linux-toradex.git/drivers/md, branch v6.8-rc7

Merge tag 'for-6.8/dm-fix-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm

2024-02-24T17:55:29+00:00

Pull device mapper fix from Mike Snitzer:

 - Fix DM integrity and verity targets to not use excessive stack when
   they recheck in the error path.

* tag 'for-6.8/dm-fix-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
  dm-integrity, dm-verity: reduce stack usage for recheck

dm-integrity, dm-verity: reduce stack usage for recheck

2024-02-24T15:53:57+00:00

The newly added integrity_recheck() function has another larger stack
allocation, just like its caller integrity_metadata(). When it gets
inlined, the combination of the two exceeds the warning limit for 32-bit
architectures and possibly risks an overflow when this is called from
a deep call chain through a file system:

drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:1767:13: error: stack frame size (1048) exceeds limit (1024) in 'integrity_metadata' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than]
 1767 | static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)

Since the caller at this point is done using its checksum buffer,
just reuse the same buffer in the new function to avoid the double
allocation.

[Mikulas: add "noinline" to integrity_recheck and verity_recheck.
These functions are only called on error, so they shouldn't bloat the
stack frame or code size of the caller.]

Fixes: c88f5e553fe3 ("dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure")
Fixes: 9177f3c0dea6 ("dm-verity: recheck the hash after a failure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

Merge tag 'for-6.8/dm-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm

2024-02-23T17:23:54+00:00

Pull device mapper fixes from Mike Snitzer:

 - Stable fixes for 3 DM targets (integrity, verity and crypt) to
   address systemic failure that can occur if user provided pages map to
   the same block.

 - Fix DM crypt to not allow modifying data that being encrypted for
   authenticated encryption.

 - Fix DM crypt and verity targets to align their respective bvec_iter
   struct members to avoid the need for byte level access (due to
   __packed attribute) that is costly on some arches (like RISC).

* tag 'for-6.8/dm-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
  dm-crypt, dm-integrity, dm-verity: bump target version
  dm-verity, dm-crypt: align "struct bvec_iter" correctly
  dm-crypt: recheck the integrity tag after a failure
  dm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption
  dm-verity: recheck the hash after a failure
  dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure

Merge tag 'block-6.8-2024-02-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux

2024-02-22T19:57:30+00:00

Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
 "Mostly just fixlets for md, but also a sed-opal parsing fix"

* tag 'block-6.8-2024-02-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
  block: sed-opal: handle empty atoms when parsing response
  md: Don't suspend the array for interrupted reshape
  md: Don't register sync_thread for reshape directly
  md: Make sure md_do_sync() will set MD_RECOVERY_DONE
  md: Don't ignore read-only array in md_check_recovery()
  md: Don't ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery()
  md: Fix missing release of 'active_io' for flush

dm-crypt, dm-integrity, dm-verity: bump target version

2024-02-20T18:35:47+00:00

Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

dm-verity, dm-crypt: align "struct bvec_iter" correctly

2024-02-20T18:34:32+00:00

"struct bvec_iter" is defined with the __packed attribute, so it is
aligned on a single byte. On X86 (and on other architectures that support
unaligned addresses in hardware), "struct bvec_iter" is accessed using the
8-byte and 4-byte memory instructions, however these instructions are less
efficient if they operate on unaligned addresses.

(on RISC machines that don't have unaligned access in hardware, GCC
generates byte-by-byte accesses that are very inefficient - see [1])

This commit reorders the entries in "struct dm_verity_io" and "struct
convert_context", so that "struct bvec_iter" is aligned on 8 bytes.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcLuWUNRZadJr0tQ@fedora/T/

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

dm-crypt: recheck the integrity tag after a failure

2024-02-20T18:34:32+00:00

If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-crypt reports an authentication error [1]. The error is
reported in a log and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the
array.

This commit fixes dm-crypt, so that if integrity verification fails, the
data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it)
and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content
of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails,
an integrity error is reported.

[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

dm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption

2024-02-20T18:34:31+00:00

It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when
the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by
copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the
clone bio.

This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from
corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at
the same time.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

dm-verity: recheck the hash after a failure

2024-02-20T18:34:31+00:00

If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-verity reports an error [1].

This commit fixes dm-verity, so that if hash verification fails, the data
is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it) and
the hash is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content of the kernel
buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails, an error is
reported.

[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer

dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure

2024-02-20T18:34:31+00:00

If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-integrity reports an error [1]. The error is reported in a log
and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the array.

This commit fixes dm-integrity, so that if integrity verification fails,
the data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify
it) and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the
content of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the
recheck fails, an integrity error is reported.

[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer