<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/drivers/md, branch v4.4.160</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dm thin metadata: fix __udivdi3 undefined on 32-bit</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Snitzer</name>
<email>snitzer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-14T01:16:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=93ae8552ec98405e84d194f9c5b084996c20ccdf'/>
<id>93ae8552ec98405e84d194f9c5b084996c20ccdf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 013ad043906b2befd4a9bfb06219ed9fedd92716 upstream.

sector_div() is only viable for use with sector_t.
dm_block_t is typedef'd to uint64_t -- so use div_u64() instead.

Fixes: 3ab918281 ("dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 013ad043906b2befd4a9bfb06219ed9fedd92716 upstream.

sector_div() is only viable for use with sector_t.
dm_block_t is typedef'd to uint64_t -- so use div_u64() instead.

Fixes: 3ab918281 ("dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Thornber</name>
<email>ejt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-10T15:50:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a438d505966601c324ebe3c231de9ed9d5ef8642'/>
<id>a438d505966601c324ebe3c231de9ed9d5ef8642</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ab91828166895600efd9cdc3a0eb32001f7204a ]

Committing a transaction can consume some metadata of it's own, we now
reserve a small amount of metadata to cover this.  Free metadata
reported by the kernel will not include this reserve.

If any of the reserve has been used after a commit we enter a new
internal state PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE.  This is reported as
PM_READ_ONLY, so no userland changes are needed.  If the metadata
device is resized the pool will move back to PM_WRITE.

These changes mean we never need to abort and rollback a transaction due
to running out of metadata space.  This is particularly important
because there have been a handful of reports of data corruption against
DM thin-provisioning that can all be attributed to the thin-pool having
ran out of metadata space.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3ab91828166895600efd9cdc3a0eb32001f7204a ]

Committing a transaction can consume some metadata of it's own, we now
reserve a small amount of metadata to cover this.  Free metadata
reported by the kernel will not include this reserve.

If any of the reserve has been used after a commit we enter a new
internal state PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE.  This is reported as
PM_READ_ONLY, so no userland changes are needed.  If the metadata
device is resized the pool will move back to PM_WRITE.

These changes mean we never need to abort and rollback a transaction due
to running out of metadata space.  This is particularly important
because there have been a handful of reports of data corruption against
DM thin-provisioning that can all be attributed to the thin-pool having
ran out of metadata space.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RAID10 BUG_ON in raise_barrier when force is true and conf-&gt;barrier is 0</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiao Ni</name>
<email>xni@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-30T07:57:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e02c60d8b79abb4c96043bcf3cb70e98461ceb42'/>
<id>e02c60d8b79abb4c96043bcf3cb70e98461ceb42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1d0ffd264204eba1861865560f1f7f7a92919384 ]

In raid10 reshape_request it gets max_sectors in read_balance. If the underlayer disks
have bad blocks, the max_sectors is less than last. It will call goto read_more many
times. It calls raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0) every time. In this condition
sectors_done is not 0. So the value passed to the argument force of raise_barrier is
true.

In raise_barrier it checks conf-&gt;barrier when force is true. If force is true and
conf-&gt;barrier is 0, it panic. In this case reshape_request submits bio to under layer
disks. And in the callback function of the bio it calls lower_barrier. If the bio
finishes before calling raise_barrier again, it can trigger the BUG_ON.

Add one pair of raise_barrier/lower_barrier to fix this bug.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni &lt;xni@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1d0ffd264204eba1861865560f1f7f7a92919384 ]

In raid10 reshape_request it gets max_sectors in read_balance. If the underlayer disks
have bad blocks, the max_sectors is less than last. It will call goto read_more many
times. It calls raise_barrier(conf, sectors_done != 0) every time. In this condition
sectors_done is not 0. So the value passed to the argument force of raise_barrier is
true.

In raise_barrier it checks conf-&gt;barrier when force is true. If force is true and
conf-&gt;barrier is 0, it panic. In this case reshape_request submits bio to under layer
disks. And in the callback function of the bio it calls lower_barrier. If the bio
finishes before calling raise_barrier again, it can trigger the BUG_ON.

