented appropriately

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 714b33d15130cbb5ab426456d4e3de842d6c5b8a upstream.

Stephan Mueller reported to me recently a error in random number generation in
the ansi cprng. If several small requests are made that are less than the
instances block size, the remainder for loop code doesn't increment
rand_data_valid in the last iteration, meaning that the last bytes in the
rand_data buffer gets reused on the subsequent smaller-than-a-block request for
random data.

The fix is pretty easy, just re-code the for loop to make sure that
rand_data_valid gets incremented appropriately

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix race condition in larval lookup</title>
<updated>2013-09-27T00:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-08T04:33:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=139653e11c9eec4d5eff614e688d6bec99b78d7f'/>
<id>139653e11c9eec4d5eff614e688d6bec99b78d7f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77dbd7a95e4a4f15264c333a9e9ab97ee27dc2aa upstream.

crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one.
Any larval created by another entity must be processed through
crypto_larval_wait before being returned.

Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which
will most likely lead to a crash.

Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77dbd7a95e4a4f15264c333a9e9ab97ee27dc2aa upstream.

crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one.
Any larval created by another entity must be processed through
crypto_larval_wait before being returned.

Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which
will most likely lead to a crash.

Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sanitize argument for format string</title>
<updated>2013-07-13T18:42:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-03T22:01:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c231b9d04be757bd8a9953737ed2c22ffb987f49'/>
<id>c231b9d04be757bd8a9953737ed2c22ffb987f49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c8fca1d92e14859159a82b8a380d220139b7344 upstream.

The template lookup interface does not provide a way to use format
strings, so make sure that the interface cannot be abused accidentally.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c8fca1d92e14859159a82b8a380d220139b7344 upstream.

The template lookup interface does not provide a way to use format
strings, so make sure that the interface cannot be abused accidentally.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algboss - Hold ref count on larval</title>
<updated>2013-06-25T11:15:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-25T11:15:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=939e17799619e31331d2433041196529515a86a6'/>
<id>939e17799619e31331d2433041196529515a86a6</id>
<content type='text'>
On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 10:00:21AM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
&gt; After having fixed a NULL pointer dereference in SCTP 1abd165e ("net:
&gt; sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction"), I ran into
&gt; the following NULL pointer dereference in the crypto subsystem with
&gt; the same reproducer, easily hit each time:
&gt; 
&gt; BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
&gt; IP: [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt; PGD 0
&gt; Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
&gt; Modules linked in: padlock_sha(F-) sha256_generic(F) sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [..]
&gt; CPU: 6 PID: 3326 Comm: cryptomgr_probe Tainted: GF            3.10.0-rc5+ #1
&gt; Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
&gt; task: ffff88007b6cf4e0 ti: ffff88007b7cc000 task.ti: ffff88007b7cc000
&gt; RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt; RSP: 0018:ffff88007b7cde08  EFLAGS: 00010082
&gt; RAX: ffffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffff88003756c130 RCX: 0000000000000000
&gt; RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff88003756c130
&gt; RBP: ffff88007b7cde48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88012b173200
&gt; R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000282
&gt; R13: ffff88003756c138 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
&gt; FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88012fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
&gt; CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
&gt; CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
&gt; DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
&gt; DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
&gt; Stack:
&gt;  ffff88007b7cde28 0000000300000000 ffff88007b7cde28 ffff88003756c130
&gt;  0000000000000282 ffff88003756c128 ffffffff81227670 0000000000000000
&gt;  ffff88007b7cde78 ffffffff810722b7 ffff88007cdcf000 ffffffff81a90540
&gt; Call Trace:
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227670&gt;] ? crypto_alloc_pcomp+0x20/0x20
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff810722b7&gt;] complete_all+0x47/0x60
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227708&gt;] cryptomgr_probe+0x98/0xc0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227670&gt;] ? crypto_alloc_pcomp+0x20/0x20
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff8106760e&gt;] kthread+0xce/0xe0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81067540&gt;] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff815450dc&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81067540&gt;] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
&gt; Code: 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 66 66 66 66 90 89 75 cc 89 55 c8
&gt;       4c 8d 6f 08 48 8b 57 08 41 89 cf 4d 89 c6 48 8d 42 e
&gt; RIP  [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt;  RSP &lt;ffff88007b7cde08&gt;
&gt; CR2: 0000000000000000
&gt; ---[ end trace b495b19270a4d37e ]---
&gt; 
&gt; My assumption is that the following is happening: the minimal SCTP
&gt; tool runs under ``echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable'', hence
&gt; it's making use of crypto_alloc_hash() via sctp_auth_init_hmacs().
&gt; It forks itself, heavily allocates, binds, listens and waits in
&gt; accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills some of them (no
&gt; need for an actual client in this case to hit this). Then, again,
&gt; allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.
&gt; 
&gt; The problem that might be happening here is that cryptomgr requests
&gt; the module to probe/load through cryptomgr_schedule_probe(), but
&gt; before the thread handler cryptomgr_probe() returns, we return from
&gt; the wait_for_completion_interruptible() function and probably already
&gt; have cleared up larval, thus we run into a NULL pointer dereference
&gt; when in cryptomgr_probe() complete_all() is being called.
&gt; 
&gt; If we wait with wait_for_completion() instead, this panic will not
&gt; occur anymore. This is valid, because in case a signal is pending,
&gt; cryptomgr_probe() returns from probing anyway with properly calling
&gt; complete_all().

