<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/drivers/misc/lkdtm, branch v5.19-rc3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'char-misc-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc</title>
<updated>2022-06-03T18:36:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-03T18:36:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f9b5ed8caddfbc94af8307c557ed57a8ec5c65c'/>
<id>6f9b5ed8caddfbc94af8307c557ed57a8ec5c65c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull char / misc / other smaller driver subsystem updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the large set of char, misc, and other driver subsystem
  updates for 5.19-rc1. The merge request for this has been delayed as I
  wanted to get lots of linux-next testing due to some late arrivals of
  changes for the habannalabs driver.

  Highlights of this merge are:

   - habanalabs driver updates for new hardware types and fixes and
     other updates

   - IIO driver tree merge which includes loads of new IIO drivers and
     cleanups and additions

   - PHY driver tree merge with new drivers and small updates to
     existing ones

   - interconnect driver tree merge with fixes and updates

   - soundwire driver tree merge with some small fixes

   - coresight driver tree merge with small fixes and updates

   - mhi bus driver tree merge with lots of updates and new device
     support

   - firmware driver updates

   - fpga driver updates

   - lkdtm driver updates (with a merge conflict, more on that below)

   - extcon driver tree merge with small updates

   - lots of other tiny driver updates and fixes and cleanups, full
     details in the shortlog.

  All of these have been in linux-next for almost 2 weeks with no
  reported problems"

* tag 'char-misc-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (387 commits)
  habanalabs: use separate structure info for each error collect data
  habanalabs: fix missing handle shift during mmap
  habanalabs: remove hdev from hl_ctx_get args
  habanalabs: do MMU prefetch as deferred work
  habanalabs: order memory manager messages
  habanalabs: return -EFAULT on copy_to_user error
  habanalabs: use NULL for eventfd
  habanalabs: update firmware header
  habanalabs: add support for notification via eventfd
  habanalabs: add topic to memory manager buffer
  habanalabs: handle race in driver fini
  habanalabs: add device memory scrub ability through debugfs
  habanalabs: use unified memory manager for CB flow
  habanalabs: unified memory manager new code for CB flow
  habanalabs/gaudi: set arbitration timeout to a high value
  habanalabs: add put by handle method to memory manager
  habanalabs: hide memory manager page shift
  habanalabs: Add separate poll interval value for protocol
  habanalabs: use get_task_pid() to take PID
  habanalabs: add prefetch flag to the MAP operation
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull char / misc / other smaller driver subsystem updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the large set of char, misc, and other driver subsystem
  updates for 5.19-rc1. The merge request for this has been delayed as I
  wanted to get lots of linux-next testing due to some late arrivals of
  changes for the habannalabs driver.

  Highlights of this merge are:

   - habanalabs driver updates for new hardware types and fixes and
     other updates

   - IIO driver tree merge which includes loads of new IIO drivers and
     cleanups and additions

   - PHY driver tree merge with new drivers and small updates to
     existing ones

   - interconnect driver tree merge with fixes and updates

   - soundwire driver tree merge with some small fixes

   - coresight driver tree merge with small fixes and updates

   - mhi bus driver tree merge with lots of updates and new device
     support

   - firmware driver updates

   - fpga driver updates

   - lkdtm driver updates (with a merge conflict, more on that below)

   - extcon driver tree merge with small updates

   - lots of other tiny driver updates and fixes and cleanups, full
     details in the shortlog.

  All of these have been in linux-next for almost 2 weeks with no
  reported problems"

