linux-toradex.git/drivers/s390/crypto, branch master

s390/zcrypt: Fix missing mem scrub at clear key import in cca_clr2cipherkey()

2026-07-31T11:31:20+00:00

The helper function _ip_cprb_helper() uses internal buffer memory for
building and processing CPRBs. After use this buffer was never
scrubbed which could lead to leaving for example clear key material in
memory which could be exposed via tricky reuse of this same memory.

Extend the _ip_cprb_helper() function with another parameter 'scrub'
used to steer scrubbing of this buffer. So now the caller has the
opportunity to decide if scrubbing is needed or not.

Extend the clear key to secure key token import process in function
cca_clr2cipherkey() to tell the helper function from above to scrub
the cprb buffer when the clear key value is part of the request data.

Add explicit scrubbing on return from function cca_clr2cipherkey() for
the random EXOR buffer and the cprb buffer.

Overall this cleans the internal used buffer in case of clear key
import to prevent sensitive data to get exposed.

Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler 
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Close speculative mem read possibility

2026-07-31T11:31:19+00:00

The domain value is extracted from a given CCA or EP11 ioctl struct
when a CPRB is about to be sent. Thus this is a user controlled value.
Under some special conditions (custom device node used, administrative
load) this value is used as an array index after bounds checking, but
without speculation barrier.

Add the missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative
execution where this domain value is used.

Fixes: cfd68b33094e ("s390/zcrypt: Filter admin CPRBs on custom devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger 
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies 
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs

2026-07-31T11:31:19+00:00

There is a wrong upper limit check for the domain value when an EP11
CPRB is processed for sending to a crypto card. This check is only
active on custom device nodes but may lead to access heap memory
behind perms->adm when an administrative CPRB is sent.
Add correct limit (AP_DOMAINS = 256) checking to fix this.

Fixes: cfd68b33094e ("s390/zcrypt: Filter admin CPRBs on custom devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Finn Callies 
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey

2026-07-31T11:31:19+00:00

Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.

The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.

So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
  sizeof key token struct ... key buf length

Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki 
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests

2026-07-31T11:31:19+00:00

cca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block.

Fixes: fa6999e326fe ("s390/pkey: support CCA and EP11 secure ECC private keys")
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests

2026-07-31T11:31:19+00:00

cca_cipher2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block.

Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys")
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

s390/zcrypt: Remove the empty file

2026-07-08T15:02:47+00:00

The files has no real user because CEX2 and CEX3 device drivers
are removed, also remove these empty files.

Fixes: 5ac8c72462cd ("s390/zcrypt: remove CEX2 and CEX3 device drivers")
Signed-off-by: Rongguang Wei 
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik

Merge tag 's390-7.2-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux

2026-07-04T16:28:45+00:00

Pull s390 fixes from Vasily Gorbik:

 - Fix PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl key type handling by removing the generic
   key-length based type check with its wrong bit-size calculation, and
   leaving protected key verification to the pkey handler

 - Fix monwriter buffer reuse by rejecting records that change the data
   length, preventing out of bounds user copy into the kernel buffer

* tag 's390-7.2-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
  s390/monwriter: Reject buffer reuse with different data length
  pkey: Move keytype check from pkey api to handler

Replace by more specific (c files)

2026-07-03T05:38:17+00:00

Replace the #include of  by the more specific
 where applicable. For most cases the include
can be dropped completely, only a few drivers need one or two headers
added.

Acked-by: Danilo Krummrich 
Acked-by: Takashi Sakamoto 
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1a3f2007c5c5dcf555c09a4035ce3ae8ef1b6c49.1782808461.git.u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König (The Capable Hub)

pkey: Move keytype check from pkey api to handler

2026-07-01T15:10:53+00:00

The PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl takes data from user-space and verifies the
contained protected key. While checking the integrity of the ioctl
request structure is the responsibility of the generic pkey_api code,
the verification of the contained protected key is the responsibility
of the pkey handler.

The keytype verification (based on the calculated bitsize of the key)
is part of the protected key verification and therefore the
responsibility of the pkey handler (which already verifies
it). Therefore the keytype verification is removed from the generic
pkey_api code.

As the calculation of the key bitsize is currently wrong, the removal
of the keytype check in pkey_api also removes this wrong
calculation. For this reason, the commit is flagged with the Fixes:
tag.

Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.12+
Fixes: 8fcc231ce3be ("s390/pkey: Introduce pkey base with handler registry and handler modules")
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki 
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger 
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler 
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev 
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik