<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/drivers/char, branch v3.17-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>virtio: rng: add derating factor for use by hwrng core</title>
<updated>2014-08-15T04:56:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amit Shah</name>
<email>amit.shah@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-11T18:35:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=34679ec7a0c45da8161507e1f2e1f72749dfd85c'/>
<id>34679ec7a0c45da8161507e1f2e1f72749dfd85c</id>
<content type='text'>
The khwrngd thread is started when a hwrng device of sufficient
quality is registered.  The virtio-rng device is backed by the
hypervisor, and we trust the hypervisor to provide real entropy.

A malicious or badly-implemented hypervisor is a scenario that's
irrelevant -- such a setup is bound to cause all sorts of badness, and a
compromised hwrng is the least of the user's worries.

Given this, we might as well assume that the quality of randomness we
receive is perfectly trustworthy.  Hence, we use 100% for the factor,
indicating maximum confidence in the source.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah &lt;amit.shah@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amos Kong &lt;akong@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The khwrngd thread is started when a hwrng device of sufficient
quality is registered.  The virtio-rng device is backed by the
hypervisor, and we trust the hypervisor to provide real entropy.

A malicious or badly-implemented hypervisor is a scenario that's
irrelevant -- such a setup is bound to cause all sorts of badness, and a
compromised hwrng is the least of the user's worries.

Given this, we might as well assume that the quality of randomness we
receive is perfectly trustworthy.  Hence, we use 100% for the factor,
indicating maximum confidence in the source.

Signed-off-by: Amit Shah &lt;amit.shah@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amos Kong &lt;akong@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'virtio-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux</title>
<updated>2014-08-11T04:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-11T04:31:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=801a71a858631109a64bf30b1c480b0a18386605'/>
<id>801a71a858631109a64bf30b1c480b0a18386605</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull virtio updates from Rusty Russell.

* tag 'virtio-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  Revert "hwrng: virtio - ensure reads happen after successful probe"
  virtio: rng: delay hwrng_register() till driver is ready
  virtio: rng: re-arrange struct elements for better packing
  virtio: rng: remove unused struct element
  virtio: Replace DEFINE_PCI_DEVICE_TABLE macro use
  virtio: console: remove unnecessary null test before debugfs_remove_recursive
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull virtio updates from Rusty Russell.

* tag 'virtio-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  Revert "hwrng: virtio - ensure reads happen after successful probe"
  virtio: rng: delay hwrng_register() till driver is ready
  virtio: rng: re-arrange struct elements for better packing
  virtio: rng: remove unused struct element
  virtio: Replace DEFINE_PCI_DEVICE_TABLE macro use
  virtio: console: remove unnecessary null test before debugfs_remove_recursive
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'drm-next' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux</title>
<updated>2014-08-08T00:36:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-08T00:36:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a7d7a143d0b4cb1914705884ca5c25e322dba693'/>
<id>a7d7a143d0b4cb1914705884ca5c25e322dba693</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull DRM updates from Dave Airlie:
 "Like all good pull reqs this ends with a revert, so it must mean we
  tested it,

[ Ed. That's _one_ way of looking at it ]

  This pull is missing nouveau, Ben has been stuck trying to track down
  a very longstanding bug that revealed itself due to some other
  changes.  I've asked him to send you a direct pull request for nouveau
  once he cleans things up.  I'm away until Monday so don't want to
  delay things, you can make a decision on that when he sends it, I have
  my phone so I can ack things just not really merge much.

  It has one trivial conflict with your tree in armada_drv.c, and also
  the pull request contains some component changes that are already in
  your tree, the base tree from Russell went via Greg's tree already,
  but some stuff still shows up in here that doesn't when I merge my
  tree into yours.

  Otherwise all pretty standard graphics fare, one new driver and
  changes all over the place.

  New drivers:
   - sti kms driver for STMicroelectronics chipsets stih416 and stih407.

  core:
   - lots of cleanups to the drm core
   - DP MST helper code merged
   - universal cursor planes.
   - render nodes enabled by default

  panel:
   - better panel interfaces
   - new panel support
   - non-continuous cock advertising ability

  ttm:
   - shrinker fixes

  i915:
   - hopefully ditched UMS support
   - runtime pm fixes
   - psr tracking and locking - now enabled by default
   - userptr fixes
   - backlight brightness fixes
   - MST support merged
   - runtime PM for dpms
   - primary planes locking fixes
   - gen8 hw semaphore support
   - fbc fixes
   - runtime PM on SOix sleep state hw.
   - mmio base page flipping
   - lots of vlv/chv fixes.
   - universal cursor planes

  radeon:
   - Hawaii fixes
   - display scalar support for non-fixed mode displays
   - new firmware format support
   - dpm on more asics by default
   - GPUVM improvements
   - uncached and wc GTT buffers
   - BOs &gt; visible VRAM

  exynos:
   - i80 interface support
   - module auto-loading
   - ipp driver consolidated.