* tag 'char-misc-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (387 commits)
  habanalabs: use separate structure info for each error collect data
  habanalabs: fix missing handle shift during mmap
  habanalabs: remove hdev from hl_ctx_get args
  habanalabs: do MMU prefetch as deferred work
  habanalabs: order memory manager messages
  habanalabs: return -EFAULT on copy_to_user error
  habanalabs: use NULL for eventfd
  habanalabs: update firmware header
  habanalabs: add support for notification via eventfd
  habanalabs: add topic to memory manager buffer
  habanalabs: handle race in driver fini
  habanalabs: add device memory scrub ability through debugfs
  habanalabs: use unified memory manager for CB flow
  habanalabs: unified memory manager new code for CB flow
  habanalabs/gaudi: set arbitration timeout to a high value
  habanalabs: add put by handle method to memory manager
  habanalabs: hide memory manager page shift
  habanalabs: Add separate poll interval value for protocol
  habanalabs: use get_task_pid() to take PID
  habanalabs: add prefetch flag to the MAP operation
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/heap: Hide allocation size from -Warray-bounds</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T21:47:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-17T21:44:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f260fd59e3f387432bda51072fff4494fba10b91'/>
<id>f260fd59e3f387432bda51072fff4494fba10b91</id>
<content type='text'>
With the kmalloc() size annotations, GCC is smart enough to realize that
LKDTM is intentionally writing past the end of the buffer. This is on
purpose, of course, so hide the buffer from the optimizer. Silences:

../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c: In function 'lkdtm_SLAB_LINEAR_OVERFLOW':
../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:59:13: warning: array subscript 256 is outside array bounds of 'void[1020]' [-Warray-bounds]
   59 |         data[1024 / sizeof(u32)] = 0x12345678;
      |         ~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:7:
In function 'kmalloc',
    inlined from 'lkdtm_SLAB_LINEAR_OVERFLOW' at ../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:54:14:
../include/linux/slab.h:581:24: note: at offset 1024 into object of size 1020 allocated by 'kmem_cache_alloc_trace'
  581 |                 return kmem_cache_alloc_trace(
      |                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  582 |                                 kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index],
      |                                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  583 |                                 flags, size);
      |                                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With the kmalloc() size annotations, GCC is smart enough to realize that
LKDTM is intentionally writing past the end of the buffer. This is on
purpose, of course, so hide the buffer from the optimizer. Silences:

../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c: In function 'lkdtm_SLAB_LINEAR_OVERFLOW':
../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:59:13: warning: array subscript 256 is outside array bounds of 'void[1020]' [-Warray-bounds]
   59 |         data[1024 / sizeof(u32)] = 0x12345678;
      |         ~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:7:
In function 'kmalloc',
    inlined from 'lkdtm_SLAB_LINEAR_OVERFLOW' at ../drivers/misc/lkdtm/heap.c:54:14:
../include/linux/slab.h:581:24: note: at offset 1024 into object of size 1020 allocated by 'kmem_cache_alloc_trace'
  581 |                 return kmem_cache_alloc_trace(
      |                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  582 |                                 kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index],
      |                                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  583 |                                 flags, size);
      |                                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/usercopy: Check vmalloc and &gt;0-order folios</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T21:35:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-12T17:19:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fc34eec6869a5882fd339f4e200fad21eb284093'/>
<id>fc34eec6869a5882fd339f4e200fad21eb284093</id>
<content type='text'>
Add coverage for the recently added usercopy checks for vmalloc and
folios, via USERCOPY_VMALLOC and USERCOPY_FOLIO respectively.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add coverage for the recently added usercopy checks for vmalloc and
folios, via USERCOPY_VMALLOC and USERCOPY_FOLIO respectively.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/usercopy: Rename "heap" to "slab"</title>
<updated>2022-05-12T05:46:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-12T05:46:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d2b8060f165105a68748a6d98ed548ca112ce4d3'/>
<id>d2b8060f165105a68748a6d98ed548ca112ce4d3</id>
<content type='text'>
To more clearly distinguish between the various heap types, rename the
slab tests to "slab".

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To more clearly distinguish between the various heap types, rename the
slab tests to "slab".

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/stackleak: fix CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n</title>
<updated>2022-05-08T08:33:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-06T12:11:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8c6a490e404fe82b53bbafe0f0eeef10605617f7'/>
<id>8c6a490e404fe82b53bbafe0f0eeef10605617f7</id>
<content type='text'>
Recent rework broke building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n.
This patch fixes that breakage.

Prior to recent stackleak rework, the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING code could
be built when the kernel was not built with stackleak support, and would
run a test that would almost certainly fail (or pass by sheer cosmic
coincidence), e.g.