Add one pair of raise_barrier/lower_barrier to fix this bug.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni &lt;xni@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md-cluster: clear another node's suspend_area after the copy is finished</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guoqing Jiang</name>
<email>gqjiang@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-02T08:26:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=825fabcb91aa23dc66e7f29c8fb5d51916fde7b7'/>
<id>825fabcb91aa23dc66e7f29c8fb5d51916fde7b7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 010228e4a932ca1e8365e3b58c8e1e44c16ff793 ]

When one node leaves cluster or stops the resyncing
(resync or recovery) array, then other nodes need to
call recover_bitmaps to continue the unfinished task.

But we need to clear suspend_area later after other
nodes copy the resync information to their bitmap
(by call bitmap_copy_from_slot). Otherwise, all nodes
could write to the suspend_area even the suspend_area
is not handled by any node, because area_resyncing
returns 0 at the beginning of raid1_write_request.
Which means one node could write suspend_area while
another node is resyncing the same area, then data
could be inconsistent.

So let's clear suspend_area later to avoid above issue
with the protection of bm lock. Also it is straightforward
to clear suspend_area after nodes have copied the resync
info to bitmap.

Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang &lt;gqjiang@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 010228e4a932ca1e8365e3b58c8e1e44c16ff793 ]

When one node leaves cluster or stops the resyncing
(resync or recovery) array, then other nodes need to
call recover_bitmaps to continue the unfinished task.

But we need to clear suspend_area later after other
nodes copy the resync information to their bitmap
(by call bitmap_copy_from_slot). Otherwise, all nodes
could write to the suspend_area even the suspend_area
is not handled by any node, because area_resyncing
returns 0 at the beginning of raid1_write_request.
Which means one node could write suspend_area while
another node is resyncing the same area, then data
could be inconsistent.

So let's clear suspend_area later to avoid above issue
with the protection of bm lock. Also it is straightforward
to clear suspend_area after nodes have copied the resync
info to bitmap.

Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang &lt;gqjiang@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid5: fix data corruption of replacements after originals dropped</title>
<updated>2018-09-19T20:48:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>BingJing Chang</name>
<email>bingjingc@synology.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-01T09:08:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ccae23ff45ccd3e9c610c46ee8449c2617118daa'/>
<id>ccae23ff45ccd3e9c610c46ee8449c2617118daa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d63e2fc804c46e50eee825c5d3a7228e07048b47 ]

During raid5 replacement, the stripes can be marked with R5_NeedReplace
flag. Data can be read from being-replaced devices and written to
replacing spares without reading all other devices. (It's 'replace'
mode. s.replacing = 1) If a being-replaced device is dropped, the
replacement progress will be interrupted and resumed with pure recovery
mode. However, existing stripes before being interrupted cannot read
from the dropped device anymore. It prints lots of WARN_ON messages.
And it results in data corruption because existing stripes write
problematic data into its replacement device and update the progress.

\# Erase disks (1MB + 2GB)
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdd bs=1MB count=2049
mdadm -C /dev/md0 -amd -R -l5 -n3 -x0 /dev/sd[abc] -z 2097152
\# Ensure array stores non-zero data
dd if=/root/data_4GB.iso of=/dev/md0 bs=1MB
\# Start replacement
mdadm /dev/md0 -a /dev/sdd
mdadm /dev/md0 --replace /dev/sda

Then, Hot-plug out /dev/sda during recovery, and wait for recovery done.
echo check &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/sync_action
cat /sys/block/md0/md/mismatch_cnt # it will be greater than 0.

Soon after you hot-plug out /dev/sda, you will see many WARN_ON
messages. The replacement recovery will be interrupted shortly. After
the recovery finishes, it will result in data corruption.

Actually, it's just an unhandled case of replacement. In commit
&lt;f94c0b6658c7&gt; (md/raid5: fix interaction of 'replace' and 'recovery'.),
if a NeedReplace device is not UPTODATE then that is an error, the
commit just simply print WARN_ON but also mark these corrupted stripes
with R5_WantReplace. (it means it's ready for writes.)