  armada:
   - irq handling in crtc layer only
   - crtc renumbering
   - add component support
   - DT interaction changes.

  tegra:
   - load as module fixes
   - eDP bpp and sync polarity fixed
   - DSI non-continuous clock mode support
   - better support for importing buffers from nouveau

  msm:
   - mdp5/adq8084 v1.3 hw enablement
   - devicetree clk changse
   - ifc6410 board working

  tda998x:
   - component support
   - DT documentation update

  vmwgfx:
   - fix compat shader namespace"

* 'drm-next' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux: (551 commits)
  Revert "drm: drop redundant drm_file-&gt;is_master"
  drm/panel: simple: Use devm_gpiod_get_optional()
  drm/dsi: Replace upcasting macro by function
  drm/panel: ld9040: Replace upcasting macro by function
  drm/exynos: dp: Modify driver to support drm_panel
  drm/exynos: Move DP setup into commit()
  drm/panel: simple: Add AUO B133HTN01 panel support
  drm/panel: simple: Support delays in panel functions
  drm/panel: simple: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/panel: s6e8aa0: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/panel: ld9040: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/tegra: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/exynos: dsi: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/exynos: dpi: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: simple: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: s6e8aa0: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: ld9040: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: Provide convenience wrapper for .get_modes()
  drm/panel: add .prepare() and .unprepare() functions
  drm/panel: simple: Remove simple-panel compatible
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull DRM updates from Dave Airlie:
 "Like all good pull reqs this ends with a revert, so it must mean we
  tested it,

[ Ed. That's _one_ way of looking at it ]

  This pull is missing nouveau, Ben has been stuck trying to track down
  a very longstanding bug that revealed itself due to some other
  changes.  I've asked him to send you a direct pull request for nouveau
  once he cleans things up.  I'm away until Monday so don't want to
  delay things, you can make a decision on that when he sends it, I have
  my phone so I can ack things just not really merge much.

  It has one trivial conflict with your tree in armada_drv.c, and also
  the pull request contains some component changes that are already in
  your tree, the base tree from Russell went via Greg's tree already,
  but some stuff still shows up in here that doesn't when I merge my
  tree into yours.

  Otherwise all pretty standard graphics fare, one new driver and
  changes all over the place.

  New drivers:
   - sti kms driver for STMicroelectronics chipsets stih416 and stih407.

  core:
   - lots of cleanups to the drm core
   - DP MST helper code merged
   - universal cursor planes.
   - render nodes enabled by default

  panel:
   - better panel interfaces
   - new panel support
   - non-continuous cock advertising ability

  ttm:
   - shrinker fixes

  i915:
   - hopefully ditched UMS support
   - runtime pm fixes
   - psr tracking and locking - now enabled by default
   - userptr fixes
   - backlight brightness fixes
   - MST support merged
   - runtime PM for dpms
   - primary planes locking fixes
   - gen8 hw semaphore support
   - fbc fixes
   - runtime PM on SOix sleep state hw.
   - mmio base page flipping
   - lots of vlv/chv fixes.
   - universal cursor planes

  radeon:
   - Hawaii fixes
   - display scalar support for non-fixed mode displays
   - new firmware format support
   - dpm on more asics by default
   - GPUVM improvements
   - uncached and wc GTT buffers
   - BOs &gt; visible VRAM

  exynos:
   - i80 interface support
   - module auto-loading
   - ipp driver consolidated.

  armada:
   - irq handling in crtc layer only
   - crtc renumbering
   - add component support
   - DT interaction changes.

  tegra:
   - load as module fixes
   - eDP bpp and sync polarity fixed
   - DSI non-continuous clock mode support
   - better support for importing buffers from nouveau

  msm:
   - mdp5/adq8084 v1.3 hw enablement
   - devicetree clk changse
   - ifc6410 board working

  tda998x:
   - component support
   - DT documentation update

  vmwgfx:
   - fix compat shader namespace"