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: checking unused part of the thread stack (15560 bytes)...
| lkdtm: FAIL: the erased part is not found (checked 15560 bytes)
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: This is probably expected, since this kernel (5.18.0-rc2 aarch64) was built *without* CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y

The recent rework to the test made it more accurate by using helpers
which are only defined when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y, and so when
building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, we get a build
failure:

| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c: In function 'check_stackleak_irqoff':
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:30:46: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_low_bound' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    30 |         const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
|       |                                              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:31:47: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_high_bound'; did you mean 'stackleak_task_init'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    31 |         const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current);
|       |                                               ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|       |                                               stackleak_task_init
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:33:48: error: 'struct task_struct' has no member named 'lowest_stack'
|    33 |         const unsigned long lowest_sp = current-&gt;lowest_stack;
|       |                                                ^~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:74:23: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_find_top_of_poison' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    74 |         poison_high = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, untracked_high);
|       |                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This patch fixes the issue by not compiling the body of the test when
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, and replacing this with an unconditional
XFAIL message. This means the pr_expected_config() in
check_stackleak_irqoff() is redundant, and so it is removed.

Where an architecture does not support stackleak, the test will log:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)

Where an architectures does support stackleak, but this has not been
compiled in, the test will log:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)

Where stackleak has been compiled in, the test behaves as usual:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     688 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     1232 bytes
|   untracked:   672 bytes
|   poisoned:    14136 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Fixes: f4cfacd92972cc44 ("lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121145.1162908-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Recent rework broke building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n.
This patch fixes that breakage.

Prior to recent stackleak rework, the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING code could
be built when the kernel was not built with stackleak support, and would
run a test that would almost certainly fail (or pass by sheer cosmic
coincidence), e.g.

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: checking unused part of the thread stack (15560 bytes)...
| lkdtm: FAIL: the erased part is not found (checked 15560 bytes)
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: This is probably expected, since this kernel (5.18.0-rc2 aarch64) was built *without* CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y

The recent rework to the test made it more accurate by using helpers
which are only defined when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y, and so when
building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, we get a build
failure:

| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c: In function 'check_stackleak_irqoff':
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:30:46: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_low_bound' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    30 |         const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
|       |                                              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:31:47: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_high_bound'; did you mean 'stackleak_task_init'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    31 |         const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current);
|       |                                               ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|       |                                               stackleak_task_init
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:33:48: error: 'struct task_struct' has no member named 'lowest_stack'
|    33 |         const unsigned long lowest_sp = current-&gt;lowest_stack;
|       |                                                ^~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:74:23: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_find_top_of_poison' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
|    74 |         poison_high = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, untracked_high);
|       |                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This patch fixes the issue by not compiling the body of the test when
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, and replacing this with an unconditional
XFAIL message. This means the pr_expected_config() in
check_stackleak_irqoff() is redundant, and so it is removed.

Where an architecture does not support stackleak, the test will log:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)

Where an architectures does support stackleak, but this has not been
compiled in, the test will log:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)

Where stackleak has been compiled in, the test behaves as usual:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     688 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     1232 bytes
|   untracked:   672 bytes
|   poisoned:    14136 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Fixes: f4cfacd92972cc44 ("lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121145.1162908-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries</title>
<updated>2022-05-08T08:33:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T17:31:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f171d695f3adfd8093272fa5776ef4a2c6b9cf08'/>
<id>f171d695f3adfd8093272fa5776ef4a2c6b9cf08</id>
<content type='text'>
The stackleak code relies upon the current SP and lowest recorded SP
falling within expected task stack boundaries.

Check this at the start of the test.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-12-mark.rutland@arm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The stackleak code relies upon the current SP and lowest recorded SP
falling within expected task stack boundaries.

Check this at the start of the test.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-12-mark.rutland@arm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage</title>
<updated>2022-05-08T08:33:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T17:31:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f03a50938decaa601f02294e4d057fb0048ca9ca'/>
<id>f03a50938decaa601f02294e4d057fb0048ca9ca</id>
<content type='text'>
The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test is instrumentable and runs with IRQs
unmasked, so it's possible for unrelated code to clobber the task stack
and/or manipulate current-&gt;lowest_stack while the test is running,
resulting in spurious failures.

The regular stackleak erasing code is non-instrumentable and runs with
IRQs masked, preventing similar issues.

