The newly added DXE calls use 64-bit quantities, which means we need to marshall them explicitly when running in mixed mode. Currently, we get away without it because we just bail when GetMemorySpaceDescriptor() fails, which is guaranteed to happen due to the function argument mixup. Let's fix this properly, though, by defining the macros that describe how to marshall the arguments. While at it, drop an incorrect cast on a status variable. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Add support for getting the boot hart ID from the Linux EFI stub using RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL. This method is preferred over the existing DT based approach since it works irrespective of DT or ACPI. The specification of the protocol is hosted at: https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-uefi Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519051512.136724-2-sunilvl@ventanamicro.com [ardb: minor tweaks for coding style and whitespace] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
If the system exposes memory regions with the EFI_MORE_RELIABLE attribute, it is implied that it is intended to be used for allocations that are relatively important, such as the kernel's static image. Since efi_random_alloc() is mostly (only) used for allocating space for the kernel image, let's update it to take this into account, and disregard all memory without the EFI_MORE_RELIABLE attribute if there is sufficient memory available that does have this attribute. Note that this change only affects booting with randomization enabled. In other cases, the EFI stub runs the kernel image in place unless its placement is unsuitable for some reason (i.e., misaligned, or its BSS overlaps with another allocation), and it is left to the bootloader to ensure that the kernel was loaded into EFI_MORE_RELIABLE memory if this is desired. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
If the loader has already placed the EFI kernel image randomly in physical memory, and indicates having done so by installing the 'fixed placement' protocol onto the image handle, don't bother randomizing the placement again in the EFI stub. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
In a future patch, arm64's implementation of handle_kernel_image() will omit randomizing the placement of the kernel if the load address was chosen randomly by the loader. In order to do this, it needs to locate a protocol on the image handle, so pass it to handle_kernel_image(). Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
There are UEFI versions that restrict execution of memory regions, preventing the kernel from booting. Parts that needs to be executable are: * Area used for trampoline placement. * All memory regions that the kernel may be relocated before and during extraction. Use DXE services to ensure aforementioned address ranges to be executable. Only modify attributes that does not have appropriate attributes. Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@ispras.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303142120.1975-3-baskov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
UEFI DXE services are not yet used in kernel code but are required to manipulate page table memory protection flags. Add required declarations to use DXE services functions. Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@ispras.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303142120.1975-2-baskov@ispras.ru [ardb: ignore absent DXE table but warn if the signature check fails] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() function currently returns U32_MAX
for failure case which is not correct because U32_MAX is a valid
hartid value. This patch fixes the issue by returning error code.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: d7071743db31 ("RISC-V: Add EFI stub support.")
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The kernel is aligned at SEGMENT_SIZE and this is the size populated in the PE
headers:
arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S: .long SEGMENT_ALIGN // SectionAlignment
EFI_KIMG_ALIGN is defined as: (SEGMENT_ALIGN > THREAD_ALIGN ? SEGMENT_ALIGN :
THREAD_ALIGN)
So it depends on THREAD_ALIGN. On newer builds this message started to appear
even though the loader is taking into account the PE header (which is stating
SEGMENT_ALIGN).
Fixes: c32ac11da3f8 ("efi/libstub: arm64: Double check image alignment at entry")
Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
This patchset allows to have a single kernel for sv39 and sv48 without being relocatable. The idea comes from Arnd Bergmann who suggested to do the same as x86, that is mapping the kernel to the end of the address space, which allows the kernel to be linked at the same address for both sv39 and sv48 and then does not require to be relocated at runtime. This implements sv48 support at runtime. The kernel will try to boot with 4-level page table and will fallback to 3-level if the HW does not support it. Folding the 4th level into a 3-level page table has almost no cost at runtime. Note that kasan region had to be moved to the end of the address space since its location must be known at compile-time and then be valid for both sv39 and sv48 (and sv57 that is coming). * riscv-sv48-v3: riscv: Explicit comment about user virtual address space size riscv: Use pgtable_l4_enabled to output mmu_type in cpuinfo riscv: Implement sv48 support asm-generic: Prepare for riscv use of pud_alloc_one and pud_free riscv: Allow to dynamically define VA_BITS riscv: Introduce functions to switch pt_ops riscv: Split early kasan mapping to prepare sv48 introduction riscv: Move KASAN mapping next to the kernel mapping riscv: Get rid of MAXPHYSMEM configs Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>