<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/drivers/xen, branch v3.2.38</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntdev: don't leak memory from IOCTL_GNTDEV_MAP_GRANT_REF</title>
<updated>2012-11-16T16:47:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Vrabel</name>
<email>david.vrabel@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-24T11:39:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=de1e9234c8d6aa740d2c8b6df0bca372663481d9'/>
<id>de1e9234c8d6aa740d2c8b6df0bca372663481d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a67baeb77375199bbd842fa308cb565164dd1f19 upstream.

map-&gt;kmap_ops allocated in gntdev_alloc_map() wasn't freed by
gntdev_put_map().

Add a gntdev_free_map() helper function to free everything allocated
by gntdev_alloc_map().

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a67baeb77375199bbd842fa308cb565164dd1f19 upstream.

map-&gt;kmap_ops allocated in gntdev_alloc_map() wasn't freed by
gntdev_put_map().

Add a gntdev_free_map() helper function to free everything allocated
by gntdev_alloc_map().

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Use correct masking in xen_swiotlb_alloc_coherent.</title>
<updated>2012-09-19T14:04:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ronny Hegewald</name>
<email>ronny.hegewald@online.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-31T09:57:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7c013154e1cb6ffd5f2a0b6b17b4b70df9e16ebd'/>
<id>7c013154e1cb6ffd5f2a0b6b17b4b70df9e16ebd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b5031ed1be0aa419250557123633453753181643 upstream.

When running 32-bit pvops-dom0 and a driver tries to allocate a coherent
DMA-memory the xen swiotlb-implementation returned memory beyond 4GB.

The underlaying reason is that if the supplied driver passes in a
DMA_BIT_MASK(64) ( hwdev-&gt;coherent_dma_mask is set to 0xffffffffffffffff)
our dma_mask will be u64 set to 0xffffffffffffffff even if we set it to
DMA_BIT_MASK(32) previously. Meaning we do not reset the upper bits.
By using the dma_alloc_coherent_mask function - it does the proper casting
and we get 0xfffffffff.

This caused not working sound on a system with 4 GB and a 64-bit
compatible sound-card with sets the DMA-mask to 64bit.

On bare-metal and the forward-ported xen-dom0 patches from OpenSuse a coherent
DMA-memory is always allocated inside the 32-bit address-range by calling
dma_alloc_coherent_mask.

This patch adds the same functionality to xen swiotlb and is a rebase of the
original patch from Ronny Hegewald which never got upstream b/c the
underlaying reason was not understood until now.

The original email with the original patch is in:
http://old-list-archives.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-02/msg00038.html
the original thread from where the discussion started is in:
http://old-list-archives.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-01/msg00928.html

Signed-off-by: Ronny Hegewald &lt;ronny.hegewald@online.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Panella &lt;stefano.panella@citrix.com&gt;
Acked-By: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b5031ed1be0aa419250557123633453753181643 upstream.

When running 32-bit pvops-dom0 and a driver tries to allocate a coherent
DMA-memory the xen swiotlb-implementation returned memory beyond 4GB.

The underlaying reason is that if the supplied driver passes in a
DMA_BIT_MASK(64) ( hwdev-&gt;coherent_dma_mask is set to 0xffffffffffffffff)
our dma_mask will be u64 set to 0xffffffffffffffff even if we set it to
DMA_BIT_MASK(32) previously. Meaning we do not reset the upper bits.
By using the dma_alloc_coherent_mask function - it does the proper casting
and we get 0xfffffffff.

This caused not working sound on a system with 4 GB and a 64-bit
compatible sound-card with sets the DMA-mask to 64bit.

On bare-metal and the forward-ported xen-dom0 patches from OpenSuse a coherent
DMA-memory is always allocated inside the 32-bit address-range by calling
dma_alloc_coherent_mask.

This patch adds the same functionality to xen swiotlb and is a rebase of the
original patch from Ronny Hegewald which never got upstream b/c the
underlaying reason was not understood until now.

