<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/drivers/connector, branch v3.14.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:15:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-23T21:29:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1'/>
<id>be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>connector: improved unaligned access error fix</title>
<updated>2013-11-14T22:19:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Metcalf</name>
<email>cmetcalf@tilera.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-14T17:09:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1ca1a4cf59ea343a1a70084fe7cc96f37f3cf5b1'/>
<id>1ca1a4cf59ea343a1a70084fe7cc96f37f3cf5b1</id>
<content type='text'>
In af3e095a1fb4, Erik Jacobsen fixed one type of unaligned access
bug for ia64 by converting a 64-bit write to use put_unaligned().
Unfortunately, since gcc will convert a short memset() to a series
of appropriately-aligned stores, the problem is now visible again
on tilegx, where the memset that zeros out proc_event is converted
to three 64-bit stores, causing an unaligned access panic.

A better fix for the original problem is to ensure that proc_event
is aligned to 8 bytes here.  We can do that relatively easily by
arranging to start the struct cn_msg aligned to 8 bytes and then
offset by 4 bytes.  Doing so means that the immediately following
proc_event structure is then correctly aligned to 8 bytes.

The result is that the memset() stores are now aligned, and as an
added benefit, we can remove the put_unaligned() calls in the code.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@tilera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In af3e095a1fb4, Erik Jacobsen fixed one type of unaligned access
bug for ia64 by converting a 64-bit write to use put_unaligned().
Unfortunately, since gcc will convert a short memset() to a series
of appropriately-aligned stores, the problem is now visible again
on tilegx, where the memset that zeros out proc_event is converted
to three 64-bit stores, causing an unaligned access panic.

A better fix for the original problem is to ensure that proc_event
is aligned to 8 bytes here.  We can do that relatively easily by
arranging to start the struct cn_msg aligned to 8 bytes and then
offset by 4 bytes.  Doing so means that the immediately following
proc_event structure is then correctly aligned to 8 bytes.

The result is that the memset() stores are now aligned, and as an
added benefit, we can remove the put_unaligned() calls in the code.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@tilera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>connector: use 'size' everywhere in cn_netlink_send()</title>
<updated>2013-10-02T20:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-30T20:03:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ac73bf50b709dea4e39635151b861b8a8f52bfbb'/>
<id>ac73bf50b709dea4e39635151b861b8a8f52bfbb</id>
<content type='text'>
We calculated the size for the netlink message buffer as size. Use size
in the memcpy() call as well instead of recalculating it.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We calculated the size for the netlink message buffer as size. Use size
in the memcpy() call as well instead of recalculating it.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>connector: use nlmsg_len() to check message length</title>
<updated>2013-10-02T20:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-30T20:03:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=162b2bedc084d2d908a04c93383ba02348b648b0'/>
<id>162b2bedc084d2d908a04c93383ba02348b648b0</id>
<content type='text'>
The current code tests the length of the whole netlink message to be
at least as long to fit a cn_msg. This is wrong as nlmsg_len includes
the length of the netlink message header. Use nlmsg_len() instead to
fix this "off-by-NLMSG_HDRLEN" size check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # v2.6.14+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The current code tests the length of the whole netlink message to be
at least as long to fit a cn_msg. This is wrong as nlmsg_len includes
the length of the netlink message header. Use nlmsg_len() instead to
fix this "off-by-NLMSG_HDRLEN" size check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # v2.6.14+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc connector: fix info leaks</title>
<updated>2013-10-02T20:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-30T20:03:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e727ca82e0e9616ab4844301e6bae60ca7327682'/>
<id>e727ca82e0e9616ab4844301e6bae60ca7327682</id>
<content type='text'>
Initialize event_data for all possible message types to prevent leaking
kernel stack contents to userland (up to 20 bytes). Also set the flags
member of the connector message to 0 to prevent leaking two more stack
bytes this way.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # v2.6.15+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Initialize event_data for all possible message types to prevent leaking
kernel stack contents to userland (up to 20 bytes). Also set the flags
member of the connector message to 0 to prevent leaking two more stack
bytes this way.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  # v2.6.15+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>connector: replace obsolete NLMSG_* with type safe nlmsg_*</title>
<updated>2013-03-28T18:27:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hong zhi guo</name>
<email>honkiko@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-27T06:54:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9631d79e815197dbe90080aedfbab6de41218d85'/>
<id>9631d79e815197dbe90080aedfbab6de41218d85</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo &lt;honkiko@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Hong Zhiguo &lt;honkiko@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>connector: Added coredumping event to the process connector</title>
<updated>2013-03-20T17:23:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesper Derehag</name>
<email>jderehag@hotmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-19T20:50:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b5faa4c553f90ee2dde1d976b220b1ca9741ef0'/>
<id>2b5faa4c553f90ee2dde1d976b220b1ca9741ef0</id>
<content type='text'>
Process connector can now also detect coredumping events.