* 'drm-next' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux: (551 commits)
  Revert "drm: drop redundant drm_file-&gt;is_master"
  drm/panel: simple: Use devm_gpiod_get_optional()
  drm/dsi: Replace upcasting macro by function
  drm/panel: ld9040: Replace upcasting macro by function
  drm/exynos: dp: Modify driver to support drm_panel
  drm/exynos: Move DP setup into commit()
  drm/panel: simple: Add AUO B133HTN01 panel support
  drm/panel: simple: Support delays in panel functions
  drm/panel: simple: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/panel: s6e8aa0: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/panel: ld9040: Add proper definition for prepare and unprepare
  drm/tegra: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/exynos: dsi: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/exynos: dpi: Add support for panel prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: simple: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: s6e8aa0: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: ld9040: Add dummy prepare and unprepare routines
  drm/panel: Provide convenience wrapper for .get_modes()
  drm/panel: add .prepare() and .unprepare() functions
  drm/panel: simple: Remove simple-panel compatible
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T15:16:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-06T15:16:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f4f142ed4ef835709c7e6d12eaca10d190bcebed'/>
<id>f4f142ed4ef835709c7e6d12eaca10d190bcebed</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
  call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
  with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.

  Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
  hardware rng devices into /dev/random"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
  random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
  random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
  hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
  random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
  hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
  hwrng: create filler thread
  random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
  random: use an improved fast_mix() function
  random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
  random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
  random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
  random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Cleanups and bug fixes to /dev/random, add a new getrandom(2) system
  call, which is a superset of OpenBSD's getentropy(2) call, for use
  with userspace crypto libraries such as LibreSSL.

  Also add the ability to have a kernel thread to pull entropy from
  hardware rng devices into /dev/random"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes
  random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half
  random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
  hw_random: fix sparse warning (NULL vs 0 for pointer)
  random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter
  hwrng: add per-device entropy derating
  hwrng: create filler thread
  random: add_hwgenerator_randomness() for feeding entropy from devices
  random: use an improved fast_mix() function
  random: clean up interrupt entropy accounting for archs w/o cycle counters
  random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
  random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
  random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T15:06:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-06T15:06:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bb2cbf5e9367d8598fecd0c48dead69560750223'/>
<id>bb2cbf5e9367d8598fecd0c48dead69560750223</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this release:

   - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
   - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
   - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
  X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
  netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
  netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
  netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
  PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
  tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
  tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
  tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
  tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
  PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
  X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
  PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
  KEYS: revert encrypted key change
  ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
  firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
  security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
  PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this release:

   - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
   - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
   - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
  X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
  netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
  netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
  netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
  PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
  tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
  tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
  tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
  tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
  PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
  X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
  PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
  KEYS: revert encrypted key change
  ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
  firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
  security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
  PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T00:46:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-06T00:46:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e7fda6c4c3c1a7d6996dd75fd84670fa0b5d448f'/>
<id>e7fda6c4c3c1a7d6996dd75fd84670fa0b5d448f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull timer and time updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A rather large update of timers, timekeeping &amp; co

   - Core timekeeping code is year-2038 safe now for 32bit machines.
     Now we just need to fix all in kernel users and the gazillion of
     user space interfaces which rely on timespec/timeval :)

   - Better cache layout for the timekeeping internal data structures.

   - Proper nanosecond based interfaces for in kernel users.

   - Tree wide cleanup of code which wants nanoseconds but does hoops
     and loops to convert back and forth from timespecs.  Some of it
     definitely belongs into the ugly code museum.

   - Consolidation of the timekeeping interface zoo.

   - A fast NMI safe accessor to clock monotonic for tracing.  This is a
     long standing request to support correlated user/kernel space
     traces.  With proper NTP frequency correction it's also suitable
     for correlation of traces accross separate machines.

   - Checkpoint/restart support for timerfd.

   - A few NOHZ[_FULL] improvements in the [hr]timer code.

   - Code move from kernel to kernel/time of all time* related code.

   - New clocksource/event drivers from the ARM universe.  I'm really
     impressed that despite an architected timer in the newer chips SoC
     manufacturers insist on inventing new and differently broken SoC
     specific timers.

[ Ed. "Impressed"? I don't think that word means what you think it means ]

   - Another round of code move from arch to drivers.  Looks like most
     of the legacy mess in ARM regarding timers is sorted out except for
     a few obnoxious strongholds.