The original email with the original patch is in:
http://old-list-archives.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-02/msg00038.html
the original thread from where the discussion started is in:
http://old-list-archives.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2010-01/msg00928.html

Signed-off-by: Ronny Hegewald &lt;ronny.hegewald@online.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Panella &lt;stefano.panella@citrix.com&gt;
Acked-By: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: do not map the same GSI twice in PVHVM guests.</title>
<updated>2012-05-30T23:44:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-21T15:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=482953eeea949295981474e179d37fd61258d3ca'/>
<id>482953eeea949295981474e179d37fd61258d3ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 68c2c39a76b094e9b2773e5846424ea674bf2c46 upstream.

PV on HVM guests map GSIs into event channels. At restore time the
event channels are resumed by restore_pirqs.

Device drivers might try to register the same GSI again through ACPI at
restore time, but the GSI has already been mapped and bound by
restore_pirqs. This patch detects these situations and avoids
 mapping the same GSI multiple times.

Without this patch we get:
(XEN) irq.c:2235: dom4: pirq 23 or emuirq 28 already mapped
and waste a pirq.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 68c2c39a76b094e9b2773e5846424ea674bf2c46 upstream.

PV on HVM guests map GSIs into event channels. At restore time the
event channels are resumed by restore_pirqs.

Device drivers might try to register the same GSI again through ACPI at
restore time, but the GSI has already been mapped and bound by
restore_pirqs. This patch detects these situations and avoids
 mapping the same GSI multiple times.

Without this patch we get:
(XEN) irq.c:2235: dom4: pirq 23 or emuirq 28 already mapped
and waste a pirq.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/xenbus: Add quirk to deal with misconfigured backends.</title>
<updated>2012-05-11T12:13:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-18T02:21:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=24815a3dbb017e5e738132882c89d3acddcf735e'/>
<id>24815a3dbb017e5e738132882c89d3acddcf735e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3066616ce23aad5719c23a0f21f32676402cb44b upstream.

A rather annoying and common case is when booting a PVonHVM guest
and exposing the PV KBD and PV VFB - as broken toolstacks don't
always initialize the backends correctly.

Normally The HVM guest is using the VGA driver and the emulated
keyboard for this (though upstream version of QEMU implements
PV KBD, but still uses a VGA driver). We provide a very basic
two-stage wait mechanism - where we wait for 30 seconds for all
devices, and then for 270 for all them except the two mentioned.

That allows us to wait for the essential devices, like network
or disk for the full 6 minutes.

To trigger this, put this in your guest config:

vfb = [ 'vnc=1, vnclisten=0.0.0.0 ,vncunused=1']

instead of this:
vnc=1
vnclisten="0.0.0.0"

Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
[v3: Split delay in non-essential (30 seconds) and essential
 devices per Ian and Stefano suggestion]
[v4: Added comments per Stefano suggestion]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3066616ce23aad5719c23a0f21f32676402cb44b upstream.

A rather annoying and common case is when booting a PVonHVM guest
and exposing the PV KBD and PV VFB - as broken toolstacks don't
always initialize the backends correctly.

Normally The HVM guest is using the VGA driver and the emulated
keyboard for this (though upstream version of QEMU implements
PV KBD, but still uses a VGA driver). We provide a very basic
two-stage wait mechanism - where we wait for 30 seconds for all
devices, and then for 270 for all them except the two mentioned.

That allows us to wait for the essential devices, like network
or disk for the full 6 minutes.

To trigger this, put this in your guest config:

vfb = [ 'vnc=1, vnclisten=0.0.0.0 ,vncunused=1']

instead of this:
vnc=1
vnclisten="0.0.0.0"

Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
[v3: Split delay in non-essential (30 seconds) and essential
 devices per Ian and Stefano suggestion]
[v4: Added comments per Stefano suggestion]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntdev: do not set VM_PFNMAP</title>
<updated>2012-05-11T12:13:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-03T17:05:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=25a873a89ffb910c5a28fe792b008e6a93d99242'/>
<id>25a873a89ffb910c5a28fe792b008e6a93d99242</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e8e937be971d706061dc56220ff3605ab77622a7 upstream.