Make the body of the test non-instrumentable, and run it with IRQs
masked, avoiding such spurious failures.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test is instrumentable and runs with IRQs
unmasked, so it's possible for unrelated code to clobber the task stack
and/or manipulate current-&gt;lowest_stack while the test is running,
resulting in spurious failures.

The regular stackleak erasing code is non-instrumentable and runs with
IRQs masked, preventing similar issues.

Make the body of the test non-instrumentable, and run it with IRQs
masked, avoiding such spurious failures.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management</title>
<updated>2022-05-08T08:33:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T17:31:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=72b61896f2b47fa4b98e86184bc0e6ddbd1a8db1'/>
<id>72b61896f2b47fa4b98e86184bc0e6ddbd1a8db1</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a few problems with the way the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING test
manipulates the stack pointer and boundary values:

* It uses the address of a local variable to determine the current stack
  pointer, rather than using current_stack_pointer directly. As the
  local variable could be placed anywhere within the stack frame, this
  can be an over-estimate of the true stack pointer value.

* Is uses an estimate of the current stack pointer as the upper boundary
  when scanning for poison, even though prior functions could have used
  more stack (and may have updated current-&gt;lowest stack accordingly).

* A pr_info() call is made in the middle of the test. As the printk()
  code is out-of-line and will make use of the stack, this could clobber
  poison and/or adjust current-&gt;lowest_stack. It would be better to log
  the metadata after the body of the test to avoid such problems.

These have been observed to result in spurious test failures on arm64.

In addition to this there are a couple of things which are sub-optimal:

* To avoid the STACK_END_MAGIC value, it conditionally modifies 'left'
  if this contains more than a single element, when it could instead
  calculate the bound unconditionally using stackleak_task_low_bound().

* It open-codes the poison scanning. It would be better if this used the
  same helper code as used by erasing function so that the two cannot
  diverge.

This patch reworks the test to avoid these issues, making use of the
recently introduced helpers to ensure this is aligned with the regular
stackleak code.

As the new code tests stack boundaries before accessing the stack, there
is no need to fail early when the tracked or untracked portions of the
stack extend all the way to the low stack boundary.

As stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is now used to find the top of the
poisoned region of the stack, the subsequent poison checking starts at
this boundary and verifies that stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is
working correctly.

The pr_info() which logged the untracked portion of stack is now moved
to the end of the function, and logs the size of all the portions of the
stack relevant to the test, including the portions at the top and bottom
of the stack which are not erased or scanned, and the current / lowest
recorded stack usage.

Tested on x86_64:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 168 bytes
|   current:     336 bytes
|   lowest:      656 bytes
|   tracked:     656 bytes
|   untracked:   400 bytes
|   poisoned:    15152 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Tested on arm64:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     656 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     1232 bytes
|   untracked:   672 bytes
|   poisoned:    14136 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Tested on arm64 with deliberate breakage to the starting stack value and
poison scanning:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 24 bytes below poison boundary: 0x0
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 32 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083dbc00
...
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1912 bytes below poison boundary: 0x78b4b9999e8cb15
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1920 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083db400
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     688 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     576 bytes
|   untracked:   288 bytes
|   poisoned:    15176 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: Unexpected! This kernel (5.18.0-rc1-00013-g1f7b1f1e29e0-dirty aarch64) was built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-10-mark.rutland@arm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are a few problems with the way the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING test
manipulates the stack pointer and boundary values:

* It uses the address of a local variable to determine the current stack
  pointer, rather than using current_stack_pointer directly. As the
  local variable could be placed anywhere within the stack frame, this
  can be an over-estimate of the true stack pointer value.

* Is uses an estimate of the current stack pointer as the upper boundary
  when scanning for poison, even though prior functions could have used
  more stack (and may have updated current-&gt;lowest stack accordingly).

* A pr_info() call is made in the middle of the test. As the printk()
  code is out-of-line and will make use of the stack, this could clobber
  poison and/or adjust current-&gt;lowest_stack. It would be better to log
  the metadata after the body of the test to avoid such problems.

These have been observed to result in spurious test failures on arm64.