The use of wait_for_completion_interruptible is intentional so that
we don't lock up the thread if a bug causes us to never wake up.

This bug is caused by the helper thread using the larval without
holding a reference count on it.  If the helper thread completes
after the original thread requesting for help has gone away and
destroyed the larval, then we get the crash above.

So the fix is to hold a reference count on the larval.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.6+
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On Thu, Jun 20, 2013 at 10:00:21AM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
&gt; After having fixed a NULL pointer dereference in SCTP 1abd165e ("net:
&gt; sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction"), I ran into
&gt; the following NULL pointer dereference in the crypto subsystem with
&gt; the same reproducer, easily hit each time:
&gt; 
&gt; BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
&gt; IP: [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt; PGD 0
&gt; Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
&gt; Modules linked in: padlock_sha(F-) sha256_generic(F) sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [..]
&gt; CPU: 6 PID: 3326 Comm: cryptomgr_probe Tainted: GF            3.10.0-rc5+ #1
&gt; Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
&gt; task: ffff88007b6cf4e0 ti: ffff88007b7cc000 task.ti: ffff88007b7cc000
&gt; RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt; RSP: 0018:ffff88007b7cde08  EFLAGS: 00010082
&gt; RAX: ffffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffff88003756c130 RCX: 0000000000000000
&gt; RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff88003756c130
&gt; RBP: ffff88007b7cde48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88012b173200
&gt; R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000282
&gt; R13: ffff88003756c138 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
&gt; FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88012fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
&gt; CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
&gt; CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
&gt; DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
&gt; DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
&gt; Stack:
&gt;  ffff88007b7cde28 0000000300000000 ffff88007b7cde28 ffff88003756c130
&gt;  0000000000000282 ffff88003756c128 ffffffff81227670 0000000000000000
&gt;  ffff88007b7cde78 ffffffff810722b7 ffff88007cdcf000 ffffffff81a90540
&gt; Call Trace:
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227670&gt;] ? crypto_alloc_pcomp+0x20/0x20
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff810722b7&gt;] complete_all+0x47/0x60
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227708&gt;] cryptomgr_probe+0x98/0xc0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81227670&gt;] ? crypto_alloc_pcomp+0x20/0x20
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff8106760e&gt;] kthread+0xce/0xe0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81067540&gt;] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff815450dc&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
&gt;  [&lt;ffffffff81067540&gt;] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x70/0x70
&gt; Code: 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 66 66 66 66 90 89 75 cc 89 55 c8
&gt;       4c 8d 6f 08 48 8b 57 08 41 89 cf 4d 89 c6 48 8d 42 e
&gt; RIP  [&lt;ffffffff81070321&gt;] __wake_up_common+0x31/0x90
&gt;  RSP &lt;ffff88007b7cde08&gt;
&gt; CR2: 0000000000000000
&gt; ---[ end trace b495b19270a4d37e ]---
&gt; 
&gt; My assumption is that the following is happening: the minimal SCTP
&gt; tool runs under ``echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable'', hence
&gt; it's making use of crypto_alloc_hash() via sctp_auth_init_hmacs().
&gt; It forks itself, heavily allocates, binds, listens and waits in
&gt; accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills some of them (no
&gt; need for an actual client in this case to hit this). Then, again,
&gt; allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.
&gt; 
&gt; The problem that might be happening here is that cryptomgr requests
&gt; the module to probe/load through cryptomgr_schedule_probe(), but
&gt; before the thread handler cryptomgr_probe() returns, we return from
&gt; the wait_for_completion_interruptible() function and probably already
&gt; have cleared up larval, thus we run into a NULL pointer dereference
&gt; when in cryptomgr_probe() complete_all() is being called.
&gt; 
&gt; If we wait with wait_for_completion() instead, this panic will not
&gt; occur anymore. This is valid, because in case a signal is pending,
&gt; cryptomgr_probe() returns from probing anyway with properly calling
&gt; complete_all().

The use of wait_for_completion_interruptible is intentional so that
we don't lock up the thread if a bug causes us to never wake up.

This bug is caused by the helper thread using the larval without
holding a reference count on it.  If the helper thread completes
after the original thread requesting for help has gone away and
destroyed the larval, then we get the crash above.

So the fix is to hold a reference count on the larval.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.6+
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