Since we are using the m2p_override we do have struct pages
corresponding to the user vma mmap'ed by gntdev.

Removing the VM_PFNMAP flag makes get_user_pages work on that vma.
An example test case would be using a Xen userspace block backend
(QDISK) on a file on NFS using O_DIRECT.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e8e937be971d706061dc56220ff3605ab77622a7 upstream.

Since we are using the m2p_override we do have struct pages
corresponding to the user vma mmap'ed by gntdev.

Removing the VM_PFNMAP flag makes get_user_pages work on that vma.
An example test case would be using a Xen userspace block backend
(QDISK) on a file on NFS using O_DIRECT.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/xenbus: Reject replies with payload &gt; XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX.</title>
<updated>2012-01-26T00:13:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Campbell</name>
<email>Ian.Campbell@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-04T09:34:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ee1f334f2f580ff09f7c1f83be46aa2bbb4d5f6a'/>
<id>ee1f334f2f580ff09f7c1f83be46aa2bbb4d5f6a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9e7860cee18241633eddb36a4c34c7b61d8cecbc upstream.

Haogang Chen found out that:

 There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result
 in cross-domain attack.

 	body = kmalloc(msg-&gt;hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);

 When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg-&gt;hdr.len, the subsequent
 call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer.

 The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon
 so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The
 xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system.

 However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should
 have it.

And Ian when read the API docs found that:
        The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096
        (XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions.  If a client exceeds the
        limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by
        xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of
        view.  Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect)
        should avoid this.

so this patch checks against that instead.

This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell &lt;ian.campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Haogang Chen &lt;haogangchen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9e7860cee18241633eddb36a4c34c7b61d8cecbc upstream.

Haogang Chen found out that:

 There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result
 in cross-domain attack.

 	body = kmalloc(msg-&gt;hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);

 When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg-&gt;hdr.len, the subsequent
 call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer.

 The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon
 so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The
 xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system.

 However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should
 have it.

And Ian when read the API docs found that:
        The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096
        (XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions.  If a client exceeds the
        limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by
        xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of
        view.  Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect)
        should avoid this.

so this patch checks against that instead.

This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell &lt;ian.campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Haogang Chen &lt;haogangchen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add xs_reset_watches to shutdown watches from old kernel"</title>
<updated>2011-12-19T14:30:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-19T14:30:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=12275dd4b747f5d87fa36229774d76bca8e63068'/>
<id>12275dd4b747f5d87fa36229774d76bca8e63068</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit ddacf5ef684a655abe2bb50c4b2a5b72ae0d5e05.
As when booting the kernel under Amazon EC2 as an HVM guest it ends up
hanging during startup. Reverting this we loose the fix for kexec
booting to the crash kernels.

Fixes Canonical BZ #901305 (http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/901305)

Tested-by: Alessandro Salvatori &lt;sandr8@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by:  Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ian Campbell &lt;Ian.Campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit ddacf5ef684a655abe2bb50c4b2a5b72ae0d5e05.
As when booting the kernel under Amazon EC2 as an HVM guest it ends up
hanging during startup. Reverting this we loose the fix for kexec
booting to the crash kernels.