   - The usual updates and fixlets all over the place"

* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits)
  timekeeping: Fixup typo in update_vsyscall_old definition
  clocksource: document some basic timekeeping concepts
  timekeeping: Use cached ntp_tick_length when accumulating error
  timekeeping: Rework frequency adjustments to work better w/ nohz
  timekeeping: Minor fixup for timespec64-&gt;timespec assignment
  ftrace: Provide trace clocks monotonic
  timekeeping: Provide fast and NMI safe access to CLOCK_MONOTONIC
  seqcount: Add raw_write_seqcount_latch()
  seqcount: Provide raw_read_seqcount()
  timekeeping: Use tk_read_base as argument for timekeeping_get_ns()
  timekeeping: Create struct tk_read_base and use it in struct timekeeper
  timekeeping: Restructure the timekeeper some more
  clocksource: Get rid of cycle_last
  clocksource: Move cycle_last validation to core code
  clocksource: Make delta calculation a function
  wireless: ath9k: Get rid of timespec conversions
  drm: vmwgfx: Use nsec based interfaces
  drm: i915: Use nsec based interfaces
  timekeeping: Provide ktime_get_raw()
  hangcheck-timer: Use ktime_get_ns()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull timer and time updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A rather large update of timers, timekeeping &amp; co

   - Core timekeeping code is year-2038 safe now for 32bit machines.
     Now we just need to fix all in kernel users and the gazillion of
     user space interfaces which rely on timespec/timeval :)

   - Better cache layout for the timekeeping internal data structures.

   - Proper nanosecond based interfaces for in kernel users.

   - Tree wide cleanup of code which wants nanoseconds but does hoops
     and loops to convert back and forth from timespecs.  Some of it
     definitely belongs into the ugly code museum.

   - Consolidation of the timekeeping interface zoo.

   - A fast NMI safe accessor to clock monotonic for tracing.  This is a
     long standing request to support correlated user/kernel space
     traces.  With proper NTP frequency correction it's also suitable
     for correlation of traces accross separate machines.

   - Checkpoint/restart support for timerfd.

   - A few NOHZ[_FULL] improvements in the [hr]timer code.

   - Code move from kernel to kernel/time of all time* related code.

   - New clocksource/event drivers from the ARM universe.  I'm really
     impressed that despite an architected timer in the newer chips SoC
     manufacturers insist on inventing new and differently broken SoC
     specific timers.

[ Ed. "Impressed"? I don't think that word means what you think it means ]

   - Another round of code move from arch to drivers.  Looks like most
     of the legacy mess in ARM regarding timers is sorted out except for
     a few obnoxious strongholds.

   - The usual updates and fixlets all over the place"

* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits)
  timekeeping: Fixup typo in update_vsyscall_old definition
  clocksource: document some basic timekeeping concepts
  timekeeping: Use cached ntp_tick_length when accumulating error
  timekeeping: Rework frequency adjustments to work better w/ nohz
  timekeeping: Minor fixup for timespec64-&gt;timespec assignment
  ftrace: Provide trace clocks monotonic
  timekeeping: Provide fast and NMI safe access to CLOCK_MONOTONIC
  seqcount: Add raw_write_seqcount_latch()
  seqcount: Provide raw_read_seqcount()
  timekeeping: Use tk_read_base as argument for timekeeping_get_ns()
  timekeeping: Create struct tk_read_base and use it in struct timekeeper
  timekeeping: Restructure the timekeeper some more
  clocksource: Get rid of cycle_last
  clocksource: Move cycle_last validation to core code
  clocksource: Make delta calculation a function
  wireless: ath9k: Get rid of timespec conversions
  drm: vmwgfx: Use nsec based interfaces
  drm: i915: Use nsec based interfaces
  timekeeping: Provide ktime_get_raw()
  hangcheck-timer: Use ktime_get_ns()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hwrng: Pass entropy to add_hwgenerator_randomness() in bits, not bytes</title>
<updated>2014-08-05T20:50:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Boyd</name>
<email>sboyd@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-25T22:19:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e02b876597777ab26288dd2611a97b597d14d661'/>
<id>e02b876597777ab26288dd2611a97b597d14d661</id>
<content type='text'>
rng_get_data() returns the number of bytes read from the hardware.
The entropy argument to add_hwgenerator_randomness() is passed
directly to credit_entropy_bits() so we should be passing the
number of bits, not bytes here.

Fixes: be4000bc464 "hwrng: create filler thread"
Acked-by: Torsten Duwe &lt;duwe@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;sboyd@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
rng_get_data() returns the number of bytes read from the hardware.
The entropy argument to add_hwgenerator_randomness() is passed
directly to credit_entropy_bits() so we should be passing the
number of bits, not bytes here.