To fix this case, we can leverage 'sync and replace' mode mentioned in
commit &lt;9a3e1101b827&gt; (md/raid5: detect and handle replacements during
recovery.). We can add logics to detect and use 'sync and replace' mode
for these stripes.

Reported-by: Alex Chen &lt;alexchen@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Wu &lt;alexwu@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng &lt;cccheng@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: BingJing Chang &lt;bingjingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d63e2fc804c46e50eee825c5d3a7228e07048b47 ]

During raid5 replacement, the stripes can be marked with R5_NeedReplace
flag. Data can be read from being-replaced devices and written to
replacing spares without reading all other devices. (It's 'replace'
mode. s.replacing = 1) If a being-replaced device is dropped, the
replacement progress will be interrupted and resumed with pure recovery
mode. However, existing stripes before being interrupted cannot read
from the dropped device anymore. It prints lots of WARN_ON messages.
And it results in data corruption because existing stripes write
problematic data into its replacement device and update the progress.

\# Erase disks (1MB + 2GB)
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=1MB count=2049
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdd bs=1MB count=2049
mdadm -C /dev/md0 -amd -R -l5 -n3 -x0 /dev/sd[abc] -z 2097152
\# Ensure array stores non-zero data
dd if=/root/data_4GB.iso of=/dev/md0 bs=1MB
\# Start replacement
mdadm /dev/md0 -a /dev/sdd
mdadm /dev/md0 --replace /dev/sda

Then, Hot-plug out /dev/sda during recovery, and wait for recovery done.
echo check &gt; /sys/block/md0/md/sync_action
cat /sys/block/md0/md/mismatch_cnt # it will be greater than 0.

Soon after you hot-plug out /dev/sda, you will see many WARN_ON
messages. The replacement recovery will be interrupted shortly. After
the recovery finishes, it will result in data corruption.

Actually, it's just an unhandled case of replacement. In commit
&lt;f94c0b6658c7&gt; (md/raid5: fix interaction of 'replace' and 'recovery'.),
if a NeedReplace device is not UPTODATE then that is an error, the
commit just simply print WARN_ON but also mark these corrupted stripes
with R5_WantReplace. (it means it's ready for writes.)

To fix this case, we can leverage 'sync and replace' mode mentioned in
commit &lt;9a3e1101b827&gt; (md/raid5: detect and handle replacements during
recovery.). We can add logics to detect and use 'sync and replace' mode
for these stripes.

Reported-by: Alex Chen &lt;alexchen@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Wu &lt;alexwu@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng &lt;cccheng@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: BingJing Chang &lt;bingjingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm kcopyd: avoid softlockup in run_complete_job</title>
<updated>2018-09-15T07:40:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Pittman</name>
<email>jpittman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-06T19:53:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=66236f1b06f6d2564fa49247cb4d26612fd6c23f'/>
<id>66236f1b06f6d2564fa49247cb4d26612fd6c23f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 784c9a29e99eb40b842c29ecf1cc3a79e00fb629 ]

It was reported that softlockups occur when using dm-snapshot ontop of
slow (rbd) storage.  E.g.:

[ 4047.990647] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#10 stuck for 22s! [kworker/10:23:26177]
...
[ 4048.034151] Workqueue: kcopyd do_work [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034156] RIP: 0010:copy_callback+0x41/0x160 [dm_snapshot]
...
[ 4048.034190] Call Trace:
[ 4048.034196]  ? __chunk_is_tracked+0x70/0x70 [dm_snapshot]
[ 4048.034200]  run_complete_job+0x5f/0xb0 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034205]  process_jobs+0x91/0x220 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034210]  ? kcopyd_put_pages+0x40/0x40 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034214]  do_work+0x46/0xa0 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034219]  process_one_work+0x171/0x370
[ 4048.034221]  worker_thread+0x1fc/0x3f0
[ 4048.034224]  kthread+0xf8/0x130
[ 4048.034226]  ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
[ 4048.034227]  ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
[ 4048.034231]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 4048.034233] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks

Fix this by calling cond_resched() after run_complete_job()'s callout to
the dm_kcopyd_notify_fn (which is dm-snap.c:copy_callback in the above
trace).