Fixes Canonical BZ #901305 (http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/901305)

Tested-by: Alessandro Salvatori &lt;sandr8@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by:  Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ian Campbell &lt;Ian.Campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/swiotlb: Use page alignment for early buffer allocation.</title>
<updated>2011-12-15T16:28:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-15T16:28:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=63a741757d15320a25ebf5778f8651cce2ed0611'/>
<id>63a741757d15320a25ebf5778f8651cce2ed0611</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes an odd bug found on a Dell PowerEdge 1850/0RC130
(BIOS A05 01/09/2006) where all of the modules doing pci_set_dma_mask
would fail with:

ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: enabling device (0005 -&gt; 0007)
ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: can't derive routing for PCI INT A
ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: BMDMA: failed to set dma mask, falling back to PIO

The issue was the Xen-SWIOTLB was allocated such as that the end of
buffer was stradling a page (and also above 4GB). The fix was
spotted by Kalev Leonid  which was to piggyback on git commit
e79f86b2ef9c0a8c47225217c1018b7d3d90101c "swiotlb: Use page alignment
for early buffer allocation" which:

	We could call free_bootmem_late() if swiotlb is not used, and
	it will shrink to page alignment.

	So alloc them with page alignment at first, to avoid lose two pages

And doing that fixes the outstanding issue.

CC: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: "Kalev, Leonid" &lt;Leonid.Kalev@ca.com&gt;
Reported-and-Tested-by: "Taylor, Neal E" &lt;Neal.Taylor@ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This fixes an odd bug found on a Dell PowerEdge 1850/0RC130
(BIOS A05 01/09/2006) where all of the modules doing pci_set_dma_mask
would fail with:

ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: enabling device (0005 -&gt; 0007)
ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: can't derive routing for PCI INT A
ata_piix 0000:00:1f.1: BMDMA: failed to set dma mask, falling back to PIO

The issue was the Xen-SWIOTLB was allocated such as that the end of
buffer was stradling a page (and also above 4GB). The fix was
spotted by Kalev Leonid  which was to piggyback on git commit
e79f86b2ef9c0a8c47225217c1018b7d3d90101c "swiotlb: Use page alignment
for early buffer allocation" which:

	We could call free_bootmem_late() if swiotlb is not used, and
	it will shrink to page alignment.

	So alloc them with page alignment at first, to avoid lose two pages

And doing that fixes the outstanding issue.

CC: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: "Kalev, Leonid" &lt;Leonid.Kalev@ca.com&gt;
Reported-and-Tested-by: "Taylor, Neal E" &lt;Neal.Taylor@ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-gntalloc: signedness bug in add_grefs()</title>
<updated>2011-11-16T17:13:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-04T18:24:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=99cb2ddcc617f43917e94a4147aa3ccdb2bcd77e'/>
<id>99cb2ddcc617f43917e94a4147aa3ccdb2bcd77e</id>
<content type='text'>
gref-&gt;gref_id is unsigned so the error handling didn't work.
gnttab_grant_foreign_access() returns an int type, so we can add a
cast here, and it doesn't cause any problems.
gnttab_grant_foreign_access() can return a variety of errors
including -ENOSPC, -ENOSYS and -ENOMEM.

CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
gref-&gt;gref_id is unsigned so the error handling didn't work.
gnttab_grant_foreign_access() returns an int type, so we can add a
cast here, and it doesn't cause any problems.
gnttab_grant_foreign_access() can return a variety of errors
including -ENOSPC, -ENOSYS and -ENOMEM.

CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-gntalloc: integer overflow in gntalloc_ioctl_alloc()</title>
<updated>2011-11-16T17:13:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-04T18:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=21643e69a4c06f7ef155fbc70e3fba13fba4a756'/>
<id>21643e69a4c06f7ef155fbc70e3fba13fba4a756</id>
<content type='text'>
On 32 bit systems a high value of op.count could lead to an integer
overflow in the kzalloc() and gref_ids would be smaller than
expected.  If the you triggered another integer overflow in
"if (gref_size + op.count &gt; limit)" then you'd probably get memory
corruption inside add_grefs().

CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On 32 bit systems a high value of op.count could lead to an integer
overflow in the kzalloc() and gref_ids would be smaller than
expected.  If the you triggered another integer overflow in
"if (gref_size + op.count &gt; limit)" then you'd probably get memory
corruption inside add_grefs().

CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