Fixes: be4000bc464 "hwrng: create filler thread"
Acked-by: Torsten Duwe &lt;duwe@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;sboyd@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: limit the contribution of the hw rng to at most half</title>
<updated>2014-08-05T20:41:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-17T09:27:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48d6be955a7167b0d0e025ae6c39e795e3544499'/>
<id>48d6be955a7167b0d0e025ae6c39e795e3544499</id>
<content type='text'>
For people who don't trust a hardware RNG which can not be audited,
the changes to add support for RDSEED can be troubling since 97% or
more of the entropy will be contributed from the in-CPU hardware RNG.

We now have a in-kernel khwrngd, so for those people who do want to
implicitly trust the CPU-based system, we could create an arch-rng
hw_random driver, and allow khwrng refill the entropy pool.  This
allows system administrator whether or not they trust the CPU (I
assume the NSA will trust RDRAND/RDSEED implicitly :-), and if so,
what level of entropy derating they want to use.

The reason why this is a really good idea is that if different people
use different levels of entropy derating, it will make it much more
difficult to design a backdoor'ed hwrng that can be generally
exploited in terms of the output of /dev/random when different attack
targets are using differing levels of entropy derating.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For people who don't trust a hardware RNG which can not be audited,
the changes to add support for RDSEED can be troubling since 97% or
more of the entropy will be contributed from the in-CPU hardware RNG.

We now have a in-kernel khwrngd, so for those people who do want to
implicitly trust the CPU-based system, we could create an arch-rng
hw_random driver, and allow khwrng refill the entropy pool.  This
allows system administrator whether or not they trust the CPU (I
assume the NSA will trust RDRAND/RDSEED implicitly :-), and if so,
what level of entropy derating they want to use.

The reason why this is a really good idea is that if different people
use different levels of entropy derating, it will make it much more
difficult to design a backdoor'ed hwrng that can be generally
exploited in terms of the output of /dev/random when different attack
targets are using differing levels of entropy derating.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: introduce getrandom(2) system call</title>
<updated>2014-08-05T20:41:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-17T08:13:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895'/>
<id>c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895</id>
<content type='text'>
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers.  It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.

The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available.  Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.

The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool.  Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.

This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable.  In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not).  However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case.  And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized.  Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.

SYNOPSIS
	#include &lt;linux/random.h&gt;

	int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
	The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
	with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
	space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
	cryptographic uses.  It should not be used for Monte Carlo
	simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
	probabilistic sampling.

	If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
	/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool.  The
	/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
	obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
	entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
	If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
	either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
	the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.

	If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
	will be used.  Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
	/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
	initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
	errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).

	The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
	the following function:

            int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
            {
                    int     ret;

                    if (buflen &gt; 256)
                            goto failure;
                    ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
                    if (ret &lt; 0)
                            return ret;
                    if (ret == buflen)
                            return 0;
            failure:
                    errno = EIO;
                    return -1;
            }

RETURN VALUE
       On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
       returned.  This may not be all the bytes requested by the
       caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
       /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
       signal.

       On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
	EINVAL		An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)

	EFAULT		buf is outside the accessible address space.

	EAGAIN		The requested entropy was not available, and
			getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
			GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.

	EINTR		While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
			interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
			of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
			are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
			in the signal(7) man page.

NOTES
	For small requests (buflen &lt;= 256) getrandom(2) will not
	return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
	entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
	the bytes that have been requested.  This is the recommended
	way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
	with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.

	However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
	block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
	environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
	will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
	who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime.  Since it may
	block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply.  The
	user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
	so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
	would be unfriendly.

	For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
	the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
	bytes than requested was returned.  In the case of
	!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
	happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
	should be careful) should check for this anyway!

	Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
	perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
	GRND_RANDOM.  The cryptographic algorithms used for
	/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
	sufficient for all purposes.  The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
	is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
	deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown &lt;zab@zabbo.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers.  It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.

The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available.  Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.

The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool.  Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.

This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable.  In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not).  However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case.  And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized.  Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.

SYNOPSIS
	#include &lt;linux/random.h&gt;

	int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
	The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
	with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
	space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
	cryptographic uses.  It should not be used for Monte Carlo
	simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
	probabilistic sampling.

	If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
	/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool.  The
	/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
	obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
	entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
	If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
	either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
	the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.

	If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
	will be used.  Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
	/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
	initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
	errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).