In addition to this there are a couple of things which are sub-optimal:

* To avoid the STACK_END_MAGIC value, it conditionally modifies 'left'
  if this contains more than a single element, when it could instead
  calculate the bound unconditionally using stackleak_task_low_bound().

* It open-codes the poison scanning. It would be better if this used the
  same helper code as used by erasing function so that the two cannot
  diverge.

This patch reworks the test to avoid these issues, making use of the
recently introduced helpers to ensure this is aligned with the regular
stackleak code.

As the new code tests stack boundaries before accessing the stack, there
is no need to fail early when the tracked or untracked portions of the
stack extend all the way to the low stack boundary.

As stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is now used to find the top of the
poisoned region of the stack, the subsequent poison checking starts at
this boundary and verifies that stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is
working correctly.

The pr_info() which logged the untracked portion of stack is now moved
to the end of the function, and logs the size of all the portions of the
stack relevant to the test, including the portions at the top and bottom
of the stack which are not erased or scanned, and the current / lowest
recorded stack usage.

Tested on x86_64:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 168 bytes
|   current:     336 bytes
|   lowest:      656 bytes
|   tracked:     656 bytes
|   untracked:   400 bytes
|   poisoned:    15152 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Tested on arm64:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     656 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     1232 bytes
|   untracked:   672 bytes
|   poisoned:    14136 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased

Tested on arm64 with deliberate breakage to the starting stack value and
poison scanning:

| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 24 bytes below poison boundary: 0x0
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 32 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083dbc00
...
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1912 bytes below poison boundary: 0x78b4b9999e8cb15
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1920 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083db400
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
|   high offset: 336 bytes
|   current:     688 bytes
|   lowest:      1232 bytes
|   tracked:     576 bytes
|   untracked:   288 bytes
|   poisoned:    15176 bytes
|   low offset:  8 bytes
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: Unexpected! This kernel (5.18.0-rc1-00013-g1f7b1f1e29e0-dirty aarch64) was built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-10-mark.rutland@arm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure</title>
<updated>2022-05-08T08:33:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T17:31:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4130a61cebb1843517d68017a967f27fb602b885'/>
<id>4130a61cebb1843517d68017a967f27fb602b885</id>
<content type='text'>
The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test scans for a contiguous block of
poison values between the low stack bound and the stack pointer, and
fails if it does not find a sufficiently large block.

This can happen legitimately if the scan the low stack bound, which
could occur if functions called prior to lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() used
a large amount of stack. If this were to occur, it means that the erased
portion of the stack is smaller than the size used by the scan, but does
not cause a functional problem

In practice this is unlikely to happen, but as this is legitimate and
would not result in a functional problem, the test should not fail in
this case.

Remove the spurious failure case.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test scans for a contiguous block of
poison values between the low stack bound and the stack pointer, and
fails if it does not find a sufficiently large block.

This can happen legitimately if the scan the low stack bound, which
could occur if functions called prior to lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() used
a large amount of stack. If this were to occur, it means that the erased
portion of the stack is smaller than the size used by the scan, but does
not cause a functional problem

In practice this is unlikely to happen, but as this is legitimate and
would not result in a functional problem, the test should not fail in
this case.

Remove the spurious failure case.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lkdtm: cfi: Fix type width for masking PAC bits</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T00:11:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-27T00:09:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2a0338769f27a38b5dd60b6bef5b83003789439b'/>
<id>2a0338769f27a38b5dd60b6bef5b83003789439b</id>
<content type='text'>
The masking for PAC bits wasn't handling 32-bit architectures correctly.
Replace the u64 cast with uintptr_t.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdVz-J-1ZQ08u0bsQihDkcRmEPrtX5B_oRJ+Ns5jrasnUw@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2e53b877dc12 ("lkdtm: Add CFI_BACKWARD to test ROP mitigations")
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The masking for PAC bits wasn't handling 32-bit architectures correctly.
Replace the u64 cast with uintptr_t.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdVz-J-1ZQ08u0bsQihDkcRmEPrtX5B_oRJ+Ns5jrasnUw@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 2e53b877dc12 ("lkdtm: Add CFI_BACKWARD to test ROP mitigations")
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