Signed-off-by: John Pittman &lt;jpittman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 784c9a29e99eb40b842c29ecf1cc3a79e00fb629 ]

It was reported that softlockups occur when using dm-snapshot ontop of
slow (rbd) storage.  E.g.:

[ 4047.990647] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#10 stuck for 22s! [kworker/10:23:26177]
...
[ 4048.034151] Workqueue: kcopyd do_work [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034156] RIP: 0010:copy_callback+0x41/0x160 [dm_snapshot]
...
[ 4048.034190] Call Trace:
[ 4048.034196]  ? __chunk_is_tracked+0x70/0x70 [dm_snapshot]
[ 4048.034200]  run_complete_job+0x5f/0xb0 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034205]  process_jobs+0x91/0x220 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034210]  ? kcopyd_put_pages+0x40/0x40 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034214]  do_work+0x46/0xa0 [dm_mod]
[ 4048.034219]  process_one_work+0x171/0x370
[ 4048.034221]  worker_thread+0x1fc/0x3f0
[ 4048.034224]  kthread+0xf8/0x130
[ 4048.034226]  ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
[ 4048.034227]  ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
[ 4048.034231]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 4048.034233] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks

Fix this by calling cond_resched() after run_complete_job()'s callout to
the dm_kcopyd_notify_fn (which is dm-snap.c:copy_callback in the above
trace).

Signed-off-by: John Pittman &lt;jpittman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bcache: release dc-&gt;writeback_lock properly in bch_writeback_thread()</title>
<updated>2018-09-09T18:04:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shan Hai</name>
<email>shan.hai@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T18:02:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=95861df6188b3960e1d80292c905e3d040fd619c'/>
<id>95861df6188b3960e1d80292c905e3d040fd619c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3943b040f11ed0cc6d4585fd286a623ca8634547 upstream.

The writeback thread would exit with a lock held when the cache device
is detached via sysfs interface, fix it by releasing the held lock
before exiting the while-loop.

Fixes: fadd94e05c02 (bcache: quit dc-&gt;writeback_thread when BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is set)
Signed-off-by: Shan Hai &lt;shan.hai@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coly Li &lt;colyli@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Shenghui Wang &lt;shhuiw@foxmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.17+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3943b040f11ed0cc6d4585fd286a623ca8634547 upstream.

The writeback thread would exit with a lock held when the cache device
is detached via sysfs interface, fix it by releasing the held lock
before exiting the while-loop.

Fixes: fadd94e05c02 (bcache: quit dc-&gt;writeback_thread when BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is set)
Signed-off-by: Shan Hai &lt;shan.hai@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coly Li &lt;colyli@suse.de&gt;
Tested-by: Shenghui Wang &lt;shhuiw@foxmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.17+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm cache metadata: save in-core policy_hint_size to on-disk superblock</title>
<updated>2018-09-09T18:04:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Snitzer</name>
<email>snitzer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-02T20:08:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=75ae059e856946a47f600c9ee1cd60dba006c6d3'/>
<id>75ae059e856946a47f600c9ee1cd60dba006c6d3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fd2fa95416188a767a63979296fa3e169a9ef5ec upstream.

policy_hint_size starts as 0 during __write_initial_superblock().  It
isn't until the policy is loaded that policy_hint_size is set in-core
(cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size).  But it never got recorded in the on-disk
superblock because __commit_transaction() didn't deal with transfering
the in-core cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size to the on-disk superblock.

The in-core cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size gets initialized by metadata_open()'s
__begin_transaction_flags() which re-reads all superblock fields.
Because the superblock's policy_hint_size was never properly stored, when
the cache was created, hints_array_available() would always return false
when re-activating a previously created cache.  This means
__load_mappings() always considered the hints invalid and never made use
of the hints (these hints served to optimize).

Another detremental side-effect of this oversight is the cache_check
utility would fail with: "invalid hint width: 0"

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fd2fa95416188a767a63979296fa3e169a9ef5ec upstream.

policy_hint_size starts as 0 during __write_initial_superblock().  It
isn't until the policy is loaded that policy_hint_size is set in-core
(cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size).  But it never got recorded in the on-disk
superblock because __commit_transaction() didn't deal with transfering
the in-core cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size to the on-disk superblock.

The in-core cmd-&gt;policy_hint_size gets initialized by metadata_open()'s
__begin_transaction_flags() which re-reads all superblock fields.
Because the superblock's policy_hint_size was never properly stored, when
the cache was created, hints_array_available() would always return false
when re-activating a previously created cache.  This means
__load_mappings() always considered the hints invalid and never made use
of the hints (these hints served to optimize).

Another detremental side-effect of this oversight is the cache_check
utility would fail with: "invalid hint width: 0"

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid10: fix that replacement cannot complete recovery after reassemble</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:26:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>BingJing Chang</name>
<email>bingjingc@synology.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-28T10:40:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=66de11067753fbc562b7d2dba550d563c02449ec'/>
<id>66de11067753fbc562b7d2dba550d563c02449ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bda3153998f3eb2cafa4a6311971143628eacdbc ]

During assemble, the spare marked for replacement is not checked.
conf-&gt;fullsync cannot be updated to be 1. As a result, recovery will
treat it as a clean array. All recovering sectors are skipped. Original
device is replaced with the not-recovered spare.

mdadm -C /dev/md0 -l10 -n4 -pn2 /dev/loop[0123]
mdadm /dev/md0 -a /dev/loop4
mdadm /dev/md0 --replace /dev/loop0
mdadm -S /dev/md0 # stop array during recovery

mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/loop[01234]

After reassemble, you can see recovery go on, but it completes
immediately. In fact, recovery is not actually processed.

To solve this problem, we just add the missing logics for replacment
spares. (In raid1.c or raid5.c, they have already been checked.)

Reported-by: Alex Chen &lt;alexchen@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Wu &lt;alexwu@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng &lt;cccheng@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: BingJing Chang &lt;bingjingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bda3153998f3eb2cafa4a6311971143628eacdbc ]

During assemble, the spare marked for replacement is not checked.
conf-&gt;fullsync cannot be updated to be 1. As a result, recovery will
treat it as a clean array. All recovering sectors are skipped. Original
device is replaced with the not-recovered spare.

mdadm -C /dev/md0 -l10 -n4 -pn2 /dev/loop[0123]
mdadm /dev/md0 -a /dev/loop4
mdadm /dev/md0 --replace /dev/loop0
mdadm -S /dev/md0 # stop array during recovery

mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/loop[01234]

After reassemble, you can see recovery go on, but it completes
immediately. In fact, recovery is not actually processed.

To solve this problem, we just add the missing logics for replacment
spares. (In raid1.c or raid5.c, they have already been checked.)

Reported-by: Alex Chen &lt;alexchen@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Wu &lt;alexwu@synology.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng &lt;cccheng@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: BingJing Chang &lt;bingjingc@synology.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md: fix NULL dereference of mddev-&gt;pers in remove_and_add_spares()</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:24:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yufen Yu</name>
<email>yuyufen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-04T10:08:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c356cd64f01667cadf12d4fa0008164207bf533e'/>
<id>c356cd64f01667cadf12d4fa0008164207bf533e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c42a0e2675721e1444f56e6132a07b7b1ec169ac ]

We met NULL pointer BUG as follow:

