Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags.
This prevents from passing multiple isolation features at once to
housekeeping interfaces, which soon won't be possible anymore as each
isolation features will have their own cpumask.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207155910.527133-5-frederic@kernel.org

Fix checkpatch warnings:
    WARNING: Prefer 'unsigned int' to bare use of 'unsigned'

Signed-off-by: Jinchao Wang <wjc@cdjrlc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628171907.63646-2-wjc@cdjrlc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

These are only used by putting their address in an array of pointers to
const struct attribute_group (either directly or via the
__ATTRIBUTE_GROUP macro). Make them const to allow the compiler to place
them in read-only memory.

Signed-off-by: Rikard Falkeborn <rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528213408.20067-1-rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The variable retval is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  Clean this up by
initializing retval to -ENOMEM and remove the assignment to retval
on the !dev failure path.

Kudos to Rafael for the improved fix suggestion.

Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218202837.516231-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Change additional instances that could use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at
that the coccinelle script could not convert.

o macros creating show functions with ## concatenation
o unbound sprintf uses with buf+len for start of output to sysfs_emit_at
o returns with ?: tests and sprintf to sysfs_emit
o sysfs output with struct class * not struct device * arguments

Miscellanea:

o remove unnecessary initializations around these changes
o consistently use int len for return length of show functions
o use octal permissions and not S_<FOO>
o rename a few show function names so DEVICE_ATTR_<FOO> can be used
o use DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO where appropriate
o consistently use const char *output for strings
o checkpatch/style neatening

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8bc24444fe2049a9b2de6127389b57edfdfe324d.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.

Done with:

$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .

And cocci script:

$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
+	sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
-	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+	len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	...
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
-	return strlen(buf);
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>

Pull core SMP updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "CPU (hotplug) updates:

   - Support for locked CSD objects in smp_call_function_single_async()
     which allows to simplify callsites in the scheduler core and MIPS

   - Treewide consolidation of CPU hotplug functions which ensures the
     consistency between the sysfs interface and kernel state. The low
     level functions cpu_up/down() are now confined to the core code and
     not longer accessible from random code"

* tag 'smp-core-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (22 commits)
  cpu/hotplug: Ignore pm_wakeup_pending() for disable_nonboot_cpus()
  cpu/hotplug: Hide cpu_up/down()
  cpu/hotplug: Move bringup of secondary CPUs out of smp_init()
  torture: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  firmware: psci: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  xen/cpuhotplug: Replace cpu_up/down() with device_online/offline()
  parisc: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  sparc: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  powerpc: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  x86/smp: Replace cpu_up/down() with add/remove_cpu()
  arm64: hibernate: Use bringup_hibernate_cpu()
  cpu/hotplug: Provide bringup_hibernate_cpu()
  arm64: Use reboot_cpu instead of hardconding it to 0
  arm64: Don't use disable_nonboot_cpus()
  ARM: Use reboot_cpu instead of hardcoding it to 0
  ARM: Don't use disable_nonboot_cpus()
  ia64: Replace cpu_down() with smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus()
  cpu/hotplug: Create a new function to shutdown nonboot cpus
  cpu/hotplug: Add new {add,remove}_cpu() functions
  sched/core: Remove rq.hrtick_csd_pending
  ...