	The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
	the following function:

            int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
            {
                    int     ret;

                    if (buflen &gt; 256)
                            goto failure;
                    ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
                    if (ret &lt; 0)
                            return ret;
                    if (ret == buflen)
                            return 0;
            failure:
                    errno = EIO;
                    return -1;
            }

RETURN VALUE
       On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
       returned.  This may not be all the bytes requested by the
       caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
       /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
       signal.

       On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
	EINVAL		An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)

	EFAULT		buf is outside the accessible address space.

	EAGAIN		The requested entropy was not available, and
			getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
			GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.

	EINTR		While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
			interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
			of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
			are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
			in the signal(7) man page.

NOTES
	For small requests (buflen &lt;= 256) getrandom(2) will not
	return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
	entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
	the bytes that have been requested.  This is the recommended
	way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
	with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.

	However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
	block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
	environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
	will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
	who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime.  Since it may
	block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply.  The
	user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
	so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
	would be unfriendly.

	For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
	the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
	bytes than requested was returned.  In the case of
	!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
	happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
	should be careful) should check for this anyway!

	Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
	perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
	GRND_RANDOM.  The cryptographic algorithms used for
	/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
	sufficient for all purposes.  The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
	is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
	deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown &lt;zab@zabbo.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tty-3.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty</title>
<updated>2014-08-05T01:51:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-05T01:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=79eb238c76782a59d51adf8a3dd7f6444245b475'/>
<id>79eb238c76782a59d51adf8a3dd7f6444245b475</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tty / serial driver update from Greg KH:
 "Here's the big tty / serial driver update for 3.17-rc1.

  Nothing major, just a number of fixes and new features for different
  serial drivers, and some more tty core fixes and documentation of the
  tty locks.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while"

* tag 'tty-3.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (82 commits)
  tty/n_gsm.c: fix a memory leak in gsmld_open
  pch_uart: don't hardcode PCI slot to get DMA device
  tty: n_gsm, use setup_timer
  Revert "ARC: [arcfpga] stdout-path now suffices for earlycon/console"
  serial: sc16is7xx: Correct initialization of s-&gt;clk
  serial: 8250_dw: Add support for deferred probing
  serial: 8250_dw: Add optional reset control support
  serial: st-asc: Fix overflow in baudrate calculation
  serial: st-asc: Don't call BUG in asc_console_setup()
  tty: serial: msm: Make of_device_id array const
  tty/n_gsm.c: get gsm-&gt;num after gsm_activate_mux
  serial/core: Fix too big allocation for attribute member
  drivers/tty/serial: use correct type for dma_map/unmap
  serial: altera_jtaguart: Fix putchar function passed to uart_console_write()
  serial/uart/8250: Add tunable RX interrupt trigger I/F of FIFO buffers
  Serial: allow port drivers to have a default attribute group
  tty: kgdb_nmi: Automatically manage tty enable
  serial: altera_jtaguart: Adpot uart_console_write()
  serial: samsung: improve code clarity by defining a variable
  serial: samsung: correct the case and default order in switch
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tty / serial driver update from Greg KH:
 "Here's the big tty / serial driver update for 3.17-rc1.

  Nothing major, just a number of fixes and new features for different
  serial drivers, and some more tty core fixes and documentation of the
  tty locks.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while"

* tag 'tty-3.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (82 commits)
  tty/n_gsm.c: fix a memory leak in gsmld_open
  pch_uart: don't hardcode PCI slot to get DMA device
  tty: n_gsm, use setup_timer
  Revert "ARC: [arcfpga] stdout-path now suffices for earlycon/console"
  serial: sc16is7xx: Correct initialization of s-&gt;clk
  serial: 8250_dw: Add support for deferred probing
  serial: 8250_dw: Add optional reset control support
  serial: st-asc: Fix overflow in baudrate calculation
  serial: st-asc: Don't call BUG in asc_console_setup()
  tty: serial: msm: Make of_device_id array const
  tty/n_gsm.c: get gsm-&gt;num after gsm_activate_mux
  serial/core: Fix too big allocation for attribute member
  drivers/tty/serial: use correct type for dma_map/unmap
  serial: altera_jtaguart: Fix putchar function passed to uart_console_write()
  serial/uart/8250: Add tunable RX interrupt trigger I/F of FIFO buffers
  Serial: allow port drivers to have a default attribute group
  tty: kgdb_nmi: Automatically manage tty enable
  serial: altera_jtaguart: Adpot uart_console_write()
  serial: samsung: improve code clarity by defining a variable
  serial: samsung: correct the case and default order in switch
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