[  151.760358] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000060
[  151.761340] PGD 80000001011eb067 P4D 80000001011eb067 PUD 1011ea067 PMD 0
[  151.762039] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  151.762406] Modules linked in:
[  151.762723] CPU: 2 PID: 3561 Comm: mdadm-test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #238
[  151.763542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014
[  151.764432] RIP: 0010:remove_and_add_spares.part.56+0x13c/0x3a0
[  151.765061] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001d7fcd8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  151.765590] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88013601d600 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  151.766306] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88013601d600 RDI: ffff880136187000
[  151.767014] RBP: ffff880136187018 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000051
[  151.767728] R10: ffffc90001d7fed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88013601d600
[  151.768447] R13: ffff8801298b1300 R14: ffff880136187000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  151.769160] FS:  00007f2624276700(0000) GS:ffff88013ae80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  151.769971] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  151.770554] CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 0000000111aac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  151.771272] Call Trace:
[  151.771542]  md_ioctl+0x1df2/0x1e10
[  151.771906]  ? __switch_to+0x129/0x440
[  151.772295]  ? __schedule+0x244/0x850
[  151.772672]  blkdev_ioctl+0x4bd/0x970
[  151.773048]  block_ioctl+0x39/0x40
[  151.773402]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x610
[  151.773770]  ? dput.part.23+0x87/0x100
[  151.774151]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[  151.774493]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[  151.774877]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[  151.775258]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

For raid6, when two disk of the array are offline, two spare disks can
be added into the array. Before spare disks recovery completing,
system reboot and mdadm thinks it is ok to restart the degraded
array by md_ioctl(). Since disks in raid6 is not only_parity(),
raid5_run() will abort, when there is no PPL feature or not setting
'start_dirty_degraded' parameter. Therefore, mddev-&gt;pers is NULL.

But, mddev-&gt;raid_disks has been set and it will not be cleared when
raid5_run abort. md_ioctl() can execute cmd 'HOT_REMOVE_DISK' to
remove a disk by mdadm, which will cause NULL pointer dereference
in remove_and_add_spares() finally.

Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu &lt;yuyufen@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c42a0e2675721e1444f56e6132a07b7b1ec169ac ]

We met NULL pointer BUG as follow:

[  151.760358] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000060
[  151.761340] PGD 80000001011eb067 P4D 80000001011eb067 PUD 1011ea067 PMD 0
[  151.762039] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  151.762406] Modules linked in:
[  151.762723] CPU: 2 PID: 3561 Comm: mdadm-test Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #238
[  151.763542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014
[  151.764432] RIP: 0010:remove_and_add_spares.part.56+0x13c/0x3a0
[  151.765061] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001d7fcd8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  151.765590] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88013601d600 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  151.766306] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88013601d600 RDI: ffff880136187000
[  151.767014] RBP: ffff880136187018 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000051
[  151.767728] R10: ffffc90001d7fed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88013601d600
[  151.768447] R13: ffff8801298b1300 R14: ffff880136187000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  151.769160] FS:  00007f2624276700(0000) GS:ffff88013ae80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  151.769971] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  151.770554] CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 0000000111aac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  151.771272] Call Trace:
[  151.771542]  md_ioctl+0x1df2/0x1e10
[  151.771906]  ? __switch_to+0x129/0x440
[  151.772295]  ? __schedule+0x244/0x850
[  151.772672]  blkdev_ioctl+0x4bd/0x970
[  151.773048]  block_ioctl+0x39/0x40
[  151.773402]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x610
[  151.773770]  ? dput.part.23+0x87/0x100
[  151.774151]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[  151.774493]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[  151.774877]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[  151.775258]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

For raid6, when two disk of the array are offline, two spare disks can
be added into the array. Before spare disks recovery completing,
system reboot and mdadm thinks it is ok to restart the degraded
array by md_ioctl(). Since disks in raid6 is not only_parity(),
raid5_run() will abort, when there is no PPL feature or not setting
'start_dirty_degraded' parameter. Therefore, mddev-&gt;pers is NULL.

But, mddev-&gt;raid_disks has been set and it will not be cleared when
raid5_run abort. md_ioctl() can execute cmd 'HOT_REMOVE_DISK' to
remove a disk by mdadm, which will cause NULL pointer dereference
in remove_and_add_spares() finally.

Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu &lt;yuyufen@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