Main aim of patch is get notified at start of coredumping, instead of
having to wait for it to finish and then being notified through EXIT
event.

Could be used for instance by process-managers that want to get
notified as soon as possible about process failures, and not
necessarily beeing notified after coredump, which could be in the
order of minutes depending on size of coredump, piping and so on.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Derehag &lt;jderehag@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Process connector can now also detect coredumping events.

Main aim of patch is get notified at start of coredumping, instead of
having to wait for it to finish and then being notified through EXIT
event.

Could be used for instance by process-managers that want to get
notified as soon as possible about process failures, and not
necessarily beeing notified after coredump, which could be in the
order of minutes depending on size of coredump, piping and so on.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Derehag &lt;jderehag@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc connector: reject unprivileged listener bumps</title>
<updated>2013-02-27T18:08:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-25T21:32:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e70ab977991964a5a7ad1182799451d067e62669'/>
<id>e70ab977991964a5a7ad1182799451d067e62669</id>
<content type='text'>
While PROC_CN_MCAST_LISTEN/IGNORE is entirely advisory, it was possible
for an unprivileged user to turn off notifications for all listeners by
sending PROC_CN_MCAST_IGNORE. Instead, require the same privileges as
required for a multicast bind.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Evgeniy Polyakov &lt;zbr@ioremap.net&gt;
Cc: Matt Helsley &lt;matthltc@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov &lt;zbr@ioremap.net&gt;
Acked-by: Matt Helsley &lt;matthltc@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While PROC_CN_MCAST_LISTEN/IGNORE is entirely advisory, it was possible
for an unprivileged user to turn off notifications for all listeners by
sending PROC_CN_MCAST_IGNORE. Instead, require the same privileges as
required for a multicast bind.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Evgeniy Polyakov &lt;zbr@ioremap.net&gt;
Cc: Matt Helsley &lt;matthltc@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov &lt;zbr@ioremap.net&gt;
Acked-by: Matt Helsley &lt;matthltc@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: proc: change proc_net_remove to remove_proc_entry</title>
<updated>2013-02-18T19:53:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gao feng</name>
<email>gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-18T01:34:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ece31ffd539e8e2b586b1ca5f50bc4f4591e3893'/>
<id>ece31ffd539e8e2b586b1ca5f50bc4f4591e3893</id>
<content type='text'>
proc_net_remove is only used to remove proc entries
that under /proc/net,it's not a general function for
removing proc entries of netns. if we want to remove
some proc entries which under /proc/net/stat/, we still
need to call remove_proc_entry.

this patch use remove_proc_entry to replace proc_net_remove.
we can remove proc_net_remove after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
proc_net_remove is only used to remove proc entries
that under /proc/net,it's not a general function for
removing proc entries of netns. if we want to remove
some proc entries which under /proc/net/stat/, we still
need to call remove_proc_entry.

this patch use remove_proc_entry to replace proc_net_remove.
we can remove proc_net_remove after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: proc: change proc_net_fops_create to proc_create</title>
<updated>2013-02-18T19:53:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gao feng</name>
<email>gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-18T01:34:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d4beaa66add8aebf83ab16d2fde4e4de8dac36df'/>
<id>d4beaa66add8aebf83ab16d2fde4e4de8dac36df</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now, some modules such as bonding use proc_create
to create proc entries under /proc/net/, and other modules
such as ipv4 use proc_net_fops_create.

It looks a little chaos.this patch changes all of
proc_net_fops_create to proc_create. we can remove
proc_net_fops_create after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Right now, some modules such as bonding use proc_create
to create proc entries under /proc/net/, and other modules
such as ipv4 use proc_net_fops_create.

It looks a little chaos.this patch changes all of
proc_net_fops_create to proc_create. we can remove
proc_net_fops_create after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng &lt;gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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